2006 Remedial Law Case Digests

CIVIL

PROCEDURE

MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S HOUSE

PHILIPPINES,
G.R.

INC.
No.

158245.

June

30,

2005

Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of three parcels of agricultural land. They
entered into a Contract of Sale with respondent and agreed that "in the event that the
parties herein are unable to effect the transfer and sale of the said properties in whole
or in part in favor of the vendees, all the paid-in amounts shall be applied to another
similar property also owned by the vendors in substitution of the above-described
properties."
Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down payment however; it
refused to remit any monthly installment due to petitioners' failure to obtain a clearance
and/or approval of the sale of the subject land from the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Respondent demanded that petitioners either solve the problem with the land
tenants or substitute the lots with another acceptable, suitable and untenanted land,
pursuant

to

their

agreement.

Petitioners informed respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in
accordance with the legal opinion of the DAR. In a letter, respondent informed
petitioners that the scheme proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from acceptable."
Respondent offered to purchase the property on a direct sale basis. Petitioners did not
respond to respondent hence, the latter, through counsel, requested the return of its
down payment. As petitioners did not acquiesce, respondent filed a complaint for
rescission with damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. As a
countermove, petitioners filed the instant case for specific performance with the RTC of
Laguna.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners
opposed contending that the instant complaint for specific performance was served on
respondent ahead of the service of the complaint for rescission on petitioners. Later,
however, respondent withdrew its motion to dismiss in view of the order of the RTC of
Makati dismissing the complaint for rescission. In its Answer with Counterclaim,

respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense that "specific performance is not

possible because the respondent had already bought another property which is
untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now converted from agricultural to
non-agricultural

purpose

in

accordance

with

DAR

Administrative

Order.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering respondent's

special defense that specific performance was no longer possible. They prayed that
their complaint and respondent's counterclaim be ordered withdrawn or dismissed,
arguing that respondent's counterclaim would have no leg to stand on as it was
compulsory
Issue:

Whether

in
respondent's

counterclaim

nature.
should

be

dismissed.

Held: There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of
the plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the
plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by
the defendant. Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the
dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than
before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. While the dismissal in
the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial
order, the second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the case
may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect of the
dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint
after respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their
motion for withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its answer that
substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the
subject lots under the contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue
that their complaint was successfully withdrawn upon the mere filing of a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in this petition that "private
respondent objected to the withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the objection."

LUCIANO ELLO and GAUDIOSA ELLO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R.

No.

141255.

June

21,

2005

Facts: Respondent Springfield Development Corporation is the owner and actual

possessor of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92571, while
respondent Constantino Jaraula is the owner and actual possessor of a covered by TCT
No. T-63088, both situated at Cagayan de Oro City. The two lots adjoin each other and
were originally parts of a 12-hectare lot which has been developed by respondents as
the Mega Heights Subdivision. Sometime in 1996, petitioner spouses Luciano and
Gaudiosa Ello and their hired personnel surreptitiously and stealthily occupied
respondents lots, built a make-shift shed under the trees, and fenced the area they
occupied. Respondents then demanded that petitioners and their hired personnel
vacate the area but they refused. Instead, they threatened and prevented respondents
from developing their lots into a subdivision. Thus, respondent Springfield Development
Corporation and Constantino G. Jaraula, filed a complaint against them for forcible entry
with

application

for

preliminary

mandatory

injunction.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed
outright petitioners petition for review on the sole technical ground that it does not
contain the affidavit of service as required by Section 11 in relation to Section 13, Rule
13

of

the

1997

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

Held: Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
prescribe two modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders,
judgments and other papers. These are: (a) by personal delivery, governed by Section 6
of

the

same

Rule;

and

(b)

by

mail,

under

Section

thereof.

However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that whenever practicable, the filing of

pleadings and other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers on the
adverse party or his counsel, must be done personally. But if such filing and service
were through a different mode, the party concerned must submit a written explanation
why

they

were

not

done

personally.

There is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to append

the affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals challenged Resolution dismissing
outright their petition due to such omission, promptly filed a motion for reconsideration,
readily acknowledging their procedural lapse and attaching therewith the required

affidavit of service. Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate

with

his

failure

to

comply

with

the

prescribed

procedure.

EXECUTION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; DELAY BY ONE PARTY JUSTIFIES

EXECUTION
MANILA

INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT

AUTHORITY

VS.

ALA

INDUSTRIES

13,

2004

CORPORATION
G.R.

No.

147349.

February

Facts: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT
building of the NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent ALA.
Respondent

made

the

necessary

repair

and

waterproofing.

After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received partial
payments. Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the
respondent. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that
respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date.
Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims.
The trial court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties executed a
compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment based on the
compromise agreement. The Court a quo rendered judgment approving the
compromise

agreement.

For petitioners failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a motion for
execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to its
being a government agency. The trial court denied the respondents motion. Reversing
the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to enforce respondents
claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement was immediately executory, and that a delay was not
substantial

compliance

therewith.

Issues: 1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and

executory.
2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution.
Held: 1) A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such
agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its
identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Judges therefore
have

the

ministerial

and

mandatory

duty

to

implement

and

enforce

it.

2. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement.
Thus, non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution. It is the height
of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous event its delayed payment.
Petitioners explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion that borders callousness.
TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION;

NEUTRALITY
BAILINANG
G.R.

ORDER;
DUE

ISSUANCE

PROCESS;

OF
MAROHOMBSAR
No.

OF

TRO

PRESUMPTION
A

VS.

JUDGE

RTJ-02-1674.

January

EX-PARTE;
OF

COLD
JUDGE

SANTOS

ADIONG

22,

2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for injunction. The
case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsars
appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his
appointment,

Pangadapun

used

to

occupy

said

position.

Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the
hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also served on both parties.
Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was
given the time to comment. Respondent judge issued an order stating that a preliminary
conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case and

reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge
gave

another

time

to

file

her

comment

again.

During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it submitted for
resolution and issued the preliminary injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross
ignorance

of

law, abuse

of

discretion

and

conduct

unbecoming

judge.

Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case.

2)

Whether

or

not

trial-type

hearing

is

essential

to

due

process.

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of
preliminary

injunction.

Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended
only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be
determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo until that determination.
Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of
the

urgency

of

the

relief

sought.

2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions
for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a
formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his
defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process
when

he

was

given

the

opportunity

to

present

his

position.

3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts in good
faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that
matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal
of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS, SUBSTITUTED SERVICE; SEVICE BY PUBLICATION;

ACTIONS

IN

REM;

ACTIONS

QUASI

IN

REM

SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND ROMEO
BOYON
G.R.

No.

147369.

October

23,

2003

Facts: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to

compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a
controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return of the
summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because
efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before
the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication and the
judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in default and
as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their
evidence

ex

parte.

Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of
the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court
a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted
respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the respondents raised the
issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration and the same
was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of the controverted judgment
which

the

judge

granted.

Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the
trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.
Issue: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.
Held: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where
the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However,

extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the

action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of
against the defendants person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose is to subject the individuals interest in a piece of property to
the

obligation

or

loan

burdening

it

if

quasi

in

rem.

In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece
of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has
consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam.
Hence,

summons

by

publication

cannot

be

validly

JURISDICTION;

served.
RTC

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

386

SCRA

67.

August

1,

2002

Facts: Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has
jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent.
Held: RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint reveal
that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it
was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him
to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was
breached. As alleged therein, petitioners failure to pay rentals due for the period from
January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of
accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the
action for specific performance, irrespective of the amount of the rentals and damages

sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable

exclusively

by

the

RTC.

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION

SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of Bulacan
A.M.

No.

RTJ-04-1879.

January

17,

2005

Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun Rances, Zoilo Salamat and Rey
Santos were drinking together at the same table. While waiting to be seated, Pedrito
Alonzo was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of exCaptain Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and his
companions took their seats and started drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzos
table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of the house. Santos
passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise followed them. A
shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The
wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle being
driven by Santos. Pedritos uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to
chase the culprits. He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4
Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified.
Upon review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it was
recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and Santos and
Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor
found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their conspiracy with
Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC issued an Order directing the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to include all the aforenamed
persons

as

accused

in

this

case,

all

as

principals.

Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for
the

purpose

of

amending

the

Information.

Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is

sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is through
the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence
of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts
cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. However,
while prosecuting officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of
a crime they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation,
the

evidence

adduced

is

not

sufficient

to

establish

prima

facie

case.

In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who
did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the prosecutor's
should
MELBA
G.R.

normally
QUINTO
No.

VS.

DANTE
155791.

ANDRES

prevail.
and
March

RANDYVER
16,

PACHECO
2005

Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante
Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson
Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown
and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to
prove their liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of
Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the
acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding

that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus,
pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot
prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the
judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to
them.
Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondents criminal liability carries with it the
extinction

of

their

civil

liability.

Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately

or

institutes

the

civil

action

prior

to

the

criminal

action.

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him
and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to
reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of
the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the

accused.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the
civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of
any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by the
the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner
has

cause

of

action

against

the

respondents

for

damages.

SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO QUESTION

LEGALITY

OF

PEOPLE
G.R.

SEARCH;
VS.

No.

147607.

EVIDENCE

IN

ILLEGAL

BENHUR
January

SEARCH
MAMARIL

22,

2004

Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing
the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur. During the search
operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves.
Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the
property seized and certified that the house was properly searched which was signed by
the

appellant

and

the

barangay

officials

who

witnessed

the

search.

After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the
PNP station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP Crime
Laboratory issued a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test for the
presence of marijuana. Moreover, the person who conducted the examination on the
urine

sample

of

appellant

affirmed

that

it

was

positive

for

the

same.

Appellant denied that he was residing at his parents house since he has been residing
at a rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latters family who were
residing with his mother, but on said search operation, his brother and family were out.
He testified that he was at his parents house because he visited his mother, that he
saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time during the trial and admitted that
the signature on the certification that the house was properly search was his.
Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.
2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of the
search.
3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence
against

the

accused.

Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally; 2)

the examination must be under oath; 3) the examination must be reduced in writing in
the form of searching questions and answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the
judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and his
witnesses on the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the
search warrant. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly
determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search
warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the
search

warrant

invalid.

2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not
determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with law. It was only during
the trial that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search
warrant was illegally issued. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional
grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the
trial, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no
intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during
the

trial.

3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law that
the examination of the complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering
the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to illegal search
warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2)
Article

III

of

the

Constitution.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON; MOTION TO QUASH; ARREST WITHOUT

WARRANT
PEOPLE
G.R.

VS.
No.

114967-68.

CRISPIN
January

BILLABER
26,

2004

Facts: Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin

Billaber by her friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire the
necessary papers and find her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the accused to Raul
Durano. The accused offered Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S. Durano
and Genteroy paid the accused and asked for receipt, but the accused said that it was
not

necessary

since

they

will

leave

together.

Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to Tersina Onza and offered a job abroad.
Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants, Genteroy, Durano
and Onza to meet him at the airport on the agreed date, however, the accused failed to
show

up.

Durano chanced upon the accused at the canteen. A commotion ensued when Durano
tried to stop the accused from leaving. A police officer brought both Durano and the
accused to the PNP station. The prosecution offered in evidence a certificate from the
POEA stating that the accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad. The accused denied receiving money from private complainants
and

interposed

defense

of

frame-up

and

extortion

against

Durano.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering that the accused
arrested

without

warrant.

2) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Held: 1) It appears that accused-appellant was brought to the police station, together
with the complainant Durano, not because of the present charges but because of the
commotion that ensued between the two at the canteen. At the police station, Durano
and the other complainants then executed statements charging appellant with illegal
recruitment and estafa. As to whether there was an actual arrest or whether, in the
commotion, the appellant committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to
commit

an

offense,

have

been

rendered

moot.

2) Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a motion to quash before entering his plea,
and is therefore deemed to have waived any question of the trial courts jurisdiction over
his

person.

UNREASONABLE
PEOPLE

VS.

G.R.

No.

SEARCHES
NOEL

AND

TUDTUD

144037,

AND

SEIZURES
DINDO

BOLONG

26,

2003

Sept.ember

Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of
marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a
carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and
Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish
where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers.
Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what seemed to the
police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that
they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and
sentenced

them

to

suffer

the

penalty

of

reclusion

perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained.
Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes reasonable within the meaning
of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the following instances even in
the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search
in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless
search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that,
a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the
items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accuseds
constitutional

rights

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.

CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM DELICT; EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE CIVIL

ASPECT; EFFECT OF GRANT OF DEMURRER ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE

CASE
ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE AND J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORP.
G.R.

No.

151931,

September

23,

2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers
Marketing. As payment for these, she gave a check drawn against the Prudential Bank
by one Nena Timario. J.Y. accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it
was good check. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn
under a closed account. Upon being informed of such dishonor, petitioner replaced the
check drawn against the Solid Bank, which, however, was returned with the word
DAUD

(Drawn

against

uncollected

deposit).

After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with
Leave of Court. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to pay, as payment of her purchase. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that she be
allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, but the court
denied

the

motion.

Issues: 1) Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal offense prevent a judgment
against

her

on

2)

the

denial

Was

the
of

civil
the

aspect

motion

for

of

the

case?

reconsideration

proper?

Held: 1) The rule on the Criminal Procedure provides that the extension of the penal
action does not carry with it the extension of the civil action. Hence, the acquittal of the
accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where
a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; c)
where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of

which

the

accused

was

acquitted.

2) No, because after an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the trial shall proceed for the
presentation of evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both

on the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence
for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to set the case for continuation of
the trail for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect and for the private
offended party adduce evidence by way of rebuttal as provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Otherwise, it would be a nullity for the
reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.
AMENDED
PEOPLE
G.R.

RULES
OF
No.

ON

DEATH

THE
147678-87,

PENALTY

CASES

REVIEW

PHILIPPINES

VS.

MATEO

July

7,

2004

Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-daughter
Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the rape incident were
inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her
bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told
the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when asked again, she said that
he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends
an

acquittal

of

the

appellant.

Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court.
Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the
factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of
Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances

so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to
the

Supreme

Court

for

its

final

disposition.

Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested
in

the

Supreme

Court

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading,

practice,

and

procedure

in

all

courts.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule
here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a
subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic

review

is

such

procedural

matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly

Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125, and
any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19
September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving
the

death

penalty,

A.M.

are

to

be

deemed

modified

accordingly.

No.

RE:

00-5-03-SC

AMENDMENTS

REVISED

RULES

TO

GOVERN

OF

TO

THE

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

DEATH

PENALTY

CASES

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the Proposed Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases, the Court
Resolved

to

APPROVE

the

same.

The amendment shall take effect on October 15, 2004 following its publication in a
newspaper
September

of

general

circulation

not

later
28,

than

September

30,

2004
2004

_____________________________________
AMENDED

RULES

TO

DEATH

GOVERN

REVIEW

PENALTY

OF
CASES

Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, and Rule 124, Sections 12 and 13, of the Revised Rules
of

Criminal

Procedure,

are

amended

as

follows:

RULE

122

Sec. 3. How appeal taken (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases whereby the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses
committed on the same occasion on the or which arose out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in
accordance

with

paragraph

(a)

of

this

Rule.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed
the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as
provided

in

Section

10

of

this

Rule.

(3a)

xxx
RULE

124

Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary to
resolve the factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials or hearing in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed
within

three

months,

unless

extended

by

the

Chief

Justice.

(12a)

Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. (a) Whenever the Court
of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render
judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case
and

elevate

its

entire

record

to

the

Supreme

Court

for

review.

(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the
same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
severe offense for which the penalty is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal
shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal file with the Court
of

Appeals.

(13a)

EVIDENCE
INOCELIA S. AUTENCIO VS. CITY ADMINISTRATOR, RODEL M. MAARA ET AL.
G.R.

No.

152752.

January

19,

2005

Facts: City Administrator Rodel M. Maara lodged a complaint against petitioner

Inocelia S. Autencio with the Office of the City Mayor for dishonesty and misconduct in
office. The complaint alleged that Riza Bravo, an employee of the City Assessors Office
charged with the preparation of the payroll of casual employees, changed the
September 1996 payroll prepared by her upon the order of petitioner. After hearing, the
Office for Legal Services issued a resolution/decision, declaring the petitioner guilty of
misconduct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led to illegal payment of
salaries to casuals. However, as regards to the charge of dishonesty, the same was
found wanting due to insufficiency of evidence. A penalty of forced resignation with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except for earned leave accumulated before the filing of
the complaint was imposed. In return, petitioner alleged that she had waived her right to
present her evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case for resolution,
only because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she
could
Issue:

be

held

Was

liable
the

only

for

petitioner

the

lesser

deprived

of

offense

of

substantial

simple

negligence.

due

process?

Held: Petitioner was afforded due process. On the formal charge against her, she had
received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She
filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of
personnel in the Assessors Office to support her claim of innocence. A pre-hearing
conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she -- assisted by her
counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor
Badoy

to

the

CSC,

and

then

to

the

CA.

Finally, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative
agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is
not the task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the latter in respect of
the sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of
Appeals finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are
supported
TURADIO
G.R.

by
C.
No.

substantial

DOMINGO

VS.

150897.

JOSE

C.
April

evidence.
DOMINGO
11,

ET

AL.
2005

Facts: Petitioner Turadio Domingo is the oldest of the five children of the late Bruno B.
Domingo, formerly the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute. Private
respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro, Nuncia Domingo-Balabis, Abella Domingo, and
Jose Domingo are petitioners siblings. A family quarrel arose over the validity of the
purported sale of the house and lot by their father to private respondents. Sometime in
1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the disputed property, received a notice,
declaring him a squatter. Petitioner learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of
Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was filed against him. Subsequently, he had the
then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine
National Police or PNP) Crime Laboratory compare the signature of Bruno on the said
deed against specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him
Questioned Document Report to the effect that the questioned signature and the
standard signatures were written by two different persons Thus; petitioner filed a
complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private individuals
against his siblings. But after it conducted an examination of the questioned documents,

the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the conclusion that the
questioned signature and the specimen signatures were written by one and the same
person, Bruno B. Domingo. Consequently, petitioner instituted a case for the declaration
of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance of the disputed property, and
cancellation

of

TCT.

Issue: Whether or not the court errs when it held that the trial court correctly applied the
rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI questioned document
reports.
Held: Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the
credibility of the respondents witnesses below should be disturbed. Findings by the trial
court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even
finality by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to observe their
demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized
document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
expressed. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Petitioner has
failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this case.