Koha Digest # 100

Front page: CAN A COW SAVE SERBIA?

Date: 17 April 1996

EDITORIAL

CAN A COW SAVE SERBIA?

by VETON SURROI

While discussions on the disaster were going on in Britain, the European Union was creating
a joint front to eliminate British cows, affected by the BSE virus or "disease of mad cows",
from their common market. It seems that the only one who was happy on this occasion was
Serbian minister Djonovic who said that "the mad cows are our chance".

Many things have been said about Serbia, but this must be one of the most original ones. And
waiting for the Cow to save Serbia, two key parallel political processes are developing. On
one hand, Serbia (FRY) is making steps towards recognition by EU, after reciprocal
recognition with Macedonia. Thus, the Serbian government is showing its population that its
statehood is being recognised by powerful and rich European states.

But, on the other hand, Serbia has found itself in the position of a man who is participating in
a marathon run for the first time, but who gets tired after first three hundred metres: it has
started to discover that it is exhausted. The whole incident with the governor of the National
Bank, Avramovic, and his position towards international financial institutions, shows the
points of fear of the Serbian regime.

The regime now needs money for financing agriculture and for the revival of the industry, and
during this year it will need money to fill in the gaps in pension funds before elections. There
are two ways: to ask for the money from abroad or to print bank notes without coverage. The
governor says that money should be sought from abroad and that all conditions set by the
International Monetary Fund should be accepted, including the fact that "FRY" cannot be the
exclusive successor of SFRY. The regime says the conditions should not be accepted, and it
even requests from the Governor to print money. The Serbian regime is facing two options
with the same negative effect: either print notes and experience a higher rate of hyper
inflation (now it is over 7 per cent per month), or to accept international conditions that leave
it without the matter it has insisted on since beginning of dissolution of SFRY, that FRY is
the successor of SFRY.

Hyper-inflation destroys the economic substance of the state, the state economy and its
infrastructure. It leaves it in the position which we remember, not regretting it, when one
could buy many, many things and pay for communal services with 10 German Marks. The
loss of continuity of succession, has already happened. The UN Security Council, like all
international relevant institutions, has sanctioned that official Belgrade is not the successor of
the Belgrade that died in 1990/1991. To the Serbian regime, and especially to the Serbian
president, succession and all this struggle for it have ambiguous values. To show that during
the destruction of Yugoslavia, he was the only one in favor of its preservation and that all
others were separatists. And, not to fill-out the damned application for UN membership.
Why? Maybe because some adviser could have told him, for example, that when India was

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separated, two states recognised by UN, India and Pakistan, emerged. Several years later,
independence of Bangladesh originated from Pakistan's independence.What connections does
the Hindu sub-continent have with Belgrade? The Cow. In India it is sacred, in Belgrade, if it
is mad, it is an inspiration for happiness.

FRY's RECOGNITION

THE AVALANCHE OF RECOGNITION AND DESPAIR

by BATON HAXHIU \ Prishtina

There are three main news of this week which have directly
revealed the problem of status of Kosova and prejudged it in
advance: the Document of the Center for Preventive Action,
New York; the Communique of the European Union and "the
avalanche" of the recognition of FRY. The first two initiatives
belong to important institutions and add to clarifying the
position of Kosova and clearly decipher the future of its
political contours. This is best reflected in the fourth point of
the communique of the European Union and the largest part
of the document of the Center for Preventive Action.

The recognition of the sovereignty of FRY by the international

community is an act notified in advance, but also a proof that
the conditions stipulated for the normalisation of diplomatic
relations with the so called FRY are not respected. And,
states, clearly define their personal interests. "The avalanche"
of recognition was launched by France, soon to be joined by
tens of European states, despite all remarks made by USA that
it was to early to recognise FRY. France normalised
diplomatic relations on grounds of the conditions set in the
communique made by the European Union.

Radio "Deutsche Welle", in the main comment, on Saturday,

advised that Germany will recognise FRY. Despite all
pressure made by the press and opposition, the American ally in
international affairs, announced that it will recognise FRY and
normalise diplomatic relations with it. Isn't this a news that
should upset every political factor in Kosova? But, even after
this, one can hear comments like the one made by Fehmi Agani in
LDK's press conference, when he stated that "the eventual
recognition of the Serb-Montenegrin Federation does not mean
normalisation of inter-state relations." Agani adds that
according to international resolutions, the recognition of this
federation is not conditioned, but the admittance of Serbia and
Montenegro in different political an financial bodies is. The
present international postures do not exclude the independence of
Kosova. "Deutsche Welle's" comment denies such an approach of

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Kosova's political leadership, adding that "Germany is not ready
to ask concessions from FRY, even when the problem of Kosova is
in question". Hydajet Hyseni, the other vice-chairman of LDK, has
disputed the prejudiced decisions reached by the international
community because, according to him, Serbian forces of aggression
have been stimulated. But those who are well aware of the
political circumstances call the present political segment no
more nor less than a real policy. Therefore, the statement made
by Hyseni that "we consider as just the conditioning of the
European Union towards Serbia, among others, with the solution of
Kosova's question, a solution that cannot be prejudiced..." is
controversial. Therefore, EU's conditioning is just and at the
same time it can't be prejudiced! Still, despite conditioning,
states continue to be recognised. How does Zejnullah Gruda,
professor of international law, explain this fact? He says that
"this recognition is a discretional action of certain states,
rather induced by political reasons than by the fulfilment of
legal conditions. We say this because there is no more rigorous
insisting not only in respecting general criteria, but even of
criteria formulated and determined by the Council of Ministers of
European Community (Union) regarding recognition of
new states in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. Thus, while
European Ministers have foreseen that for formal recognition of
new states the respect of obligations arising in most important
international acts, especially when it is dealt with the rule of
law, democracy, human rights and "guarantee of ethnic and
national rights of groups and minorities" is necessary, on the
other hand, they recognize the state although, there are few
places in the world where human rights and rights of ethnic
groups and minorities are violated in a more brutal way.

Regarding this matter, Luljeta Pula-Beqiri, stated that the

"recognition of Yugoslavia by a series of western countries and
the announcement that this process will continue by others, after
the agreement between Belgrade and Shkup was reached, is in fact
a cynical crowning of the policy of concessions towards Serbia,
permanently led by the international community". "The recognition
of Yugoslavia, with Kosova unsolved" added Pula-Beqiri, "was the
expected epilogue of the constant marginalisation and
underestimation of Kosova's question, because of the relation of
forces in this region." As an expert on international relations
and international public law, Gruda, added: "The mater of
recognition of what remained of Yugoslavia by the European
states, or the normalisation of relations and their advancement
to the level of ambassadors is a very controversial matter, and
this is not because of a simple recognition, since the interest
of international community and peaceful people is to have the
situation in Balkans normalised and the serious problems
overcome, but because European states treat the recognition a
political matter rather than an issue that needs to be solved

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within the framework of an existing legal order." This
international recognition of Yugoslavia is a powerful reflection
of shameful international recognition of the
politics of violence and terror as well as bowing
before its results. It will be reflected in Belgrade's
encouragement and the dangerous delay of the solution of Kosova's
question and towards slow but systematic ruin of the so called
"outer wall" sanctions. The question rises: how to get out of
this political dead-end imposed by the international community?
This is how Pula-Beqiri thinks: "The international community
should be conscious that by this act of recognition it can become
accomplice in the new and very serious challenge made to peace in
this region. In the meantime, the Political Movement in Kosova
should reconsider its strategy, build up its political philosophy
and develop the concept of liberation and the respective
mechanism for its implementation. This would not mean that the
movement should not follow carefully different suggestions coming
from different international instances regarding possible ways
for the realisation of the political will of the people which has
no returning back. In this sense, we consider of interest a
detailed analysis of the document and recommendations of the
American Center for Preventive Actions regarding Kosova". But we
must be careful, says Gruda, because "regretfully, the European
policy is thus bringing into the scene some phenomena which used
to be characteristic for the Berlin Congress in times of
unscrupulous bargaining at the expense of small and weak nations.
This should be noticed and said openly. Awareness is needed,
especially among Albanians." What gives hopes in the whole
problem is the good concept of the policy on the future of the
status of Kosova. What is important and should be appraised as a
positive approach to the problem of Kosova and its status, which
at the same time should be taken seriously and not accepted a
priori, is the dimension of the document of Center for Preventive
Action and agreeing to the fact that Kosova is a question in
process and that any kind of solution which could be imposed will
be only a temporary solution. Therefore, the definition of this
proposal as "temporary solution" is a new quality and requires
seriousness in approaching the problem of Kosova, and deserves
attention as such. In this regard, Luljeta Pula-Beqiri also adds
that "the assessment that after Dayton Albanians felt that their
peaceful determination was not awarded while results of Serbian
violence in Bosnia were, has been proven truly correct". Now when
it is clear how illusory was the hope of Albanians that the
lifting of the sanctions against Serbia would also be conditioned
with Kosova, leaves us on not giving in with the "outer wall",
which is also requested in the document.

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FRY's RECOGNITION

LILLIPUTIANS AND THE CLEVER GULLIVER

by ASTRIT SALIHU \ Prishtina

After France recognised Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(Serbia and Montenegro) a month ago, many other
recognitions and establishment of diplomatic relations with the
Yugoslav state followed. Last news was that Sweden,
Norway, Holland and Denmark would recognise it and that
preparations are being done in Bonn for establishment of
diplomatic relations. All this led to creation of a new political
climate. Of course, this climate also included Kosova and its
unsolved question. This is nothing new for political processes
which subordinate to a normal rule of change of situations
after impositions of new factors - as the case is now with the
recognition of FRY. But if we analyse the Albanian factor in all
this climate - it will come out that we are playing with many
unknowns in the political games. This posture can easily be
illustrated with reactions of the Albanian political subjects
regarding recognition of FRY. Thus if BUJKU, daily of April 12,
were to be considered, we would see that the information there
was rather confusing and unclear. In the first page of this
newspaper we could find the communique of the European Union in
which there were "four conditions for recognition, normalisation
and full integration" of FRY. The first condition, among others,
mentions the "reciprocal recognition of all states that emerged
from the dissolution of former Yugoslav Federation...", which
started to be implemented by recognition between Macedonia and
FRY, recently agreed in Belgrade. In the fourth condition (in the
end of the paragraph), after mentioning protection of rights of
minorities, it was also mentioned giving Kosova "a wide autonomy
within FRY". So, the process of recognition has started and is
taking hold and it is only days that are dividing FRY from full
recognition of its sovereignty - i.e., its territorial borders,
together with Kosova. The thing that makes every reader get
confused and perplexed is the second page of "BUJKU". The
reaction written by Rugova's advisor for information, after the
normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Shkup, forgetting
the first condition put to Belgrade, or the reciprocal
recognition with "all states that emerged from the former
Yugoslav federation", and published under title "Support to the
policy of force and recognition of results of aggression", which
among others states... "if the EU decides to normalise diplomatic
relations with Belgrade, not conditioning it with the issue of
Kosova, then it is sure that such a step will be considered as a
concession made to Milosevic, so Milosevic can continue with the
repression, violence and a policy which has led Kosova to where
it is now". And this was not only a reaction made by

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the advisor but this became the official posture of political
circles in Kosova - a hasty step of the European Union. The best
illustration on how hasty this step was seems to be the
information published in the same column about the visit of a
delegation of the Liberal Party of Kosova paid to several
embassies in Belgrade, such as USA, Great Britain and Austria.
This information was published, believe it or not, under title
"Yugoslavia does not exist for us". After recognitions that
followed and announcements for more recognition and normalisation
of relations with FRY, our only daily in Kosova published
articles with such titles chosen by certain editors. The best
picture of all confusions and political unclearness among
Albanians is their only daily "BUJKU", whose superficial analysis
shows a shallow political improvisation. Hence, the comfortable
appraisal of the policy led by the international factor, as a
hasty policy. Why not ask another question: isn't the policy led
by Albanians slow? Not only that one cannot exercise influence on
hasty steps of the international policy by the politic mirrored
through our daily, but one cannot even be a hurdle to "slowing
down" such steps. So it is not the matter of being hasty, but it
is rather of being slow... Thus Albanians are resembling
Lilliputians confused by the steps of the political giant who, in
the pattern story of Gulliver's Travels, was found fainted and
unconscious.

FRY's RECOGNITION

CONTROVERSIAL RECOGNITION

by ISO RUSI \ Shkup

The normalisation of relations between Macedonia and FR

Yugoslavia was the "always actual" subject of the day in the last
six months. Macedonian media, from "confident" sources, would
inform about visit that Milosevic would pay to Shkup regarding
signing of the agreement by which FRY would definitely recognise
Macedonia with its constitutional name. And when the public was
tired of announcements about the visit, the signing took place.
Foreign ministers, Milan Milutinovic and Ljubomir Frckovski,
signed the agreement to regulate relations between the two
countries on April 8, in Belgrade. And the agreement put an end
to the insecurity of relations which lasted for five years. It is
clear that FRY could not make resistance to pressure from the
west, first of all to Europe, which gave several clear messages
to Belgrade during the last month, that there would be no
normalisation unless Belgrade recognised Macedonia with its
constitutional name, therefore it was logical to expect that the
normalisation of relations would take place sooner or later,

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despite reactions from Athens. Belgrade had delayed and played
tactics hoping that the pressure coming from Europe would be
forgotten and that some of the members of the Union would follow
the example of France. But, the text of the agreement leaves open
old-new dilemmas about these relations. What does the agreement
contain and what does it leave open? The agreement is concise
regarding reciprocal respect of the parties as independent
countries within internationally recognised borders, respect of
sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful solution of
disputes, avoid of threats or use of force, strengthening of
confidence, tolerance and cooperation, establishment of
diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors, protection of
minorities in conformity with the highest internationally
recognised standards, strengthening of economic, technical and
cultural cooperation. But, the agreement leaves open
at least two things: the matter of succession of SFRY and the
problem of reciprocal borders. In other words, Article 4 of the
agreement reads: "Starting from the fact that Serbia and
Montenegro have existed as independent countries before the
creation of Yugoslavia, and taking into consideration the fact
that Yugoslavia extended the international-juridical subjectivity
of these countries, the Republic of Macedonia respects the statal
continuity of Yugoslavia. Starting from the fact that the
Macedonian people during the National Liberation War and in ASNOM
meeting decided to organise Republic of Macedonia as a state, and
remain in the Yugoslav Federation, taking into consideration the
fact that the Macedonian people decided to organise the Republic
of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent country in the
referendum in 1991 and appraising the fact that this was done in
a peaceful way, FR Yugoslavia will respect state continuity of
the Republic of Macedonia. Parties have agreed to settle their
requests for succession by mutual agreement". It was this Article
that was considered as reason to spread out the opinion that
Skopje bowed down before Belgrade's persistence to proclaim
itself as the sole legal successor of SFRY; or as the
vice-chairman of the Liberal Party, Risto Ivanov, declared in the
press conference, the text adjusted during January was changed
and we consider that in "no matter in what procedure it were
made, Macedonia would lose the status of an equal partner in
discussions regarding succession". This part of the agreement
could be interpreted as a compromise to efforts made by Belgrade
to proclaim itself as the sole successor of SFRY and refusal of
Shkup to do it, considering itself for one of several successors
of the former country, because the matter of continuity differs
from the matter of succession - Yugoslavia was recognised as the
avantgarde state, but not as the sole successor. But the
agreement of modalities "of settlement by agreement" of
reciprocal requests on basis of succession here is considered as
giving in and harming Shkupi itself. The second paragraph of
Article two of the agreement caused even more dilemmas: "Both

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parties will set up a joint diplomatic commission of experts
within 30 days from the date of the signing of the agreement.

This commission will prepare a draft international treaty where

the joint state borders will be described with respective
geographic maps attached. Both parties will then sign the
treaty." Thus, alongside agreement on territorial integrity in
the internationally recognised borders, the issue of borders
practically remains open, which according to some unofficial
information cover about 75 squared kilometres. Even before SFRY
was dissolved, Macedonia and Serbia had made statements that
during WW II territories of one republic were taken by the
other. After independence of Macedonia, in June 1994, there was
a serious incident on the border. After a short interference, 20
Yugoslav soldiers had entered 250 metres inside the territory of
Macedonia in the location called Cupino Brdo and stayed there for
one week, until the Minister of Defence had set them an ultimatum
for their retreat. It results that the existing borders could not
have been legalized by agreement which directly means that there
are disputes which couldn't be solved at the moment. Of course,
internal reactions are reduced to the pleasure of international
recognition and that Belgrade finally decided to make such a
step, despite (negative) reflections in relations with Athens,
since Belgrade was extremely careful towards Athens. Let's just
remember Milosevic's statement that "Macedonia will be recognised
as soon as it settles the disputes with our friends the Greeks".

On the other hand, reactions from local political parties, except

for Albanian ones, are positive. Meanwhile, Greece reacted
severely. For Athens, this was an unfriendly act. The government
spokesman was firm: "The agreement signed in Belgrade is not
friendly for Athens and is not in the interest of the stability
in the region". Conservative "Katemerini" wrote: "The decision
made by Milosevic for recognition is anything else but repayment
for Greek support to Belgrade about the crisis in the former
Yugoslavia". The same newspaper is engaged in moderate reactions,
because according to it "everybody is aware about Milosevic's
plans to create tutorship over all states of Former Yugoslavia
according to Tito's model". Private TV "MEGA" informed from
Washington that Greek premier Simitis, who was there for a visit,
was surprised by Belgrade's decision. The same TV broadcast the
information about "...the pleasure of American and European
diplomacies expressed after the agreement was signed". "MEGA"
broadcasted the information of the alleged dissatisfaction of
Serbian diplomats about Milosevic's decision to recognise
Macedonia, because this "was legalisation of the state of Skopje,
which Serbia would have liked to include in the new Yugoslavia."

State TV simply concluded that Belgrade's decision has its

influence in Macedonian-Greek discussions in New York, but in any

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case relations between Belgrade and Athens take "dimensions
without sentimentalism". In Athens it was considered that
Milosevic used the opportunity to recognise Macedonia when Athens
refused to abolish visas for Yugoslavs and also to give FRY some
priorities in the port of Thessaloniki. The Macedonian diplomacy,
after posting Ljubomir Frckovski, seemed to gain "in speed". The
new minister promoted the opening towards the public and an
aggressive foreign policy - offering his Greek colleague a direct
meeting, and by intensifying his official visits. Some relate
this with the efforts of the reconstructed government to prove
that it has the support of the "foreign factor". On the other
hand, the well known oppositionist, Stojan Andov, in his
interview given to "Nova Makedonija" stressed that Macedonia is
losing as regarding its foreign rating which is reflected in the
negative changes in the text of the agreement offered to
Macedonia by European Union and that this is before all motivated
by internal unfavourable flows created by the dissolution of the
electoral coalition - the League for Macedonia.

FRY's RECOGNITION

WHAT DOES RECOGNITION MEAN?

by SELADIN XHEZAIRI \ Shkup

Macedonian authorities, when referring to the issue of Kosova,

have many times stressed that the delay in finding a just
solution was a "potential risk for destabilisation of Macedonia".
They have even often admitted that this was their only "window"
towards the West. At the time when travel and other documents
were seized from Albanians by Serbian authorities, because of "a
stamp in passport", Macedonian customs officers "used to close
their eyes and forget" to put stamps on them. Contacts with the
"leader of LDK, president of Republic of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova,
used to be regular and, as it is said, they have been of mutual
and reciprocal understanding". It can even be heard in Tetova
that "...Rugova has met more often with president Gligorov than
with us Albanians". But, the sudden recognition of the continuity
of statehood of Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro,
has been qualified by the Albanian political parties as
"unacceptable" and as "an act that does not contribute to peace
and stability in the region". Of course, the "Unified Albanian
Opposition" partially blames it on "its position" for its
participation in the governmental coalition. "This agreement
exclusively observes the Macedonian and Serbian interests, and
with a senseless arrogance, ignores the Albanian ones. However,
it contains some elements for analysis, such as the secret
diplomacy cultivated by both sides reached at the time when

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Macedonia withdrew from the Yugoslav army without any
difficulties; this, at the same time shows the negligible
position of the Albanian political subject participating in the
government, which signed an agreement according to which Kosova
is considered to be a part of Serbia, and which is in
contradiction not only with the determination of the Albanian
people of Kosova but also with the wide support given by
Albanians in Macedonia. The agreement also proves a method of
solution of questions pending in the Balkans which can generate
future crises. It also shows the position and structure of
Albanian political subjects that act in former Yugoslavia and who
have undertaken the task to articulate Albanian interest wherever
they act" stated spokesman for PPDSH, Alajdin Demiri. While the
chairman of PPD, Abdurrahman Aliti, commenting criticism
addressed to his party because of the diplomatic recognition
between Macedonia and Yugoslavia, stated: "Critiques should at
least have a minimal consideration towards the political power
that Albanian political parties in Macedonia have, including the
party whose chairman I am". In any ways, he adds, "this is
happening because the Albanian political subject has broken into
fragments, although the above mentioned act should be looked upon
in the context of a wider relation of forces, international
factor and organisation of Albanians on the national level. But,
regardless of this, one should state that what has happened was
in disproportion with the practice of reciprocal recognition of
states. It is known that this is usually done through exchange of
notes. Macedonia recognises the juridical-state continuity of
what is now called Yugoslavia, based on the fact that Serbia and
Montenegro have existed before SFRY, not defining since when. If
the Agreement of Bucharest is to be taken as a starting point,
then it results that Macedonia in the present borders, used to be
inside the Serbian state. This unclearness imposes the question
of whether this country can be returned to its old nest. On the
other hand, the Agreement is unacceptable for us also because it
does not respect the political will of Albanians, there is not
one sentence to mention the question of Kosova and this
implicitly results to the fact that Macedonia agrees that Kosova
is treated as part of Serbia". In a statement made for KOHA,
vice-chairman of PDP, Etem Aziri said: The agreement for
reciprocal recognition between Macedonia and FRY can not be
appraised as an act that will help peace and stability in Balkans
and wider, since this agreement does not contain the free will of
the Albanian people of Kosova expressed in the Referendum for
independence. Although one of the main requests of the
international community towards FRY is the solution of the issue
of Kosova, the document signed puts the issue in a second line,
or transforms it into internal question of Serbia respectively,
and thus provides considerable space for political manoeuvres
which FRY needs to continue its games in unclear waters regarding
Kosova Albanians. Macedonian diplomacy which is not naive at all,

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should take into consideration that one day such agreements,
without the true will of ethnic Albanians, can come back as a
boomerang to this newly created state." Regarding the problem of
Kosova, in the last session of the Parliament of Macedonia,
Albanian MPs requested from the government to prepare an answer
in writing what is its posture about the solution of its problem.
The same day, Macedonian RTV in its first news, quoted president
Gligorov who had stated to radio "Free Europe" that he saw the
solution within the framework of Serbia. This part was "taken
off" from the central news and the morning press...

INTERVIEW

EVA BRANTLEY, Human Rights' Attorney

IT IS TIME TO OPEN THE QUESTION OF KOSOVA, BUT NOT OF ITS STATUS

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA & NEDIME BELEGU / Prishtina

Eva Brantley, a well-known attorney from New York, is known as an

expert on human rights and holds two PhD titles, one on
International Law and the other on Philosophy of Comparative
Literature. She is the main bearer of the joint project of Yale
and Harvard universities on the protection of human rights,
"Diana" and also a lecturer in several universities in the USA.
She is also known for her engagement in Polish Solidarnosc and
the Polish Helsinki Committee. Kosova Albanians remember her as a
brave woman who with the help of her dog (she is blind) had come
to follow the works of the session of the Parliament of Kosova on
July 2, 1990, when she had been arrested by the police... Today,
after six years, there she is again in Kosova telling us about
her impressions....

KOHA: Do you think that, after Dayton, pressure can be exerted on

Milosevic to settle the situation in Kosova, or was Kosova
sacrificed in the Dayton agreement?

BRANTLEY: I do not think it was sacrificed because the Dayton

agenda had not foreseen to deal with Kosova... The Dayton
Conference was followed by a series of resolutions by UN, NATO
and other bodies and the matter is that there are still some
things unsolved between Dayton and the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia... In fact, I think that Dayton has
dealt with two things in succession, first with Bosnia and later
with regions in war and its task was not to deal with this
"Yugoslavia"...

KOHA: Then, where does Kosova fit in international institutions

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if not in Dayton...

BRANTLEY:... Yes, one should by all means mention activities

in the General Assembly of UN when its secretary in his report
requests a long-term mission in Kosova, similar with the one of
the OSCE. The difference between this and the previous mission
would be that this would not be only a monitoring but also a
preventive mission... For example, to seek the possibilities for
building a civil society in Kosova, developing economy etc. I
would not say that Kosova was sacrificed in Dayton. I think the
first part of the question is more linked to it. Now it is time
to postpone the issue of the status of Kosova... This is not
only the matter of the Former Yugoslavia, but it has to do with
supra politics, with Russia and China, who have problems with
self-determination... Any decision regarding this issue in
relation with Kosova, to give it international status, bears
consequences for problems such as Chechenya, Kashmir, etc. The
international community has been trying to find a solution
targeting the solution of the problem of the status of Kosova,
but bringing this up only as a process... And this does not seem
bad to me, because it places Kosova into a right direction, and
the international community under obligations; on the other hand,
it seems to me that Kosova now is in position to build up all
institutions it needs, from economy, infrastructure and up to
diplomacy... The strategy that works should be followed...

KOHA: Can the issue be brought up through OSCE mechanisms?

BRANTLEY: Yes, this is of interest although one should pay

attention to the direction of development of these mechanisms,
especially after the Conference in Budapest... There is a
tendency of the International Community to act in parallel way -
what UN and OSCE are to do, what are their tasks... This has by
all means to do with role of European Union, especially with
projects for economic aid and restructuring in the Former
Yugoslavia, and also with other matters...

KOHA: It seems that there is no quick solution for Kosova...

BRANTLEY: I think that two things happened. LDK took

guidelines too fast and was not prepared for different options.
It means: either all or nothing! In fact, I think that it is good
for parties to have different strategies and seek for different
solutions. Secondly, as regarding Albanian political parties,
they should orientate towards economic aid an enable them reach
in Kosova, no matter the pressure arriving from Milosevic's
regime... One more thing. I think that LDK should pay more
attention to the Albanian diaspora which is very much divided and
partitioned. They should find favourable ways to cooperate and
orientate their capital towards Kosova. They should also pay

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attention that in no way, no matter what status Kosova may have,
and Albanians like, Serbs of Kosova can feel endangered. Maybe
building confidence could be started in small civil projects...

KOHA: You have witnessed a historical event in the history of

Kosova, you were here on July 2, 1990 and were taken in by
police. Now, six years later, you are again in Kosova. Has
anything changed in the behavior of the Serbian regime?

BRANTLEY: Well, how should I say, it might sound cynical, but

until now I had no problems with the police on the personal level
and to be honest - I do not wish to have any... I have the
impression that it was worked in several levels, maybe not
consciously, but those who wanted to create a difficult situation
by dismissing workers and then offering some of their jobs to
their compatriots, meant to create a situation where they could
change the ethnic structure, through refugees from Krajina. But
it seems that after this they do not have it clear themselves
what to do next. Anyhow, Kosova for Serbs is a "White Elephant" -
and they are not quite sure what to do with it... One should see
how Milosevic is behaving after all problems in Bosnia &
Herzegovina and it does not seem to me that he wants to go
through all this again. Kosova is a good case for this, to see if
he will enable Albanians to develop in Kosova etc. Whatever is
thought of Milosevic, one thing should not be forgotten - he is
not dumb....

KOHA: Is he that smart so as to let Kosova be democratised or to

give Albanians the right for self-determination?

BRANTLEY: I do not like the word self-determination, because

it is not clear what it means and it is so complicated... But I
think that he will face pressure from the intranational community
to allow the exercise of political life for Albanians in Kosova.
I believe that he will evaluate the matter very carefully because
he does not want to lose, and he has an extraordinary sense for
survival. Therefore a solution that is acceptable for
international community and main political parties and people of
Kosova will be found... now the monitoring mechanism of the
international community which is following on everything is of
interest. There is a good Polish saying: "Looking at someone's
fingers..."!

KOHA: What could happen if the peaceful way of Albanians were

changed...

BRANTLEY: ...The radicalisation of Albanian people would be the

greatest tragedy that could happen to the Albanian people in its
history, because none, absolutely none, would come to help
Albanians in that case. Albanians would be used, and only used,

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and none would help them. Therefore, I think that it is very
important, no matter how difficult it is to follow the peaceful
and non-violent way, because they will continue to enjoy respect,
and those who enjoy respect are also supported. I will emphasise
it once more that none would help Albanians if they used
violence. Look what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian
Muslims were attacked by Serbs and no one helped them, although
every one knew what was going on in Srebrenica. Srebrenica was
almost destroyed when NATO started air-striking. They could have
had done this earlier. The Security Council asked for NATO's
assistance to help Bosnians in Srebrenica, but they did not go
there. You also would not have international protection, and
especially not in the situation in which you are now, when you do
not even have information centres. This would be a suicide and I
think that Serbia would not ask for anything better, that you
either flee Kosova or commit a massive suicide... ...The most
difficult recommendation is to tell someone to continue hoping
and that after every storm there is a rainbow which cannot be
reached. I know that it sounds idealistic, but this is the most
difficult thing to ask from people of Kosova, to continue hoping
and follow the peaceful way to be recognised justice and freedom.
In the end, it will be recognised. In the letter that Nobel Prize
winner, Asan Sushi, sent to her people in Burma, she wrote: "the
most important thing is that when the right man is created in
your imagination, he cannot be taken away from there, and
imagination of a thing is beginning of its realisation". It is
important that Albanian people of Kosova bear in their mind the
freedom and the wanted day will come and Albanian people will
realise their rights and the rights of their children.

ECONOMY

APARTMENTS NEITHER ON THE GROUND NOR IN THE SKY

by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina

The purchase of apartments has been actualised again.

Albanians continue to face difficulties in completing necessary
documents, even documents which are not required at all
according to Serbian laws. Whether apartments could or could
not be purchased, this was a long lasting dilemma which used
to be present among the top of the largest party and within the
UITUK. But this was overcome in time. Still, there is a
problem that has never been seen on the surface. The first laws
that placed restrictions regarding the purchase of real estate,
when parties belong to different nationalities, date since the
mid-eighties, i.e., since the time when Assembly of former SAPK
passed laws targeting the "prevention of emigration of Serbs and

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Montenegrins". It is understandable why the highest organ of rule
in Kosova then passed laws similar to this one. This was because
of the pressure that came from above and due to the conviction
that in this way, the situation in Kosova would be calmed down.
But it was a wrong posture, for all provincial organs and laws
adopted by that organ were suspended. Still, the Constitution of
Kaçanik stipulates that until new laws of Republic of Kosova are
adopted, the laws reached by the Assembly will be valid. Are
these laws that discriminate Albanians valid? Lawyers have been
running polemics about Serbian laws: are they discriminatory laws
or laws imposed by the occupier? One side says that we have not
to deal with discriminatory laws, since a law of a foreign
country cannot discriminate anyone in another country. From the
aspect of theory, the other side admits this remark, but from
practical aspect they say that this is an imposed law, that there
are no other laws, therefore they have to be applied. And now,
one had to face a legal proceedings to accomplish a deal, such as
the case with purchase of apartments, or other relations in the
market, where Serbian laws are to be respected. Talking of
this issue, Bajram Krasniqi, lawyer from Prishtina, said that
after the historical events in 1981, the political postures of
the Communist League of Yugoslavia, and later of its organs,
formulated in the ill-famed document called "Political Platform
on Kosova...", whose provisions were directly reflected in the
juridical system, in the beginning at the provincial level and
later on the level of Serbia. Thus in 1986 (8 July '86), the
Assembly of the former SAPK adopted the Law on Amendments and
Modifications of the Law on Turnover of Real Estate ("Official
Gazette of SAPK" No. 29/86), and this was a discriminatory law.
Provisions of this law were annulled by the Constitutional Court
of the former SFRY, following a courts proceedings which lasted
for two and a half years. But Serbia, in a anti-constitutional
procedure adopted the Law on Amendment and Modification of Law on
Turnover of Real Estate in RSS ("Official Herald of RS Serbia"
No. 28/87) and, prior to the forceful adoption of the
constitution and "constitutional unification", it passed some
amendments and modifications of the mentioned law and finally
adopted a special law - "Law on Special Conditions for Turnover
of Real Estate" ("Official Herald of RSS" No. 22/90, 8 April
1991) which is applied by executive organs of the Serb occupying
state. Article one of this law sets special conditions for
turnover of real estate for the territory of RS. And,
this is valid only in Kosova, or, in other words, for Albanians
alone. These special conditions continue for ten years now, or
since the date of validation of the law. This brings to national
discrimination against Albanians of Kosova, which is in
contradiction with the Constitution of Serbia, or with the
Constitution of the so called FRY. This law is by all means in
contradiction with international legal norms, or the
International Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of

- 15 -
1966, which was ratified by the former Yugoslavia one year later.
So, this law has no legal value, which means that any legal
dealing based on it, would be annulled in any rule of law,
however the administrative, court and executive organs of the
occupying states observe it with special care. It is only
Albanians who suffer from this law. Consequences are disastrous,
because in the first order they have no right to buy or sell real
estate or to rent it. A special issue in relation with this
juridical and political situation of the occupying Serbian state,
regarding Albanians only, is the one of the purchase of societal
apartments. This is an essential element of discrimination, which
nowadays is being applied only in the South African Republic. No
sale or purchase nor lease can be done even between Albanians,
without the consent-approval from Belgrade. This law and other
willings and dealings of respective organs of the occupying
Serbian state, not only restrict Albanians, but hamper their
existence in the economic aspect, knowing that property is the
grounds of economy. The procedure to obtain these
consent-approvals from Belgrade is complicated and requires time
and money. And everything emerges here, such as corruption and
many other difficulties, for Albanians. But they have to live
even in such circumstances! After the "constitutional
unification" in 1990, Serbia has adopted Law on Housing and this
law set rights, obligations, conditions and procedure
to purchase socially or state owned apartments. This is the
beginning of an overwhelming period for Albanians to gain the
right to enjoy their property. According to Article 16 of the
above mentioned law, those who have the right of ownership of
societal or state owned apartments are obliged to sell them to
those who have gained the right of occupancy should they make
written request for this. In the beginning the law was applied so
the occupying state organisation did not make any differences on
national grounds and Albanians were even given priority in
signing contracts and making payments, but not in notarising and
registering the ownership in cadaster registries. After Albanians
made payments for apartments, notarising contracts with courts
were delayed, putting as a precondition to register ownership in
cadaster books. This delay has been lasting so long, not by
accident, that almost as much as 80 per cent of Albanian buyers,
although they have met all requirements, have not managed to
complete this complicated procedure. In the beginning of 1993,
the Parliament of Serbia evaluated the Law on Modification and
Amendments of the Law on Housing. The parliamentary group of
Serbian ultranationalists, headed by Seselj, who used to play
the same game with Socialist Party of Serbia at the time,
presented a special amendment. The amendment stipulates "that
Albanian separatists who are not citizens of Serbia, are not
allowed to purchase apartments, i.e., any property of this
state". According to his known theory, this right is denied to
all Albanians who have not attended the census, who have not

- 16 -
voted or who do not recognise Serbian state. Shortly, to all
Albanians who live in Kosova, with few exceptions. The amendment
was withdrawn from the parliament following the statement by the
Minister of Urbanisation and Minister of Finance in the Serbian
Government who explained that such restriction can not be set in
law because of the international public, but
respective ministers promised that on basis of political postures
they prevent the sale and purchase of societal or state owned
apartments and turnover of real estate in general for Albanians.
And they kept their promises. By mid April 1993, or few days
after session of Parliament of Serbia, municipal courts in Kosova
started to ask for submission of written consent from Ministry of
Finance, Directorate for Property and Legal Relations of Serbia.
In this direction, organisations and state organs which had
already collected the money and had stopped notarising contracts
with courts, now started to send documents "in trucks and vans"
applying for consent from above mentioned ministry, the one who
issued consent to all Serbs and to an Albanian here and there.

However, in September 1993, they started to ask for one more

condition that, apart from other documents, a certificate of
employment was needed. This was done intentionally since they
knew that the forceful organs of the occupier had fired more than
140 thousand Albanians and that they were not able to have such
certificates, therefore it was implied that attempts for consent
were in vain. Bajram Krasniqi mentioned several cases of workers
who are still employed but did not manage to get such consents. -
I will mention two cases in "FERRONIKELI", then of three other
pensionists, one of them retired in 1981, who have been wasting
their time running from one counter to another, in vain. All
these dealings of the occupier are in contradiction with their
law. But based on secrete political postures, state organs
applied a policy of genocide against Albanians. This is a policy
of its kind in Europe today! It is a misfortune for the
international community which allows this state of genocide that
the occupier is doing in Kosova. While Albanians born in
Macedonia, who have been living and working in Kosova for more
than 30 years are not allowed to purchase apartments or other
real estate, even if the seller is an Albanian. Most of them have
asked to be granted citizenship, but until today they have
received no answer - added Krasniqi. Time ago Serbia was making
preparations to register all apartments in Kosova, to verify if
their owners are living there or not. The task was clear, since,
as they stated in the Service for Cadaster in Prishtina, all
empty apartments are to be considered as property without owners,
and as such to be transferred to ownership of the state - Serbia.

Such a census was not carried out yet, and Serb colonisers from
Croatia were not accommodated in empty apartments. The risk in
the beginning was too big, there were even concrete threats. Some

- 17 -
were forced to "quit asylum seeking" and come back to take care
of their apartments. But this calmness of the Serbian authorities
does not mean that they have given up these intentions. They
carry these actions when they consider that the moment, not only
domestic but also the international, is suitable.

MACEDONIA

RUNNING TOWARDS MIRAGE

by MERSEL BILALLI \ Shkup

The matter of territorial division, or reconstruction of units of

local self-administration, represents a problem too complicated,
even in states with long democratic experience, since in this
level and structure positions of the rule of law on one hand and
civil self-administration on the other, are crossed. Although
according to the Macedonian Constitution, the Law on the
Territorial Division of the State should have had
been adopted within six months from the adoption of
the Constitution, the complexity and sensitivity of the issue led
to its delay of four years. A few days ago, the Working Group of
the Ministry of Justice came out with a version for the
territorial division, most probably to monitor the pulse of
public opinion. Reactions were noisy, but most of them were based
on superficial arguments. We would need an approach towards many
segments to have a comprehensive explanation of the matter, and
especially we should emphasise the economic-financial, political
and functional segments. The Law on Local Self-administration
stipulates several conditions for the formation of new
municipalities. Firstly, a future municipality needs to have
geographic and economic integrity. Secondly, it needs to be a
centre gravitated and thirdly, it needs to have infrastructure
and communication ties with surrounding settlements and suburbs.
Hence, many villages meet the legal requirements to gain the
status of a municipality, and many applications were lodged. But
the truth is that many claimants for municipalities are not
advised about the amount of competencies of the units of local
self-administration (municipality) which are approximately equal
to the ones of "local communities" according to the Constitution
of 1974. So, municipalities are left only some authorisations
from the sphere e communal, sports, cultural matters (in social,
education and urbanisation spheres) which distinguishes them from
state regional administration. Many of them see "a municipality"
as a complex of all services, but the truth is that the future
municipalities will only be as the ones to be blamed for eventual
failures while citizens will have to apply for services in cities
where main state administration headquarters are based. This law

- 18 -
also stipulates that municipalities in the first line will be
financed from their own funds and the insisting of
some places to gain this status is illogical, since
they are not in position to pay even for the salary of the
president of the local community. Legal conditions for financing
of municipalities also disfavour future (village) municipalities,
since turnover of goods and services, providing for taxes, are
realised in cities where public enterprises exist. So in
practice, we will have stagnation of municipalities (villages)
and prosperity of cities. The political aspect of division of the
present municipalities who have several hundreds of thousands of
inhabitants, resembles a federal unit or a canton. From this
aspect maybe, a division would not be harmful if the law enabled
the creation of joint organs of two or more municipalities, which
would be a basis for formation of two level local
self-administration (county, region, district etc). On the
contrary, the law bans this although it is foreseen in the
Charter of the European Council. In the end we should not forget
the functional segment of the future municipalities, especially
of rural ones where legal discipline will most probably be
difficult, since there will be lack of authority because of small
competencies. There is much opposing and conflicts between many
villages about the future center, unaware that they oppose each
other for no reason. So, a small municipality with large
authorisation which is a practice and reality in Europe, will be
a dream for a long time in this region. This also goes for the
two level local self-administration. Therefor, running after new
municipalities is no more than running after a mirage

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