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SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357

VALERIO E. KALAW,
Petitioner,

Present:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
*PEREZ, and
**LEONEN, JJ

- versus -

Promulgated:
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,
Respondent.

JAN 1 't 2015

x-------------------------------------------------------------------- ~
J

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011, 1 the Court
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in
setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xx xx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent

Per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.

Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 2, Internal Rules.
657 SCRA 822.

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G.R. No. 166357

which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied
on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly
played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and
always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were
with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family.
While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged
constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive
need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to
prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends.
Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during
these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance
of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A
fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by
their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony
whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While

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G.R. No. 166357

petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their
academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual
basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in
the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually
assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,
infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for
legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court

to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that
had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were
2
3

Id. at 836-839.
Rollo, pp. 689-704.

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G.R. No. 166357

not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected in order to have the law
allow some resiliency in its application.4 Illustrative of the less specificity
than expected has been the omission by the Family Code Revision
Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would
have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the
decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the
provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the
relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances, and could not be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus correlated:x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be legitimate.7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some

guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, as follows:

4
5
6
7
8

See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.
See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108.
Supra note 4.
Id. at 34.
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.

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G.R. No. 166357

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife

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G.R. No. 166357

as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code

is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less
specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application. Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts
in recognition of the verity that no case would be on all fours with the next
one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
9

Id. at 209-213.

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G.R. No. 166357

milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus
enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed,
the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or
non-existence of a partys psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It
is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court
and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution
and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We
have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State
to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts
really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an
inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made
all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine

10

Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8, at 214.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Republic v.
Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735.
12
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 158, 170.
13
Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
14
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
15
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 ([B]lind adherence by
the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological
incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly
inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.).
11

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G.R. No. 166357

the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the
opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard
Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate
basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that
said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the
veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be
unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings
on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration
other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another
expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself.
Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for
the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to
enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological
incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the
lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the
findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that
16

Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 206, 212;
People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 382-383.
17
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 379.
18
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
19
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.

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G.R. No. 166357

there is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated

to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the
presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological
incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the
record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for
the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an
expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as
conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands
the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by
bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had
been based on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.23
In that context, Dr. Gates expert opinion should be considered not in
isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological
incapacity, the trial court was expected to compare the expert findings and
opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of
Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that
the respondent had compulsive and dependent tendencies to the extent of
being relationship dependent. Based from the respondents psychological
data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and
seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around people,
she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but
she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite
difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize
opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and
demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to
those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 764.
Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V (1999), pp. 804-805.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, supra, note 15, at 487.
Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal Issues (2010), p. 16.
Records Volume II, pp. 87-105.

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G.R. No. 166357

person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon
her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on
having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person
clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance
that she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon
Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent, observing
that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A :

Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73

percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw
obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q :
A :

Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the

acceptable score?
When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very
significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as
acceptable.

Q :

In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A :

Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under

compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but

corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had
been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q :

25

Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite
familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please
tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at your findings
that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

Id. at 100, 103.

A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on the respondents answers to 175
true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity [2006], p. 109).
27
TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
26

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11

G.R. No. 166357

A :

I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about

her childhood background, her father died in a vehicular accident
when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look
for a job to partly assume the breadwinners role in her family. I
gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her
siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry
out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died
prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on
several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for
being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced
the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a
precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this
seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a
script, the tendency to repeat some kind of experience or the lack
of care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to
sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own
family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with
what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though
as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he
could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care
on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father
actually.

Q :

Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is
self-centered and narcissistic?

A :

Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a

deprived childhood and she is still in search of this. In her several
boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other
people.

Q :

And that led you to conclude?

A :

And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of

neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a

mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert,
an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a
consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father
Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding
of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking
into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological
28
29

TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.

Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569, 585.

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G.R. No. 166357

and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do

so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36
of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the respondents
level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children and
to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not
psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on
the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?

30

A :

I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of

her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her
own children.

Q :

So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is
not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A :

Yes. It should be rejected.

Q :

Why do you say so?

A :

Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle,

inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their life
made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because
her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her
early life and being the breadwinner of the family put her in an
unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own
ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became
an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating
to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q :

You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact.
How about the impact on the relationship of the respondent with
her husband?

A :

Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her lifestyle to fulfill
her obligation to her husband and to her children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q :

And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A :

Secondary.

Q :

And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A :

That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of

marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration on
the husband and the children before everything else would be

Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 370.

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G.R. No. 166357

subordinated to the marriage with her. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they
were their priorities in her life.
Q :

And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call

this?

A :

That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is

from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q :

Could you please define to us what narcissism is?

A :

Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss
of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that
became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx

Q :

And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How
do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave,
slight or .?

A :

I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her
family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored
and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q :

And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism

afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or marriage
or even thereafter?
xxxx

A :

When you get married you dont develop narcissism or

psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage
and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept
these responsibilities. And now you show that you dont accept
them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you dont care
about them.

Q :

Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or

what?

A :

No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still
the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at
Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.

Q :

What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even

expanded after the marriage?

A :

That could have expanded because it became very obvious after

the marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental
obligations.

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G.R. No. 166357

Q :

And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or

clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A :

Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was
found in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure
would be incurable now.

Q :

What specific background are you referring to?

A :

Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner
and her beauty was so important to give in her job and money and
influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a
young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very
unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in
her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in
top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father

Healys opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his
opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby
inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the
nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provide to the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological
incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings.
Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would
advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness
in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
31
32

TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.

Supra note 18.

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G.R. No. 166357

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume
the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage
. . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the
right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973
have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to
Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains
of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial

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G.R. No. 166357

personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to

persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach
for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case
for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that
does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts
are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage
(lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities
as promised at the time the marriage was entered
into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.33

Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences

of strictly applying the standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider
the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

33
34

Id. at 229-232.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8.

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G.R. No. 166357

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the
result and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina
has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account
of the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence
and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from

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G.R. No. 166357

remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of

physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage
to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.
To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35

III
In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven
that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as
a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any
proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so
frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode
to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was
to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have

delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made
her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages
35
36

Supra note 18, at 220-228.

Decision, pp. 837-838.

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G.R. No. 166357

to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and

other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very
young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio
Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the
son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on
playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON:

From the timebefore your parents separation, do you

remember any habit or activity or practice which your
mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS:

Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to

play mahjong a lot, and I cant remember.
xxxx

ATTY. PISON:

You said that your mother played mahjong frequently.

How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS

Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I

cant

ATTY. PISON:

How long would she stay playing mahjong say one

session?

WITNESS

Really long cuz we would go to my aunts house in

White
Plains and I think we would get there by
lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one
in the morning.

ATTY. PISON:

You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS

Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my brothers &

sisters.

ATTY. PISON:

Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS:

Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed

go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion
of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating
their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist
desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr.
37
38

Records, pp. 354-391.

Id. at 363.

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G.R. No. 166357

Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of
the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent
to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209
and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over
the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority
shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for
their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry
and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical
and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others,
protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner
and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could
not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have
found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her

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21

G.R. No. 166357

answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioners psychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A :

Yes, sir.

Q :

And that the marriage was a mistake?

A :

Yes, sir.

Q :

What is your basis for your statement that respondent was

behaviorally immature?

A :

Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed
already some of those short temper of the petitioner but she
was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and
even the time that they were together, that they were living
in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits
if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to make the
relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of
problems that she had seen.

Q :

To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the

petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr.
Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A :

I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly
stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except
that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to
marry her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.

39

: Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to

marry lied on the petitioner?

A :

I think so, Sir.

Q :

Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the
petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was
often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically to
page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of
commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these
admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it
possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite

Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:

3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Petition alleging that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations to the marriage
and that such incapacity manifested itself only after the marriage, the truth of the matter being that it is the
petitioner who is psychologically incapacitated.

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G.R. No. 166357

this fear of commitment and given his admission that he

was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his
womanizing ways during the marriage?
A :

Sir, its difficult.

Q :

It would be difficult for that person?

A :

Yes, Sir.

Q :

What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing

after marriage?

A :

Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only

20%.

Q :

So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his

marriage with the respondent?

A :

Yes, Sir.

Q :

What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on the part of the

petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform
his duties as a husband is concerned?

A :

Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to
be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.

Q :

Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on

whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the
petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage
was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?

A :

Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove

the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the
matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the
other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them,
and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage
has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways.
By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful
truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was
40

TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.

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23

G.R. No. 166357

already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It
would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void
marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling
her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the
ruling the Court makes today. It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a habitual tryster or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied
by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love
which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.

In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because
the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the
time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the
nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the
basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital
union that is ill-equipped to promote family life, thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common
legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of
the Constitution, which respectively state that [t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t],
and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State. These provisions highlight
the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to
the institution of marriage.

41

Supra note 4, at 38.

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24

G.R. No. 166357

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject
of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective
of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should
be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage.
Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated
to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. 42
(Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE,
the
Court GRANTS
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to
the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

42

Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 371-373.

G.R. No. 166357

25

Resolution

WE CONCUR:

~~~~

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

,Lu b~ fl;Jl~/111'"-

p~~;?

%~ANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOS

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

lit!

3Republit of tbe ~btlippineg

~upreme C!Court
manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 188289

DAVID A. NOVERAS,

Petitioner,
Present:
SERENO,* CJ,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,**
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, .!.!.

-versus-

Promulgated:
LETICIA T. NOVERAS,
Respondent.

AUG 2 0 20

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------==---- x
DECISION
PEREZ, J:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which
affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in
California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired
*
**

Per Raffle dated 28 July 2014.

Per Special Order No. 1757 dated 20 August 2014.
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now Supreme Court Associate Justice)
with Associate Justices Portia Aliflo-Hormachuelos and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. ~
Rollo, pp. 26-37.
Presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren. Records, pp. 262-288.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and Jena T. Noveras, born on
2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia
worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the
Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY
House and Lot with an area of 150
sq. m. located at 1085 Norma Street,
Sampaloc,
Manila
(Sampaloc
property)

FAIR MARKET VALUE

P1,693,125.00

Agricultural land with an area of

20,742 sq. m. located at Laboy,
Dipaculao, Aurora

P400,000.00

A parcel of land with an area of 2.5

hectares located at Maria Aurora,
Aurora

P490,000.00

A parcel of land with an area of 175

sq.m. located at Sabang Baler,
Aurora

P175,000.003

3-has. coconut plantation in San

Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora

P750,000.00

USA

PROPERTY
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover
Street, Daly City, California

FAIR MARKET VALUE

$550,000.00 (unpaid debt of
$285,000.00)

Furniture and furnishings

$3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch)

$9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup

truck

$13,770.00

Bank of America Checking Account

$8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

$10,000.00

Life Insurance (Cash Value)

$100,000.00

Id. at 2.

Decision

Retirement, pension, profit-sharing,

annuities

G.R. No. 188289

$56,228.004

The Sampaloc property used to be owned by Davids parents. The

parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property.
When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of
P1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the
Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2
Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David
abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province.
Leticia claimed that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with
Leticia in the presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David
shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of
the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that
David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal
and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect
P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid
balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and
judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted
to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couples
properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3
December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all
conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all
conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit
half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
4
5
6
7

Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 79-81.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation

expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of
their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated
and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties
be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result into the forfeiture
of the parties properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2)
children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in
California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the Joint Affidavit x x x executed by petitioner
Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a
waiver or forfeiture of the latters property rights over their conjugal
properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc,
Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property
of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorneys fees and litigation expenses of the
parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the above is the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to
support and presumptive legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in
the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David
8
9
10

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 23-26.
Id. at 267.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America

remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issued by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of America,
dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be
issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in
the preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two
minor children with petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on
the titles covering the said properties. Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are
hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with
respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said
properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any,
shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half
of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena,
respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly
allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive
legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their
food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody
in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be
increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price of the
Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay
P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and P405,000.00 to the two
children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in
Baler, Aurora, in a joint account to be taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made within the period of thirty (30) days
after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint
account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this
Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from
the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the parties shall
be shouldered by them individually.11
11

Id. at 287-288.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the
laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With
respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of
dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo on 24 June 2005. Under their law, the parties
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the
petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody
of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified
their property regime as absolute community of property because they did
not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their
marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of
the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law.
The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the
provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the
absolute community properties cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and
her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the
reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already acquired all
of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the
Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the
payment of the childrens presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that
under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by
David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by
directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.
Moreover with respect to the common childrens presumptive legitime, the
appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailed Decision dated December 8, 2006 of
Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in

the Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
x x x

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)

in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as
their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within
the first half of January, starting 2008;
x x x

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are

each ordered to pay the amount of P520,000.00 to their two children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be
deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the
latters names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody of the Clerk of Court a
quo within the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00 representing her share
in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler,
Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner
EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should
have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine
properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented
and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing
Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted
all US properties by the California court.
12

Rollo, pp. 36-37.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US
citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June
2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia.
With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for
judicial separation of conjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may
be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the

national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence.
Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer.
13
14
15

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

Id. at 281-282.
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, 26 June 2013.

Decision

G.R. No. 188289

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the
requirement on certification where we held that [petitioner therein] was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of
a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court
issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. In this case however, it appears
that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the
lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with,
divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred
in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must
be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is
allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only
to the instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family
Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family
Code, to wit:
16
17

18

591 Phil. 452, 470 (2008).

Processual presumption means that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. See EDI-Staffbuilders Intl. Inc. v.
NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).
Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, Fourth Edition, 2004, p. 396.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 188289

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been
decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated
in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of
the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough
basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
(Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment
in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4
of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie
presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months
from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as
she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to
visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened.
The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the
petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the said petition can also be considered as
valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19

19

Records, p. 280.

Decision

11

G.R. No. 188289

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial

separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision because,
the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and
David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it
is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed
for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community
of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in
the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Upon the death of either spouse;

When there is a decree of legal separation;
When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the

dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following procedure
should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of
the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
20

TSN, 9 March 2006, p. 13.

Decision

12

G.R. No. 188289

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out
of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven
years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the
trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of
Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not
acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia.
Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well
as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in
the Philippines, as well as the payment of their childrens presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to

Decision

13

G.R. No. 188289

have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale
of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot
be given full credence. Only the amount oflll 20,000.00 incurred in going
to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the
amount of P.300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,
expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not
deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and
David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
P-120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of P-1,040,000.00.
xx xx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc
therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the
absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds
from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of P.410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of P.520,000.00 as their presumptive
..
1eg1t1mes
there firom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

JO

21

Rollo, pp. 34-35.

j'REZ

G.R. No. 188289

14

Decision

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

~c?

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

az:

ANTONIOT. C
Associate Justice
Second Division Chairperson

Decision

15

G.R. No. 188289

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707

December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondentmade a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located
at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo,
are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to
the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is analien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty ishereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation to support
their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure todo so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless
of the obligors nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents duty and obligation to givesupport to his
child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless
it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should
be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on
appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability
of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in
relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a
definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the
courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is
a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law,
i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under Article195 of
the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean
that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law
of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which
was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in,
or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or

threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioners claim
that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the
instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted,
we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1896
dated November 28, 2014
1

Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and "B" to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.

Rollo, p. 6.

Id.

Id. at 7.

Annex "F" to Petition, rollo, p. 31.

Id. at 32.

Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.

Id. at 24.

Id.at 32.

10

Id.

11

Supra note 7, at 23-24.

12

Supra note 5, at 32.

13

Rollo, p. 7.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 22.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 24.

18

Id. at 8.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Supra note 7.

22

Id.at 24.

Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
23

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
24

Annex "R" to Petition, rollo, p. 102.

25

Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 25.

26

Id.

27

Rollo, p. 10.

28

G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.

29

Id.at 332-333.

30

Supra note 23.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there assuch, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
31

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
32

Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.

33

Id. at 122.

34

Supra note 23.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
35

36

Supra note 7, at 24.

37

Id.

38

G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.

39

Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)

40

EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).

41

Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, p. 84.

42

399 Phil. 342 (2000).

43

Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)

44

Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).

45

G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

46

Rollo, p. 18.

47

Supra note 44.

48

Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied)

49

543 Phil. 275 (2007).

50

Id.at 290.

51

Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)

52

Rollo, p. 15.

53

In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that:
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of
acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only
one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.