Chavez vs.

jbc
Facts: In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives
of the legislature.
Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of congress refers that both houses of congress
should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components
of congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to
be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

Held: JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of
congress should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a equality in voting. The JBC was designed to have seven voting members with
the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of the
JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined
in the Constitution.

Manila prince hotel vs. GSIS

Facts: In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Held: As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino
entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the
provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and
instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. The rule is that (from Agpalo) in
the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather than non self executing.

Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that
in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state
shall give preference to qualified Filipino. Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term
patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and therefore an
example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.

Tawag multi-purpose cooperative vs. La Trinidad water district

Facts: On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and
maintain a waterworks system inBarangayTawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local water
utility, opposed TMPCs application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended,
its franchise is exclusive.
Held: Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive
in character. When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. In case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and
to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

Javellana vs. Executive secretary

Facts: On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution.
Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the
constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for
the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in objective.
Held: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted
the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which
was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.

Phil bar association vs. comelec

Facts: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of
the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding

office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only
when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath
office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for
the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his
office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
Held: BP 883 is not unconstitutional as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election.

Lambino vs. Comelec

Facts: On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Held: The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People. Under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution the two elements must be
present to allow peoples initiative: First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. Then the Revisit of Santiago v.
COMELEC is Not Necessary. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause
on amendments to the Constitution.

Defensor Santiago vs. comelec

Facts: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the
petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After
the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and
the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative.
Held: R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Magallona vs. Ermita

Facts: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
Held: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of
the scope of our maritime space. Making KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.

Bayan muna vs. Romulo

Facts: In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by
its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement
and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Held: Respondents did not abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a matter
of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the
Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC
coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Also a signatory
state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
ThePhilippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the
Senate. the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The agreement is valid even without 2/3 concurrence of the senate as it has been confirmed by long usage
even from the earliest days of our history.

Air transportation vs. sps. David

Facts: Respondent sps. David discovered that a portion of their land in baguio city was beaing used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of Loakan Airport being operated by ATO. Respondents agreed

after negotiations to convey affected portion by deed of sale but ATO failed to pay despite verbal and
written demands. Respondents filed an action for collection against ATO.
Held: The ATO cannot invoke immunity from suit. An unincorporated gov. agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is inherent power of sovereignty.
ATO is an agency of the govt. not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and maintenance of Loakan airport, an activity that was not
prerogative of the state. Further more, the taking of property without proper expropriation proceedings
and without compensation is not proper as it would lead to injustice thereby the state cannot invoke its
immunity from suit.
Professional video inc. vs. tesda
Facts: Professional video inc. is engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information
technology products and broadcast devices. And TESDA is an instrumentality of the govt established
under RA 7796 which provides skill standardization, testing and certification and entered into negotiated
contract with PROVI. TESDA paid 30% of the total cost but failed to pay the balance. PROVI filed writ
of preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA.
HELD: Public funds cannot be object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted. Even it entered into implied consent with PROVI, still funds are public in nature.
TESDA is covered by state immunity because TESDA is an unincorporated instrumentality of the govt
directly attached to DOLE through the participation of the secretary of labor as the chairman. As an
unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter it is equipped with both express and
implied powers and all state immunity fully apply to it. The recourse of PROVI if ever, is to file to COA
for general appropriation.

China National Machinery vs. Santamaria

Facts: On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery& Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with the North Luzon Railways Corporation(Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for
the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank)and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30
MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to
finance the Northrail Project
The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named
the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not
exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at

the rate of 3% per annum. On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines,Wang Chungui
(Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of
CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.
Held: Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from
suit. Accordingto the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign isrecognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities ( jure imperii ). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered
into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was between
Northrail and CNMEG.
Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the
foregoing provisions of the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking,
nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as
commercial or proprietary in character. Therefore Loan Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to
construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity performed in the ordinary course
of its business.

Holy see vs. Rosario

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in
the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other
lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner
forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Held: The petitioner holy see represented by papal nuncio was immuned from suit. Petitioner acted in
pursuit of a sovereign activity which is an act jure imperii because the disposal of the Lot 5-A is not
undertaken for gain or profit. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The disposal thereof are likewise clothed with
a governmental character and because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy
for the redress of its grievances, if a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask
his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Jusmag vs. NLRC

Facts: Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel
(SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAGPhils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator
2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc., a labor org.
duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.
Sacramento filed complaint w/ DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from
service by JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity
from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento
appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter and held that
petitioner had lost its right not to be sued bec. (1) the principle of estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to refute
the existence of employer-employee rel. (2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it
hired the services of private respondent. Hence, this petition.
Held: Jusmag has immunity from suit. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement between the Phils. and America* JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group and its
primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on air force, army and naval matters. A suit against
JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the
latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suit is one of the
universally recognized principles of international law that the Phils. recognizes and adopts as part of the
law of the land. Immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the
judicial jurisdiction of another state and anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states
under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non
habeat imperium (an equal has no power over an equal) As it stands now, the application of the doctrine
of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to
commercial, private and proprietary acts.

Abakada guro vs. Purisima

Facts: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards
and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees
of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the
President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws
implementing rules.
Held: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to review the laws Implementing Rules and Regulations.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and Bureau of Customs employees and officials into bounty hunters and
mercenaries is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and
employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause
violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common
distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue
collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.

However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM,
NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress
arrogated judicial power upon itself.

MMDA vs. Concerned citizens of manila bay

Held: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Adjudicative function

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art.
VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative
function of the Court.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status
reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
Marcos vs. Manglapus
Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now
in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents

and prohibit the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair
their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor,
according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.
Held: The president has the power to bar the return of Marcoses.
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears
on
the
horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed
against
the
state
and
instigate
more
chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of
the
people
is
the
essence
of
the
duty
of
the
government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.