Calalas v CA. G.R. No.

122039 May 31, 2000

FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of
about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC Dumaguete rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu truck
was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena,
for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable
to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
2. CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of
contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of
the safety of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasidelict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party,
obligation is created by law itself)

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
2. Overloading of passengers.

Rodriguez-Luna vs IAC
FACTS:

The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision
took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car
driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license. In a suit for damages
brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the following judgment:
Judgment was rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay,
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of
Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his
companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial
court to issue a writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal amount. In the meantime,
Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle
but only casually employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He
has no assets of his own as yet."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose, the father, should be primarily or subsidiary liable with his son, Luis.
HELD:
Primarily liable. The Dela Rosas invoke Elcano vs Hill for subsidiary liability only. In Elcano vs Hill, it
was held that article 2180 was applied to Atty Hill despite the emancipation by marriage by his
son, but as his son attained age, as a matter of equity, Atty Hill's liabilty should only be subsiadiary
as to his son. However, the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this
case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the
reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines or
elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE

G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.

Facts:
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo
Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant.
As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced
to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against
defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer,
set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here
apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the
theory of defendant.
Issue:
WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of
the CC.
Ruling:
Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for
an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular
provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or
identical cases.

Paleyan vs. Bangkili

Facts:

Carlos Bangkili, 19 yrs. of age killed Balos Paleyan. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of
the wounding of another victim, Bangkili was accused of the crime of homocide with less serious
physical injuries. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly, but no desicion as to the civil
indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased was made. Plaintiffs filed an action for
damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili. Complaint was dismissed
against Victoria because his son was already 19 yrs. of age at the time he committed the offense.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the mother of Carlos should be liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay
considering that he was then a minor of 19 yrs.
Ruling:
Victoria Bangkili is liable solidarily with her son.
Ratio: Art. 2180 is applicable in this case. Considering that her son, although living with her, was
already 19 yrs. of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal
defense, however, and does not exempt the appellent from her responsibility as parent and natural
guardian. Art. 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent
"observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent damage."

Anuran, et al. vs. Buno, et. Al. G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966 |17 SCRA
224
FACTS

At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney owned by defendant spouses Pedro Gahol and
Luisa Alcantara and driven by defendant Pepito Buno was on its regular route travelling form
Mahabang Ludlud, Taal, Batangas towards the poblacion of the said municipality. After crossing the
bridge, Buno stopped the jeepney to allow one of the passengers to a light. He parked his jeepney
in such a way that one-half of its width (the left wheels) was on the aspha lted pavement of the
road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the said road.
Thereafter a speeding water truck, owned by defendant spouses Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina
Aro driven by Guillermo Razon, violently smashed against the parked jeepney from behind, causing
it to turn turtle into a nearby ditch.
As a result of the collision, three of the jeepneys passengers died with two others suffering
injuries.
The suit was instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover damages
from the owners and drivers of both the truck and the jeepney.
The Batanga s CFI rendered judgment absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners. On
appeal to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the exoneration of the jeepney driver and of its
owners.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made liable?
W/N the Last Clear Chance principle is applicable?

HOLDING & RATIO DE CIDENDI

YES, THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND DRIVER ARE ALSO LIABLE

The obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers sa fely is such that the Civil Code requires
utmost diligence from the carriers who are presumed to have been at fault of to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence. The driver of the
jeepney was at fault fo parking the vehicle i mproperly.

NO, THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE PRINCIPLE IS NOT APPLICABLE

The principle about the last clea r chance would call for application in a suit between the owners
and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence.

Exconde vs. CapunoG.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 2957 | 101 Phil 843
FACTS

Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon and two passengers (Isidiro
Caperina and Amado Ticzon) died. At the time this happened, Dantes father, Delfin was not with
him, nor did he know tha t his son wa s going to attend a pa rade.
Dante was then charged with double homicide through reckless imprudence. After conviction by
the RTC and CA, petitioner Sabina Exconde (mother of one of the deceased) filed a separate civil
action against Dante a nd Delfin for damages in the amount of P2,959.00. Defendants averred as a
defense that Da nte should be the only one civilly liable because at the time of the accident he was
not under the control, supervision, and custody of Delfin.
The lower court sustained the defense, and so Exconde appealed, the ca se certified
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Delfin can be held jointly and severally liable w ith his son Dante for damages resulting from
the death of Isidro caused by the negligent act of his minor son Dante.
HOLDING & RATIO DE CIDENDI
DELFIN JOINTLY AND SE VERALLY LIABLE WITH DANTE.
Article 1903, 1and 5 Paragraphs: The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are liable for any damages caused by minor children who live with them. Teachers and directors
of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody. The 5th paragraph only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to
any academic educational institution. Hence, neither the head of the school, nor the city schools
supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of
an institution of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them,
which imposes upon pa rents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand, gives
them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way to relieve them is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. This defendants failed to do.
Petition GRANTED. Decision MODIFIED. Defendants Dante and Delfin shall pay Exconde P2,959.00.
Reyes Dissenting
(a) We should affirm the decision relieving the father of liability(b) The words arts and trades
does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments (c)Where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter should be answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere
with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction(d) Delfin could not have properly refused to allow the child to attend the
parade, in defiance of school authorities(e) If a teacher was present, he/she should be the one
responsible for allowing the minor to drive. If there was no teacher present, the school authorities
are the ones answerable. (f) The father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way
able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid.

Fuellas v. Cadano October 31, 1961

FACTS:

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, both 13, were classmates at St. Marys High School. While Pepito
was studying, Rico took a classmates pencil and put it in Pepitos pocket. When the classmate
asked Rico for the pencil, it was Pepito who returned it. This angered Rico, thus he held Pepito by
the neck and pushed him to the floor. A teacher broke up the fight and sent them home.
Pepito has just gone down from the schoolhouse when he was met by a still angry Rico. A
classmate asked them to shake hands but instead of shaking Pepitos extended hand, Rico held
him by theneck, put him off-balance which caused Pepito to land on his right side, breaking his
arm. Rico just got up and ran away.
Up to the last day of the hearing of the case, Pepitos forearm was seen to be shorter than his left
and cannot be fully used.
2 separate actions were instituted:(a). Criminal case against Rico for Serious Physical Injuries (b).
Civil case for damages against Agapito Fuellas, Ricos father.
Criminal case: (TC):Rico guilty. Civil liability to be determined in the civil case
Civil case: (TC): Agapito liable under 2180 for medicine, MD, ED and attys fees. (CA): Reduced MD
ISSUE:
WON Agapito Fuellas, Ricos father is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Agapito is liable for damages. CA affirmed
Agapito contends that he cannot be liable under 2180 in connection with 2176 there being no
fault or negligence but deliberate intent to cause injury.
SC: Jurisprudence proves him wrong.
Araneta v. Arreglado -(the Arreglados- father, mother and son were held liable for damages) civil
law liability under 2180 is not respondeat superior but pater familias, which bases the liability of
the father ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his minor son, and that if an injury is
caused by the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that there was negligence on
the part of his father.
Exconde v. Capuno
(the father was held solidarily liable with his son for damages) The civil liability of the father is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority he exercises. Only defense is proof of diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent the damage.
Manresa:
Children and wards do not have the capacity to govern themselves so parents and guardians have
the duty to exercise special vigilance. If they fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the
consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused.
Agapito claims that he could only be liable if the action was based on the subsidiary liability of the
parents under the RPC. And since Rico acted with discernment, the provisions do not cover the
case.
SC: Case law is against him again.
Salen and Salbarena v. Balce
(where father was made to pay the indemnity his 18 year old son was sentenced to pay because
his son was insolvent) Since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of a minor over 9 but
under 15 who acted with discernment, resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil
Code, specifically 2180

CA decided the case based on the evidence submitted by both parties, independently of the
criminal case. Responsibility for fault or negligence under 2176(upon which this action is instituted)
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the
RPC, hence, any discussion of Ricos criminal intent is of no moment.

Cuadra v. Monfort G.R. L-24101 | Sept. 30, 1970

FACTS
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Ma ria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six. Their
teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school
premises. Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had

found an earthworm and, to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise
moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July
20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all
of which the pa rents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right
eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the pa rents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as
actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of
the suit.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the parents are liable for the acts of their minor child when the act or omission of the child is
committed in the absence of the parents.
HOLDING & RATIO DE CIDENDI: NO.
There is no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the
attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of
such diligence the da mage could have been prevented.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his pa
rental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, und er the care and supervision of the teacher.
The act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual a mong
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate
much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could
be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell
her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal
sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience

Libi v. IAC September 18, 1992

FACTS:
Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2years when Julie broke it off due to Wendells sadisticand
irresponsible nature. A month after their break-up,Julie and Wendell died each from a single

gunshotwound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell.
There were 2versions of the story:
Libis: another man shot the 2
Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide. The Gotiongs (julies parents) filed for
damages against the Livis under Art. 2180.
TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.
HELD: Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed.
The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having access to the key to the
safety deposit box where the gun was stored. Diligence required is that of instruction and
supervision of the kid.
BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY
Rule on parents liability is correct but characterization of their nature must be given a second look
(coz SC held in some cases that the liability of parents is subsidiary).
If the liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, then they can
neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damages.
But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid and substantial
defense.
Hence, the liability of parents for QDs of their minor kids as contemplated in 2180 is PRIMARY and
not subsidiary.
In fact, applying 2194 (solidary liability of join tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with
the child.
The liability of parents for felonies is likewise PRIMARY & not subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC says so. For
both QDs and crimes, the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both the RPC and CC that the minor transgressor shall be answerable
or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of thein solvency of the
parents. Arts. 2182 , CC and 101,RPC support this.
RULES:
1. For civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority or control or who
live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY (a)Premised on Art. 101, RPC with respect to damages
ex delicto by kids 9 or under, or 9-15 but without discernment (b)Premised on Art. 2180, CC for kids
9-15 with discernment, or 15-21 (now 18)
2. Liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE
PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE MINOR. Under 2180, the liability shall be effected against the
father, and in case of his death or incapacity the mother-which rule was amplified by the Youth and
Welfare Code.
BUT, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.

3. For civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in accordance with 2180 and
2182, as so modified.
NOTES: This case cleared up the issue on whether the parents liability is primary or subsidiary.
What is the basis of the doctrine that liability of parents is primary and not solidary? Why? 2 legal
bases: 101 RPC and 2182 CC
Why?-provisions provide for such defenseliability of parents is primary
According to the Court, the reliance on Fuellasv. Cadano was NOT correct because the liability in
fuellas was PRIMARY
Why primary liability? 1. law provides a defense; 2. property of minor only liable when parents are
insolvent

Tamargo v. CAJune 3, 1992

FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Adelbertos natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his
natural parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has already been filed by
the Rapisura spouses. Thispetition was granted after the shooting of Jennifer.

The Tamargos filed:

1. Criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence but Adelberto was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
2. Civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of Adelberto. The Bundocs claimed that
the Rapisuras should be held liable instead, that they are indispensable parties because parental
authority had already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable parties to the action.
CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE:
Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the Rapisuras?
HELD:
The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable parties. CA reversed and set aside,
complaint reinstated and case remanded.
When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the Bundocs, his natural
parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit
for damages.
Ratio:
The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176 against him. On the other
hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for the torts committed
by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parentstheir parental authoritywhich includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child.
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained in
Cangco v. Manila Raildroad:
With respect to extra contractual obligations arising from negligence, whether of act or omission,
the legislature has elected to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by legal fiction, to others who
are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
The legislature which adopted our civil code elected to limit extra contractual liability with certain
well-defined exceptionsto cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the
persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in
ones own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of ones own
agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person liable for their conduct.
Basis of civil liability imposed on parents for torts of their minor kids living with them: PARENTAL
AUTHORITY vested by the civil code.

In other words, parental liability is anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed
parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. Parental dereliction
is only a PRESUMPTION which can be overturned under 2180 by proof of all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control.
Art 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code: responsibility for child under parental authority
Art. 221, FC: child (tortfeasor) must be in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable
Anent the retroactivity of parental authority to the time of filing of the petition for adoption:
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the child.
Here, no presumption of parental dereliction on the Rapisuras could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
RULE: Parents must have actual or physical custody over the minor to be held liable.
NOTES: Only benefits retroact to the time of filing of the petition for adoption, not parental
authority Parental Authority: Control and supervision over children. Hence, no PA, no parental
liability

GUTIERREZ v CA November 29, 1976

FACTS:
Benigno Gutierrez was awarded by the Bureau of Public Works the contract to construct a drainage
in Manila. Heengaged Domingo Balisala as project engineer.
Under the supervision of Balisalisa, the workers of Gutierrez dug up a street by means of crane.
The earth and the muddig up were scooped by the crane and dumped against the exterior side of
the adobe stone of A. Mabini ElementarySchool along the street.

When the pile of earth and mud reached the height of the fence, the cranes steel scooper was
used to press themdown. Because of the heavy stress thus placed on the fence, a portion of it gave
way and collapsed.
When the adobe wall collapsed, a school child who was then playing inside the school grounds, was
hit and pinneddown by the falling debris of the wall. She was buried underneath and eventually
died.
The parents of the child filed a suit for actual, moral and exemplary damages against Gutierrez and
Balisalisa.
TC ordered the 2 jointly and severally to pay the parents of the deceased moral and exemplary
damages, actualexpenses, attorneys fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed judgment.
ISSUE:
Are defendants liable for moral and exemplary damages.
HELD: YES
Employer-employee relationship existed between the them and the crane operators:1.the contract
between the government and Gutierrez stipulated that the contractor would furnish himself his
ownlabor plant.2.the crane operator was actually operating and managing the heavy equipment in
the construction site of thedefendants in connection with their construction job3.defense of alleged
non-existence of such relationship cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
SC quoted with approval the basis of TCs award for moral and exemplary damages.
Negligence of defendants has been clearly established by evidence. Indeed, no evidence is
necessary to show that defendants were negligent in the performance of their obligation.They
ought to have known that it was not the right thing to do-to pile up the big volume of earth against
the wall, whichwas fragile, being made only of adobe held together by mortar and w/out
reinforcements.The collapse, therefore, could be reasonably expected by any person of ordinary
prudence, if not intelligence. They should have foreseen the danger but they failed to take the
necessary precautions.For this omission on their part, they should be held responsible for moral
and exemplary damages. More so withrespect to Gutierrez so that other contractors similarly
situated will be more careful.
Judgment affirmed.