Journal of Cultural Economics 22: 197–207, 1998.

197
© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Art Museums: Collections,

Deaccessioning and Donations

JOHN W. O’HAGAN∗
Department of Economics, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

Abstract. This paper looks at three issues: the functions of art museums, the role of deaccessioning
in this context and the importance of donations of works of art in contributing to the collection
function. Donor restrictions it is argued should not be allowed to unduly influence the policy of an
art museum, including that in relation to deaccessioning: this is especially the case given that often
the state has paid, in the form of a tax expenditure, for the bulk of such donations.

Key words: deaccessioning, art collections, donors

1. Introduction
While there is enormous variation in the scale and type of art museums (see for
example Rosset, 1991), almost all art museums have common characteristics and
functions. They own art collections and exhibit them to the public on a regular
basis: the physical collections and the interaction between these collections and
visitors are the defining characteristics perhaps of art museums. Arising from this,
Section 2 of the paper will examine the functions of an art museum: what they
involve and how they interact. One of the functions is “to collect” works of art,
but does this permit the selling or deaccessioning of works of art so that the com-
position and quality of the collection can be improved? This is one of the most
controversial public policy issues in relation to art museums (Montias, 1973; Feld-
stein, 1991; Ginsburgh and Menger, 1996), and it will be discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 will follow on from this by discussing how tax policy, particularly in the
United States, gives wealthy donors a significant say in what art museums do, in-
cluding placing restrictions on what they can sell/deaccession. Section 5 concludes
the paper.

2. Functions of a Museum
The functions of a museum are closely interrelated: like the fingers of a hand they
are independent, but yet form an entity united for common purpose (Weil, 1990).
The first function, collection or acquisition, is primary in that it provides the core
material for a museum, namely its contents. All other functions are dependent on
it, since there can be no conservation, study/research, interpretation/education or
198 JOHN W. O’HAGAN

exhibition without collections. The collection is built up through either purchase

or donation, the latter playing a huge role in the case of art museums. This in turn
means that much of the time of some museum staff is devoted to “securing” such
donations, a topic that will be returned to later. A related issue, as mentioned, is the
extent to which the collection can be improved by alterations in its composition, an
issue that raises the question of whether or not parts of the collection can/should
be sold.
The second function, conservation, is essential if the material acquired is to
be kept intact for present and future generations. Indeed, without a programme
of conservation the collection will deteriorate and decline in value. Herein is evi-
dent the link between the first two functions: an art museum should only acquire
material that it can care for and preserve. Hence, Weil argues that the acquisi-
tion and preservation functions could be merged into one: not just interrelated but
considered as different aspects of the same function. This emphasis of course has
important practical implications for the acquisitions process.
The rarity, importance, or desirability of an object may no longer be a wholly
sufficient (albeit still necessary) justification for its acquisition. Equally basic
might be the question of its future care. Such a fusion of the desirability with
the question of preservability might, moreover, better undergird the increas-
ingly made demand that the proffer to a museum of a collection object be
accompanied by the proffer of the resources required for its long-term care.
(Weil, 1990, p. 59)
The last point is the one with economic significance, as too often the cost of ac-
quisition is considered separate from the cost of preservation. Besides, it is related
in a very direct way to the issue of deaccessioning.
Research is an integral part of the functions of preservation and conservation. It
involves study of the collections of the art museum, either by museum staff or
scholars given access to the collections. It also includes the uncovering of the
information which is relevant to an understanding of the objects, the recording
of information relevant to the collections and the making of catalogues of the
collections. Indeed, research can greatly enhance the standing, and therefore value,
of a painting and thereby be seen as an investment, as is acquisition. It is also a nec-
essary component of the interpretation/education and exhibition/display functions,
in that it provides the information and understanding necessary for these functions
to be carried out effectively.
The education/interpretation function involves educating and informing people
about the collections. This can be done when people attend the art museum, by way
of guide books, guided tours, written and other exhibition-related information, for-
mal classes and so on. This function extends very much also to non-attenders, es-
pecially for example schoolchildren, where the information can be communicated
through slides, booklets, videos, internet, etc.
If a museum does not provide space where the contents of the museum can be
displayed and exhibited, it would render meaningless the functions of acquisition,
ART MUSEUMS: COLLECTIONS, DEACCESSIONING AND DONATIONS 199

preservation, research and education. Thus, the exhibition/access function of an art

museum, together with the education/interpretation function, some see as the most
important work of an art museum, especially museums that rely on extensive state
assistance, be it in the form of grants or tax expenditures. Weil (1990) argues in fact
that the functions of education/interpretation and exhibition are so intertwined as
to be inseparable and he suggests that combined these functions could be described
as the “communication” function of a museum. Thus he suggests that the functions
of a museum could be reduced to three: acquisition/preservation, research and
communication.
It is clear then that a museum does not simply perform a single function but is
best viewed as a complex institution which performs many separate but closely-
interrelated functions. While the functions are interrelated, this does not mean that
every art museum necessarily performs them all: it would be expected, though,
that the large art museums, especially those that receive government aid, either
direct or indirect, would perform all of these functions. The important point for
this discussion is that the question of deaccessioning must be seen in the context of
the overall functions of a museum, the collection clearly not being an end in itself. 1

3. Value of Collections and Deaccessioning

The question of whether or not to sell part of the collection of an art museum is and
has been one of the most controversial issues facing the art museum sector in the
last twenty years, particularly in the United States where the practice is now quite
widespread and broadly accepted by many of the major art museums. It has as yet
barely surfaced as an issue in the European art museum sector, where the need to
seek out new revenue sources is less pressing and the legal right of art museums to
sell is more debatable.
For some in the arts sector, the question of selling part of the collection appears
to undermine the very functions of an art museum, particularly those of collec-
tion/preservation and research. However, the discharge of these functions costs
money, money that could perhaps be used to pursue more effectively some other
function of the museum. Besides, while it might be the case that the size of the
overall collection should be maintained, it does not follow that the composition of
the collection should not be altered. All of this assumes increased importance when
one realises the enormous commercial value of the collections of an art museum.

3.1. COMMERCIAL VALUE OF COLLECTIONS

The commercial value of the collections of a major art museum can be very large
indeed (Rosset, 1991). It is very large in relation to the value of the buildings and
in relation to the annual current expenditure of the art museum. If the paintings
were sold and the money invested in a bank, then interest could be earned and it
is this “lost” interest that is referred to as the opportunity cost of the collections:
200 JOHN W. O’HAGAN

it is the money that could be earned on the collections if the money so tied up
in the collections was used for another purpose. It appears that many museums in
Europe and the United States, though, do not even have a proper inventory of what
is in their collections, let alone know the value of the collections (Grampp, 1996).
Given this, they cannot then impute in their annual accounts the opportunity cost
of holding the collections and thus these accounts seriously understate the cost of
the collection/preservation function of the art museum.
The failure to value the cost of their collections and to impute an opportunity
cost of holding them, creates in turn an ambivalence with regard to the functions of
the museum. Those involved in museum administration are often loathe to accept
any classification of their activities and are more content to be vague about their
precise intentions and objectives (see Grampp, 1996). As a result, it is often im-
possible to identify not only the weighting given to the different functions outlined
earlier, but in any way to assign a cost to these various functions. The more vague
is this aspect of the museum’s operation, the greater is the scope for those who
manage the museum to shape its functions to meet their own preferences or those
of some professional élite. As a result, it is argued (see Frey and Pommerehne,
1989) that this allows museum personnel to avoid performance measurement and
thereby accountability for what they do.
Weil (1990) however argues that it is not possible to provide any reasonable
guess of the value of the collection of an art museum. The estimated value of a
painting he argues is very difficult to provide. There is a further problem:
To capitalize the value of a museum’s collections, at least as approached
through the option of current market value, the accumulation of such guesses
would be only the initial stage. At a second stage, considerations would have
to be given to a concept first recognized in the securities market, the concept
of blockage. Is the market value of a museum or any collection merely the
mechanical sum of its one-at-a-time parts, or must that total then be adjusted
downward to reflect the hypothetical impact on a hypothetical market of so
many works of art being hypothetically offered for sale at one hypothetical
time? (pp. 148–149)
The issue then he argues is whether an art museum should pursue the principle
of valuing its collection regardless, or admit that a museum’s stewardship of its
collection is not a relationship that can be adequately expressed in numbers. Weil
is unambiguous in his answer to this dilemma: “If there is no right number we can
get for our financial statements, then it seems to me that no number at all would be
infinitely preferable to the use of a number we knew from the start to be wrong”
(p. 149). If it is not possible to get even an approximate estimate of the value of the
collection, it will be equally difficult to compute the opportunity cost of holding the
collection. Indeed, it might be argued anyway that if a gift of a painting is donated
to an art museum, there is in a sense no opportunity cost at all because the painting
is not tying up money that would otherwise be available to the museum. Besides,
the exercise may be academic in the sense that, first, knowing the opportunity cost
ART MUSEUMS: COLLECTIONS, DEACCESSIONING AND DONATIONS 201

will not in fact alter anything that the museum does at present (the opportunity cost
in fact may not be that large as paintings can appreciate substantially in value, in
some cases at a rate higher than the net of tax interest rate earned in a bank), and
second, even if the museum did want to sell part of the collection, in recognition of
this and other costs, it might not be able to because of donor or other restrictions.
This is the issue to which we now turn.

3.2. DEACCESSIONING

The question of ownership of museums in the United States, especially the col-
lections, is very well reviewed in Thompson (1986). The issue is whether or not
an art museum “owns” or is simply a “steward” for the art objects it possesses.
Some claim that once the original donors are deceased the state is the ultimate
owner. This clearly has a major bearing on an issue discussed earlier: the extent to
which an art museum can alter either the level or composition of its collection.
Many art museums have trustee status, which protects art works given in trust
from being sold to satisfy creditors, a constraint which many people consider de-
sirable. However, by blocking the most efficient use and allocation of its available
resources, donor restrictions can seriously hinder the attempt of museum trustees
to keep the museum solvent. This subsection will not discuss the wider legal issue
relating to ownership of museums, but concentrate on one issue, namely that of
deaccessioning.
Montias (1973) was one of the first economists to look at the issue of deac-
cessioning, ie the selling of parts of the collection of an art museum and in his
article he provided an early and forceful case for deaccessioning. Perhaps the most
cogent case for such a policy is provided by Weil (1990, see also Borg, 1991).
There has been and is to this day very considerable opposition to deaccessioning in
the museum world (Besterman, 1991; Cannon-Brookes, 1996), but this opposition
has lessened considerably, in the Unites States in particular (Weiss, 1990).
The first point to note is that most art museums in the United States appear
to have the legal power to remove permanently, through sale, objects from their
collections. This may be much less the case in Europe, particularly in the civil
law countries of continental Europe (Cannon-Brookes, 1996). The objectives of a
museum also may rule out a policy of deaccessioning. For example, a museum may
be primarily depository or archival, ie its chief objective is collection, in which case
the notion of refining its collection would per se be contrary to its objectives. This
is unlikely though to apply to most art museums.
The case for deaccessioning is based on a number of considerations. First, there
is the fact that, apart from the opportunity cost, the retention of each and every
object in a museum’s collection involves a fixed (purchase or rental of space) and an
on-going expense (preservation, heating, etc), an expense that is non-trivial. Weil
(1990) outlines clearly that the cost of storing a sizable painting is very substantial,
money that could be used in some other way by the museum towards achieving its
202 JOHN W. O’HAGAN

goals. This leads to the second consideration. The sale of a work of art generates
an income for the art museum, money which could be used to acquire more desir-
able works of art for the museum. For example, the Art Institute of Chicago sold
two lesser works by Monet and several by Renoir to purchase two canvases from
Monet’s haystack series to add to the four already in its collection. The following
quotation captures nicely both of the above points.
Well-meaning but tasteless benefactors may donate works of art of less than
exhibition quality. Or the museum may have upgraded its collection so that
mediocre works that once formed its core are no longer needed. Because
collections demand space, protection, and maintenance, it seems sensible for
the museum with precarious finances to “deaccession” (the museum profes-
sion’s euphemism for “sell”) artworks that are unexhibitable and unwanted.
(Thompson, 1986, p. 222)
Most deaccessioning policies provide that the proceeds from the sale of works of
art must be used only to purchase other works. Such policies serve as a bulwark
against allegations that museums are wasting assets, since in effect the art works
are simply being traded for other art works. Nonetheless, as Thompson points
out, maintenance of an overly large collection may operate to the detriment of,
for example, the communication function of an art museum, if funds from a sale
are used solely to buy other works of art rather than build quarters large enough to
exhibit all of the art or to pay operating costs for the facilities. If the money is used
for such purposes though it is possible that a successful legal challenge could be
mounted against the trustees over breach of trust. There is also the fear that, once
this “wall” was breached, politicians might insist on the sale of further works of
art as the quid pro quo of further subsidy: this is unlikely as the opposite is more
likely to apply, namely a large public outcry against the use of the money from a
sale for anything other than the purchase of more art.
Trustees though have to be very careful to remain within the law, especially
in relation to the deaccessioning of works of art that were donated with specific
restrictions (Thompson, 1986; Weil, 1990). In America in particular, art museum
collections were built on the basis of private donations of works of art, donations
which nearly always carried some restrictions, especially in the past. “In practice
this meant that gifts of art had to be preserved as art, whether in the objects actually
transferred or others bought from the revenues from their sale. And it meant that
the funds donated had to be used exclusively for the acquisition and preservation
of art” (Temin, 1991, p. 182). This would imply that the policy of deaccessioning
for the purpose of altering the composition of the collection is acceptable. Some
donors, however, have applied more stringent conditions, something that raises the
issue of the power afforded to donors in a situation where a large proportion of the
cost of the donation is actually borne by the taxpayer (see later). Legal restrictions
preventing disposition though appear to be rare and few art museums today would
appear to accept such restrictions attached to a donation (Weil, 1990). Even where
there is a legal impediment, the possibility remains that in some cases a legal way
ART MUSEUMS: COLLECTIONS, DEACCESSIONING AND DONATIONS 203

may be found to clear it away.2 The fact remains that much of the above may be
irrelevant in a European context. In the civil law countries of continental Europe,
where many of the great art collections of the world are held, the collections of
museums and the museums themselves are state property, and as such may be
inalienable (Grampp, 1996). The museums may not be permitted to sell anything
even if they wished to and even where state property may be sold, it may none
the less be regulated by the government. The prohibition on sale in the civil law
countries though does not appear to be absolute. It is certainly legal to sell in the
United States, and to a lesser extent this appears to be the case in Britain (Grampp,
1996). Besides, in the countries where the prohibition is most absolute, it is not
the case that museums there are clamouring to be given the right to sell, but are
prevented from so doing by law. The real opposition arises from the views of
museum personnel and not from the law. Moreover, in the United States where
deaccessioning is legally possible, many people in the museum world argue that it
is not ethically right to sell works of art unless it is for the purposes of trading them
in for other works of art.
Apart from the issues of the reasons for and legality of selling works of art from
a museum’s collections, there are the issues concerning the process of deaccession:
what conditions apply (already discussed), who decides how it is to be disposed
of, and how the proceeds are to be allocated. All of these issues are looked at in
Weil (1990, see also Besterman, 1991). In relation to what can be sold, different
museums use different criteria, with some indicating simply that objects can be
disposed of if they are no longer of value to the museum. Who decides what and
when to sell is also a contentious issue, but clearly there is no reason why it should
not be the same people who do so in relation to purchase.3 There is then the issue
of how to effect a sale, as for example between exchanging with another art mu-
seum, or selling via a negotiated private sale or a public auction. 4 The issue of the
application of proceeds has already been discussed. Almost without exception, as
mentioned, policy is that the proceeds from the sale of any deaccessioned objects
should be used for the benefit of the collection, usually implying the purchase of
other works of art. Once all of these matters have been settled satisfactorily, then
“the establishment and pursuit of a clearly articulated deaccession policy may be
among the most vital practices that a museum can adopt for its own well-being and
the well-being of the community that supports it” (Weil, 1990, pp. 116–117). As
an art museum expands it must also adapt to new conditions : deaccessioning, or
the continuous process of defining, upgrading and removing seems in this context
an entirely normal and desirable process argues Weil. Why museum curators then
are so opposed to deaccessioning is hard to understand and can perhaps best be
understood in the context of the importance of donations of works of art to the
collection function of art museums.
204 JOHN W. O’HAGAN

4. Donations of Works of Art

Tax policy is the main instrument for encouraging support of arts museums in the
United States and in the process provides an incentive for art museums to receive
works of art. This in turn often leads to restrictions on the museum’s flexibility in
selling from its existing stock of works of art (see earlier). The net result is that
many museums may hold a much greater collection of works of art than would
apply if no such tax incentives were in operation. This may be particularly unfor-
tunate if quantities of these works are never exhibited and/or are in poor condition,
something that strengthens the case for a policy of deaccessioining.
Indirect aid such as tax breaks for donations then encourages the accumulation
of art over and above what would be the case without such aid. In the United States
the tax law encourages the donation of property, either as a gift or as a bequest, over
and above the incentive it provides to donate cash (see O’Hagan, 1998, Chapter 5,
for a discussion of this). Moreover, works of art will nearly always be donated to
museums, as opposed to other charitable organisations, and as such this incentive
is particularly strong not just for the arts but specifically for art museums. On top
of this the incentive is greatest for those with the highest incomes, the people who
would normally have private collections of art to donate: this explains why such a
very high proportion of charitable contributions to the arts takes the form of works
of art. The importance of these gifts to art museums cannot be overemphasised:
between 1965 and 1975, over 85 per cent of the 15,000 works of art added to
the collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York came from gifts or
bequests and this situation is replicated throughout the museum world in the United
States. Between 1986 and 1988, donated art accounted for over half of the value
of purchased art by art museums in the United States: this figure would be much
higher if gifts of cash specifically tied to the purchase of paintings were included
(Rosset, 1991).
The problem of a bias towards works of art, as opposed for example to more
educational or curatorial services, is compounded further in that donor restrictions,
as mentioned, may tie gifts of cash or securities to increased investment by the mu-
seum in works of art. Furthermore a donor may attach restrictions when donating a
painting, such as that the museum may not sell it, or sometimes it may be specified
as to how it should be exhibited: in some case donors may even stipulate that the
museum cannot introduce admission charges. Even without such restrictions, a
museum may feel a “moral” obligation to keep a donated work of art, partly for
fear that other major donors who impose the “no-sale” restriction may not know
that such a restriction did not apply to a particular work of art that was sold by
the museum and be discouraged from making any future donations. It would also
be a brave museum director who turned down a “gift” of a work of art because of
such restrictions, even though the long-run costs for the museum could be sizable.
It may be that this is the explanation as to why museum personnel are so opposed
to a policy of deaccessioning.
ART MUSEUMS: COLLECTIONS, DEACCESSIONING AND DONATIONS 205

Is it right though that donors should have so much say over the operation of art
museums? The problem with the tax expenditures associated with tax breaks is that
most people don’t see them as such. “It is in the interest of fundraisers and con-
tributors alike to treat philanthropy as though the total contribution received from
the donor – including both the cost to the donor (the private contribution) and the
cost to the government (the tax expenditure) – were a totally private contribution”
(Feld et al., 1983, pp. 156–157). It is not of course, but yet the donor decides on
the disbursement of his/her own contribution and the public contribution. Montias
(1973) indicates that the state share of the cost probably ranges from 60–70 per
cent and Feld et al. (1983) indicate cases where it could be much higher. The
implication of this is that a gift of work or art say valued at $10 million could
“cost” the individual only $3–4 million and the taxpayer $6–7 million. The key
point made by Feld, et al, is that it is the wealthy donor who decides exclusively
on how this very large public donation is allocated (see Simon, 1987, for a lengthy
defence of this system of state support).

5. Concluding Comments
It is clear that the functions of an art museum are varied and complex. The weights
that attach, or should attach, to each of these functions pose the most important and
yet most difficult questions to be resolved in terms of both overall funding and the
public/private mix of such funding, when discussing an art museum. Paintings have
to be acquired, conserved, researched and interpreted before they can be effectively
exhibited. These functions are immensely costly, and once performed result in an
“output” that is available not just to those who attend, but to those who might like
at some stage to attend, to future generations, and those who do not attend but yet
consume the services of the art museum through the internet, videos, books, slides
and so on. This all links to the benefits, both private and public, that can flow from
an art museum (see O’Hagan, 1998).
The collections of many art museums have a very high asset value, at least
compared to other assets held by the art museum. Many art museums, though, do
not appear to have even a complete inventory of what is in the collection. Given
this, it is not surprising then that few if any art museums have a full valuation of the
collection and the associated opportunity cost of holding this collection. As such,
compared to any commercial operation, the financial reports of an art museum are
very incomplete. Related to this dearth of financial reporting of its assets is the issue
of deaccessioning. Without a complete statement, financial and otherwise, of an art
museum’s collection, it is difficult to see how a rational policy of deaccessioning
can take place, if such a policy is implemented at all.
In the case of the United States, deaccessioning is a common practice now,
but still unusual in a European context. This could be linked to the manner in
which art museums are funded in each continent. European art museums rely very
heavily on state funding, with little incentive, at least until the last ten years or
206 JOHN W. O’HAGAN

so, to seek out other sources of funding, including money from the process of
deaccessioning. The result of this is that art museums in Europe have been shielded
from the “winds” of commercialisation and accountability, in terms of value for
money, that have been the norm for some time in the United States. All institutions,
whether in the public or private sector, should be accountable and should seek
to conduct their activities in the most cost-effective manner possible: with this in
mind, it is important that checks are put in place to ensure such an outcome. Given
the functions of an art museum, though, commercialisation is not necessarily the
most appropriate or effective check on accountability and value for money.
Tax breaks for donations of works of art and cash are an extremely important
part of policy in relation to art museums, particularly in the United States. These tax
breaks involve the state in considerable tax expenditures, the level and allocation
of which state expenditure though is decided on by the donor alone. Apart from
this aspect of tax policy, there is the related issue of the restrictions that donors
can place on the operation of art museums, including in relation to its policy of
deaccessioning. While the “power” so delegated to donors is the subject of some
controversy, it does not appear that this is the only and/or overriding constraint on
deaccessioning in art museums. A further important constraint, on any deacces-
sioning at all in Europe and on deaccessioning in the United States for purposes
other than altering the composition of the collection, appears to be the beliefs and
values held by museum personnel themselves regarding the collections.

Notes
∗ The author would like to thank Peter Johnson for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper and Maurice Davies for drawing his attention to some reference material. This paper is
based on extracts from O’Hagan (1998), Chapter 7, and in relation to the latter he would like to
acknowledge again the assistance of John Fingleton, Lisa Finneran and Stephen Weil.
1. For many curators, however, collection appears to be the only important function. “The collec-
tion is what gives the museum its identity, establishes its mission, and suggests its future. The
collection also is often the most important factor in attracting the attention and allegiance of
both its professional staff and its major supporters” (T. Stebbins (curator, Museum of Fine Arts,
Boston), in Feldstein (1991), p. 13). The following quotation from Montias (1973) captures the
essence of the dilemma:
Many scholars, particularly European ones, view a museum as an institution akin to the library
of a monastery in Merovingian times, where the finest fruits of civilization were preserved
from the destruction of barbarians and the ravages of time. Their objective is that every work
of art salvaged from the past, whether great or small, should find a place in the library. (p. 72)
2. “There are two methods by which charitable trusts may deviate from the stated purposes of
a trust in order better to effectuate the specific goals of a settlor or the needs of the trust or
institution as a whole” (Thompson, 1986, p. 226). Trustees of a financially troubled museum
may under certain circumstances ask the courts to invoke these doctrines in order to free assets
from restricted uses and apply them towards the more general benefit of the institution and the
public.
3. As Weil (1990) states, “if their judgement is considered trustworthy in the case of accessioning
– if their perceptions of quality and importance are what a museum relies upon to commit its
ART MUSEUMS: COLLECTIONS, DEACCESSIONING AND DONATIONS 207

slender and very precious acquisitions funds – then why should there be such scepticism about
their judgement in the case of deaccessioning” (p. 126).
4. “While auction sales have become the primary means through which most museums dispose
of deaccessioned works of art, occasions may arise when a mutually beneficial exchange can
be arranged. A dramatic instance of this occurred in 1982 when the Museum of Modern Art
surrendered important paintings by Pablo Picasso and Henri Matisse to the Guggenheim in ex-
change for two paintings by Wassily Kandinsky. Through this exchange, the Modern was able to
complete the ensemble of Kandinsky’s four-painting suite, Four Seasons, while the Guggenheim
was, at the same time, able to fill certain gaps in its collection”. (Weil, 1990, p. 124)

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