Determinism, soft determinism andindeterminismarethreecompetingideasthatcanbeusedto

explain the way that humans act in the world. In this paper, I argue that indeterminism is a
stronger position than either determinism or soft determinism. First I explain the determinist
position as discussed by Thomas Nagel in
What Does it All Mean? (1987). I take up Aron
Gurwitschs argument in
On Contemporary Nihilism (1945) to argue that determinism is
incompatible with the idea of responsibility, casting doubt on the determinist position. I cast
further doubt on its truth by explaining how it canbe consideredto be selfdefeating. Next,I
explain soft determinism asdiscussedbyW.T. Stacein
Compatibilism:Free WillIsConsistent
with Determinism (2000). I argue that Staces definition of freedom is dubious, and that
otherwise soft determinism is not really different than determinism. Then I explain the
indeterminist position, focussing on libertarianism. I argue that the main criticism of
libertarianism does not hold, making this position stronger than either determinism or soft
determinism.

Determinism is the position taken bythosewhobelieve that alleventsarecaused(Nagel1987,

51). This meansthatwheneveran event occurs, thesituation intheworldjustpriortotheevent
determined that the event would happen as it did, and that it could not have happened
differently. Whatthismeansforhumans isthatourchoicesaredetermined.ThomasNagelgives
the following example. In a cafeteria line, you have a choice between apeachandapiece of
cake. Youchoose the cake.Afterwards, however,youthinktoyourself,I wishIhadnt eaten
that chocolate cake. I could have chosen the peach instead. (
ibid
, 47). Nagel observes that
when we say this, we meanmore than
if wehadchosen the peach, we wouldhave. Wemean
that we
could have chosen it (
ibid
, 48). This ability to choose the other option is free will.
According to determinists, however,your choicewasdetermined by thesituationintheworld
immediately prior to your choice, so you could not have chosen the peach at all. What this
meansisthatdeterministsdenythatwehavefreewill.
The problem with determinism is that, if it is true, then moral responsibilitymakes no
sense. AsAronGurwitschobserves in
OnContemporaryNihilism
,ifalleventsarecaused,then
not onlycan we nothelp butchoosewhatwe choose, wecannothelpbutbelievewhat we do,
and hold the opinions that we do (1945, 1701).Thismeans that everyonesbeliefs, opinions
and valuesare asright as those of everyone else,becausewecannothelpbutholdthem.Ifall
moral values are as right as all others, then nobody can claim moral superiority overanyone
else. This meansnoonecanhold anyone responsible ina systemofmoral responsibility.Ifno
one can be held responsible for their actions, then morality and responsibility are completely
meaningless. Gurwitsch observes that this would mean that on no grounds could we
meaningfully condemn, forexample,theNazi exterminationof European Jewsbecause they
could not help but do what they did (
ibid
, 175). However, that we do condemn the Final
Solution, and that we do hold people responsible for their actions, indicates that we dofind
moralresponsibilitymeaningful.Thismeansthatwemustnotliveinadeterministworld.
Another problem with determinism is that it appears to be selfdefeating. For, if
everything is determined, as explained above, we have no reason tobelieve that anything we
believe is true. Hence wehaveno reasontobelieve that everythingisdetermined. It seems to
methat, if determinismis true,then there is noreason tobelievethatitistrue.Soanyonewho

argues for the determinist position, who says that there

are reasons to believe that it is true,
necessarily denies that determinism is true. Hence, there is little reason to believe in
determinism.

Soft determinists also claim that every event has a cause. The difference between soft
determinism anddeterminismisthedefinitionoffreewillused.W.T.Stace arguesthatanactis
freely done if its immediate causes are psychological states of the agent (2000, 511). Using
Nagelsexample,thismeans that, eventhough you couldnothave chosen thepeachinsteadof
the cake, your choice was free, because it was
your choice. This concept of freedom is
hypothetical freedom that is, your choice is free when
if you had chosen differently, you
wouldhave.One ofStacesexamples isthata manwhogoeswithoutfood foraweekbecause
heisstranded inthedeserthasnotmadeafreechoicetogowithoutfood.However,amanwho
goeswithoutfood foraweekbecauseheisfastingisactingfreely,becausetheimmediatecause
ofhischoiceispsychological,notexternal(
ibid
,510).
The problemwithsoftdeterminismisthat, according to thisposition,all eventsarestill
caused. Psychological causes are themselves caused by other causes, whether internal or
external,whichareinturncaused,
adinfinitum
. Whatthis meansis that, eventhough anagent
chooses toperformanaction, that agent
couldnot havechosendifferentlytheagentsactions
are still determined by the priorstateoftheworld,which was caused bythestatebeforethat,
and so on. Inthiscase,to saythatthechoices that wemake are freeisdubious,becausewhen
wesaythatwearefreetochoose,wemeanthatwecanmake
anychoice,notjustthechoicethat
it isdeterminedwewillmake. Hence,thesoftdeterministdefinitionoffreedomashypothetical
that we are free when
ifwechose differently we wouldhave, eventhoughthereisno other
choice that can be made,isdubious.Oncethisis accepted, the soft determinist position is not
reallydifferentthanthedeterministposition,andisopentothesamecriticisms.

Indeterminism is the position taken by those who argue that not all events are caused.
Libertarianism is the position that, within the events that are not caused, some are human
choices.InNagels example,thiswould mean that you had the abilityto chooseeither cakeor
fruit,
and you could have chosen either
. The advantage of this positionis that it is consistent
withhow we feel we act intheworld.WhenImake achoice,Ifeel that I am freetochoose
notthatmychoiceisdeterminedbeforehand.Thereare,however,objectionstothisview.Nagel
asks, if our choices are not determined, in what sense can we say that they are
our choices
,
given that, if nothing determines them,
we do not determine them either (1987, 56)? Stace
insiststhat, ifouractionswerenot determined,thenresponsibilitydoesnotmakesense,because
wedidnotchoose
(2000,513).
The assumptionbehind thesecriticisms is that causationis an essentialpart ofa choice.
They imply that whenwechoose,we
causeourchoice.Simplyput,causalityistheconceptthat
ifBcannotoccur without Ahavingoccurred, thenAcausesBtooccur.However,theveryidea
thatanything canbe understoodinthiswayis,asLubicaUcnikpoints out,anhypothesis(2007,
298). Causality is a concept. It is not located in the world, butisa wayof
understandingthe
world.Whenwesay that the state of the world
nowwascausedbya
previousstate,wehave to
arbitrarily separate onestatefrom another.Butin the world,one stateisnotseparatefromthe

next or the previous everything is interconnected. So to say that human choice is made in
terms of cause and effectistoarbitrarilyseparatethe
choosing fromthe
choice
.Butwhenwe
choose in the world,our choosing and ourchoice are notseparatethere isnocausality. What
this means is that to try to understand ourselves in terms of causality is to try to understand
ourselves from the same position that we try to understand the world as observers.Thisis
because causality is an attempt to understand the world as we observe it. But the fact is we
cannotreacha point outsideofourselves where we canobserve ourselvesinthesamewaythat
weobservetheworld. Hence, tosay that if ourchoicesarenotcaused,thentheycannotbefree
is to ignore that we created the concept of causality, that it is an hypothesis, andthatweact
outside of it. Therefore, the criticism of libertarianismon the grounds that it does notexplain
human choice in terms of causality does not hold. Thus it is a stronger position than either
determinismorsoftdeterminism.

I have argued that indeterminism is a stronger position than either determinism or soft
determinism. Determinism is the position that all events are caused.Theproblem with thisis
that,ifitis true,moral responsibilityismeaningless.Also, it isselfdefeating,inthat,ifallour
beliefsarecaused, thenwehave no reasontobelievetheyaretruehence,wehavenoreasonto
believe that allourbeliefs arecaused.Softdeterministsalsoclaimthatalleventsarecaused,but
claimthat ourchoicesarefreewhenthecauseispsychological.The problemwiththisisthat,if
true, we still cannot choose other than we do, so our choices can hardly be said to be free.
Hence, it isopen tothesamecriticismsas determinism.Indeterminism is the position that not
alleventsarecaused. Libertarianismisthepositionthat,withintheseuncausedevents,someare
humanchoices. The mainobjection to thisis that, ifourchoicesarenotcaused,then
wedonot
cause them, so they cannot be
our choices. The problem with this is that causality is not a
featureoftheworld,but away of understanding the world. Hence, we actoutsideofcausality,
soourchoices need notbecausedtobeours.ThusIconcludethatindeterminism isastronger
positionthandeterminismorsoftdeterminism.

Reference:

Gurwitsch,Aron.1945.OnContemporaryNihilism.In
TheReviewofPolitics,
170195.
Nagel,Thomas.1987.
WhatDoesItAllMean?
NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Stace, W.T. 2000.Compatibilism:FreeWillIsConsistentwithDeterminism. In

Introductionto
Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings
, ed. Louis P. Pojman, 506513. Belmont,
CA:Wadsworth.

Ucnik, Lubica. 2007.

Esse or
Habere
: To Be or To Have. Patockas Critique of Husserl and
Heidegger.In
TheJournaloftheBritishSocietyforPhenomenology
38(3),297317.