Art 790

the words of the will are to be taken

in their ordinary and grammatical
sense [..]

Buhay De Roma v CA

Ruling:

Rules of Interpretation

1. The SC agrees with the respondent court

that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties.

Doctrine: The intention to exempt from

collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such
a clear indication of that intention, we apply
not the exception but the rule, which is
categorical enough.
Facts:
1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally
adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma
2. Candelaria died intestate administration
proceedings were instituted in the
3. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the
fruits thereof, had not been included.
4. The private respondent rigorously argues
that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the
Civil Code.
5. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062,
claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such
collation and the donation was not
officious.
6. The trial court ruled in favor of the
petitioner which held that the decedent,
when she made the donation in favor of
Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.
Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it
could be accommodated in, and in fact was
imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's
estate.

As the said court correctly observed, the

phrase
"sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition
against collation.
The fact that a donation is irrevocable does
not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article
1061.
2.Anything less than such express
prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062.
The suggestion that there was an implied
prohibition because the properties donated
were imputable to the free portion of the
decedent's estate merits little consideration.
Imputation is not the question here, nor is
it claimed that the disputed donation is
officious
The sole issue is whether or not there was
an express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.
3.The intention to exempt from collation
should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.

7. On appeal, the order of the trial court

was reversed, the respondent courtholding
that the deed of donation contained no
express prohibition to collate as an
exception to Article 1062

Decision: The
AFFIRMED

appealed

decision

is

Issue: Was there an express prohibition

against collation? NO

FACTS: Agripina Valdez died and was

survived by 7 com- pulsory heirs (6
legitimate children and 1 legitimate

DIZON-RIVERA v. DIZON 33 SCRA 554

(1970)

grandchild as heir of a pre-deceased

legitimate child). She left a will.
One of the compulsory heirs Marina Dizon
was appointed executrix. The real and
personal properties of the testatrix had a
total ap- praised value of P1,811,695.00
(formerly P1,801,960.00). The legi- time of
each of the 7 compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11.
In her will, Agripina commanded that her
property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real
properties to her children and grandchildren.
Marina and Tomas were given more than
their re- spective legitimes, while the rest
received less than their respec- tive
legitimes.
Marina submitted a project of partition,
adjudicating the properties given them in the
will, plus cash and/or properties to complete
the respective legitimes to P129,254.96 of
those given less while Tomas and Marina
must pay in cash or property an amount
necessary to complete the prejudiced
legitimes.
The oppositors, who were the other 6
compulsory
heirs
(including
Tomas),
submitted their counter-project of partition
where they proposed the reduction of all
testamentary dispositions proportionately to
the value of 12 of the entire estate
corresponding to the free portion, and the
other half to be divided among the 7
compulsory heirs as constituting their
legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
testamentary
dispositions in the will are in the nature of
devises imputable to the free portion of the
estate and therefore subject to reduction?
HELD: Articles 788 and 791 of the New Civil
Code are applicable in this case. The
testamentary disposition made by the
testatrix was in the nature of a partition of
her estate by will. The testatrix specified
each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her
seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the

same.
This was a valid partition of her estate as
contemplated in Article 1080 of the New
Civil Code, providing that should a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs. This
right of a testator to partition his estate is
subject only to the right of compulsory heirs
to their legitime.
The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dis- positions in favor of
compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken
only from the free portion of the estate, for
the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that one who
has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs.
Determination of Testators Intent: If a will is
subject to different interpretations, the
cardinal principle of determining the
testators intent must dictate which of these
interpretations will be followed. The law
does not prohibit a testator from favoring
people in making the provisions of his will
provided he respects the legitime of the
compulsory heirs. Thus, when the will clearly
indicates
favored
heirs,
then
the
interpretation must be in such a way that
such heirs remain favored than the others.
the testatrix expressly provided that "it is my
wish and I command that my property be
divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir
among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same.
Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906
of the Civil Co
VDA DE VILLAFLOR V. JUICO
FACTS:
On October 9, 1908 Don Nicolas Villaflor, a

wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,

executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno,
one half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his
brother Don Fausto Villaflor
Don Nicolas died in 1922, without begetting
any child with his wife Doa Fausta. The
latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted
special proceedings for its settlement of her
husbands estate and that proceeding, she
was appointed judicial administratrix. She
submitted a project of partition, and the
probate court approved the project of
partition and declared the proceedings
closed.
She also received
the use and
possession of all
the real and
personal
properties
mentioned and
referred to in
Clause 7th of the
will.

Now, Leonor Villaflor,

grandniece of Nicolas,
instituted the present
action against the
administrator of the estate
of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno.
She contends that upon
the widow's death,she
became vested with the
ownership of the real and
personal properties
bequeathed by the late
Nicolas Villaflor to clause
7 of his will, pursuant to its
eight (8th) clause.

As the project of partition, Exhibit E now

shows Doa Fausta received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of
real and personal properties mentioned and
referred to in clause with the will. The order
approving the project partition (Exhibit C),
however, expressly provided that approval
thereof was sin perjuico de los disperesto
in al clausala 8.0 del testamento de Nicolas
Villaflor.
In 1956, Doa Fausta died without having
begotten any child with the deceased Don
Nicolas. The estate is being settled in a
special proceeding with its defendant Delfin
N. Juico, as the duly appointed and qualified
judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. De
Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas in
his will as his sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
(niece)
ISSUE: WON defendants position, adopted
by the trial court, is that the title to the
properties aforesaid becomes absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on
account of the fact that she never remarried,
will be sustained.
HELD: No, the testament of Don Nicolas
clearly and unmistakably provided that his
widow should have the possession and use
(usufruct) of the legacies while alive and did
not remarry. It necessary follows that by the

th
express provisions of the 8 clause of his
will, the legacies should pass to the
testators sobrina nieta, appellant, upon the
widows death, even if the widow never
remarried in her life lifetime. Consequently,
the widow had no right to retain or dispose
of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is
accountable to the reversionary legates for
their retain, unless they had been lost due to
fortuitous event, or for their value should
rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.
BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA
454 (1975)
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died in 1973.
She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
children, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina
B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a
petition.for the probate of his mothers
notarial will. Paragraph V of the will stated
that after her husbands death, her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
should be divided and distributed in the
manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands
as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husbands 12
share of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio
opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the
conjugal estate.
The lower court declared the will void and converted into intestate proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in

passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and in declaring the will void
HELD: Yes. The probate court erred in
holding that he will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding despite an earlier Order
giving effect to the surviving husbands
conformity to the will and to his renunciation
of his hereditary rights which presumably
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in
a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of
the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a
co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso

But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

included his one-half share of the conjugal

estate.
BELLIS v. BELLIS 20 SCRA 358 (1967)
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, an American citizen
and resident of San Antonio, Texas
executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he disposed of his estate to his relatives
including his first wife, his 3 illegitimate
children, and his surviving children by his
first and second marriage.
Upon the death of Amos G. Bellis, his will
was admitted to probate in Manila. The
executor of the will complied with the
provisions of the will and filed with the court
a Project of Partition.
Herein plaintiffs,
children of Amos,
Partition on the
deprived of their
children.

2 of the 3 illegitimate
opposed said Project of
ground that they were
legitimes as illegitimate

The lower court dismissed the opposition

filed by plaintiffs and admitted the Project of
Partition relying on Article 16 of the Civil
Code which states that the national law of
the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law shall be applied. Texas law did not
provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: Which law should apply Texas law
or Philippine law?
HELD: Texas law should apply. Article 16,
par.2 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code
state that the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions,
shall govern with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will; and (4) the
capacity to succeed. The parties admit that
the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs
or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO

LAXA
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster
when she made her last will and testament
entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala (Will) in the Pampango dialect
on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in
the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin
(Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia
twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She
thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the
]
said document on page s and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra.
Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due
execution by affixing their signatures below its
attestation clause and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of
Paciencia and of one another and of Judge
Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or
sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties
to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and
his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna
Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa,
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with
Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is
Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her
own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in
Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised
and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days
after the execution of the Will or on September
19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of
America (USA). There, she resided with
Lorenzo and his family until her death on
January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the
custody of Judge Limpin. More than four years
after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000,
]
Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,

Pampanga for the probate of the Will of

Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favour.
Petitioners
filed
an
Amended
Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the
Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law;
that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a
Will at the time of its execution; that she was
forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of
the Will had been procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or
by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged;
that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that
Paciencia did not intend the document to be her
Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation reiterating
their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for
the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
ISSUE:
Whether Paciencia was not of sound
mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.
RULING:
The state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to
being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799
of the New Civil Code states: To be of
sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered
by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be
sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects
of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. Bare allegations of duress
or influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper influence and pressure, fraud and
trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the
probate of a will.
Here, there was no showing that
Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one

month or less before the making of the

Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that
Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby
warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed
to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, the Court is convinced that
Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary
act.
SUROZA v. HONRADO 110 SCRA 381
(1981)
FACTS: Marcelina Suroza supposedly
executed a notarial will in July 1973 when
she was 73 years old. The will, which was in
English, was thumbmarked by Marcelina,
who was illiterate.
Upon her death, the will which bequeathed
all her estate to a supposed granddaughter
was presented for probate. Opposition to the
probate was made by Nenita Suroza, the
wife of the alleged adopted son of Marcelina
on the ground of preterition of said son,
Agapito, and on the ground that the will was
void because Marcelina did not appear
before a notary public and because it is
written in English which is not known to
Marcelina. The presiding judge denied the
opposition of Nenita Suroza and admitted
the will to probate.
ISSUE: Was there sufficient evidence on
record to show that the will on its face was
void?
HELD: Upon perusing the will and noting
that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, respondent Judge could have
readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was
stated that English was a language
understood and known to the testatrix. But
in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix and
translated into Filipino language. That could
only mean that the will was written in a
language not known to the illiterate testatrix

and, therefore, it is void because of the

mandatory provision of Article 804 of the
Civil Code that every will must be executed
in a language or dialect known to the
testator. Thus, a will written in English,
which was not known to the Igorot testator,
is void (Acop v. Piraso, 52 Phil.660).