G.R. No.

L-48050
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994 ]
FELICIDAD JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH I,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES AND REINO ROSETE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing the final decision of the city
court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry, and on the basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet
title on the ground of res judicata. We summon the time-honored remedies accion interdictal, accion publiciana and
accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues presented in the petition.
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the
Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands,
Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a
certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and 3 therein that x x x plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a certain parcel of land situated at Lower
Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, said lot being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision
since 1961 and up to the present time, until the day and incidents hereinafter narrated x x x x Sometime on
December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme,
strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance
of hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry
was further augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete,
likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and
by these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land which contains an area of 200
square meters, more or less.[1]
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,[2] dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the ground that "it
appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the
plaintiff x x x x"[3] The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 when
the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br. 3,[4] dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to
prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641.[5]
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and
appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200
square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in
dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 926, petitioner
instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino

Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0,
alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that x x x plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo
Townsite Subdivision x x x covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the
province of Zambales x x x x Sometime in December, 1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an application
filed on December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have squatted, illegally occupied and unlawfully
possessed the southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-described property of about 200 square meters, then by
defendant BEN BABOL and now by defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his property to
the latter, including the portion in question x x x x[6]
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein) moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading.
In its Order dated 27 January 1978,[7] the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1,[8] sustained the argument of
Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.[9] Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes
of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her subsequent
petition for quieting of title. She argues that private respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense of res
judicata, was never impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in personam; neither was he a purchaser
pendente lite who, perhaps, could have validly invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to the cause of
action, she maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is
merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which
looks into the ownership of the disputed land.
Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in
interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first action. On the issue of identity of
causes of action, he simply states that neither of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the
subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus, private respondent continues, both cases
have to be dismissed.
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following
requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between
the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.[10] The presence of the first
three requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only
issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties
and of causes of action which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly
ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties.[11] It is
fundamental that the application of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a
subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties although in the second action there is
one party who was not joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the first
or second action,[12] or is a mere nominal party.[13] Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides that "x x x
the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the

commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity."
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by title
subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity
of parties between the two actions. But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of
action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who has
lawful title over the disputed property.[14] Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or
material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror."[15] And, a judgment rendered in a case for
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any
way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.[16]
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and
Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria
under Art. 434[17] of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion
interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly
sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared
the owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.
[18]

The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado,[19] decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has preserved the
age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely,
accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of
the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's
possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court;[20] accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion
de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in
the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel
of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.[21] It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.[22]
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without
asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership,
specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in
Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical
possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute
owner in fee simple" of the parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint
in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of
plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of
such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other

issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.[23]
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria,[24] even if we treat Civil Case No. 2203-0
as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from that for ejectment.
Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the
prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying
reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court a quo and the latter to proceed with the
trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

411 Phil. 552

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001 ]
PACENCIO ABEJARON, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ALEJANDRO ABEJARON,
PETITIONER, VS. FELIX NABASA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N*
PUNO, J.:
With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in the limited land resource, especially so if, as in the
case at bar, one's home of many years stands on the land in dispute. It comes as no surprise therefore that while
this case involves a small parcel of land, a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General
Santos City, the parties have tenaciously litigated over it for more than twenty years.
Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent court's Decision dated April 26,
1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing the trial court's decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the
owner of the subject lot.
The following facts spurred the present controversy:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a
175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded
on the North by Road, on the South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West by
Road."[1] In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the
land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small
store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a two-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet or 87.78
square meters made of round wood and nipa roofing.[2] This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot
1, Block 5, Psu-154953 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner's daughter,
Conchita Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron built another
store which stands up to the present. In 1951, he planted five coconut trees on the property in controversy.
Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abejaron, harvested coconuts from these trees.[3] Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana
and avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher pump.[4] All this time that the Abejarons introduced these improvements
on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land,
for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and 1978.[5] The last two declarations state that petitioner Abejaron's
house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Psu 154953.[6] Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and 1981.[7]
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953.[8] Nabasa built his house about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Beatriz
Gusila, a neighbor of the Abejarons and the Nabasas confirmed that when she arrived in Silway in 1949, Nabasa was
not yet residing there while Abejaron was already living in their house which stands to this day.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron merely watched them
do the survey[9] and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it
was government property.[10] Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa "clandestinely,

willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu154953, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.[11] Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the part
of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa
represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's
118-square meter portion despite knowledge of Abejaron's actual occupation and possession of said portion.[12]
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the title included petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion of
the lot, his son, Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron's wife), filed a protest with the
Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed on
November 22, 1979 for failure of Matilde and Alejandro to attend the hearings.[13] Alejandro claims, however, that they
did not receive notices of the hearings. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 10, 1980.
Alejandro also filed a notice of adverse claim on January 14, 1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of Lands
to treat the motion as an appeal considering that it was filed within the 60-day reglementary period. The motion for
reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the District Land Office XI-3 of the Bureau of Lands in Koronadal,
Cotabato to the Director of Lands in Manila on November 24, 1981.[14] But because the appeal had not been resolved
for a prolonged period for unknown reasons, petitioner Abejaron filed on March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance
with damages against respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.[15] On May
10, 1982, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens.[16]
Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner. Lagsub stated that on March 30, 1980, Alejandro
Abejaron hired him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, the land in controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring
175 square meters. Fifty-seven (57) square meters of Lot 1 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 3 were occupied by
Nabasa's house. This portion was fenced partly by hollow blocks and partly by bamboo. On the remaining 118
square meters stood a portion of petitioner Abejaron's house and two coconut trees near it, and his store. Abejaron's
118-square meter portion was separated from Nabasa's 57-square meter part by Abejaron's fence made of hollow
blocks. Both Nabasa's and Abejaron's houses appeared more than twenty years old while the coconut trees
appeared about 25 years old.
Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu-154953. He was then hired by the Silway
Neighborhood Association to conduct the survey for purposes of allocating lots to the members of the association,
among whom were respondent Nabasa and petitioner Abejaron. When the 1971 survey was conducted, both the
Abejarons and Nabasa were already occupying their respective 118 and 57 square meter portions of Lot 1, Block 5.
Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron, representative of petitioner, were present during the survey.[17]
Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends that he had been residing on a 12 x 15 meter or 180square meter public land in Silway, General Santos City since 1945. He admits that petitioner Abejaron was already
residing in Silway when he arrived there. Nabasa constructed a house which stands to this day and planted five
coconut trees on this 180-square meter land, but only two of the trees survived. Nabasa never harvested coconuts
from these trees as petitioner Abejaron claims to own them and harvests the coconuts. In many parts of respondent
Nabasa's testimony, however, he declared that he started occupying the 180-square meter area in 1976.[18]
Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in possession of portions of Lot 2, Psu-154953. This
lot was subsequently surveyed and divided into smaller lots with the area of petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2,
Block 5, Psu-154953 measuring one hundred eighty (180) square meters, while his was designated as Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953 with an area of one hundred seventy five (175) square meters.
Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner Abejaron gave this lot to his daughter Conchita AbejaronAbellon and allowed her to file the application with the District Land Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South
Cotabato. Conchita secured Free Patent No. (XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2. Pursuant to this, she was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4420. On April 27, 1981, Conchita's title was transcribed in the Registration Book of General

Santos City.
Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for Free Patent over Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with the
District Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato. While the application was pending,
petitioner Abejaron forcibly encroached upon the northern and southwestern portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-159543.
Abejaron fenced the disputed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1 and despite Nabasa's opposition, constructed a store
near the road. Petitioner Abejaron then transferred his old house constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 to a
portion of the disputed 118-square meter area. Petitioner's daughter, Conchita, patentee and title holder of Lot 2,
constructed her own house in Lot 2.
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued to respondent Nabasa on September 24, 1974. But
before the patent could be transcribed on the Registration Book of the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the
District Land Officer of District Land Office No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation of an administrative protest filed by the
petitioner.[19] The protest was given due course, but petitioner Abejaron or his representative failed to appear in the
hearings despite notice.
On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was dismissed by the District Land Officer for failure of petitioner
Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings despite notice.[20] Respondent Nabasa's Free Patent No. (XI4)-2877 was then re-transmitted by the District Land Officer of District Land Office XI-4 to the Register of Deeds,
General Santos City, and the same was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Registry of Property of General
Santos City on December 13, 1979. Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140, covering Lot 1, Block 2, Psu-154953,
was issued to respondent Nabasa.[21]
On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for reconveyance with damages
seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.
During the trial, respondent Nabasa presented Abundio Guiral, his neighbor who had been living since 1945 in Lot 3,
Block 5, Psu-154953, adjoining Nabasa's Lot 1. He testified that when he arrived in Silway, petitioner Abejaron was
already living there. Four months after, Nabasa started residing in the area. Nabasa constructed a house, planted
coconut trees, and fenced his 12 x 15 meter area. Abejaron's house in 1945 is still the same house he lives in at
present, but in 1977, it was jacked up and transferred from Lot 2 to Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa tried to prevent the
transfer to no avail. The house was then extended towards Lot 2.[22]
On rebuttal, petitioner Abejaron presented two neighbors. One of them, Alejandra Doria, started living in Silway in
1947. She testified that when she arrived in the neighborhood, Abejaron's fence as it now stands between the 57square meter portion occupied by Nabasa's house and the 118-square meter area claimed by petitioner Abejaron
was already there.[23] The other neighbor, Pacencia Artigo, also started living in Silway in 1947. She declared that the
house of the Abejarons stands now where it stood in 1947. She also testified that the Abejarons previously had a
store smaller than their present store.[24]
On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Abejaron, viz:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio Abejaron over 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P-4140
erroneous and a mistake, and for which, defendant Felix Nabasa is hereby ordered to reconvey and execute a
registerable document in favor of plaintiff Pacencio Abejaron, Filipino, married and a resident of Silway, General
Santos City, his heirs, successors and assigns over an area of one hundred eighteen (118) square meters of Lot No.
1, Block 5, Psu-154953, situated at Silway, General Santos City, on the Western portion of said lot as shown in the
sketch plan, Exhibit "R", and the remaining portion of 57 square meters of said lot to be retained by defendant Felix

Nabasa;
2) Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of this judgment, the Clerk of Court shall executed (sic) it
in the name of Felix Nabasa, widower, and will have the same effect as if executed by the latter and the Register of
Deeds, General Santos City, is hereby directed to issue New Transfer Certificate of Title to Alejandro Abejaron over
118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, and New Transfer Certificate of Title over 57 square meters of
same Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, in favor of Felix Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-4140 of Felix
Nabasa cancelled accordingly."
Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April
26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent Nabasa, viz:
". . . the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. In this case, Abejaron failed to substantiate the existence of
actual fraud. . . There was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor
was there a claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the title, thus, the title has become indefeasible (Frias v.
Esquival, 67 SCRA 487). Abejaron was not able to establish his allegation that Nabasa misrepresented his status of
possession in his application for the title. . . In fact, in Abejaron's answer to Nabasa's counterclaim, he said that
Nabasa has been occupying the area since 1950.
Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, the Bureau of Lands conducted an ocular inspection before the title was
issued. This was confirmed by Abejaron himself (tsn, January 19, 1984).
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered declaring Felix Nabasa as the owner of the lot covered by O.C.T. No. P-4140. Costs against plaintifappellee.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. On July 22, 1988, the Court of
Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari with the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACTUAL FRAUD WAS COMMITTED
BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PROVEN BY THE PETITIONER AND SUSTAINED BY THE TRIAL COURT
WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROCURED THE TITLE IN HIS NAME OF THE AREA OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION, LOT 1, BLOCK 5, LOCATED AT SILWAY, DADIANGAS, GENERAL SANTOS CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO
THE PETITIONER IS LOT 2 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FORCIBLY
ENTERED INTO LOT 1 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND FORCIBLY TRANSFERRED HIS OLD HOUSE
FROM LOT 2 TO LOT 1 IS BASED ONLY ON THE SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPETENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS A
CLEAR RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN IN ACTUAL AND LAWFUL
POSSESSION FOR SO MANY YEARS AND A CLAIMANT OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION."
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value.[25] The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set
aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the property
in controversy is not the real owner thereof.[26] Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.[27]
Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. He in fact admits that he believed the land in
dispute was public in character, thus he did not declare it for taxation purposes despite possession of it for a long
time. Neither did he apply for title over it on the mistaken belief that he could not apply for title of a public land. In his
Complaint, he stated that respondent Nabasa's fraudulent procurement of Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and OCT No.
P-4140 over the disputed land deprived him not of ownership, but of his "right to file the necessary application
thereon with the authorities concerned"[28] as long-time possessor of the land.
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance is proper, viz:
". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of land to prosper, it is not necessary that the proponent be the
absolute owner thereof. It is enough that the proponent has an equitable right thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff
had been in lawful, open, continuous and notorious possession, occupation and control in the concept of an owner of
a greater portion of the subject lot since 1945 and have (sic) thereby acquired an equitable right thereon protected by
law. Possession of public lands once occupation of the same is proven, as the herein plaintiff did, under claim of
ownership constitutes a grant from the state (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). A portion of the public land ceased
to be public as soon as its claimant had performed all the conditions essential to a grant (Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875)."[29]
Petitioner's contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief Justice Teehankee's dissent in the Villanueva case, is
similar to the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina v. Vda. de Sonza, et al.[30] In that case, plaintiff filed in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an action for cancellation of the original certificate of title procured by the
defendant by virtue of a homestead patent. The title covered a public land which she claimed to own through public,
open, and peaceful possession for more than thirty years. The law applicable in that case, which petitioner Abejaron
apparently relies on in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, viz:
"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration
Decree), to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter." (emphasis supplied)
Citing Susi v. Razon,[31] the Court interpreted this law, viz:

". . . where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical
possession openly, continuously, and publicly with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts -an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as
Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. (Italics supplied)"
The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar,[32] another action for cancellation of title issued pursuant to a
free patent. Again, the Court ruled that under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, with the plaintiff's proof of occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessor-in-interest, title over the land had vested in him as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thenceforth, the land was no longer disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent.[33] The Court held, viz:
"As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v. Pineda Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L14722, May 25, 1960) when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of public domain, and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent."[34]
In citing Republic v. Villanueva, et al.,[35] petitioner Abejaron relied on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Teehankee. However, the en banc majority opinion in that case and in Manila Electric Company v. Bartolome,[36]
departed from the doctrines enunciated in the Susi, Mesina, and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez.[37] the Court
ruled that "the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under Sec. 48(b) of
Com. Act. No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, is 'derecho dominical incoativo' and that before the issuance
of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State."[38]
The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are different from the oft-cited Susi case as the latter
involved a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, while the land in dispute in the
Villanueva and Meralco cases were sought to be titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. In
explaining the nature of land possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,[39]
viz:
"All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."
In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[40] this Court en banc recognized the
strong dissent registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in the Villanueva case and abandoned the Villanueva and
Meralco ruling to revert to the Susi doctrine. Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court ruled:
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself [Sec. 48(b)] that the possessor(s) 'x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x.' No proof being

admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length
of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete."[41]
(Emphasis supplied)
This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case of Rural Bank of Compostela v. Court of Appeals,
a ponencia of now Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[42] viz:
"The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942), is that when the
conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right
to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands."[43]
The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not petitioner Abejaron has satisfied the conditions specified
in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. Sec. 48(b) has been further amended by P.D.
No. 1073 which took effect on January 25, 1977. Sec. 4 of the P.D. reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945."
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter." (Italics ours)[44]
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of
said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As
the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon
Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in
1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[45] that the
law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or
their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[46]
Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
1942, we now determine whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land. In doing so, it is
necessary for this Court to wade through the evidence on record to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the 118-square meter disputed land for 30 years
at least since January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive on the parties and upon this Court, which will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal unless

these findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.[47] One instance
when findings of fact of the appellate court may be reviewed by this Court is when, as in the case at bar, the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.[48]
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built a nipa house, a small
store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-storey
house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of
hollow blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner
planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown continued existence of these improvements on
the disputed land, they were introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the
disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24,
1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years
which he may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was
surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult
to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of
specific and incontrovertible proof.
The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo, and Beatriz Gusila, could not
also further his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated that they started residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying
whether it was on or prior to January 24, 1947, while Gusila arrived in the neighborhood in 1949. While Doria
testified that there was a fence between Abejaron's and Nabasa's houses in 1947, she did not state that Abejaron's
118-square meter area was enclosed by a fence which stands to this day. This is confirmed by Geodetic Engineer
Lagsub's 1984 survey plan which shows that a fence stands only on one side of the 118-square meter area, the side
adjacent to Nabasa's 57-square meter portion. Again, this poses the problem of determining the area actually
occupied and possessed by Abejaron at least since January 24, 1947.
Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax
receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by
other effective proof.[49] Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the
earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through
possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to
the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."[50] As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced
any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free
patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.
In De La Pea v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan,[51] the petitioner filed an action for reconveyance, claiming
preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare of land and imputing fraud and misrepresentation to
respondent in securing a free patent and original certificate of title over the land in controversy. The action for
reconveyance was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, viz:
"It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously
titled in another's name. (Tomas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v.
Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 [1958];
Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 [1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil. 261 [1948]).
In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is
only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January 1947. . . Title

to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty
(30) years. . . Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. (Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 [1936]) In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to
whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to
the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions
imposed by the law. (See Sec. 101 of C.A. 141 [Public Land Act]; Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 [1957];
Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 [1955]). Not being an applicant,
much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance." (emphasis supplied)[52]
In the more recent case of Tankiko, et al. v. Cezar, et al.,[53] plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
they were the actual occupants and residents of a 126,112-square meter land which was titled to another person.
The trial court dismissed the action, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Despite the appellate court's
finding that plaintiffs had no personality to file the action for reconveyance, the disputed land being part of the public
domain, it exercised equity jurisdiction to avoid leaving unresolved the matter of possession of the land in dispute.
On appeal to this Court, we reinstated the decision of the trial court and dismissed the action for reconveyance, viz:
". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed and relief sought, has a clear right that he
seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. In
the present case, respondents have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land in question is merely
inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for sales patents on the land, they are not and they
do not even claim to be owners thereof.
Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they admit that they are not the
owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in character
and that it should revert to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares
that only the government may institute an action for reconveyance of ownership of a public land. . .
xxx
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the
owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit.
Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
xxx
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil.
1157, September 23, 1957, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the
patent was obtained by fraudulent means and consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the
cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government,
to which the property would revert."[54]
Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the proper party to file an
action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion.[55] He has the specific power
and function to "represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" and to "institute actions
for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in
violation of the Constitution."[56] Since respondent Nabasa's Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title originated
from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[57]

Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal standing to sue and is not the real party in interest, we
deem it unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud and the other issues raised in the petition. These shall be timely
for adjudication if a proper suit is filed by the Solicitor General in the future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2492 before the Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato, Branch 1, is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

NOT SURE IF THIS IS THE CORRECT CASE (312 SCRA 180)

371 Phil. 107
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999 ]
JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO AND
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T. Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa
Magpayo and Sheriff of Makati, Defendants, Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".[1]
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz:
"Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel
Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter
Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).
"On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure
a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four Thousand (P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two Hundred
Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom.
"On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545
was issued in the name of the Magpayos.
"The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos
title.
"The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at
the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land.
"The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title
over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 138233 was issued in its name.
"On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint
was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
"On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted.
"Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession
of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion

was denied.
"Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and
damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T.
Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover.
"In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is belied by the fact that it is not among
the properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City, Branch
27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of
Administration, Pedro V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator".
"The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's
parents to enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from PBCom.
"Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be rendered in his favor to which PBCom
counter-motioned that judgment should be rendered in its favor.
"The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that PBCom raised in its answer both
factual and legal issues which could only be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
"The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment."[2]
In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo spouses in favor of
PBCom was void. It found that:
"x x x [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in favor of the defendant PBCom
on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet the owners of the property. This finding is evident from the other
undisputed fact that a new Torrens title was issued to the defendants Magpayo spouses only on March 9, 1981 x x x.
The Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale
because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and
hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document (MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134).
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the said mortgage is null and void for lack of one of the essential
elements of a mortgage as required by Art. 2085 of our Civil Code x x x."[3]
Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to PBCom. Dissatisfied, PBCom
appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:
"(P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property was not transmitted to his sister and her
husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse
possession thereof does not lie.
"For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into possession of the disputed property only upon the
demise of his mother, from whom he alleges to have inherited it but who was not the registered owner of the property,
that is, on October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records), by which admission he is bound. Since the
execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on August 1,
1980, then contrary to his claim, plaintiff-appellee was not in possession of the property at the time of the execution
of said public instrument.
"Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was registered in his name
and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to
exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the land.
"`When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of sale is also registered, the sale may
be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55).'

"That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following the execution of the deed of real
estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended
merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land (Municipality of Victorias v. Court of
Appeals, 149 SCRA 32, 44-45 [1987])."
Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of the above decision which was denied. He now comes before us
raising the following errors committed by the Court of Appeals:
I
The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of proceedings when it decided
the appeal subject of this case based on issues which were raised neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief.
II
The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable jurisprudence when it disregarded
the admissions of the private respondents and, despite ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own
findings of facts which were contrary to the said admissions.
III
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established jurisprudence and even
contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the Summary Judgment is concerned.
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals resolved the issues of "ownership"
and "possession" though they were not raised by PBCom in its appellant's brief. The allegation is belied by page 17
of PBCom's appellate brief, viz:
"Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that `Magpayo Spouses could not have acquired the
property merely by the execution of the deed of sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff'
(Order, p. 10).
"Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession. Ownership and possession are two
entirely different legal concepts.
"Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only `at the time of the filing of the complaint in this
present case up to the present.' (page 2, Summary Judgment).
"Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into
ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith
(to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so
because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the
issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985."
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts were admitted by the parties in the
trial court:
"1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V. Garcia and Remedios Tablan Garcia;
"2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property of the said spouses;
"3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the present in actual physical possession of the
property. At the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo spouses, petitioner was in possession of the property;

"4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation of law,
a co-owner of the property;
"5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in
possession of the subject property."[4]
We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these alleged admitted facts are his own
paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed by the trial court in the summary judgment.[5] Indeed, petitioner did
not cite any page number of the records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who admitted the said
facts.
Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is entitled to summary judgment merits
scant attention. A summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an expeditious
settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important
questions or issues of fact are involved (except the determination of the amount of damages) and that therefore the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[6] Under Rule 34, either party may move for a summary
judgment - the claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz:
"Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof."
It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless, PBCom likewise moved for a
summary judgment with supporting affidavit and documentary exhibits, to wit:
"COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT"
"PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment"
"The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the defending parties who may be the object of
unfounded claims as clearly shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34."
x x x.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render summary judgment in PBCom's favor by
DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps. Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous."[7]
Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to summary judgment as prayed
for by both parties.
We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the
rights of others.[8] Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by
way of sale.[9] Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when
they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right.[10] Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a
holder.[11] "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so."[12] On the
other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."[13] The records show that petitioner occupied the
property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court

of Appeals[14] that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in
possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer
of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's share in
the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by
his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered owned
by petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo
spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after the
mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such
ownership over a particular property.[15] The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property
sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership.[16] All said, the Magpayo spouses were
already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.[17]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

56 Phil. 117
[ G. R. No. 35223, September 17, 1931 ]
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO. ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This proceeding originated in a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc., for the delivery of the amount of P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit for that sum payable
on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma; the complaint further prays that the sugar central
be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends,
or otherwise, and to pay the plaintiff a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment mentioned in the complaint, and that
the sale made by said Mariano Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which
Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as bonus, because that would be
civil fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to, and by virtue
of a deed of assignment, and praying that said central be ordered to deliver directly to the intervening bank said sum
on account of the latter's credit against the aforesaid Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
The corporation Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., answered the complaint stating that of Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
credit, P7,500 belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchased it, and praying that it be absolved from the
com- plaint and that the proper party be named so that the remainder might be delivered.
Cesar Ledesma, in turn, claiming to be the owner by purchase in good faith and for a consideration of the P7,500
which is a part of the credit referred to above, answered praying that he be absolved from the complaint.
The plaintiff Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., answered the third party claim alleging that its credit against Mariano
Lacson Ledesma was prior and preferential to that of the intervening bank, and praying that the latter's complaint be
dismissed.
At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma of the P7,500
part of the credit in question, for which reason the trial court dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint against
Cesar Ledesma authorizing the defendant central to deliver to him the aforementioned sum of P7,500. And upon
conclusion of the hearing, the 'court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to receive the
amount of P11,076.02 which was Mariano Lacson Ledesma's bonus, and it ordered the defendant central to deliver
said sum to the plaintiff.
The Philippine National Bank appeals, assigning the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court:

1. In holding that the bonus which the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., bound itself to pay the planters who had
mortgaged their land to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of the debt of said central to
said bank is not civil fruits of said land.

2. In not holding that said bonus became subject to the mortgage executed by the defendant Mariano
Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of his personal debt to said bank
when it fell due.
3. In holding that the assignment (Exhibit 9, P. N. B.) of said bonus made on March 7, 1930, by Mariano
Lacson Ledesma to the Philippine National Bank to be applied to the payment of his debt to said Philippine
National Bank is fraudulent.
4. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., in civil case No. 31597 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
levied a valid attachment upon the bonus in question.
5. In admitting and considering the supplementary complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., alleging
as a cause of action the attachment of the bonus in question which said Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., in civil
case No. 31821 of the Court of First Instance of Manila levied after the filing of the original complaint in this
case, and after Mariano Lacson Ledesma in this case had been declared in
default.
*
6. In holding that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., has a preferential right to receive from the Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 which is in the possession of said corporation as the bonus to be paid to
Mariano Lacson Ledesma, and in ordering the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said amount to the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
7. In not holding that the Philippine National Bank has a preferential right to receive from the Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc., the amount of P11,076.02 held by said corporation as Mariano Lacson Ledesma's bonus,
and in not ordering said Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to deliver said amount to the Philippine National
Bank.
8. In not holding that the amended complaint and the supplementary complaint of the Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc., do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.,
and against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., or against the Philippine National Bank.*'

The appellant bank bases its preferential right upon the contention that the bonus in question is civil fruits of the
land which the owners had mortgaged for the benefit of the central giving the bonus, and that, as civil fruits of said
land, said bonus was assigned by Mariano Lacson Ledesma on March 7, 1930, by virtue of the document Exhibit
S of said intervening institution, which admitted in its brief that "if the bonus in question is not civil fruits or rent
which became subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank when Mariano Lacson Ledesma's
personal obligation fell due, the assignment of March 7, 1930 (Exhibit 9, P. N. B.), is null and void, not because it is
fraudulent, for there was no intent of fraud in execufcing the deed, but that the cause or consideration of the assignment was erroneous, for it was based upon the propo- sition that the bonus was civil fruits of the land mortgaged
to the Philippine National Bank." (P. 31.)
The fundamental question, then, submitted to our consid- eration is whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits.
This is how that bonus came to be granted: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was
indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters,
among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the creditor bank. And in order to
compensate those planters for the risk they were running with their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid

central, by a resolution passed on that same date, i. e., December 22, 1923, and amended on March 23, 1928,
undertook to credit the owners of the plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per centum of
the debt secured according to the yearly balance, the payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from
time to time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the aforesaid bank, and of those contracted by
virtue of the contract of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon as it obtained from said bank
authority to make such payment. (Exhibits 5, 6; P. N. B.)
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds
from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. It
may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras andlogas" refers only to rents or income,
for the adjectives "otras" and "andlogas" agree with the noun "rentes," as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas"
and "vitalicias" That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three
things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not the rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left to be examined is
that of "income."
Assuming that in the broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in question is
"income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived from the land mortgaged by
Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the benefit of the central; for if it is not obtained from that land
but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's contention is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote and accidental relation to the land
mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the
bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income
arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from Mariano Lac- son Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the
pro- tection of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this
case is concerned, has nothing to do with it. Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of the mortgaged property, but
upon the total value of the debt thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct
from and independent of the property referred to.
Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without express finding as to costs. So
ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

489 Phil. 200

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 156360, January 14, 2005 ]
CESAR SAMPAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ AND
FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Cesar Sampayan seeks
the annulment and setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557, to wit:
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his petition for review and affirming an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable judgment of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry case thereat commenced
against him by herein private respondents, the brother-and-sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano;
and
2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied his motion for reconsideration.
From the pleadings and memoranda respectively filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following factual
antecedents:
On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia
Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge,
consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private respondents), substantially alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was
the owner and actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mothers death on January 11, 1984, they became
co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily
absent from the lot in question, defendant Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a
house thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite their repeated demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and
surrender the possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do so.
In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the
plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he does not even know plaintiffs
identities or their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because
he asked and was given permission therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. In the same answer,
Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been
possessed and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960,
and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado, while
the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both vendees, so Sampayan
averred, have actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the present. He thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
In the ensuing proceedings following the joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that they have been in actual

possession of Lot No. 1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his entry thereto, submitted in evidence the
following documents:
1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita;
2. Certificate of Death showing the date of death of Cristita Quita on January 11, 1984;
3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. Labonete, Land Management Officer-III of CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9, Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur showing that Lot 1959, PLS-225 is covered by a Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;
4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to the effect that he was the one who gave the lot in question to Cristita Quita
sometime in 1957 and that since then the latter had been occupying the lot;
Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for the purpose of showing that Cristita Quita
is one of the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149. Together with said position paper, they submitted a copy of the
Answer/Opposition earlier filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said cadastral case, Cristita Quita was claiming Lot
1959, thus her name appeared in the list of oppositors therein.
5. The decision in the said Cadastral Case No. 149 showing that the then Court of First Instance of Agusan del Sur
declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the lots subject of the same cadastral case.
For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove the allegations in his answer, offered in evidence the following:
1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels Tax Declaration 8103;
2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol which cancels Tax Declaration No. A-11698;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by Jesus Oriol for and in behalf of the
spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the
couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida who possessed the one-half (1/2) portion and introduced
improvements thereon, such as coconut and caimito trees;
4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of Portion of Land, executed by the spouses Oriol in favor of the same couple
Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen the transfer of possession and whatever
possessory rights the Oriols had in the lot in question;
5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol with the conformity of Teodosio Mosquito
(another claimant), to prove that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado
whose overseer allowed Sampayan to enter and occupy the premises;
6. Protest filed with the CENRO, Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana Sambale-Occida against the Miscellaneous
Sales Application of Cristita Quita;
7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting to the fact that she is residing in Lot No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in
question, since 1960 up to the present. In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed that neither Cristita Quita, much less
the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. She claimed that it was the Occida couple who possessed said lot
and introduced improvements thereon; and
8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria Ybaez to show the impossibility of plaintiffs possession of the same lot.
Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC, the presiding judge thereof personally

conducted an ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties and/or their counsels. Among those
found in the area during the inspection are: the house of defendant Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain
Peter Siscon; and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayans
witnesses.
Based on his ocular findings, the judge concluded that the improvements he saw in the premises could never have
been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the same lot. Reproduced by
petitioner Jose Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in the Memorandum he subsequently filed with this Court,
the MCTC judges findings and observations during the ocular inspection, about which the herein private respondents
took no exception whatsoever, are hereunder quoted, as follows:
Noted inside the land are the house of the defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of Peter Siscon, which appears to be
dilapidated, and part of the house of Macario Noynay which encroached to the land in question. Planted on the land
are five (5) coconut trees, fruit bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing coconut trees, and three (3) star apple or caimito
trees. Defendant Sampayan admitted that he started occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted by the parties
during the ocular inspection that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr.
and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol.
The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his predecessorsin-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in
question.
Nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiffs had once upon a time been in possession of the land. The
allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said
property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked
claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Clearly, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the predecessors-in-interest of the defendant, it is
showed that they have been in possession of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the plaintiffs, if
any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession[1] (Emphasis supplied).
In time, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit.
Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan del Sur, which appeal was raffled to
Branch VII thereof. In a decision dated December 5, 1996, said court reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the
fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over the lot. On the basis of such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-ininterest of the herein private respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of Lot No. 1959.
Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review, thereat
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43557.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision dated May 16, 2002,[2]
denied Sampayans petition. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by that court in its
Resolution of November 7, 2002,[3] Sampayan is now with us via the present recourse, it being his submissions I.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF
BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL SUR, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE
HEARING THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID MUNICIPAL COURT THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA OR
PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER ACTION;
II.

THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
BEEN IN PRIOR ACTUAL POSSESSION IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND CONSIDERING
THAT THE POSSESSION TO BE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CONSIST (SIC) IN THE EXERCISE OF DOMINIUM
OVER IT, SUCH AS FENCING, CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE ACTS OF EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY
AND CONTROL FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE - IS CONTRARY TO
LAW.[4]
In the main, petitioner maintains that based on the pieces of evidence on record, he had sufficiently proven his prior
physical possession of the subject lot. Upon this premise, he argues that private respondents complaint for forcible
entry has no leg to stand on, adding that the proper remedy available to the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de
posesion which falls under the original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
As we see it, the arguments put forward by the petitioner crystallize to one pivotal question: will the complaint for
forcible entry in this case prosper? To resolve this, however, we must first determine as to who between the herein
parties was in prior actual physical possession of the subject lot at the time the complaint was filed in the MCTC. For,
as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim[5],
xxx In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and
that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. xxx
We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of
his complaint.
Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of
course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA,[6] we wrote:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial
of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the
Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case.
However, before delving into the question of who as between the petitioner and private respondents had prior
physical possession of the subject lot, we deem it best to first resolve the issue of whether or not the MCTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case, an issue also raised by the petitioner.
Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that private respondents proper remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de
posesion, and not forcible entry, petitioner would deny the MCTCs jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner is in error.
In Sarmiento vs. CA[7], we held:
[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the

statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of
the complaint. x x x
Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the
complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived
thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth.[8] The complaint in this case makes
such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered
improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.
We shall now address the more decisive question of prior physical possession.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find for the petitioner.
To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular
inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now
petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees,
coconut trees, and others on the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had
once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita,
the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly,
exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing since 1960 onward
on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their mother had ever
possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor, Dionesias statement commands great
weight and respect. Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the
house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private
respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold that the
mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because
not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution, respectively dated May 16,
2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.