USON v.

DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530
FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged
wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and
possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario,
decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant
presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an
alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from
Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor
defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil
Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled
to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264
and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?
HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels
of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to
his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court
aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of
the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson
over
the
lands
in
question
became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it
be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply
and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides
indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated
in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which

commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore,
be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.

De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja 46 SCRA 577

FACTS
This case is compilation of three cases including:
CASE A: G.R. No. L-28040 appeal by Tasiana Vda. de de Borja from approval
of compromise agreement by CFI
Rizal
CASE B: G.R. No L-28568 appeal Jose de Borja from the disapproval of
compromise agreement by CFI Nueva
Ecija
CASE C: G.R. No. L-28611 appeal by Jose de Borja from the decision of CFI
Rizal that the main object of the
compromise agreement is a separate and exclusive property of Francisco de
Borja and not a conjugal asset
Family Tree

Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of her wife Josefa
Tangco upon her death (CFI Rizal). He was appointed executor and
administrator while Jose de Borja (their son) was appointed co-administrator.
When Francisco died, Jose became sole administrator
Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died and she instituted
testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was
appointed special administatrix. The relationship between the children of the
first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court
suits and counter-suits. Thus, Jose and Tasiana entered into a compromise
agreement to put an end to all of the pending litigations. However, Tasiana

argues that compromise agreement was not valid, because the heirs cannot
enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the
time the agreement was made, the will was
still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not
yet been probated.
RULING
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT VALID
Doctrine in Guevara vs. Guevara: presentation of a will for probate is
mandatory and that the settlement and
distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a
will, is against the law and public
policy. NOT APPLICABLE
o There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de
Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will.
o The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana
Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual
in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
Francisco de Borja
#1 Josefa Tangco Jose de Borja Cayetano de Borja Matilde de Borja Crisanto
de Borja
#2 Tasiana Vda. de de Borja
o There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as
a hereditary share in a
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777)
# 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.
o Tasiana was Franciscos compulsory heir and her successional interest
existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and
would exist even if such will were not probated at all.
Case A: affirmed
Case B: reversed
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) should be declared property of the
conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco
o Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
o Reasons:
Witnesss testimony considered hearsay and inadmissible
Franciscos testimony does not refer precisely to the Hacienda in question

o The legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda

de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof.
CASE C: reversed

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO

BONILLA(their father) who represents the minors,
petitioners, vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL
BARCENA,AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO
GIRONELLA of theCourt of First Instance of Abra,
respondents.G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla andS
alvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the
Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed a written motion to dismiss
the complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion, the plaintiffs
counsel moved to amend the complaint which was granted.
The defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint. The said
motion to dismiss was then heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiffs counsel
received a copy of the order
dismissing the complaint and on the 23rd of the same month; he moved to set
aside the said order. The court denied the MR filed by the plaintiffs counsel
which the counsel later on filed a written manifestation allowing the minor
petitioners to be allowed to substitute
their deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiffs counsel filed a second
MR of the order dismissing the complaint but the same was denied. Hence,
this present petition for review.
ISSUE: WON THE ACTION SURVIVES EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTY
DURING THEPENDENCY OF THE CASE.
HELD:
Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can
be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under
Section 16, Rule 3of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case
dies, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of the Civil

Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore,
died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856,
was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. In addition, Under Section17, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appearand be substituted for the
deceased, within such time as may be granted." The question asto whether
an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to
quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally
property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her
death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for
her. Thus, the action in the instant case survives

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEOHERRERA, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P.
BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
respondents.G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987GUTIERREZ, JR.,
J
.:Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on
March 13, 1952, in Paranaque,Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.On April 19,
1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for
the probateof a one page document as the last will and testament left by the
said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof. After due trial, the probate court held that the
document presented as the will of the deceased was aforgery.The testate
proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. After determining
the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of the
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate
heirs. On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier
claimed as heir under the forgedwill, filed a motion before the trial court
praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceasedVito
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in
the declaration of heirsmade by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard
of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other
forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child. Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo
was already barred by the order of the court dated April12, 1969 declaring
the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.Fortunato Borromeo filed a

motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to supporthis

motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a
portion of the estate. Heasserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary
Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by PilarN. Borromeo, Maria B.
Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo,
PatrocinioBorromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico
V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In
the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunat otheir shares in the
disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court,
acting as
a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that
respondent FortunatoBorromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver
agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it wasexecuted before
the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before
thedistribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance;
and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. On
December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary
rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.It is argued by the petitioner
that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July31,
1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without
force and effect because there can be noeffective waiver of hereditary rights
before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or
repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of
the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since
the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article
1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify
their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued
an orderfor the distribution of the estate.Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on
the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Codethere is no
need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or
repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of
the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must
be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the
waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well
as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in thewaiver document itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order
to be valid, must be preceded bya court declaration that the person making
the acceptance or renunciation is indeed an heir.
RULING:No.The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that
"the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as

belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession
from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to
which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or
less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until
the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance
in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article
989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore,
could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.In this case, however, the purported "Waiver
of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to
exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such
right. The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. The circumstances of this
case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27,
1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement
of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight
(8)intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including
all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of
October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them inany action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive
and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the
respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other
signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary
Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be.
Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to
settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of
the deceased; (2) On April 21 and30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs
executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed.
This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15,
1969; (3)On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document
entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the
respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her(Patrocinio B. Herrera's)
rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was
P100,000.00; (4) On thesame date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo (assignees in theaforementioned deed of assignment) in
turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors

named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was

P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on
October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March
24,1969.

RIOFERIO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real
properties.
Privaterespondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio (the paramour
) and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim ,
r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e s a n d transfers involving the properties of the

estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso

Clyde P.O r fi n a d a I I I fi l e d a
Petition for Letters of Administration
praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P.
Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.
Issue:
Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property
of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in
this case?
Ruling:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have
legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent
in accordance with the provision
of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are trans
mitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn
is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to
the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if
administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator;
then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care
enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased;
and in the mean time do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.

Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]Osh

Doctrine: The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to
the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S.
national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give
his entire estate to a complete stranger. Intrinsic validity of the will can be

passed upon during probate of will. The attested will is still valid even if the
compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime because the decedent, at the
time of his death, was a citizen of US, and was governed by Pennsylvania law
which does not have a system of legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion can
therefore dispose of her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share
in her estate.
FACTS:
1.Adoracion C. Campos died
, leaving
her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos
and her
sisters, privaterespondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta
C. Medina
as the surviving heirs.2.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74,Section I of the Rules of Court whereby
he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of
thedeceased Adoracion Campos
.3.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977,
Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will ofthe deceased,
Adoracion Campos
, which was
allegedly executed in the United States
and for herappointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.

xxx alleged that the

testatrix was an American citizen
at the time of her death xxx;

that the
testatrix died in Manila
on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at
2167Leveriza, Malate, Manila;

that during her lifetime,

the testatrix made her last will and testament
on July 10, 1975,
according to thelaws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of
New Jersey as executor
;

that after the testatrix death,

her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, andregistered
with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A
., that Clement L. McLaughlin,the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment asexecutor in favor of the
former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and

that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an

administratrix to administer andeventually distribute the properties of the
estate located in the Philippines.4.
On January 11, 1978, an
opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
amongother things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in
question is a forgery
; that the
intrinsicprovisions of the will are null and void
; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions areinvoked,
the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to
him
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preterition is proper. Yes, the governing law is law of
Pennsylvania
HELD:The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the
will.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the dueexecution thereof, the
testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
orsolemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been dulyauthenticated.
However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, evenbefore it is probated, the court should meet the issue
. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate ofAdoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face,

the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner

and thus, the respondent judgeshould have denied its reprobate outright,
the private respondents have sufficiently established thatAdoracion was, at
the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

Therefore the law which governs Adoracion Campo's

will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A
., which is thenational law of the decedent.

Although the parties admit that the

Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes
and that all the estatemay be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and establishedpublic policy and would run counter
to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
the national law of the decedent must apply.

This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein
we ruled:

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our system oflegitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals
. Xxx
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,

the records bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on
separate dates until June 19,1980 was the petitioner's
petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
of January 10, 1979.

There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to

believe otherwise.
The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when
his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process.

The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ."
did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard
and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such
request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
The issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos
was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an
estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her
death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania , United States
of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover,petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the probate court
in the petitionfor relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against hisopponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction

PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR (CIVIL)

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
iterpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
words, except when it may certainly appear that his contention was different
from that literally expressed.
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills. It is
the greatest rule in giving effect to a will.
From the testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would
become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the
devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to
say masses for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: (a) during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for priesthood; and
(b) in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by
the parish priest of Victoria as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute
devisee. The contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary
provisions does not support the view that the parish priest was a trustee or a
substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest.
The CA correctly rules that this case is covered by Article 956 of the Civil
Code which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution
and those in this the right of accretion exists."
This case is also covered by Article 960(2) which provides "legal succession
takes place when the will does not dispose of all the belongings to the
testator." There being mo substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands,
the same should be distributed among the legal heirs. The effect is as if the
testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. If a conditional legacy does

not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property

recovered by the said legacy.

was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no
need to go beyond the face of the will.

ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA,
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he
died on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for
its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews
who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.
During the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote out the will in
longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood, and that he
signed on the left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or
sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the
last page. All this was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will. The said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the
presence of each other.
The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will. Although
at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law, still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already
in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a
liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form,
said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will
as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
appealed from that decision, and because only questions of law are involved
in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will executed
before the New Civil Code may be considered for probate as such during the
effectivity of the same.
RULING: No.
At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted.
The law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills,
such as numbering correlatively each page in letters and signing on the left
hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with. The failure of the testator and
his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page vitiates the
testament.
What is the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father Abadia? May we
apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills?

But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity
of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not
by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death
of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the
time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes
a completed act.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and
interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and
that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death
of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of
wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator,
if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is
that the Legislature can not validate void wills.
In view of the foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.

Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610

Facts:The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He
alleged that the latters will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on
November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that
the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a
copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code,
annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 anda s certifi ed to by
the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however
denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the
Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of
such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and
recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of thePhilippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various states of theAmerican Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken
was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as
provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from
the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301.
No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws
of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed.
The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The
existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved.

Dela Cerna v. Potot

12 SCRA 576
FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint
last will ad testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given
to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them are living, he/she
will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.
Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31,
1939, the Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of
Bernabe.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela,
but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was
dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being
executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. On appeal, the order was
reversed.
ISSUE: W/N the will may be probated.

HELD: Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however,
because it was probated by a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive
effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is
binding upon the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate
of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a
joint will is a separate will of each testator.
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the
wife is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate
heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife,
the will cannot be given effect.
A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal
validity of the will subject to such probate.

Estate of Amos Bellis,

Succession Nationality of the Decedent Legitimes
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By
his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis
et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children.
He, however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria
Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his
Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both

wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be
applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine
the successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et
al, are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national
law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.