Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994

Cruz, J.
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated
and
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino th
ere during the Christmas season. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the
objection and so did the women's groups and the youth.
Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city
legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing
the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The
contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the
Sangguniang Panlungso of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of
a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondents
invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 are valid
Held:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is known
as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16
as follows: Sec. 16.

General Welfare
. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local go
vernment units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development
of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance.
[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG

PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.
CALIXTOCATAQUIZ
vs
.HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO
FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento
was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of
lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This
was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19,
1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial,
respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento
asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch
93, for the following reliefs: 1) a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995; 2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor
Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for
the operation of a lotto outlet; and 3)an order annulling or
declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On
February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon
Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in enjoining
petitioners Lina and Calixto from implementing Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna prohibiting the operation ofthe lotto in the province
of Laguna.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of

respondent judge enjoining petitioners form enforcing said
ordinance. The questioned ordinance merely stated the
"objection" of the council to all forms of gambling including
lotto. It is a mere policy statement and could not serve as a
valid ground to prohibit the operation of lotto, which is
a legitimate business activity duly authorized by the
national government through an Act of Congress. In
our system of government, the power of the local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress and these should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress as the delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.

TAN vs. PEREA, G.R. No. 149743, 2/18/2005

FACTS: How many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a
city or municipality?Comes into play, the traditional power
of the national government to enact police power measures,
on one hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now
enshrined in the Constitution on the other. PD449
(CockfightingLaw of 1974) provided that only
one cockpit shall be allowed in each city/municipality except
that in cities or municipalities with a population of over100T,
two cockpits may be established, maintained or operated.
In 1993, the Municipal Council of Daanbantaya, Cebu
enacted municipal ordinances which eventually allowed the
operation of not more than three cockpits in the
municipality. In 1995, Petitioner(Leonardo Tan) applied for a
license to operate a cockpit. Respondent (Socorro Perena),
who was an existing licensee, filed a complaint with the RTC

to enjoin. Petitioner from operating his cockpit citing that

the challenged ordinance allowing the operation of not more
than three cockpits violated PD449. The trial court dismissed
the complaint and upheld Petitioners franchise reasoning
that, while the ordinance may be in conflict with PD449,
any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor
of the grant of more power to LGUs under the LGCs
principle of devolution. Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision. Hence,Petitioners appeal to the SC.
RULING: Petition DENIED. For Petitioner, Section 447(a)(3)
(v) of the LGC sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the
Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power and
authority to issue franchises and regulate
the operation and establishment of cockpits in their
respective municipalities, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding.
However, while the Local Government Code expressly
repealed several laws, PD449 was not among them. Section
534(f) of the LGC declares that all general and special laws
or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
acts that are intended to be repealed. While the sanggunian
retainsthe power to authorize and license the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is
limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per
city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have
a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case
two cockpits may be established. Cockfighting Law arises
from a valid exercise of police power by the national
government. Of course, local
governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of
the Local Government Code.
We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national
government to implement police power measures that affect
the subjects of municipal government, especially if the

subject of regulation is a condition of universal character

irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one
such condition. It is a
traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant
gambling involved or maybe even the fact that it essentially
consists of two birds killing each other for public
amusement. Laws have been enacted restricting the days
when cockfights could be held, and legislation has even
been emphatic that cockfights could not beheld
on holidays celebrating national honor such as
Independence Day and Rizal Day. The obvious thrust of our
laws designating when cockfights could be held is to limit
cockfighting and imposing the one-cockpit-per-municipality
rule is in line with that aim. Cockfighting is a valid matter of
police power regulation, as it is a form of gambling
essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national
productivity and self-reliance. Limitation on the number of
cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary
means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling
cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more
cockfights. A municipal ordinance must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. Ordinance
No. 7unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law in
allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and
BATANGASCITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29,
2004]
FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in

Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that

petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993,
petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote
petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner then
filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition
for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order
No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation
in the Philippines.
ISSUE : may a local government unit (LGU) regulate
the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its
territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No. x x x The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in
light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises
regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of
other bodies. x x x Like any other enterprise, CATV operation
maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public
properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical
realities of constructing CATV system the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions
allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.x x x
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the
general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.

210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the

well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution
No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and
(2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV
industry. LGUs must recognize that technical matters
concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC
[G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002.]
HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive
Judge, Branch 28), ULRIC R. CAETE(Presiding Judge,
Branch 25), AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge,
Branch 56), HON. MTCJUDGES TEMISTOCLES M.
BOHOLST (Presiding Judge, Branch 1), VICENTE C.
FANILAG (JudgeDesignate, Branch 2), and WILFREDO
A. DAGATAN (Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all
ofMandaue City
vs
.COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
Petitioners RTC Judges Dadole et al and MTC
judges Temistocles et al stationed in Mandaue City received
a monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly
appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was
increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) then issued
Local Budget Circular No. 55 which provides that the
additional monthly allowances to be given by a local
government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the said DBM
directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount
authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office
of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a
motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the
Commission on Audit Regional Office. In turn, the COA

Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office

with recommendation that the same should be denied.
Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners
filed the instant petition. They argued, among others, that
LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of
Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local
government unit can disburse as additional allowances to
judges stationed therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 is void for infringing the local
autonomy of Mandaue City
HELD: Yes. We recognize that, although our Constitution
guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of
control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that: "Sec. 4. The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. . . . " Under Section 458, of RA 7160, the law
that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows
the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the
finances of the city government allow." The said provision
does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, this Court
need not belabor the point that the finances of a city
government may allow the grant of additional allowances
higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
government exceed its annual expenditures. Setting a
uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section
458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its
power of supervision over local government units
by imposing g a prohibition that did not correspond with the
law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory
nature of the circular had no legal basis. The President can
only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local

government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted

contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the
President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in
local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit
acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity because it violates the principle of
local autonomy and separation of powers ofthe executive
and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations

JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION DALISAY,
PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.
G.R. No. 143596
December 11, 2003
Ponente: Justice Corona
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying the grant of
P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes by
the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes was formerly assigned to
the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court. He received:
a. Salary and representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) from the SC

b. A monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of of

Naujan starting 1984
2. On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan, through
Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial
Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any
budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by
the municipality to petitioner judge.
a. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges
monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 starting May
1993.
b. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again
provided for petitioner judges P1,600 monthly allowance
in its annual budget which was again approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial
Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.
3. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them:
a. To stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or
RATA
b. To require the immediate refund of the amounts previously
paid to the judge.
4. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant
RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was
already receiving from the Supreme Court based on Section
36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993,
stating that: No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from
more than one source.
5. Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria
S. Ong.
a. COA Reg Dir Ong upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor
Dalisay

b. She added that Resolution No. 101 failed to comply with

Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 outlining the
conditions for the grant of allowances to judges and other
national officials or employees by the local government
units, particularly That similar allowances/additional
compensation are not granted by the national government
to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
6. Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the
Regional Director to the Commission on Audit.
a. Disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly
allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he received his
P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of Naujan
only for the period May 1993 to January 1994.
7. On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming
the resolution of Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong. It ruled
that:
a. The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (that the finances of
the municipality allow the grant thereof) and Section 36
of the General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] (No
one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source) have been harmonized by the Local Budget
Circular No. 53 dated 01 September 1993 (provided that
similar allowance/additional compensation are not
granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local government
unit), issued by the Department of Budget and
Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25 and
Section 327 of the Local Government Code;
b. The subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro is null
and void;
c. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national
government official is prohibited to receive additional RATA
from the local government fund.

8. Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration but it was

denied by the COA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner judge was entitled to receive
the additional allowances granted to him by the Municipality of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner judge.
a. An administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify
or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an administrative
circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it.
In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere
administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law
like RA 7160.
b. Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended. The legislature is
assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and cannot
be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.
There was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a
repeal of Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 could be
implied.
c. The presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger
when one law is special and the other is general. (Generalia
specialibus non derogant or a general law does not nullify a
specific or special law)
The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a
law of special character, considers and makes special
provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by
the special law.

d. The General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 7645), being a

general law, could not have, by mere implication, repealed
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160).
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special
law which exclusively deals with local government units
(LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in
consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy
of local autonomy.
RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) was a general law which
outlined the share in the national fund of all branches of
the national government.
Therefore, RA 7645 being a general law, could not
have, by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather,
RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645
in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary
conclusion.
e. In construing NCC No. 67, force and effect should not be
narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but
to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one
rational view.
Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in
parts or sections, one part is as important as the
others, the statute should be construed and given
effect as a whole. A provision or section which is
unclear by itself may be clarified by reading and
construing it in relation to the whole statute.
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole, what it seeks to
prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of more than one national
agency.

NCC No. 67 applies only to the national funds

administered by the DBM, not the local funds of the

LGUs to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple

allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by
national agencies. By no stretch of the imagination can
NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges under the Local
Government Code of 1991. It applies only to the
national funds administered by the DBM, not the local
funds of LGUs.
f. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges will threaten the principle of local autonomy
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and
leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances
they may want to grant, depending on the availability of
local funds ensures the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy of LGUs.
g. Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly
prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges
whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the
national government, or (2) similar to the allowances
granted by the national government, violates Section
447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
h. An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of
evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law.
The resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting
the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge fully
complied with the law. Therefore, valid.

GARCIA ET. AL. vs. COMELEC and PAYUMO et. al.

GR 111511 5 October 1993
Puno, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners brought suit for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the resolution of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of Bataan initiating recall proceedings against their governor,
Enrique T. Garcia.
The first time the local government officials constituted themselves
into a PRA, they issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall
proceedings. This was opposed by Garcia before the Commission on
Elections, which was denied, at which point he filed the petition for
certiorari. That first petition was granted by the Supreme Court, holding that
the failure of the members of the PRA to notify all the members of the
Assembly was fatal to the validity of the resolution. In view of the decision,
the officials of Bataan again convened into a PRA, duly sent its notices, and
once again issued a resolution initiating recall proceedings. That became the
subject of the instant supplemental petition, assailing the constitutionality of
Section 70 of RA 7160 for being violative of the exclusive right of the
people to initiate recall proceedings, and further for contravention of the
equal protection clause.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall
proceedings
2.
WON the procedure for recall in RA 7160 violates the equal
protection clause for being prejudiced against officials belonging to the
minority
HELD:

Case digest by Karen D. Bandilla

1.
NO. The history of Section 70 reveals a conscious effort on the part
of our lawmakers to institute an alternative mode of initiating recall apart
from the old means of commencement of the process solely by the people.

The lawmakers had observed that the mode was almost impossible to
implement and had been poorly used, thus precipitating the enactment of
Section 3 Article X, which sought to provide for a more responsible and
accountable system of decentralization with effective means of recall
There is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that the power to
initiate recall proceedings is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the
people. Congress was given the power to choose the mechanism of recall
without limit as to the number of modes and with the requisite only that the
same be effectiveand it has in its wisdom provided for one that can be
initiated by either a preparatory recall assembly or the people themselves.
Indeed, there is no great difference between the two, as recall proceedings
initiated by the recall assembly is also initiation by the people, albeit done
indirectly through their representatives.
2.
NO. Petitioners contend that Section 70 violates the equal protection
clause for being prejudicial to the minority, since the majority can always
constitute itself into a PRA and render ineffectual the popular mandate of an
elective official by initiating recall proceedings. These are fears that do not
provide sufficient ground to declare a law unconstitutional. All powers are
susceptible of abuse; the mere possibility however does not mean that the

grant of power is infirm. On the contrary, there are sufficient safeguards in

the law that o guarantee against the senseless abuse of this power by
members of the majority. First, the PRAs composition is politically neutral,
composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members without
regard to their political party. Second, the only ground for recall is loss of
confidence of the people; the PRA therefore acts for the people and not for
their respective members parties when they decide on whether or not to
initiate recall proceedings. The requirement of notice is another safeguard,
and further a qualified majority is required by the law to convene the PRA
in session which must be held in a public place. Last, the recall resolution
must be adopted during a session it calls for the purpose.
It is plain that the fear of petitioners is premised on the erroneous
assumption that the initiation of recall proceedings is equivalent to the recall
itself. This is not so. The resolution of recall is a mere proposal to subject
the official to a new test of his mandate from the electorate, which can
always choose to either affirm or withdraw it