R U SS I A

AND HER COLONIES

BY

WALTER KOLARZ

ARCHON BOOKS,
1967

REPRINTED 1967 VITH PERMISSIoN

UNALTERED AND UNABRIDGED
FROM THE THIRD EDITION OF 19'3

L I B R A R Yo F C o N G R E S S
C A , T A L o GC a n n N u u n r n : 6 7 - T ) 9 2 6
PntNreo rN THE UNITED STATESoF AMERICA

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PREFACE

The word'colonies' is employedin this book as a common denominator

for a large number of territories which enjoy either leg_allyor factually
'Colonies' are first of all those
a speciai status within Soviet Russia.
ethnically non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. which, although not
separatedfrom the metropolitan country by sea,have a statussimilar to
that of the overseasdependenciesof any other power. These Russian
colonies are situated in Asia, on the fringes of Europe and Asia and in
the Far North.
'colonies' is also extended to European countries or
The term
countries of predominantly European culture like the Ukraine, the
Baltic States, Georgia or Armenia which have been reduced to colonial
status by enforced dependenceon the Moscow Government. Finally, as
'colonies' is also used in its
an exception rather than as a rule, the word
original sense for areas of settlement, mostly in. reference to the
colonization by Slavs of practically uninhabited territories.
'colonies' or of 'colonial policy'
No Soviet writer would speak of
when describingthe relationship betweenMoscow and the non-Russian
peoples of the U.S.S.R. He would refer to natsionalnayqpglttika
'nationalities policy'. This
wniin is usually translated into English as
'nationalities policy' and 'colonial policy' in roughly the
book uses
'nationality' and 'colony' are
same sense.This does not mean that
identical. A colony is a territory and a nationality an ethnic group.
Two or more nationalitiesmay form part of one colony. In Soviet Russia
'nationality' have been
itself two contradictory definitions of the word
advanced. Some Marxist-Leninist theoreticians have maintained that a
'nation'. Accord'nationality'
is on a lower level of developmentthan a
'nation'
ing to this explanation the Ukrainians, for instance,would be a
'nationalities'. In the day_-to-day
and the peoples of Daghestan only
work of the All-Union Communist Party and of the Soviet Government this distinction is not recognizedand all non-Russian peoples of
'nationalities'.
the Soviet Union are identified as
The colonial problem of Russia cannot be viewed in isolation from
the colonial problem presentingitselfin other parts ofthe globe, for the
struggle for the fulfilment of national aspirations among the colonial

:-'oples has proceededeverywhereon a similar pattern. This struggle

,.n be observedmore easily in British, French or American colonies or
:'r.-colonies
than in the non-Russianterritoriesof the U.S.S.R. which
.:i3 cut off from almost every contact with the non-communist world.
I',-ur lessons may be drawn from the general trend in the colonial
:.-rritoriesoutside the Soviet Union.
First, the more advanced dependentpeopleswill appreciatematerial
.,.'hievementsonly if such go hand-in-hand with political progress,
' e. if the colonial power encouragesthe growth of self-government.
Secondly, the peoples of the colonial territories in order to fulfil
:heir national aspirations create political movements and ideologies
--orrespondingto their own national and tribal traditions and different
:':.rm those of their Eurooean colonizers.
Thirdly, national aspiiations can be properly defined only if the
irrlonies enjoy at least a certain measureof democracy and freedom of
,iiscussion.This implies the coexistencewithin one colony of various
rolitical groups with diverging views about the way in which to advance
lheir developmenttowards self-governmentand national independence.
Fourthly, recognition of self-governmentas a desirablepolitical aim
on the part of a progressivecolonial power does not mean uniimited
recognition of all national aspirations of a colonial people. National
'legitimate' if they aim at the oppression
aspirations cease to be
of
ethnic and religious minority groups and if the colonial power has the
obligation to protect these.
If one admits that the essenceof a modern colonial policy lies in the
encouragementof self-government,then everycolonial system,including
'Soviet nationalities policy', must be judged on
the so-called
the basis
of this fourfold standard.
I have thereforeconcentratedin this book on the question ofthe extent
ro which the governmentof the U.S.S.R.has assisiedor hamperedthe
legitimate national aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Empire.
This does not mean that I seekto belittle or to deny any of the material
achievementscarried out by the Soviet Government in territories
inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. I take them for granted as the
basis of discussion.My contention is, however, that the essenceof a
colonial policy and of the political systemof which it is a part cannot be
estimated by refr-rencesolely to material achievements.The Dnieper
Dam no more indicatesthat the Ukrainian oroblem has been solved
r l r a nH i t l e r ' s n r o t o r h i c h u a y si n d i c a t e da n y r i r t u e i n G e r m a n N a z i s m .
The Main Turknrenian Canal will be no more oroof of the successof
Soviet colonial policv than the Trans-SiberianRailway line is proof of
rhe successof the Czaristr6gime.
My original plan u'as to describe the working of Soviet colonial
policy throughout the U.S.S.R. Practical difficulties have compelled

PREFACB

me to leave out of account the Soviet colonial territories on the Facific

coast and in Eastern Siberia. These Far Eastern territories, bordering
on China, Japan and the United States of America, form a special
geopolitical entity and I intend to write a separatebook on them. I
have made an exception in the case of the Autonomous Province of
Birobidzhan which as an area of Jewish settlement is given its natural
'The
Jews - a people of the Soviet Union'.
in the chapter
place
The problems connected with Soviet colonial policy are so vast that
I have had to limit my subject in a further direction also. In dealing
at greater or lesserlength with some forty Soviet colonies one cannot
hope to tell the full story. One can but give examplesand mention the
most typical features in the development of a given nationality while
omitting or summarizing the secondaryaspectsof it. It may appear that
I have done less than justice in this book to the Baltic peoples.Indeed,
I have dealt with them only very briefly because events in the Baltic
Stateshave been a repetition of what happened earlier in other parts
of the Soviet Empire. It seemedbest to pay greater attention to those
earlier events than to the repetition of them.
A word must be said about the sourcesused. I have employed as a
rule only Soviet sources,primarily newspapers,journals, textbooks and
broadcasts,and also novels, plays and poetry. With insignificant exceptions, I have refrained from using any other material which might
have bearing on my subject. In particular, I have avoided the very large
Russian 6migr6 literature, statements by refugees from the Soviet
Union, reports by non-communist foreigners of their experiencesin
Soviet Russia and news items published under a Moscow dateline in
the press of Western countries.
Thus, as the book is based not on the testimonies of critics of the
Soviet r6gime but on evidence emanating from the r6gime itself, several
important factors pertaining to Soviet colonial policy have not been
taken into consideration. Among these is the forced-labour system to
which the reader will find only passing references. The use of Soviet
sources, which to be more precise are mostly Soviet sources in the
Russian language,has also affectedthe spelling of non-Russian names.
Except for well-known personalitiesand placesI have transcribed these
names from the Russian. I have even used the official Russianized
forms, for instance, Ibragimov instead of Ibrahim. This may be
irritating for Orientalists but it is symbolic of the Russian preponderance
in the U.S.S.R.
I am indebted to Mr. J. B. Birks, Miss Dorothy Davies and
Miss Marjorie Nicholson for many valuable suggestions.Thanks are
also due to Dr. W. A. Morison for translations of Russian poetry and
to Mrs' Nancy Feeny for compiling the index'
wa,r-rnn Kor-,q,nz
Yll

CONTENTS

PREFACE

page \

C h A P I Ct TR U S S I A N C O L O N I Z A T I O N A N D
SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY
The essenceof Russian exPansion
Russia'stwo histories
Russian anti-racialism
The Russian character of the October Revolution
The Russian character of the Bolshevik Party
Russiancolonizationunder the Sovietr6gime
Local nationalism
C'Jnstitutional federalism
Soviet BudgetarYcentralism
The 'soviet of Nationalities'
Fallacies of Soviet statistics
Chaptertr INNER RUSSIA
Borderland Russia and Inner Russia

3l

I Tnr Tanrlns - A TEsr CAsE

'Volga-Ural State'
The fight for the
'AlPhabetic Revolution'
The first
The second'AlphabeticRevolution''
Ideological strugglesin war and post-war period
Tartars 'at home' and in diasPora

32

lI Blsnrlnra - Tnr Nsw Orr-Rlpunltc

'Greater Bashkiria' against'Greater Tartaria'
Bashkir national oPPosition
Bashkir oil

4l

III Tnr Cnuvnsn - NlttoNArrsM wITHour PeN-rsu

46

IV 'Frr.tNIsnRussr.q,'
Mordvinians: sevencenturiesof Russification
Mari: national-religious resistance
'capital' versusa people
Udmurts: a
Komi - the northern coal rePublic

48

CONTENTS

V Tns INNtn Nonrn

The administrative structure
EconomicSovietization
Nationalismin the Far North
Cultural assimilation
The eclipseof the native
C u A P I CI T
II 'LIQUIDATED'

PEOPLES

I THp RussraNGEnrraaNs
The origin of the Volga Germans
Germansof South Russia
The Germansin the SovietUnion
The 'liquidation' of the RussianGermans
II TgE CnrureN Tlnr,lns
Emigration of the CrimeanTartars: 1j}4-191j
Crimean Tartar nationalism
The Crimean Province
III Knluucxs
Under the Czaristr6gime
Under Sovietrule
C h a p t e rM H E

NORTH-WESTERN BORDER

I Cslr,i-rNcr ro ScANDTNAvTA
Challengeof history
The missionof St. Petersburg
The Murmansk railway
Kola peninsulaand Murmansk
Petsamo
The Lapp issue
II KlnElrl - Ttrr ScaNnrNAvrAN
Sovrrr RrpusLrc
Russificationof the Karelian A.S.S.R_
The Stalin Canal
The Karelian Isthmus - a new Russian orovince
The 'annexation'of Kalevala
III Tur Baluc SovrEr Rrpunr-rcs
Two Russianmethods
The Baltic diasporain the U.S.S.R.
Baltic in form - Russianin essence
Liquidation of minorities in the Baltic States
SovietEstonia
SovietLatvia
Lithuania: both ally and victim
Russian Koenigsberg

59

67
68

76

8l

88
88

97

104

CONTENTS

C h a p t e rV T H E W E S T E R N B O R D E R L A N D S
I TnP UrurNr
'Little Russia'and'New Russia'
Ukrainian diasporain the U'S'S'R'
Russian diasPorain the Ukraine
Stalinist centralism versusUkrainian autonomy
policy
Communist irredenta and'Ukrainization'
The first Purges
The SkryPnik affair
'Great Purge'
The
Comintern and'Western Ukraine'
TranscarPathianUkraine
Communists an<lanti-communistsin the Western
Ukraine
Russian policy and the Uniate Church
Ukrainian nationalism in the post-war period
The Ukraine as a factor in Soviet'world politics'
National minorities in the Ukraine
'Polish
The
PolicY' of the Ukraine
II Sovrsr MolPnvra
Moldavia as A.S.S'R'
Moldavia as Soviet Republic
III BYELoRUssIA
Soviet policy in Eastern Byelorussia
Kolas and Kupala - Byelorussianleaders
'Greater BYelorussia'
ChaprerVI THE JEWS - A PEOPLE OF THE
SOVIET UNION
Jews in the Communist PartY
Political and religious persecutionof Soviet Jewry
Soviet Jewry in the war and post-war period
The social transformation of Soviet Jewry
The eastwardmigration of Soviet Jews
Jewish agricultural colonies
'Soviet
The choice of Birobidzhan as prospective
Jewish State'
Kalinin Declaration versusBalfour Declaration
Jewish colonization in Birobidzhan
Birobidzhan - successor failure?
C h a p t e \r T I T H E N O R T H C A U C A S U S P E O P L E S
Russia and the Caucasus
The first exodus of the mountaineers
The administrative chaos in the Soviet Caucasus

rr

123

r23

t49

153

163

181

CONTENTS

The secondexodus ofthe mountaineers

Continuity of RussianCaucasuspolicy: the Chechens
Chechen-IngushMoslem opposition
Grozny - the oil city
The abolition of the Karachay province
A .good' people _ the Ossetins
Reducation of the Kabardinians
The Circassians_ a reserveof Soviet Middle East
policy
Russia's most polyglot colony: Daghestan
The two facesof Soviet policy in Daghestan
The fight against the Shamil cult
Daghestan'slanguageproblem
Daghestani literaturc
Chapter VIII TRANSCAUCASIA
Transcaucasiaand Russian history
Transcaucasiaand Russian Middle East policy
I AnurNnNs
First Russian-Armeniancontacts
Russia _ ,protector' of Armenians
The Armenian S.S.R.
Armenian diaspora and Soviet repatriation policy
The role of the Armenians in t}re Soviet Union
The survival of Armenian nationalism
II GroncrnNs
'Georgian-Russian
brotherhood'
MenshevismversusBolshevism
Stalin's fight against .national' Bolshevism
Three Georgian communists: Ordzhonikidze.
Yenukidze, Beriya
Georgia's economic and cultural mission
Greater Georgia
Abkhazia
III AzrnsarozgeN
Baku - the oil city
The Bolshevik Baku
Multi-national Baku
Baku and Azerbaidzhan
The Nationalist opposition
Russian-Azerbaidzhanicultural synthesis
The other Azerbaidzhan
IV TnaxscaucAsrAN MrNonrrrrs
The Assyrians
Russia and the Kurdish problem

xu

208

Zl2

223

237

247

CONTENTS

ChapterX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The conquest
The'national-territorial delimitation'
The revolutionary role of Soviet Central Asia
The fieht against Central Asiatic unity
'elder brother'
The Russiansas
I KezarnstlN
Sovietization of the Kazakh village
Industrial colonization
The struggle for the Kazakh soul
II KtncnrzrsraN
Russian colonization
'Russian march to victory'

255

262

270

III Uzsrrrsrlx
Samarkand and Tashkent
Soviet cotton PolicY
Industrialization and Russification
Uzbek culture under tutelage
Mir Alishir Navoi - Soviet national hero

274

fV TlozntrrstlN
Tadzhikistan versus Afghanistan
Tadzhikistan and Persia
Tadzhikistan and India
Tadzhik national oPPosition

)R)

v rutrneNrsuN
Turkmenistan's crucial problem - irrigation
Greater Turkmenistan
Political and linguistic opposition
Post-war oPPosition

29o

VI Tnr MrNonrrlrs or Sovrsr CsNrnnl Aste

Uigurs and Dungans
Baluchis
An Arab'Birobidzhan'?

296

C h a p t eX
r SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AS A
303
woRLD PROBLEM
Soviet nationalities policy in Eastern Europe
Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy
The future of the PeoPlesof Russia

321

INDEX

xru

MAPS
SovietCentral Asia and its neighbours
Caucasus,Transcaucasiaand Turkey
The Western Marchlands of the Soviet Union
Autonomous Territories liquidated 1941146
Autonomous Territories of European Russia

Front enclpaper
Front endpaper
Back endpaper
Back endpaper
page 3e

I
RUSSIAN COLONIZATION AND SOVIET
NATIONALITIES POLICY
THE ESSENCE OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION

'Europe' into. an-empty

Political reality has transformed the word
geographical.r-otion.From a merely geographicalpoint of view Europe
is rtit'tfre continent bounded by the Atlantic in the West and the Ural
Mountains in the East. Politiially, however, Europe is divided into
'Eur-Asia' and 'Eur-America'. Western and Southern Europe form a
'political
unit with America, whilst Eastern Europe belongs to another
continent' which includes the whole of Northern Asia and a large part
of Central Asia. This division which has become unmistakably clear
sincethe end of the Secondworld war is fundamentally an old division
which arose when Europeans started to colonize America'
Russia is the only big European nation which has remained aloof
if we leave out of account the
from the colonization 6f A.iricu,
episode.ending in 1867, of the Russian occupation of Alaska and the
c'omparativelyinsignificant number of Russian immigrants going to the
Wes^ternHemisphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many
subjects of the ezar did certainly go to America during this last stage,
buf only a small percentageof them were Russiansin the ethnical sense;
most o"f them were Jews, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians,
Poles.etc.
While practically all European nations were devoting their energies
to the coionization of the Americas and other overseasterritories, the
Russianscolonized the vast spacesadjoining their own original livingsDace.
^
The European peoples built a new great continent for what became
the new nations of Arnerica. In addition to North and South America
the Europeans colonized Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Africa;
they dispersed their efforts all over the globe. The Russians built
Eurasia for their own benefit.
Many European nations were constantly losing the best, most.active
and most entirprising members of their younger generalio^nin the
processof colonization; the Russians preservedtheir youth for them'
ielves. They invested their manpower almost exclusively for the benefit
of.their own people and their own Empire'

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

Russia'scontinentalexpansioais unique in its scope,but

other
Europeannations,for examplethe Germansand the poies,have
tried
continentalexpansiontoo_.Thesetwo peoples,wedgedin between
the
Russiancolossus
and the westernseararing
nationsiplayeoa auai rote.
They participatedin a subordinatepositiJn in the ctlo'niruiio"-oi
ilr"
new world, and on the other hand, they also attemptedto effect
their
own _continental
expansionand coronizitionin Easternrurof.. i" tt
Middle
tJr:
Germanscrossedthe Elbe, Oder and Vistula
"
-unJ and
1g_.1
colonizedMecklenburg,pomerania,Brandenburg,sGia
gurt
_
Prussia.
The Polesspreadtheircultureand poriticairurefrom th. ur"u
or roznanandLracow,theterritorialnucleus
of theirnationalexistence,
to Lithuania and to what to-day is western Ukraine and western
B1'elorussia.
Russia'sstrongpositionat the end of the Secondworld
War_brought
aboutchangeson thggfp of Centraland EasternEurope
n hichdeprivedboth Germansand polesof thefruits of their
efforts'effortswhich had gl*uy-rbeen modestcomparedwitn
"or*ir-g
nussra's
foru ard marchto the Urals and beyond.
It is a misconception
of Russianhistory to considerit primarilv as
an urge towardsthe sea.certainly, accesito the sea*ur'of uitilmportanceto Russiantrade.arrdto the generaldeveropment
of Russra
towardsthe statusof a world power.It ivasa greatmomentin
Russian
history when Russiareachedthe shoresof th-eBaltic uoa". p"i"r-tt
Great and the Black sea coastunder catherineII. sot it *^-u
ru,"
greatermomentwhenIvan the-Terribre
capturedKazanon october2nd,
1552,for tha,teventnor only broughtabbut the transtormaii""
comparatively_
small nationalRussianStateof Muscovyinto a multi"iin"
nationalEmpire,but also determinedthe future direction
of Russian
expansion.Most of the s'bsequentterritorialconqu"stscu.
u.-lr*"a
backto.theliquidationof the tartar Khanateof Kazan.Th;r-th;li;",
of R'ssian.destinywerenot st. petersburg-odessa
nor st. r"t..ru*gfiga-Koenigsberg,but ran from Moscow"via Kazan a"a orenuu.s to
Tashkent,via KazanacrossSiberiato vladivostot uoo uguio
uiu-ru?un
to Astrakhanand Baku.
Russia'smaritimeexpansionwas,in some.cases,
only the crowning
of her continental
expansion,
not a purposein itsir. r'nu, n"*i"'oio
nor.almat the conquestof the pacificshore.Russia'sinterest
in the
werethe more or
?ld th emergenceof a Russianpacific policy
Il:tT
ressacctdentaloutcomeof the conquestof Sibelia.
The idea of 'mobile fr-ontiers,'nbt the urge to the seas,
dominates
Russiangeographical
and politicalthinking.i.ussiais a staie..iri.n r,u,
beenexpandingfor centuries;her borders"havenevermarked
the real
limils rl.prssian rule, the final dividingline betweenRussian
subiects
and foreigners,but onry a temporarydimarcation*i,i""i'i*"alti""
in internationallaw or rearporitlcalimportance.This appliesi;
R;ri;',

coLo

Easternbordersin particular, but it is also true to someextentof her

Southernand evenof her Westernborders.
In the East and South the demarcationline was usually only the
front line from which new thrustsinto further unknown territorieswere
launchedas soon as the required manpower becameavailable.The
boundsof the RussianEmpire in the East, South and North were not
determinedby the resistancewhich other statesopposedto Russian
expansion,but mainly by insuperablephysicalobstaclessuchas oceans,
'mobile frontiers'
deserts,or mountainsof great altitude.The idea of
demonstratedby the entirecourseof Russianhistory, to.day still determinesRussianforeignpolicyandtheRussianpeople'sapproachtowards
this policy.
The conquestof the RussianEasternterritories,in sofar as it was the
outcome of deliberatepolitical planning, was carried out with the
memoryof the Mongol yoke of the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturres
as the psychologicaland ideologicalbackground.There was not only
the desireto ayengethe disgraceof that past domination,but also an
ever-present
senseof the dangerthat the colonizationwork might suffer
a setbackby a new irruption of Asiatic peoplesinto Russianland. In
order to ban the menaceof a new GenghisKhan, the Czarof Moscow
had to becomeGenghisKhan. Therewasa kind of logicalcOmpulsion
for the Russiansto penetratedeeperand deeperinto the East, to build
strongholdsand fortified lines, conquer foreign peoplesand explore
Asia'smostdistantterritories.At leastthe first stageof the Russianex'reconquest'
of Spain
pansionto the Eastis comparableto the Christian
of
from the Moors, and later a beliefin thefulfilment a Christianmission
Russianexpansionbeyondthe Urals.
accompanied
RUSSIA,S TWO HISTORIES

'Christianmission'is no
In the SovietUnion, it is true, the idea of a
longerpopular,but the attitudetowardsthe historic Russianexpansion
as such remainspositive.The formation of the RussianFmpire, the
of land in the world, is viewedin Commost immenseagglomeration
munist Moscow primarily as the outcome of the gigantic collective
efforts of the Russianpeople.
There is, indeed, much evidencefor the thesis that the Russian
Empire is chieflyan unconsciouscreationdue to the sufferingsbut also
to the enterprisingspirit of a vanguard of the Russian people. The
Rrlssianpeasantsleft their homesto shakeoff the fettersof autocracy
and bondage,and to gain freedomthey werereadyto walk barefoot
to the end of the world. This urge towardsnew land,born of despair,
hunger and oppression,eventually gave rise to a kind of Russian
people'simperialism.

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

Official Russian policy and Russian state imperialism often lagged

behind the peopie's initiative. Frequently, official Russia did no more
than endorse and legalize the facts which the people had created. Even
the greatest figures of Russian history, like Ivan the Terrible and Peter
the Great, on several occasions simply followed in the wake of lawless
bands of fugitive peasants,the famous Cossacks,who had enlargedthe
boundaries of Russia without even knowins it.
In this way Russia lived a double life and-had a double history. There
was the official history of the Czars and the no lessimportant unofficial
history of the Cossacks.Cossackhistory is not only a socialhistory in
the senseof a history of the lower classesof the Russian people, but
history in the strictest and widest senseof the word, a history of wars
and conquests and territories. Despite the frequent wars which the
official Russia of the Czars and the unofficial Russia of the Cossacks
rvaged against each other, the latter became ultimately an essential
sourceof Russianstrengthand greatness.The Cossackrebels,who from
the beginning of the sixteenthcentury onwards had been settling on the
Don, had a decisivesharein conquering the southern steppesfor Russia
and in enabling her to reach the shores of the Azov and Black Seas.
From the Don the Cossackswent to the Volga, the Ural river and to
Western Siberia and later to Lake Baikal, to the Amur and the Ussuri
river in the Far East. In the later stasesof their develoomentthe Cossacks
becameorganicallyunitedwith'offiiial' history,lost their rebelcharacter
and servedin the famous Cossackunits of the Russian army.
Associated with the Cossacksin the Russian people's colonization
movement were the membersof the persecutedreligious sectsemerging
from schismin the RussianOrthodox Church. These'religiouscolonists'
\\'ere more important in quality than in quantity. Just as the English
Puritans crossed the ocean in search of religious freedom, so the
Russian dissentersor'Old Believers'covered tremendous distanceson
land to reach territories where official persecutionand intolerancecould
not reach them. To be free to observe their ancient religious customs,
u hich had been brushed aside by an ecclesiasticalreform in the official
Church in 1666, they went to the most distant areas of the Russian
Empire, to the Far North and to Siberia. The 'Old Believers'and the
membersof other sectswho were ready to brave any danger and every
conceivablehardship for the sake of freedom to worship God in their
own way were easily Russia's most tenacious and most valuable
colonlsts.
Ho*'ever, without the development of a vigorous Russian central
state authority the spontaneous Russian people's colonization would
hare ended in an impasse.Thus Russia's official and unofficial history
rre inseparablylinked with each other and it is hardly possibleto take
ur a positive attitude towards the latter and to disown the former as

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

Soviet historians originally tried to do. These attempts to discriminate

between two histories, characteristic of Soviet historiography in the
twenties and early thirties have been abandoned, and there are no
greater admirers of the centralistic order introduced by the great
Russian Czars and of their territorial conqueststhan the historians of
the Stalinist epoch.
RUSSIAN ANTI-RACIALISM

Neither official nor unofficial Russia knew any racial prejudice. It

would, therefore, be an unjustified over-simplification of Russian
'oppressors' and the non-Russians
history to describethe Russiansas
'oppressed' in the conquered and colonized territories of the
as the
Russian Empire. There was, of course,a Russian upper classin the new
Eastern territories, i.e. the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, but
there was no Russian master race since the serfs of the Russian squires
'natives' but Russians as well. Some nationalities such
were not only
as the Tartars also had an upper class whose prestige did not rank
below that of the Russian squires.Russian and native oppressedclasses
joined hands in common action against economic oppression.Russian
and Tartar nobility on the other hand establishedclose social relations
with each other which were not marred by any racial antipathies.
At no time in Russia's development was there any need for a book
hke Uncle Tom's Cabin since racial intermixture and assimilation were
the basic principies on which Russiancolonization was built. The classic
work of Russian literature depicting the relationship of the Russians
towards Tartars, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, etc. in the multi-national Volga
region is the Chronicles of a Russian Family by S. T. Aksakov, a
striking illustration of the Russian-orientalsynthesiswhich came into
existenceduring the centuriesfollowing the conquest of Kazan.
The author of this remarkable work was no revolutionary but a
conservativecountry gentlemanbelonging to a family tracing its origin
back to the ninth century. This family after transferring its seat to
Bashkiria had no objection to establishingthe closestpossibleties with
Tartars and Bashkirs,which Aksakov illustratesby numerousexamples.
He mentions one of his uncles,a wealthy nobleman who was so attracted
by the Bashkirs that he used to spend the greater part of the summer
'He spoke their languagelike one of themselves,and would
rvith them.
remain whole days in the saddG nJver alighting even for a moment, so
that his legs were as bowed as any Bashkir horseman's.' Another of
Aksakov's relatives married a beautiful Tartar girl whose family had
'an
external
then (at the end of the eighteenthcentury) already adopted
European culture and spoke good Russian but retained the strictest
Mohammedan faith'. The young Russian-Tartar couple soon enjoyed

)NIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

a 'firm and honourableposition' in Russianprovincial societyand the

Tartar lady turned out to be 'a most gracefuland interestingwoman
of the highestfashioncausingno little sensationand envy'. The most
remarkableevidenceof the gradual growing togetherof Russiansand
non-Russians
in the Volga valley and the Transvolgaregionwas the
personalityof Aksakov's own tutor at Kazan University, Nikolay
Mtttraitovictr lbragimov. His family nameand his externalipp"uran"6
werecompletelyTartar or Bashkir;he had an enormoushead,wide
cheekbones and small piercing eyes.Culturally, however,he was so
totally Russianand Slavthat he wrote an Introductionto the Slavonic
Grammarfor the perusalof Russiansecondaryschools.It was he who
encouraged
Aksakovto take up a literary career.l
In Siberia,wherethe local nationalitiesweremore primitive than in
the Volga region, the lack of racial prejudiceexpresseditself in a far
more robust way than in Aksakov's refined family circle. Rape and
barbarianactsof violencetowardsnativewomenmarkedthe first staee
of the 'physical rapprochemenl'betweenRussian Cossacksand tie
Siberianpeoples.This intermixturebetweenRussiansand nativeswas
later carried on on a voluntary basiswith the blessingof the Orthodox
Church. As a result of intermarriaeewith the nativesthe Russiansin
many parts of Siberialost all simil-arityto the Russiansof Kiev and
Novgorod.Thus in the Lower Ob region,in the Northern part of the
Tobolskprovince,the 'Russians'assumed
the characteristic
featuresof
the Ostyaks:round faceand slantingeyes;in the Tomskarea,Russians
mixedwith Tartars,Kalmucksand Kirghiz and assumedtheir physical
characteristics;in the area of Lake Baikal black-hairedand black-eyed
'Russians'bearwitnessto Russian-Buryat
mixedmarriages.
Absenceof racial pride and prejudiceis thus for Russia not a
revolutionary principle, but is both the natural prerequisiteof the
growthof the RussianEmpireand the naturaloutcomeof centuriesof
racialintermixture.A conservative
Russiannoblemanwould havebeen
asproud of beinga descendant
of GenghisKhan as of the mosthighlyborn Slavonicancestry.The Sovietr6gimemay havetransformedantiracialisminto a dogmaticprinciple,it may haveformulatedthis principle
legally and politically, but Russian anti-racialismjs no Bolshevik
creation,it is a componentpart of Russianhistory.
At the time of the establishment
of the Sovietr6simeRussiancolonization was still unfinished.The Russianshad cJlonizedthe Eastern
part of EuropeanRussia,the Volga region and the Urals from the
sixteenthcenturyonwards,they had colonizedthe Black Seacoastand
the North Caucasus
regionin the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies.
A greateffort wasmadeto colonizeSiberiain the periodbetween1886
and 1916when4,500,000
personswent to that vastarea,of whom, it is
true, 1,000,000returned to Europe. But all theseand many other

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

colonizing activities amounted to little when related to the gigantic

potentialities of the Russian Empire. The North, not only the Far
North, was a huge empty space.Siberiahad hardly any major towns.
The RussianFar East was badly underpopulated.
T H E R U S S I A N C H A R A C T E R O F T H E O C T O B E RR E V O L U T I O N

The OctoberRevolutionof 1917insteadof endineRussiancolonization

gaveit a newimpetus.The Revolutionwasa Rus-sian
revolution.It was
Russiannot only in thesense
that it took placein Russia,but alsoin that
it was carried out by people who were Russiansin the ethnical or
cultural sense.
This doesnot meanthat it wasbackedby the majority of the Russian
peopleor that it was the triumph of Russiannational aspirations.On
the contrary, the Revolution was the work of one Russianparty only,
the Bolshevikor CommunistParty, which tried to imposeitself on all
nationalitiesof the RussianEmpire in the first place and then on all
nations of the earth.
The ideals of the earlier democraticRevolution of February 1917
wereunderstandablenot only to Russiansbut to all nationalitiesof the
RussianEmpire.The political aspirationsof the progressivenationalists
in Central Asia, Transcaucasia,
Ukraine and Byelorussiawere not
fundamentally different from those for which the supportersof the
'Provisional Government' fought in Moscow and Petrograd. The
OctoberRevolution,on the other hand, wasbasedon a principlewhich
from the outset was not acceptableto the non-Russiannationalitiesthe leadershipof the proletariat over the peasantry.This meant in
reality the leadershipof the Russianworking classover the peasants
of all the peoplesof Russia.
The triumph of Bolshevismcould, therefore,be achievedonly by the
exterminationof all movementswhich did not acceptthe leadershipof
the proletariat.Thesemovementsincludednot only the bulk of the big
Russian party of Socialist-Revolutionaries
but also a large number
of local political forces like the Dashnaksin Armenia, the Mussavat
Party in Azerbaidzhan,the Alash Orda in Kazakhstan, the Shuro
Islamiyamovementin Turkestan,etc.
The October Revolution proclaimedthe equality of all nations.of
the RussianEmpire, but this 'equality' was an empty formula in view
of the leading part which the Russianproletariat was called upon to
play. Mikhail Kalinin blurted out the truth when he said it was the
aim of Sovietpolicy 'to teachthe peopleof the Kirghiz steppe,the small
Uzbek cotton-grower, and the Turkmenian gardener to accept the
ideals of the Leningrad worker'.z Kalinin, who was the head of the
Soviet State between1920 and 1946thus admitted that there was no

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

question of working out a compromise between Russian workers,

Ukrainian peasants, Uzbek cotton-growers, and Mongol cattlebreeders.The worker of Leningrad - or of Moscow - would simply
impose his ideals on the others.
The heroes of the October Revolution and of the'Civil War in the
non-Russian territories of what is now the Soviet Union were primarily
Russiansor people of non-Russian nationalities who had severedtheir
links with their nation of origin and adopted Russianculture. In Central
Asia the triumph of Bolshevism was secured by the two Russians
Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze and Valerian Vladimirovich Kuybishev. No
Soviet textbook has ever tried to deny the role ofFrunze and Kuybishev
in the establishmentof Soviet power in Central Asia or claimed that
any Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Turkmenian, or Tadzhik personality,took
a leading part in it. To make the Russian leadersof the revolution more
acceptabletheir nameswere slightly transformed and appear in the local
'Prunze-aka' and 'Koibashi-aka'.3 In the
Central Asian folklore as
multi-national Northern Caucasusregion the leaders of the revolution
werethe RussianSergeyMironovich Kirov (Kostrikov) and the Georgran
Ordzhonikidze, in Byelorussia the Russianized Jew Lazar Moiseyevich
Kaganovich, in Azerbaidzhan the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan.
THE RUSSIAN CHARACTER OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY

The strength of the Russian elementinside the revolutionary vanguard,

the Communist Party, can be gauged from official statistics on the
ethnical composition of the party membership.ln 1922,when the Civil
War had almost ended, 7l'96 per cent or 270'409 party memberswere
Great Russians although their percentage of the total population was
52'91 per cent. Other nationalities which had a greater number of
party membersthan they were entitled to on the basis of their numerical
strength in the country were Jews (5'21 per cent), Latvians (2'53
per cent), and Poles (l'5 per cent). The Latvian and Polish communists were mainly political 6migr6s,while the prominence of Jewish
communists arose from the high proportion of Jewish people in the
town population of Western Russia. Russians, Jews, Latvians and
Polesaggregated81 '2 per cent of the total party membership,although
they representedat the utmost 55'5 per cent of the total population.
The Ukrainians, the second largest nationality in the Soviet Union,
accountedfor only 5 ' 88 per cent of all communists,although one out of
every five Soviet citizens was a Ukrainian. The largest non-European
sroups among the party memberswere Tartars 3,940(l'05 per cent),
.\zerbaidzhani Turks 2,451 (0'65 per cent), Uzbeks 2,043 (0'54 per
cent). Kazakhs and Kirghiz together had 4,890 communists, or I '3 per
cent of the total.4 None of thesefigurescorrespondedin the least to the

numericar,-0",,;:.
ffi;"

."J'r'l,n",n,",uesthese

figures were of little importance since they showed only the number of
the rank and file communists belonging to a given nationality, without
disclosingtheir real political weight.
In this respect statistics on the ethnical composition of party congressesare much more revealing since the congressdelegatesare, for
the most part, leading officials of the party. At the Thirteenth Congress,
held in May 1924, only I per cent of the delegatesrepresented the
Turko-Tartar peoples who were then almost 11 per cent of the entire
population of the Soviet Union. The Russianshad 60.8 per cent of all
delegates;11'3 per cent wereJews,7 per cent Latvians and 4'7 per cent
Ukrainians.
At the Fifteenth Party Congress,held in December 1927,whenthe important decisionson the collectivization of agriculture were taken, the
non-Europeannationalitieswere again without adequaterepresentation.
The Turko-Tartar group had but 1.6 per cent of all delegates. The
percentageof Russianshad gone up to 62 per cent ; Jews and Latvians
still sent fairly large delegations,although their percentageshad gone
down to 7 per cent and 4.7 per cent. The relative strength of the
Ukrainianshadincreasedto 9.8 per cent, i.e. almost double, and the
number of Byelorussiandelegateshad goneup from 1.2 to 2.9 per cent.
The delegations of a number of non-Slav nationalities, however,
decreasedslightly compared witt' 1924.5
Throughout its existencethe Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has remained a predominantly Russian and Slav body. The number of
non-Russian party members, it is true, increasedboth absolutely and
relatively, but this statistical increase was not accompanied by a
corresponding increase of their influence in the party and siate
machinery. Attempts have been made to shake Russian predominance
and to establish both a greater degree of national equality within the
Communist Party and a genuine federation within the Soviet Union.
But these were foiled by Stalin and his associatesduring the big purge
of 1936/38.
There is no doubt that Stalin upheld the Russian character of the
October Revolution while his opponents wanted to broaden the basis
of the Soviet r6gime by giving greater weight to the non-Russian
nationalities.Both the left-wing and the right-wing opposition to Stalin
agreedon that point for opposite reasons.For the extremeleft, Russian
predominancewas incompatible with the idea of the world revolution,
The right-wing opposition around Bukharin and Rykov was guided
in its hostility to centralism by its generaliy more liberal approach to
Soviet internal politics. Both groups were able to quote in support of
their standpoints the works of Lenin, who in various proclamations
and appeals to non-Russian peopies had shown great understanding

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

for their national aspirations.In his'Letter to the Workers and Peasants

of the Ukraine' Lenin recognized the right of the Ukraine to complete
'To
the Communists of Azerbaidzhan,
independence.o
In another letter
Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountain Republic' Lenin
advised the Communist Parties of the Caucasusand of Transcaucasia
not to copy the Russian experiencebut to show more mildness and
caution than the Russian Bolsheviksdid. Lenin further suggestedto the
local communists that they should be ready to make concessionsto the
petty bourgeoisie,to the intelligentsiaand, particularly, to the peasantry.?
How far Lenin was able to equate his practical policy with these
theoretical preceptsis another question. The forcible incorporation of
the Caucasianand Central Asian territories into the Soviet Union, for
instance, took place under Lenin and was not primarily Stalin's
responsibility. The fact remains, however, that Lenin's approach to
the national oroblem was not as crude and inelastic as Stalin's. Those
communists*ho play the founder of the Soviet State againsthis successor when denoun^cingRussification and centralism are*thrrsnot entirely
wrong even if they do overstate the case.
Left-wing opposition to Stalin's nationalities policy was predominantly theoretical but Bukharin and especially Rykov, who for
several years had been at the head of the Soviet state administration,
challenged Stalin in the practical field as well. As early as 1923, at the
Twelfth Communist Party Congress,Rykov had declared'It is impossible
to administer from Moscow on the basis of bureaucratic centralism a
country with more than 130,000,000inhabitants covering one-sixth of
the earth'. Rykov, the son of a Russian peasant,acted at least to some
extent on the basis of this principle. Manifestations of local nationalism
had already been suppressedunder his rule, but more drastic centralization measuresand the large-scalepersecutionof federalist-mindednonRussian communists started only after his dismissal from the post of
Soviet Prime Minister and his replacementin 1930 by V. M. Molotov.
Rykov's policy too had moved within the narrow framework of a oneparty system, but in the days of inflexible centralism which Molotov
introduced under Stalin's supremeguidancethe Rykov period appeared
like a golden age to the communist chiefs of the non-Russian peoples.
The leading communists of the Caucasusand Central Asiatic republics
thus co-operatedwith the right-wing opposition in the hope that the
downfall of Stalin might lead to the fulfilment of some moderate
national aspirations.
From the point of view of the r6eime it was thus not enough to have
ousted Rykov from office; it was iecessary to exterminate physically
him and his group which representeda federalist alternative to Stalin's
nationalities policy. The official chargesput forward against Bukharin,
Rykov and many other members of the opposition assertedthat they
10

COLONIZATION

AND

NATION,

'sell' the Ukraine. the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia to

wanted to
'imperialistic powers'. These allegationssound fantastic and cannot be
accepted at their face value. Nevertheless, the charges against Rykov
contbined a grain of truth. Rykov did want to alter the status of the
non-Russian nationalities, not to please imperialism but to do justice
to the peoplesof the Soviet Union.
Togethei with Rykov and his co-defendantsin the Moscow trial of
'Anti-soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' the Stalin
the so-called
administration exterminated communist federalists all over the Soviet
Union. By wholesalepolice measuresand masstrials it deprived almost
all the important non-Russian peoples of an entire generation of their
political leaders, economic experts and cultural workers. These purge
'bourgeoisnationalists',
victims were describedas'enemiesof the people',
'agents of German fascism' if their homes were West of the Urals and
'agentsof Japanesemilitarism'if they belongedto an Asiatic nationality'
The purge of the national deviationists from 1936 to 1938 was exclusively-directedagainst persons who had grown up in the Bollhevik
Party and who themselveshad taken an active share in the liquidation
of genuine local nationalists. Thus the non-Russian peoples lost two
sets of their national itite dwing the period stretching from the October
Revolution until roughly the outbreak of the Second World War.
The first included intellectualswho had championed the cause of their
peoples under the Czarist r6gime and the second group wa,s.1d9
"p
of those Bolshevikswho had taken their place and had tried to defend
the interests of the nationalities and territories of which they had been
put in charge. It is true that Stalin's purges affectedboth Russiansand
non-Russiansalike, but the non-Russians,having only a limited reserve
of educated persons at their disposal, suffered proportionally much
heavier lossesthan the Great Russianswho numbered 100,000,000'
The Eighteenth Party Congressof March 1939 formally concluded
the purge and elected a Central Committee the composition of which
was highly characteristic of the Russian predominance in the Soviet
Union.- The Committee of seventy which is the highest policy-making
body in the U.S.S.R. included no more than two personsof Moslem and
Turkic origin. These were the Party Secretary of Azerbaidzhan,
M. D. Bagirov and the Party Secretaryof Uzbekistan, LJsmanYusupov.
The lattei was the only representativeof the 11,000,000Moslems of
Central Asia on the Central Committee since the other'Central Asian',
the then Party Secretary of Kazakhstan, Nikolay Skvortsov, was a
Russian.
There were three famous Caucasians on the Central Committee;
but they have never claimed to be the spokesmen of their respective
peoples'sincetheir main ambition has always been to strengthen the
ientlal state machinery of the Soviet Union; the Georgians,I. V. Stalin

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

and Lavrenty Beriya, and the Armenian, Anastas Mikoyan. Another

less-known Armenian on the Committee was I. T. Tevosyan. then
Minister for Shipbuilding. The rest of the Central Committee were
Slavs, most of them Russians, about half a dozen representativesof
the Ukraine and one or two Byelorussians.The Slavs also included
eight communists of Jewish origin who were, however, completely
assimilated and could nor. be regarded as anythins but Ruisiani.
Several of them were ousted from- the Commitiee dirins the period
of Nazi-Soviet co-ooeration.
Among the sixty-eight alternate members of the Central Committee
electedat the Eighteenth Party Congress,the non-Slavs formed again
but a tiny group, including one Tartar, one Bashkir (who was expelled
in l94l), one Armenian, three representativesfrom Georsia and t*o
local NKVD chiefs bearing Geoigian names.Of the latt'er,one was
stationed in Leningrad, the other in Vladivostok.
Among the rank and file of the Communist party the non-Russians
are, of course, more strongly representedthan on the Central Committee, but there is still a great disproportion between Russians and
non-Russians.This can be illustrated by a comparison between Moscow and the Ukraine. h 1949Moscow (includin[ the whole of Moscow
Province)with 9,000,000inhabitants had 600,000organizedcommunists.
The Ukraine with its 40,000,000inhabitants had only slightly more,
namely, 684,000 party members, but the number of Ukrainiin communistsis smaller than that, as the figure includes at Ieast 25 oer cent
non-Ukrainians, mostly Russians.x
Since the October Revolution is a Russian Revolution and the
Bolshwik Party aRussian Party, they are both bound to pursue Russian
aims. The aims of a Russian policy, like any other national policy, can
I At the Fifteenth congress of the ukrainian communist party,
which was held in May
1940,only 56 per cent ofthe delegateswere Ukrainians, as many as 37.2 per cent were
Great Russians,4 per cent were Jews and 2.8 per cent belonge<1to othei nationalities
(Pravda,May l6th, 1940.)
In the otlrer European border republics of the u.s.s.R. the position is roughly the same
as in the Ukraine: the organized communists represent1 to 2 per cent ofthe total popula_
t i o n . T h e P a r t y h a s 1 1 0 , 0 0 0m e m b e r s i n B y e l o r u s s i a( 1 9 4 9 ) , 3 1 , 0 0 0i n L a r v i a - ( 1 9 4 9 ) .
i 0 ' 0 0 0 i n M o l d a v i a ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 2 4 , 0 0 0i n L i t h u a n i a ( 1 9 4 9 ) ,1 9 . 0 0 0i n E s t o n i a { 1 9 5 1 1 .M a n y
Communist Party members of theseborder republics do not belong to the local nationalitles but are Great Russian party and state omcials, skilled workers and technicians.
In the six Moslem Republics of the u.s.s.R. - Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Krrghizistan,Tadzhikistan and rurkmenistan - there are over 580,000full party members
rrd candidates for membership in a population of nearly 20,000,000,including both
\lorlems and non-Moslems. Most of the party members live in the industrial cintres,
the Russian element is numerically strong, particularly in Kazakhstan (229.000
"nere
n e m b e r s i n 1 9 4 9 )a n d A z e r b a i d z h a n( 1 0 8 , 0 0 0m e m b e r si n 1 9 5 1 ) .
.{part from the Great Russians,the Party has recruiteda fairly strong membershipamong
(ieorgians and Armenians. There are 61,000party membersin Armenia (i951) and 166,000
rr ceorgia (1949).This meansthat about 5 per cent ofthe population ofthese two republics
dre organized in the Communist Party.

t2

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

take a great variety of forms. It can be peaceful or aggressive.9b1oad'

liberal or despotic at home. The Soviet r6gime and the Bolshevik Party
have interpreied the aims of a Russianpolicy in the most narrow-minded
way; they have followed the bad rather than the go_odexamples of
Russianhistory, while acting in conformity with someof its fundamental
'bourgeois'
lessons. Thus they have accepted the definition of the
historian, Klyuchevsky, who said Russian history was that of a country
which was being colonized.
RUSSIAN COLONIZATION

UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME

The Soviet leaders realized that the power and size of the Russian
Empire were due to successfully conducted colonization and that the
Soviet Union too could not do without a colonization policy' The form
and methods of Russian colonization, but not its essence,changed to a
certain desreeunder the Soviet r6gime.
In the fiist years after the Octobe*rRevolution the pace of colonization
declined owing to the general confusion and the hostility of the nonRussianpeoplestowards new Russian colonists. Moreover, agricultural
colonization had lost a gteat deal of its previous attraction becausethe
best land had already been occupiedby Russian settlers,and more land
could be made available only at the price of investing considerable
sums in irrigation and improvements. Land conditions in Asiatic
Russia were such that Siberia and Central Asia combined could not
absorb more than 200,000 to 250,000 agricultural settlers a year.
Despite the existence of vast empty spaces in Russian Asia, the
colonization movement at the beginning of the First World War was
headins towards an impasse.s
Not-only the Soviet rdgime but any other Russian r6gime taking over
in 1917 would have had to alter the methods of colonization policy.
The Soviet Government, particularly since 1928, the beginning of the
planning period, continued to encourage agricultural colonization on
i modeiate scale, but the emphasis was clearly shifted to industrial
colonization. To industrialize RussianAsia, to exploit its great national
riches, in short, to carry out the Five-Year Plans, it was imperative to
draw on the reservesof population of European Russia and to transfer
them beyond the Urals. In the twelve years between the end of 1926 and
the beginning of 1939 alone, 3,000,000people migrated from Central
and Western Russiainto the new industrial centresof the Urals, Siberia
and the Russian Far East. In addition, 1,700,000new settlerscame into
the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.
The migration towards the East constituted,however, only one aspect
of a general industrialization and urbanization processwhich also led
to a migration of 4,800,000people into the provinces of Moscow and
l3

ALITIES

Leningrad between 1926 and 1939, and to a minor migration of 350,000

people into the Gorky Province.e
An important feature of the industrial colonization was the foundation
of new towns and workers' settlements. Between l9l7 and 1947, the
Soviet r6gime claims to have brought into existence 508 new towns and
roughly 2,000 workers' settlements of an urban type. A detailed
analysis of these figures shows that urbanization and Russification went
hand in hand, since many of the new towns became Russian industrial
strongholds in non-Russian territories. Out of the 508 new towns, 209
sprung up in non-Russian Soviet Republics, including fifty-one iri Transcaucasia, forty-seven in Central Asia, and forty-three in the Ukrainian
coal district - the Donets Basin. Almost half of the new workers' settlements were likewise built in the non-Russian Republics, including 230
in Central Asia alone. As to the 299 new towns of Russia proper,
many were founded in ethnically non-Russianterritories or in areaswith
mixed populations: sixteen in the Far North, fifty-five in the Urals and
fifty East of the Urals.lo
Despite all efforts made under the Soviet r6gime to shift populations
from the densely populated districts of European Russia to the scarcely
populated North and East, little had been achieved up to the outbreak
of the SecondWorld War. The censusof 1939revealedthat the unequal
distribution of Russia's population showed trifling changes compared
with the Czarist period, notwithstanding all the new towns and new
industrial centres: six per cent of the Soviet population lived scattered
over two-thirds of the country's territory while forty-eight per cent of
the people were concentrated in six per cent of the territory.lr
Only a bold policy of agricultural resettlement could remedy this
situation. Moreover, industrial colonization was bound to reach a
saturation point if a sufficientfood basis could not be provided for the
new 'mushroom towns' in Asia. To keep up the tempo of industrial
colonization agricultural colonization too needed a fresh impetus.
Greater emphaiis on agricultural colonization was, therefore, one of
the important features of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-1942). To
render agricultural colonization on a larger scale possible, the Soviet
state had to make higher demands on agricultural science,whose main
task it becameto extend the cereaigrowing area towards the North and
to make Russia'swheat belt as elasticas possible.On the other hand, the
Soviet Government tried to create better opportunities for agricultural
colonization by improving the organization in charge of it. Various
Soviet institutions dealine with resettlementand colonization matters
had been in existence siice 1925, but in 1939 a new authority was
created - the 'Central ResettlementBoard', which had its agentsin all
Union Republics and Provinces.The outbreak of the war interrupted
the work of the board. and in 1945. when it was able to resume its
t4

activities, it was disbanded and a new resettlement organization was

created and attached to the Council of Ministers of the Russian
Federative Socialist Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). This was a logical
measuresincethe R.S.F.S.R. is the most important puryeyor of settlers
for under-developedareas.x
During the first post-war Five Year Plan (1946-50) the Soviet Government encouraged both industrial and agricultural colonization, but both
had a very obvious strategic tinge. Colonists were directed to certain
militarily vital areas, such as the Murmansk Province and the RussianManchurian border regions, but above all to the new strategicoutposts
which Russia had annexed at the end of the Second World War. In
this latter category belonged the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet portion
of the former East Prussia, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
A widespread propaganda campaign was started to popularize the
new territories as settlement areas: pamphlets describing their rich
resourcesand potentialitieswere lavishly distributed and the advantages
of settling in the new districts were eagerly discussedin collective farm
meetings - on the initiative of the communist rural organizations.
Alth6ugh one need not believe every word of Soiiet propaganda
about the spontaneous desire of the Russian people to migrate to
remote areas in order to serve the motherland, it would be untrue to
suggest that administrative coercion is the only motive behind the
continuous large-scalepopulation movementsinside the Soviet Union.
It cannot be denied that there exists the enthusiasmof a young generation which wants to build and to create, if possible in a new and unknown territory. There also exists the inborn 'wanderlust' of the
Russian peasant and his natural ability to adapt himself to different
geographical surroundings and climatic conditions. Another powerful
incentive for a semi-voluntary peasant migration inside Russia is the
hope, if not the definite promise, that the collective farm statute will be
less strictly applied in the distant territories than in the over-crowded
provincesof Central Russia.Lessrigidity in the application of the statute
may be worth a journey thousands of miles long, since it means for
the peasantmore time to be devoted to his individual allotment outside
the collective farm and a larger number of cows, sheep and goats for
his personal use.
Although the primary approach of the Soviet r6gime towards
colonization is an economic and strategic,and not a national Russian
one, Soviet colonization policy servesto promote the triumph of the
Russianpeopleno lessthan colonization under the Czarist r6gime. Only
a people which is both numerically large and stubborn by character,
a people which is used to hardships and privations and which has exr A number of non-Russian Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Tadzhikistan, etc., also
bave resettlement organizations which are in charge of rninor local resettlement schemes,

l5

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

perience in colonizing activities can carry out successful colonization

scaleas is neededin the vast Euro-Asiatic plain.
work on such a large
-Russians
and Ukrainians can be relied uo6n u.
This is whv onlv
colonizers to any extent worth mentioning. Many other peoples may
locally participate in the great colonization of the Russian East and
North, but the Russiansthemselvesmust necessarilylead and dominate
the colonization work everywhere.The role of the Russiansin the work
of colonization is that of a huge advancing army which is accomplishing
the main job, but which is assistedby a number of small satellitedetachments to whom certain local tasks are assigned. The use of nonRussiansfor Russian colonization is common to both the Czarist and
Soviet r6gimes, but the latter is by far more thorough and systematic
in the mobilization of the non-Russian population and no longer
permits the alternative of emigration abroad.
Christians from the Baltic countries, Moslems from the Volga,
Tartars and Mordvinians, Chuvash and Mari, cultured Jews and
half-civilized Chukchi from beyond the Polar Circle - they are all
thrown into action by the Russian colonizers for the ultimate benefit
of the Russians.The more the peoples of Russia become intermingled
and the more they are scattered through the Eurasian continent by a
planned colonization policy the less there is danger of the rise of
'national problems' and the greater the likelihood of their absorption
by Russian civilization. From economic necessitythe Soviet r6gime is
inflicting a double blow on the non-Slav peoples: it pumps Russian
and Ukrainian skilled workers, specialists and officials into the territories of the small Soviet nationalities and recruits unskilled labour
from among the latter to send them to Russian industrial centres,in
an endeavoirrto solve the manpower problem there.
LOCAL

NATIONALISM

The Soviet nationalities policy is thus largely identical with the promotion of colonization and industrialization in the non-Russianterritories
of the U.S.S.R. It can also be defined in other ways; it dependson the
standpoint from which the definition is formulated. From the point
of view of Soviet Russia's neighbours the Soviet nationalities policy is
an instrument of Soviet diolomacv. The Bolshevik 'Old Guard' considered the nationalities policy ai an abstract policy of encouraging
the cultural and economic development of the peoples of Russia. For
the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union itself the nationalities
policy and the fight against local nationalism are identical notions.
Each of thesedefinitions contains a certain amount of truth. but there
can be no doubt that the fight against local nationalism has been the
dominant element in the Soviet nationalities policv since the thirties.
l6

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

Until then the communist leadership had most energetically fought

'Great Russian chauvinism' which had been described as the
against
'maindangeron the national front'. Gradually the situation was reversed,
'Great Russian chauvinism' was more and more belittled
the danser of
'local nationalism'becameincreasing[1i
merciand theiampaign against
less.We have already referred to the political side of the purges, but
the 'fight against local nationalism' implied more than a struggle for
'local nationpower betweencentralistsand federalists.The expression
alism' was used in the widest possiblesense.Every assertionof national
individuality in the economic, cultural and political field was trans'local nationalism'.
formed in Soviet languageinto
The main forms of local nationalist tendencies which the Soviet
r6gime tried to stamp out were the following:
1 . r H s ' F E D E R A L I S TN A T I o N A L I S M ' . M a n y a n a t i o n a l i t yo f t h e
Soviet Union realized that it was too weak by itself to resist Russian
colonization. It therefore tried to strengthen its position by entering
into closer relationship with one or severalother non-Russian peoples
of the Soviet Union to which it was ethnically related or linked
togetherby geographicalcircumstances.Wheneversuch tendencieswere
'counter
exoressedthe Soviet central Government denounced them as
revolutionary maneuvres' emanating from some sort of pan-ism. Subfederations are considered undesirable within the U.S.S.R. however
politically reliable those participating in them may be. Thus a regional
federation of the three Baltic Soviet Republics is unthinkable under
the working of Soviet nationalities policy; and in four casesthe Soviet
central Government actually suppressedregional sub-federations after
having permitted them for longer or shorter transition periods (in the
Volga region, Transcaucasia,Northern Caucasusregion and Central
Asia).
N T H E E c o N o M I c s p H E R E .M e a s u r e s
2 . r o c e l , N A T T o N A L T srM
applied to the whole Soviet Union were frequently transformed into
measuresagainst local nationalism, when put into practice in the territories of national minorities. People of many nationalities in the
Soviet Union denied the Moscow Government the right to interfere
with the internal economic structure of the territories which they
inhabited. A case in point was the collectivization of agriculture in
1930-33,which, a, u ,rri., met with greaterresistancein the ion-Russian
areasthan among the Great Russians.Other economic measuresagain,
like the resettlement of the millions of nomads of the Soviet Union,
affectedexclusivelynon-Russian nationalities.
'local
3. nrrlGrousLy TAINTEDNArIoNArtslr. The fight against
local
the
fight
against
religion' has always beenclosely inter-twined with
nationalism. The Soviet leadershave disregardedthe simple truth that
a nation cannot be free if its relision is oooressed.In the inter-war
17

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

period the campaign against the religions of the national minorities

was conducted by the state authorities, the Communist Party, the
Communist Youth League and by the 'Nationalities Commission' of
the Central Committee of the S.V.B. (Soyuz Voinstvuyushchikh
Bezbozhnikov - League of Militant Godless).-After the waithe work
of the S.V.B. was taken over by a 'Society for the Dissemination of
Political and Scientific Knowledge' which has a special anti-religious
department ('Section for Propaganda Problems of Scientific-Atheistic
Knowledge'). The Society which is closely connected with the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Communist Party has branch
organizations in all non-Russian Soviet Republics. Although the
principal target of the Bolshevik fight against religion was the Russian
Orthodox Church, the non-Russians,particularly the Eastern nationalities of the U.S.S.R. were affected by it more than the Slavs. Since
nationality and religion are almost identical in the Eastern provinces
of the Russian Empire - as almost everywherein the Orient - the fight
againstreligion in theseterritories was implicitly a fight againstnational
culture and nationai traditions as well.
4. rrNGursrrc NArroNALrsM. The Sovietr6gimerightly fearedthat
the languagesof the non-Russiannationalitiescould too easily become
an instrument in the struggleagainst Bolshevismif they were not carefully kept under control. The question of political terminology, fgr
'Bourgeois
instance,was of paramount importance.
nationalists' could
obtain political advantagesby what orthodox communistsconsideredto
be an incorrect translation of such terms as 'Soviet', 'dictatorship of the
'general
proletariat', and
line of the party'. The r6gime tried, there'nationalists'
fore, to wrest from the
the weapon of the languagesby
changing their character and introducing into each of them a large
num6erif Russian and Russianizedso-cilled international terms. Tfre
dual aim of the Soviet languagepolicy was to reduce on the one hand
the differencesbetweenthe local languagesand the Russian,and on the
other to widen the cleavagebetween languagesbelonging to one and
the samelanguagegroup so as to weaken all pan-ismsbut pan-Slavism.
Not only was the victory of the Stalin group over the opposition forces
inside the Communist Party tantamount to the victory of centralism;
it also implied the triumph of the Russian language and of Russian
civilization. It is a striking coincidencethat the decreeon the obligatory
tcachingof Russianin allnationalminority schoolswas passedonthe very
d:rv on which Rykov and Bukharin were sentencedto death - on March
I -rrh.1938.The new partv leadershipwhich Stalin installedin the various
nrrtional republics siarted its activiiy by launching a campaign for the
studv of the Russianlanguage.For the non-Russiancommunists a good
command of Russian thus became a way to manifest their loyalty to
the Kremlin.
18

COLONIZATION

AND

NATION

During and particularly after the Second World War official Soviet
ideology becameless hypocritical by openly proclaiming that the Russianswerethe'driving force'within the U.S.S.R.and not just one of the
'180 peoplesof the Soviet Union'.
On the very morrow of victory Stalin ordered that greater emphasis
should be given to the leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet
State. When addressingthe Red Army commanders at a great victory
celebration on May 24th, 1945,Stalin demonstrativelytoasted the Rus'most outstanding people of the
sian people whom he describedas the
'clear mind, steadfastcharacterand
to
the
U.S.S.Rj and he paid tribute
patience' of the Russians. This toast was not only a eulogy of the
Russians,but also an oblique censureintended for the other peoplesof
the Soviet Union, whose mind, character and patience from Stalin's
point of view had been less commendable during the Great Patriotic
War.
It seemsthat Stalin's subtly formulated reproach to the non-Russians
was justified. In the fatal years of 1941 and 1942in particular, the Russianshad borne the brunt ofthe battle. In October 1942Pravda dropped
all propagandistic pretence and stated flatly that the Russiansformed
'vast majority' of the army. This admission was very remarkable in
the
view of the fact that the Russiansconstitute less than half of the populationof the U.S.S.R.*
Stalin's toast to the Russian people was no toast in the ordinary sense
of the word. It was the ultimate logical conclusion to be drawn from
the Russian character of the October Revolution. It also supplied the
key for the understanding of the purges carried out after 1945 among
the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. The aim of these purges
u'as to eliminate from the cultural life and the national traditions of the
non-Russianseverything that might possibly encourage among them
any kind of anti-Russian sentiments.
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

In examining the essentialsof Soviet nationalitiespolicy we cannot overlook the laws, decreesand constitutionsof the U.S.S.R. and its constituent republics, but we must use them with care. Consideredin isolation they give no more than a clue to the propagandist aspectof Soviet
* The same Pravda arlicle which was quoted by Soviet Ilar Nerrs on October 16th, 1942'
also complained about the insufficient military training of the non-Russian soldiers.The
newspapersaid: 'Not all the reservesarriving at the front from the national republics and
provincesare equally well trained. Someyoung soldiersare insufficientlyfamiliar with mililary technique,particularly with their weapons.It is the duty ofmilitary training organizations to attend to this, to give the young fighters a complete idea ofmodern war weapons
and teach them how to use them. Political work has always been an important activity of
our army organizations. It is of particular importance among Red Army men of nonRussian nationality. . . .'

l9

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

nationalities policy, whilst the real position of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union can be judged only on the basis of the
application of the laws, i.e. in the light of facts. The constitutional
framework of the U.S.S.R.,though not a guide to the fundamentalsof
Soviet nationalitiespolicy, acquaintsus with the terminoiogy with which
the latter operates and introduces us to the various degreesof Soviet
territorial autonomy.
1 . s o v r e r R E p u B L r c s . T h e h i g h e s tf o r m o f S o v i e ta u t o n o m y i s e n joyed by the sixteenconstituent Soviet Republics. According to Soviet
legal theory these sixteen Republics are fully fledged sovereignStates,
with all the prerogativesof a State including a constitutionalright to
leave the Union should their respective parliaments, the Supreme
Soviets,so decide.
The sovereigntyof the Soviet Republics is, however, a mere constitutional fiction, becausein reality they have no say in questionsofinternal
security,high-leveleconomicplanning,tran sport,or hisher education,not
to speak of foreign policy and defence.Since February lst, 1944, the
Soviet Republics have possesseda nominal right to have foreign
ministers and defenceministers of their own, but the national foreign
ministers and foreign offices have a purely formal existence,while the
national defenceministries never came into being. It is dificult to see
what functions such defenceministries could have had, in vierv of the
centraiized and predominantiy Russian character of the Soviet armed
forces.Non-Russians,it is true, may rise to the highestposts in the Red
Army and Navy, but Russian is the official language of the Soviet
military apparatus. During the Second World War all military orders
ilere written in Russian.
Even from a merely legal point of view the constituent Soviet Republics do not own the natural richeson their soil. The coal of the Ukraine,
the oil of Azerbaidzhan,the copperof Kazakhstanbelongto the U.S.S.R.
rs a rvhole and not to the individuai republics. The sarneapplies to the
a_criculturalland of the Republics.
The 'sovereignty' of the Union Republics is also rendered fictitious
bv theexistenceof the'Prokuratura'.the stronsivcentralizedofficeof the
:. ,
('GeneralnyProkuror') which was founded
rLlI-Ur.rionAttorne,v-General
in 1933.The all-Union Attorney-Generalhilnselfappointsan AttorneyGcneral for each of the Union Republics and even the personnelof the
'Prokuratura'in the provincesand districtsof theserepublicsis under
hi,. supremecoinmand. Repubiican governmentscannot interfere in the
lclst *'ith the work of the 'Prokuratura' nor can they influence the
crrmpositionof its local staff. The Attorney-General has a dual function.
He acts as Public Prosecutor and he checks on the legality of measures
crrrricd out by the republican and local authorities. The AttorneyGeneral of a Union Reoublic. on instructions from the all-Union

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

Attorney-General,can rescind any local laws and decreesif they contra'revolutionary legality'.
dict the so-called
on which-thJ'Prokuratura' basesits work is in
svstem
The lesal
itself rigoiousiy centralized.There is no all-Union Penal Code, it is true,
tut the"penal"Codeof the R.S.F.S.R.is also in force in Kazakhstan,
Kirghizistan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.
Theifact that there are separatepenal codesfor the R'S'F'S'R', Ukraine'
Bvelorussia.the Transcaucasianand some of the Central Asian Soviet
Repurblicsis of little importance since their differencesin content are
insignificant. Moreover many articles in the individual penal codes
the
hav! been supersededby all-Union laws and decrees(particularly
'protection of socialist property' and on various 'state
decreeson the

*
,{

crimes').
'states' do not correspond t_oStates in the
often, the Soviet legal
'States' have not
senseof living organisris. In numerous instancesthese
been created"bytistorical development or by the wiil of their peoples,
features'
nor do they owe their existenceto someparLiculargeographica.l
leaders
by
the
taken
deciiion
to
a
simply
They owe"their origin
^soviet
such
of
Examples
only.
leader
Sbviet
sup-reme
by
the
Ju"n
o'.
-'States'
rvhich weie created by Soviet political opportunism are the KareloFinnish s.s.R., the Moldavian s.s.R. and the Soviet Republics of
central Asia. Republics which were taken into the Soviet union en bloc
as an outcom. of -ilitury operutions,such as Georgia, Estonia and
t u i u r . . O r i g i n a t i n gf r o m p o l i t i c a la n d e c o n o m i c
L a t v i aa r e o f a d i f f e r e n n
units gravitating around a centre, they possessthe characteristicsof
stateh6odin thJsenseofpolitical and economicgeography,evenifthe
Soviet central Government has considerably curtailed the exerciseof
their actual state functions.
Soviet legal theory, as taught in Soviet law schools, assertsthat a
territory hai to answlr three r6quirementsto becomea Soviet Republic,
namely: (a) the nationalitY giving its name to the,Republic must have
an aUsotutemajority in the territory concerned: (6) a Soviet Republic
must have a common border with at least one foreign State because
otherwiseit could not secedefrom the Union if it wished to do so, and
(c) a Soviet Republic must have at least 1,000,000inhabitants'l2
'conditions' too are only theory and are not fulfilled by all the
These
sixteenSoviet Republics. Thus the Kazakhs have no absolute majority
in Kazakhstan, nor have the Karelians and Finns combined in the
Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic. Moreover, the last-mentionedrepublic
did not fulfil condition (c), since it had less than a million inhabitants
rvhen promoted to the status of a fully-fledged Soviet^Republic.As to
condition (b) it has become an illusion, since several Soviet Republics
adioin onlv Soviet satelliteStatesand Soviet-controlledterritories (Byeloiussia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan).
2l

ONIZATION AND NATIONALITIES

2 . e u r o N o u o u s s o v r E r R E p u B L r c s . A c o n s i d e r a b l yl o w e r d e g r e e
of autonomy was grantedto the 'Autonomous SocialistSoviet Reniublics' (A.S.S.R.)but they are also oilicially describedas 'states'. out or
the sixteenAutonomous Republicstwelve are part of the Russian Soviet
FederativeSocialistRepublic (R.S.F.S.R.),one each belongsto Azerbaidzhanand uzbekistanand two to Georsia.An A.S.S.R.ii extremely
limited in-its_scope
of action and its autonomy is almostexclusivelyconirned to the linguistic sphere.Formally and ligaliy, however, things are
different,sinceeveryAutonomous Republic pbssesses
a constituti-onof
its own (althoughalmost identicalin r,rordineand contentin all sixteen
A.S.S.R.s),a'Council of Ministers' and a .SrJpreme
Soviet'.
3 . a u r o N o u o u s p R o v r N c r s . T h e n e x t g r o u p o f n a t i o n a lt e r r i t o r i a l
units, the Autonomous Provinces(Avtononlnyeobtastt) have lost much
of their importance b_ythe introduction of ftre tg3o constitution promoting the more populous Autonomous provinces to Autonomous
Republics. out of the nine still existing Autonomous provinces six
belongto the R.S.F.s.R. encl one each t6 ceorgia, Azerbaidzhanand
fadzhikistan
The difference betr.l'eenan 'Autonomous province' and an ordinary
province is that the former has rules of its own with resard to its official
;.inguages.
The 'Autonomous Province'has a special;statute' adopted
rv the provincial Soviet and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the
R*pubiic to which it belongs; it also has a specialripresentation in the
-province
'Soviet
of Nationalities'which the ordinarv
has not.
The 'Autonomous Provinces'of the n.s.p.s.n. are not placeddirectly
-,nderthe governmentof the RussianFederationbut uncleithe Executive
L ornmittee (Ispolkom) of a kind of super-province,,Kray,, which can
:-c translated as 'Territory'. Thus the Autonomous provinte of the cir-.1:siansbelongsto the stavropol rerritory, the Khakass Autonomous
Prorinceto the I(rasnoyarskTerritory, etc.
l . L O w E n F o R M S o F N A T T o N A L A U T o N o l . l y . y e t a n o t h e rf o r m o f
::-Ltional
autonomy was designedprimarily for the small nationalitiesof
:::r- Far North, the 'Nalional Areas' (Okrugi). There are ten such
' \.itional
Areas' altogether,four of which extend.along Russia'sArctic
-...r:t. The majority of the 'National Areas' cover hugi but almost un_
:'..pukited.spacesand even from the legal point ofviJw they enjoy only
., r ery limited auronomy.
'\ational
Districts' (Ra1,on.t')were devised for small but compact
:::iiroritieswedgedirrto alien surroundings.These 'National Districts'
-.'.:ist very often of five to ten villages only. Before the Secondworld
\\'.rr therehad beenasmany as 147'NationalDistricts,in the R.S.F.S.R.
.:.oru-.lr{ost of them were locatedin the Far North, yakutia, Buryato_
\ltrnsolio, EasternSiberiaand the Amur region
'\ational
village Soviets'(viltagecouncili) and'National collective

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

Farms', of which there are many hundreds, guarantee,in theory, the

:ights of the tiniest national minority group.
The Soviet central Government has shown a singular indifferenceto
'National Areas' and
.:i own creationsin the field of nationalitiespolicy.
'\.rtional Districts'have often suddenly passedout of existence.Fron:rers of both Soviet Republics and Autonomous Soviet Republics have
::r'cr been regarded as more than experimental lines which can be
,-:.rngedby deiree just as they were created by decree.Whole slices-of
::rritory have oftenbeen cut offfrom one republic and added to another
.i rcn this appearedto be convenient from the economic point of view.
Crpitals of Autonomous Republics have been similarly shifted accord.- s ro economic expediency.Moreover, even the internal administrative
::rision of a constituentrepublic into provincesis not a matter to be
::'cided by the republic concerned,but belongsto the competenceof the
:::tral authoritiesin Moscow.
The Stalin Constitution of 1936set itself the task of giving a final form
:,r rhe administrative sub-division of the U.S.S.R. But ever since then
:::'re have been numerous alterations which were not due to territorial
: .:quests alone. A11this is only too natural: Russia is a young country
.'.:.,ie economic potential is steadily growing and whose administrative
.:".-up, therefore, has to be elastic without being hampered by the
.r.:!-restsof the local peoples.
SOVIET BUDGETARY

CENTRALISM

T:: real importance, or rather the factual insignificance,ofthe autono:-.,rus units created by the Soviet constitution can best be shown by
:r-,mining the budgetary means at the disposal of both the central
: r,rernmentand the regional governmentsand Soviets.
The expenditure side of the Soviet budget is usualiy sub-divided into
' .r'eroups: (1) financingof national economy; (2) social and cuitural
rr..rsures;(3) administration; (4) defence,and (5) miscellaneousexpen: ::rre. Expenditure for national economy is covered by the central
--Jcet to the extent of 86'3 per cent. Only 6'3 per cent is derived
::.ri the budgetsof the Union Republics.The remainingT'4 per cent
'local
: rhe expenditurefor national economy comesfrom the so-called
provinces,
the
districts,
:.:Jqets' which include the budgets of the
'local' national
".-i
o
f
a
l
l
H
a
l
f
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
s
.
r
u
r
a
l
a
n
d
t
h
e
councils
iJtroorl) expenditure is spent by the town councils and only an in..::,ilrcant percentage - at any rate less than ten per cent - by- all
.\.S.S.R.s,Autonomous Provincesand National Areas put together.
l.reir combined sharein the whole national economy budget is lessthan
'-e per cent of the total. (A11theseand the following figures are based
-': rhe budget of 1941, the first full year in which the present sixteen

COLONIZATION

AND

NATIONALITIES

Soviet Republicswere in existence.The figureswould hardly be different

in any other year.)
The central budget finances93.8 per cent ofall expenditurefor industry, including the entire heavy and armament industry and also the
larger plants of the building, food, textile, fishing and timber industries.
Only the small plants of light industry and the production of local fuel
resourcesare financedby the constituentrepublics.
In the field of agriculture the share of the local budgets is somewhat
bigger, for the ceniral budget absorbs 'only' 77.1 per Jent of the whole
expenditurefor agriculture.The Union buclgetis responsiblefor Machine
Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), large-scaieirrigation schemes,those state
farms which grorv cereals,sub-tropical fruits, cotton and other technical
cultures and also for all cattle farms. The appropriations out of the
republican budgetsgo to small state farms growing vegetablesor breeding poultry, rabbits and bees.
As far as transport is concerned the Union budget has a de facto
monopoly sinceit iovers the entire air, rail, water ani road transp5rt of
all Soviet Republicswith the exceptionof local road communications of
'republican
importance' which account for less than two per cent of
transport expenditure as a wirole.
With regard to social and cultural expenditure the preponderanceof
the Union budgetis lessmarked; it directly controls only 35.7 per cent
of the appropriations in that field. However, evenfor social servicesand
education the constituent republics have far lessflnancial means at their
disposal than the Union. Tireir share in the funds earmarked for social
and cultural purposesis no more than 14.3 per cent which, although
nominally a figure referring again to 1941only, may be considereda fair
average.Fifty per cent of the funds in this category are covered by the
local budeets.Over 300 educationalinstitutionsall over the U.S.S.R.,
many researchinstitutes, scientific libraries and all the Academies of
Sciencesare financed out of the Union budget. The republican budgets
provide for secondaryschools, libraries, museums, state theatres, etc.
The republican and locai budgets also cover ninety per cent of the
expenditureon public health.
Administration costs are divided up as follows between the three
sroups of budsets; Union budget 32:4 per cent, republican budgets
l-l per cent,local budgets43.6 per cent.Al1 that is vital to statesecurity
in all parts of the U.S.S.R.is coveredout of the Union budget.The iocal
budgets,apart from providing appropriations for generaladministrative
purposes,financeregistry offices,trafhc police and fire brigades.
The 'miscellaneous expenditure' is almost entirely charged to the
L-nion budget (95.3 per cent).
Sincethe expenditureside of the republican and local budgetsis small,
the latter have little need of major resources of income. The pur-

COLONIZATION

t:

AND NATIONALITIES

chase tax and the State's share in the profits of nationalized industry,
the two main sourcesof income of the Soviet budget, thus go mainly
into the central treasury and only comparatively small portions-are
diverted each year into the republican treasuriesand local budgets.l3
The centralistic direction of Soviet financial policy does not prevent,
of course, the application of heavy state investments in the nonRussian territoriel. On the contrary, Soviet statisticscould prove only
too easily that a comparatively greater proportion of the budgetary
appropriitions goesto non-Russian territories than_to many territories
irihabiled by Russian people. The fact remains that. the republican
sovernmentshave no financial autonomy, no real say in regard to the
i.on"y spenton their territory. Ifthe Soviet Republicsenjoyed-budgetary
autonomy the budgetswould undoubtedly look different and the interests
of the individual p-eoplesof the Soviet Union would not be sacrificedto
the interestsof the Union as a whole; instead a compromise would have
to be worked out betweenall-union requirementsand local aspirations.
THE

'sovIET oF NATIONALITIES'

The protagonistsof Soviet nationalities policy might argue that the nonRussiannationalitieshave a considerable,if not decisive,influenceonthe
preparation of the Soviet budget, through their predominant participation in the Soviet of Nationalities. At this p,ointwe again have to leave
Soviet reality as expressedin the budgetary figures and to revert to the
fiction of Soviet constitutional law.
The Soviet of Nationalities is the Second Chamber of the Soviet
oarliament. which until 1936was known as'Central ExecutiveCommitiee of the U.S.S.R.' (in Russian abbreviatedas Ts.I.K.) and which since
'Supreme Soviet' or 'Supreme Council'.
rhen has been officially called
The Soviet of Nationalities has equal rights with the First Chamber, the
Sovietofthe Union, and servesin theory as the constitutional safeguard
for the small nationalities, so as to check any preponderanceof the
Slavs.
Under the 1923constitution there was a very wide measureof equality
betweenlarge and small nations in the Soviet of Nationalities. Union
Republics and Autonomous Republics were placed on the same level
end had five representativeseach, Autonomous Provinces one eachThe new constitution greatly enlarged the Soviet of Nationalities but
discriminated between Union Republics and Autonomous Republics.
At present every Soviet Republic elects twenty-five members to the
Soviet of Nationalities, every Autonomous Republic eleven, every
Autonomous Province five, and every National Area one deputy.
Aithough the non-Russian Soviet Republics and the Autonomous
Republics and Provinces usually include Russians in their delegations to
25

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

the Soviet of Nationalities, the non-Russiansand even the non-Slavs

have a clear majority in that body. Had the deputies of the Supreme
Soviet any real powers they could by a common effort easily prevent the
passageof any law which they thought harmful to their national interests;
they could even defeat the adoption of the Union budget.
Membership of the Soviet 'parliament', however, signifiesnot much
more than a title of honour for a distinguishedStakhanovite.a .Hero of
the Soviet lJnion', a successfulchairmin of a collectivefarm or a wr-ter
of nation-wide reputation. Both the Soviet of Nationalities and the
Soviet of the Union meet for no more than a fortnight every year for
purely formal sessions,in which they have to give belated approval to
all the measurestaken by the government and to pass the budget. The
speechesmadeduring the'Supreme Soviet' sessionsservepredominantly
for propagandist purposes,although they also contain, here and there,
elementsof criticisms regarding points of detail and some minor recommendationswhich, however, never affect the substanceof the budeet or
the generalpolicy of the r6gime.
Even if the Soviet of Nationalities had more power and held longer
sessionsit could not safeguardthe individual national interests of ihe
peoples of
,the U.S.S.R., in view of the fact that the overwhelming
majority of the deputies are members of the Communist party. The
formidable totalitarian power of the Communist Party reducei even
further the importance not only of the Soviet of Nationalities but also
ofthe entire constitutional systemcreated by Soviet nationalitiespolicy.
The organization and machinery of the All-Union Communisi pariy
.
is cntralisticin the extreme.The party is the samein all SovietRepublics,
Autonomous Republics,Autonomous Provinces,etc., and thus guaranteesa completeuniformity of policy throughout the SovietUnion despite
a1l constitutional federalism. The central machinery of the All-Union
Communist Party is constantly checking on the goyernments of the
constituentrepublicslest they should take too literally the federalcharacter of the constitution. An entire staff of party officials at the serviceof
the 'Central Committee'is constantly being switchedround in the Soviet
Union so as to ensurethat the Party shall remain one monolithic whole,
* ithout regard to local frontiers drawn between Russia's nationalities.
The Central Committee often endows its emissarieswith extraordinary
po\\,ersreducing to nothing all the prerogativeswhich the governments
of the Soliet Republics, or Autonomous Soviet Republics possesson
paper. After the completion of the emissaries'mission, Moscow,s interterenceis then usually admitted by the formula 'with the assistanceof
rhe Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party it has been
po'sible . . . to overcome the difficulties on the agrarian front', or
'
. . . to iiquidate the nationalistic deviation', or'. . . to raise the level
of cattle breeding.'
26

COLONIZATIONAND NATIONALITIES

FALLACIES OF SOVIET STATISTICS

Soviet propagandahas tried to conceal the basic truth about its nationalities irolic/not only behind a fictitious legal construction but also
behind a densesmokescreenof statistics.
This propaganda makes belief that Soviet nationalities policy is
the sum'totil"of all the figures referring to the cultural and economic
advancementof the peoplesof Russia in the last thirty years.It is quite
immaterial whether the Soviet statisticsare accurateor not; they cannot
reflect the successor failure of Soviet Russia'shandling of the nationalities problem, becausethey refer solely to quantity and not to quality.
STATTSTICS.Sovietcultural statistics,for instance,rel. CUrrunel
of literacy among the non-Russian peoples,but
growth
a
fantastic
veal
they do not say-what end the literacy serves.Does it smooth the path
for the beginning of a national cultural life of the peoples concerned?
'Russification'?Or is it designedto fabricate
for final
Is it a prepiaratio-n
.Soviet culture" national in form but Bolshevik in substance?
a uniform
Moreover, Russianand western conceptsneverfully tally. words like
literacy and iuiteracy have a different melning in the.Soviet Union and
'100 per cent liquidation of illiteracy'
in western Europe. The slogan of
in a siven ureu oi the Soviet Union does not mean that any number of
p"opi" approaching this percentagecan participate in cultural life even
in tire m&t primitive wiy. Afterthe formal liquidation_of_'illiteracy'
there still remains what Russianscall malogramotnosl,which means a
low degree of literacy implying a technical knowledge of the alphabet
rvithoui the ability to make practical use of it'
Or let us take ihe impresiive number of books published since 1917
in the national languages. At the first glance these figu-rescan tell us
nothing about the dultural development of the peoples for whom they
are priited. These statisticswill reflect reaiity only as soon as we break
them up and find out how many books !n 1 given language are simplytranslaiions of the works of Lenin and Stalin, of the Short History oJ
the All-Union Communist Pafty, or propaganda pamphlets, and how
many books constitute genuine contributions towards the cultural enrichment of the nationalily for which they are printed. There is no doubt
that this last figure will be in every singlecasediscouraginglysmall'
of
Even less relevantfor any assessment
STATTSTICS.
2. BCONOTTITC
Soviet nationalities policy are economic statistics.Thesewill tell us the
percentual increasebf industrial production in any national minority
ierritory of the Soviet Union, but the figures themselveswill not answer
the queition how far this increaseguaranteesor endangersthe survival
of the non-Russiansof the U.S.S.R. This is a reproach not to Soviet
reality but to soviet propaganda,which is trying to conceala most logical

COLONIZATION

AND NATIONALITIES

and natural fact; that the theory of the Soviet nationalitiespolicy has to
be sacrificed to the Five-Year Plans, since the contrary would be
Utopian. Practice has shown that every new factory, every new coalmine, every new oil-well in a non-Russian territory of the U.S.S.R. is
not primarily an assetfor the people of that territory but rather for the
Great Russians,who alone have a sufficient manpower reserveto staff
thenewenterprises.
3. rHa NUMBERoF sovrET NArroNAlrrlrs. Finally, the most fundamental figure of the Soviet nationalitiespolicy - the number of peoples
in the Soviet Union - is also an arithmetical illusion if not Turiher
elucidated. The number of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is usually
B!v9n as 180, although there are other estimates,slightly higher ani
slightly lower. A scientific analysis based on the 1926censusgave the
number of nationalitiesin the U.S.S.R. as 169,sub-dividedinto twelve
basic groups. According to this analysis Russia included 47 Turkic,
39 Japhetic (Caucasian),27 Ugro-Finnish, 17 Iranian, 9 palae-asiatic,
8 Indo-European, 5 Semite, and other nationalities.ta Such figures,
accurate as they may be from the point of view of the ethnog.iph.r,
have no practical value and exaggeratethe real scopeof Soviei nalionalities policy, which is big enough without any exaggeration.
At least half of the 180 peoplescannot be reckoned as nationalities in
a cultural or political sense,evenif the most generouscriterion is applied.
The Soviet cultural worker and communist propagandistmust therefore
operate with a figure considerablylower than 180. Alexander Fadeyev,
the well-known Soviet writer and member of the Communist Central
Committee, addressingthe PeaceCongressin Paris in 1949,said there
were'about seventynationalities'inthe SovietUnion. This is nearerthe
truth in so far as nationalitieswhich have arrived at a minimum desree
of cultural or even linguistic self-expressionare concerned. There-are
indeed newspapersin eighty languagesof the Soviet Union. political
and literary journals exist in fifty languages.15
The rdgime can reckon with thirty to forty-five nationalities in the
actual sphere of Soviet 'home politics'. Thus forty-four nationalities
were_represented
among the delegatesof the first post-war congressof
the Communist Youth Leaguel6and thirty-two nationalities among the
delegatesto the Tenth Congressof the Soviet Trade Unions in 1949.1?
Even the existenceof thirty to forty nationalities which count politically
is sufficientto make the tasks of the Soviet nationalities policy, with its
narrow pattern and rigid principles, extremely complicated. How the
Soviet rdgime has tried to solvethe multitude of political, economic and
cultural problems which are inherent in Russia'smulti-national character, can be shown only by examining the application of Soviet nationalities policy in detail, nationality by nationality, republic by republic,
province by province.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTES TO CHAPTER

ONE

1. S. T. Arsarov, Chronicle,cof a RussianFamily, translatedby M' C'

Beverley,with an introductionty Prince Mirsky. Routledge,London
209,
353.
158,
New York 1924,PP.
Za etygody - During theseYears,Moscow-Leningrad1929'
2. M. K,q,LrwrN,
v o l . 3 ,p p . 3 8 5 i 6 .
Frun.e, I\{oscow1941,pp' 78179'
3. P. Bennzov,tuIikhail Vasilyevich
partiit-toyperepisi
4. Sotsialnvi natsiotrulnysostavvKP (b), Itogi vse.toyuznoy
A'U'C'P' (Bolthe
of
composition
and
ethnic
social
1927gorla. The
shevif,s),Resultsof the all-Union party censusof 1927,Moscow-Leninby the Departmentof statisticsof the central Comgrad 1928(publishecl
mitteeof the All-Union CommunistParty).
January5th, 1928'
5. InternationalPressCorrespondence,
of Lenin (2 vols.),Lnwnr,Ncr,and wtsnanr, London 1947,
6. TheEssentials
vol. 2, p. 548.
of Lenin, vol' 2, p. 699.
7. TheEssentials
--Sketcheson
geografi S''S:'S'R'
8. OcnNovsrv, Ocherkipo ekonotnicheskoy
the economicgeographyof the U.S.S.R.,Moscow 1924'p' 87'
VolumeU.S.S.R.,Moscow1948'p' 56'
9. LargeSovietEncyclopaedia,
10.Trud,November5th, 1947.
Geografya
I L S. S.BALZAK,V. V. V,lsvurlN,Y. G. Fr'tGIN'Ekonomicheskaya
- EconomicGeographyof the U.S.S.R',Moscow1940'vol' 1'
.S..S.S.R.
p.141.
gosudarstvennoye
12.A. I. DrNtsov, Sovetskoye
Pravo Soviet public law,
23415.
19a7,
pp.
Moscow
- The state
byudzhet,S.,S.,S.R.
13.Prof. N. N. RovrNst<v,Gosudarstvenny
budgetof the U.S.S.R.,Moscow1944'pp.30148.
Stroitelstvo,Nr. 37, August 1929,p. ll0.
14.Sovetskoye
15.Izvestiya,MaY 5th, 194916.Pravda,April 1st, 1949.
I7. Pravda,April 23rd, 1949.

29

VII
THE NORTH CAUCASUSPEOPLES

RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Caucasusmeans more to the Russiansthan either Russian Central

Asia or the Russian Far East. The bonds between Russia and the
Caucasus are strong and real and no official propaganda efforts are
'Russian
Caucasus'will
neededto orove their existence.The idea of the
be alive among the Russian people as long as they continue to honour
and read their great poets, becausethe Caucasnshas become part and
parcel of Russian national tradition through the works of Pushkin,
Lermontov and Tolstoy.
Lermontov's works in oarticular show that the Russianshave interpreted the word 'Caucasui' not as a purely geographicalnotion, but as
a whole period of Russian history and a political programme stronqly
flavoured with romanticism. While deploring the end of the primitive
freedom of the CaucasuspeoplesLermontov, like Pushkin, considered
the final triumoh of Russian civilization over the Caucasustribes to be
an unavoidablehistorical necessity.Thus the two greatestRussianpoets
gaveto the Caucasianpeoplesidentical advice,namely to reconcilethemselvesto the victory of the Russians.
'Humble thyself,
Pushkin has expressedthis conviction in the phrase:
Caucasus,for Yermolov* is coming'. Lermontov, on the other hand,
'We
predicted to the Circassiansthat one day they would proudly say
may truly be slaves,but at least we are slavesof the ruler of the Universe!' Since Lermontov's time Russia'spower has grown considerably
and the serviceof a great master has indeed becomethe dubious consolation not only of the Caucasianpeoples but of many others besides,
throughout the Soviet Union.
The peoples of the Caucasusdid not act in accordancewith Pushkin's and Lermontov's admonitions; they stubbornly fought Russia and
struggleddesperatelyfor their freedom, becausethey did not realize the
tremendousodds they were facing. They were too remote from the world
of political and diplomatic realities of the nineteenthcentury to underof their own situation or the power of the
stand either the hopelessness
RussianEmpire. They deceivedthemselvesby the erroneoui supposition
* GeneralYermolov (1772-1863)was the principal Russianhero of the Caucasusconquest

that Russiawould not fieht for the b".*r a"";;rtl""r"o,",

,f shewere
really as great and mighty as was sornetimesassertedby somemountaineerswho had seenher immensity and later returned to their own people.r
THE FIRST EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

The mountaineers of the Western Caucasus- the Circassiansor the

Adyge - who had lived close to the shoresof the Black Sea, occupied
particularly important strate_sicpositions. In every war which Russia
waged against Turkey the fearlessCircassianshad constituted a grave
menace in the immediirte rear of the Russian Caucasusfront.-The
alternatives,from the Russian point of view, therefore, could only be
either the total surrenderor the total annihilation of the circassians.
As only a minority of the Circassianswere ready to accept surrender,
a mass migration of the Circassians to Turkey appeared the only
possible'solution',both to the Russianconquerorsand the Circassians
themselves,whoseindomitabie spirit of freedbm could not be reconciled
w i t h R u s s i a nr u l e .
Thus betweenI 861 and I 864 about 500,000Circassiansleft the Caucasus; but owing_to staivation, diseaseand the hardships of the journey
in overcrowded vessels,it is said that only half of them ever ieached
Turkey alive. Referring to this trek of the Circassiansa semi-official
Russian publication admitted that 'a calamity of such proportions has
rarely befallenhumanity'.2This great exodusof the Circassiansdisposed
of the problem of nationalities in large areas of the westernpart of the
North Caucasusregion and openedthem up to Russian,Ukrainian and
Armenian colonization.
After the departure of the Circassiansa great deal still remained to be
done in the North Caucasusregion from-a Russian national point of
view. Although thousandsof Chechens,Nogai Tartars and Osseiinshad
Iikewiseparticipated in the great exodus,theseand other peoplesofthe
Central and Eastern Caucasuscontinued to be a source of uneasiness
1o the Russian State. Complete Russian victory over the rebellious
mountaineerswas achievedonly under the Soviet r6gime.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS IN THE SOVIET CAUCASUS

The Russian communist leaders came to the Northern Caucasuswith

progressiveideas and plans for raising the material and cultural level
of its peoples.The Soviet Government was originally even determined
to give the small mountain peoples a chance to combine their forces
and thus become a political factor of some importance. In accordance
with the wishesof the more advancedmountaineersthe Soviet Government decided that there should be one United Northern Caucasus

rhisRepubReoubric
"eereeatinJlffi"lj,]l;,ffi;]o,,un*.
Mountain SocialistSovietRepublic'lic I officiaiii ca"lled'-Autonomous
(Gorskaya A.S.S.R.) - was formed by a decreeof January 20th, 1920'
its capiial was the city of Vladikavkaz. The Republic comprised no
fewerihan sevendifferent Caucasianpeoples:Kabardinians, Chechens,
Circassians(Cherkess),Ingush, Ossetins,Balkars and Karachay'
In its original form the Mountain Republic remainedin being fol o{Y
about tweity months. The Russian c-ommunistrulers apparently felt
that the promotion of unity among the North caucasus peopleswas not
in the inierest of Sovietceniralism-andthat it was saferto have them split
up again into severalsingle units. The disintegralion-.ofthe Mountain
nep,iu[c started in September1921when the Kabardinians were given
a special Autonomoui Province. In January 1922 three more peoples
,."id.d from the Republic. The Balkars were made to join the Kabardinian Autonomous Province and the Karachay and the Cherkesswere
given a joint Autonomous Province. In December 1922 the chechens
ilere indlced to set up an Autonomous Province of their own, which left
in-the Mountain Republic' In.Julyonly the Ossetinsarrd the Ingush,
-endowed
with separateterritorial lnits of
were
tSi+ both thesepeoples
North CaucasusRepublic was
a
united
of
6xperiment
The
own.
their
thus finally terminited. Administrative changesin the Northern Caucasus continued even after the end of the Mountain Republic. In April
1926 the Karachay-CherkessAutonomous Province was divided into
two provincer; und in January 1934the Ingush merged with the Chechens into a singie Autonomous Province'
The auton5my which the Northern Caucasuspeoples had enjoyed
existed very largely on paper' In reality thgl yele administered up
to 1934from Rostov, thetapital of the huge North caucasus Territory,
which was almost as large as Great Britain and Eire combined. The
Executive committee of ihe North caucasus Territory (Krayispolkom)
was entitled to overrule any decisionstaken by the various Autonomous
Provinces. In 1934 the Soviet bureaucracy administering the multinational parts of the North Caucasusreglon moved from Rostov to
Vladikavkaz. Only in December 1936 did the mountaineers gain a
greater say in the management of their affairs through_thetransformation
6f thr." Autonomous-Provinces into Republics (Kabardinian-Balkar
A.S.S.R.and Northern OssetinA'S'S'R')'
A.S.S.R.,Chechen-Ingush
The repeated shifting of the Northern caucasus peoples from one
territoriai unit to anothir had left untouched the real problem: how to
make the mountaineersinto reliable soviet citizensand how to associate
them with the socialisttransformation of society.The continual changes
in the administrative boundaries had hindered rather than encouraged
these tasks. They had rendered particularly difficult the recruiting of
administrative personnel from among the local peoples and the intro183

duction
of their;;;;:;::ffi:"

;^"*,

words.the
Sovier

nationalities policy in the Northern caucasus remained unsuccessful,

and an endlessstream of statements,ordinancesand recommendations
issued by the Presidium of the central Executive committee (TsIK)
in Moscow had been
to. remedy the situation to any'majoi
-"^1_b1"^
extent. on May 10th, 1931, for instance, TsIK circulated a dlcree to
the effect that Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern caucasus
should operare at a quicker pace. Thi deiree stipulated that by the end
of 1932 at least 70 per cent of officials in the Autonomous provinces
should be recruited from among the local nationalities, and that local
l11qu1ge1should be introduced into the administration. On July 5rh,
1934,TsIK issueda statementrecognizingthat the decreeput into force
over three years earlier had remained a-dead letter. A fr.rrtherdecree
which Kalinin signed on January 7th, 1936,again denouncedthe nonimplementation of the Soviet nationalities policv in the Northern
caucasusand revealedthat the Russian languagedominated everywhere
in local government bodies, from the proiincial administratio.r do*.,
to the village councils.of 1,310officialsin the Northern caucasusTerritory only seventeenbelonged to the mountain peoples.According to
the new decreethe local languageswere supposedto come into offi"cial
usein 1936and 1937,but it is open to doubt whetherthat order had anv
greater practical results than its predecessors
THE SECOND EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

The Russo-Germanwar fully revealedthe discrepancyexisting between

propaganda and reality with regard to conditions in the lorthern
caucasus. one could hardly find a better example of the former than
the optimistic and distorted picture which Mikhail Kalinin gave in
october 1942when the German troops were approaching the ciucasus
Mountains. Kalinin then said: 'The caucasus-ii the moit enlightening
demonstration of the reforming,-beneficialeffect of the Soviet tlyt.- on
the psychology and character of people r.vho,not without ."ur'on, ,u*
danger to themselveseverywhere.Th-ecaucasians have now become a
social people who seein the collective systemtheir buhvark, the founclation of material prosperity and a higher inteilectual rife. . . . The whole
caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples.The whole
-become
soviet land, from border to border, has
their- beloved home.
National enmity has_givenway to mutual understanding,estrangement
to co-operation. . . . Is not everything that has taken place in the Laucasus during the twenty-five years of Soviet power a miracle? yes, it is a
miracle. It is that for which Lenin fought af his life, that for which Stalin
and is fighting, that to which our party has always aspired.' And
ig"ghl
Kalinin went on to say that the peoplesof th-eNorth..tr cuucarus were
184

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

displaying worthy resistanceto the enemy,,derailing trains, blowing up

briilges, destroyiirgammunition and fuel depots.s
Oity a few weeks after Kalinin had made,hit- p-untg.yl19statement
'miracle', and of the idyllic situation
little was left of the Caucasian
which the Soviet Presidenthad depicted.when the German armies occupied the Northern Caucasusregion many mountaineersmanifestedtheir
irostility towards the Soviet r6gime. They attempted to use the retreat
of the Red Army to free themselvesfrom what they considered.the
.Russian yoke'. over twenty years of Soviet-rule had not altered their
ingrainedtonviction that Russia'sfoes were their friends. Thesepeoples
ap'parently thought that they owed as little loyalty to R t,ssiaas the
tndonesiansdeeried themselvesto owe to the Dutch and the Vietnamese
to the French when their respectivecountries were occupied by -Japan.
In the official Soviet view, of the sevenpeopleswho in 1920had formed
the Mountain Republic four had shown themselvesparticularly^unreliable in the crucial winter of 1942-43.They were the chechens(407,600
according to the 1939census),the Ingush (92,074),the Balkars-(42,,660)
had been
and the karachay (i5,73i). After the North Cauc-asus_region
unable
to
itself
found
cleared of the invaders, the Soviet Government
indifference.
their
or
even
disloyalty
for
their
forgive thesenationaiities
them into good
It ilso abandoned all further attempts to transform 'happy
family of
citizens of the U.S.S.R. and expelled them from the
administrative
territorial
special
the
soviet peoples'. A1l of them lost
units which the Staiin Constitution of 1936 had bestowed on them.
Early in 1944 Ihey were rounded up and deported to far away.placesin
Sibeiia. For all practical purposes they ceased to exist. Thus were
abolished the chechen-Ingush Autonomous S.S.R. and the Autonomous Province of the Karachay. The Kabardinian-Balkar A'S'S'R'
was transformed into the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. after having been re'burden' of the Balkar traitors.
lieved of the
Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasusdiffered to some extent from
czarist potlcy since it resulted in the building .of schools, the.atres,
libraries^and"hospitals,but for the four deported nationalities a1l this
had been of little use. From their point of view there is hardly any differencebetweenthe policy of General Yermolov and that of Generalissimo
Stalin. Indeed, th; Soviet r6gime deprived at least as many Caucasian
mountaineersof their homes as did the Czarist r6gime.
CONTINUITY

OF RUSSIAN CAUCASUS POLICY: THE CHECHENS

The Chechens,as the most numerous nationality left in the Northern

Caucasusafter the emigration of the Circassians,offer a palticularly
good example of the continuity of Russian policy. lle I--1gi Soviet
Encycloprdia rightly summed up the historical role of the Chechensby

r85

HE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

describingthem as the 'most active and strongestopponents of the

czarist Governmentduring the conquestof the ciucasur;. Th" Russians
sufferedextensiveand costly disastersat the hands of this people, who
were unequalledin forest warfare.
Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the chechens have challenged
the RussianEmpire, but from 1818onwardstheir resistanceto Russian
rule assumedmajor proportions. In that year General yermolov built
a fortress to subjugatemore easily the rand of the chechens. He called
the new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. The
name of Grozny had a de,epermeaning than might appear at the first
glance:itwas the symbol of a political pr-ogrammeihat*ermolov defined
in the following words: 'I wish that the te-rrorof my name should suard
our frontiers more potently than chainsof fortresses,that my word sf,ould
be for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Gioznv became
Yermolov.'s.headquarters,and it was from Grozny that counflessRussian expeditionsset out otopunish raiders,avengebefeats,establishnew
posts, relieve beieagueredgarrisons, or rescue retreating bands and
armies'.4rhe Russian campaign against chechenia reachid its climax
in 1840,at the time of the great Chtchen rising under the leadershipof
Imam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movement
led to the gradual submission of the chechens in the years 1g57-59.
The Russianauthorities knew well that thesenew subjectsof the czar,
after all the trouble they had caused,would not easily reconcile themselvesto the loss of their freedom; so an attempt wis made to settle
the'chechen problem'by a dor-rble
transferof population. Immediately
after the conquest the inhabitants of.forty-fo.rf auls (mountain villages)
were tran_splanted
from the mountains to the plains, where they co.-uld
more easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were foiced to
emigrate to Turkey, whele they were given hospitality on the express
demand of the Russian Government. In the surnmei of 1g65,:9,OOO
chechens, one-fifth of the_entirechechen population at that date,'left
Russia. Those who stayed behind did nof remain quiescent. rn'lgli
there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the RussoTurkish war, and more trouble in 1886.ARussian monograph on the
ch-echens,pu_blished
in.1894, said that they could not yet b"ecbnsidered
'fully
pacified'; they still looked across t[e border to Turkev whither
many.more dreamed of emigrating.sThe emigration of the 39,000had
not eliminated the 'chechen problem', for the birthrate of thesechechens was particularly high, far above the averagein the Russian Empire.
CHECHEN-INGUSH

MOSLEM OPPOSITION

The immediate consequenceof the october Revolution in chechenia

was a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the
186

rhey at ;"
chechens.

;;ff";",rrip

Uzun
Sheikh
gf t_h,e

Hadii who proclaimed himseli Imam and Emir of the Northern Caucai u . . t n . E m i r w a s t h e a l l y o f t h e c o m m u n i s t si n t h e s t r u g g l ea g a i n s t h e
*hit" Cuu.ds of Geneial Denikin. Having vanquished the White
armies,the Bolsheviksdropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope
of all
with Cirechennationalism. itre Ctrechensdemandedthe expulsion'living
Russianswho in the course of the last century had settledin their
,ou.".. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist
b'andsterrorize? thi Russian population of the area beyond endurance.
In the early trventiesthe Russian settlersin Checheniasent a complaint
to Moscow on account of the endlessraids and murders perpetratedby
Chechenbands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin
went personallyto the Caucasusand attempted-to calm.down both
Russiansand ihechens. With carefully chosenwords he tried to persuade
them to live together in peace,to intermarry and to respecteach other's
customs.6
Whilst in consequenceof Kalinin's personal intervention banditry
stopped in chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the
Soiiirt r6gime was never quite suppressed.In 1931the little country still
34
had 2,6i3 mosques and Arab iChools, as rvell as 1,250 mullahs,
powerful
were
who
mullahs
The
elders.
,fr.iptt and 25b re[gious
opponents of the Sovi-etr6gime even managed to keep alive the illegal
Siliriah courts which were camouflagedas'reconciliation commissions'.
The hostile attitude of the Cheihens towards the Soviet Russian
r6gime was often manifestedin the readinessto credit the most fantastic
an"ti-Russianrumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a widespreadbelief that Kunta Hadji the head of a popular Y.ot1:- sectwho
tiad died at the end of the nineteenth century was stili alive and was
found a State based on
would
he
where
soon to return to chechenia,
did not differentiate
chechens
the
Apparently
law.
religious
Moslem
between Cza"ristancl Bolslivik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji
would appear as Messiah, for it was he who lead led them in the risings
bzarism in 1864 and 1877,for which he was exiled to Novgorod.
asainst
'ih.
Ingrrrh, whose fate Soviet policy had co-upledwith that of the
who
no iess loyal to Islam. A delega_te
Chechenf showed themselves
'second All-Union Conferenceof Godless
representedIngushetia at the
pJdagogists'iritg:t, stated that the influenceof the Moslem clergy_was
-strong
among the Ingush that-.children refused to learn from
stiil Jo
Loots wnlcfr ihey beiGveclto 6e anti-religious.Whenevera teachertried
to introduce anti-religiouspropagandahe encountereda hostile attitude
amons schooi childrJn and there-werecasesin which teachershad even
to ieaie the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular
Soviet schools,where the children were taught in the winter, was counteracted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn
187

HE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

during the summer holidavs all that the Soviet authorities wished
them
to disregard' A number of Ingush party and communist youth
League
members,insteadof working againit ttr-einfluenceof reiigion, ,r.Jir,.-_
seivesto go to the mosquesto pray.?
The difficultiesexisting between-theSoviet authorities and the
chech_
ens.and Ingush were not exclusi'ely due to the Borshevik failuie
-oi to
understand the importance of the ieligious factor in the tife
ttre
mountaineers.There were also extraord-inarydifficulties or u i."nni.ut
nature, due to the fact that the directives ofthe centrar administration
were issued in the Rr.rssianlanguage and therefore did not ,.u"r,
tn"
chechen-Ingush masses.Being unable fully to understand the orders
received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them
out, o.
falsified the decisionsof the party and of the administraiion.s
c R O Z n - y_ T H E O I L C I T y
It was the tremendousdead weight of the predominantly Russian
capital
of Checheniathat prevented.thelmplementationof any genuine
crr"irr"o
an^dfinally speiledthe doom of the Chechen'pEopre.
The actual
.1utglory
liquidation of the chechens would probably not have'occurredhaj
not
th^elargesttown in their homelandbecome an oil city, ana indeed,
one
of the most important oil centresof the U.S.S.R.
This oil city had-developed out of the littie fortress of Grozny.
Al.
though Grozny oilfierdshad beendiscoveredas early as ts::.iheiwere
hardly_exploited at all in the nineteenth century.'rn Di,
troi".u".,
they^already supplied r1'5 per cent of the entire'Russian oil.
n.t*""n
1913and 1917this_figure
had risen to
p-r,cent,and in the following
four yla1s to. near.ly25 per cenr. By .*^l
1937the proportion of Grozny oil
to total-Russianoil production had fallen to 9-.25-percent, but
in tJrms
of absolL'*efigures this output representedan increase
per-iint,
c_omparedto that before the First world war. The devetop'meni
"r'zzi
or
Grozny as an oil centre made for an increaseof the populutifn
on uo
'o,obo
'American
scale'.In 18.90^t!:place had no more than
inhabiiants,
against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468in 1939.lf
ne"o hardly be added that the Chechensand Ingush, peoples consiJne
or
shepherdsand peasants,could not contribui. o"ytt ing,"o.rr, ,n.nii"onin_gto the rise of the town which was styled, arm'ostr.ini.urrv,
Cpitur
of the Chechen-IngushA.s.s.R.'. Among the oilwork.r, 6i
G;;ry
th"T:-y:1" probably at no time more thai one-tenth of .nativesl
and
until 1936therewere but 9.7 per cent.
U n l i k e . s om a n y c i t i e si.n t h e S o v i e tU n i o n , G r o z n y n e v e rc h a n g e d
its
name underthe Soviet169ime,despitethe imperialistichistory
c"iri."t.a
witlr it. As a matter of fact, it was the Sovi'etoit citv of ciornv
*r.,i.r-,
spelled the doom of the chechens and not the liitle rort..rJ
*rrr.r,
188

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

Yermolov had founded to spread terrot among the mountaineers.The

struggle which Czarist Russian officers had begun_was.terminated.by
Sovie-tRussian police officials,who finally ensuredRussian domination
over the northern slopes of the Northern Caucasusby expelling.the
Chechens bag and baggage. It is questionable whether the crimes
officially attriluted to the ehechens - particularly the help which.they
had siven to the Germans - would have been a sufficiently weighty
,euso-nfor exterminating them as an organizedcommunity, had not the
Grozny oil been involved. To protect the Grozny oil-wells against all
futureiisks the Soviet authorities removed the Chechensfrom Grozny's
hinterland and transformed the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. into the
Grozny Province. Grozny is another instance of the danger which the
existenceof oil-wells can bring to a small people. whether in T,atinAmerica, the Middle East or in the Soviet Union, national self-determination, independence,autonomy and national rights count little as
soon as oil interestsare at stake.
Almost up to the very moment of their suppressionas an ethnographic unit, Russian propaganda made _considerable use of the
Ltrechensin its attempt to impress the public abroad with the Soviet
nationalitiespolicy. Even a year after the outbreak of the Secondworld
War the Chechenswere still regardedas a'good people'. In August 1942
they were said to have played a prominent part in l jUig anti-fascist
meitins' in the town of Ordzhonikidze where 3,000 mountaineers
'boundless devotion to our beloved motherland - the
pledeed
'Sovi"et their
Union - and the great Russian people'. Delegates of the
Chechens,Ingush, Balkars - all peopleswhom the Soviet Government
later deprived of their national existence- addressedthe meeting and
spoke a^bouttheir strong friendship towards the Russians.eData made
available on October 5ih, 1942,showed that forty-four Chechenshad
been awarded decorationsfor valour in the field, not a bad record considering that far larger national units like the Turkmenians, Tadzhiks,
Kirghii and Estonianshad not won many more by that date.
Piradoxically, the Chechensand Ingush continued to serve the.purpose of Soviei propaganda even after their liquidation as political
entities. Their removal-from their homeland enabled the Soviet rdgime
to rewrite the entire history of the Northern Caucasus.This rewriting
consistedin blaming the Chechensand Ingush for a1lacts of anti-Soviet
resistanceperpetratLdin the years following the October Revolution in
the Caucaius region, and in-whitewashing all other nationalities. This
new interpretation of Caucasushistory was even elaborated in a statement of tire Central Committee of tne Att-Union Communist Party' It
dealt with the opera The Great Friendshipthe libretto of which had not
taken into account the official reorientation with regard to the history

of Februaryl0tht
ctaternent
TheCentralCommittoe
of theCaucasus.
r89

FIENORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

1948,said: 'The plot of the operais historicalryfalseand artificial.It

ple]:nd: to.depictthe strugglefor theestablishm'ent
of Sovietpowerand
glli"_ldr!:p betweenthepeoplesin the NorthernCaucasus
in theyears
1918-20.
The operaconveysthe erroneous
impressionthat suchca"ucasian peoplesas the Georgiansand ossetinshid beenhostiledurinethis
epochtowardsthe Russianpeople.This is historicallyfalsesinc?the
obstacleto the establishmeni
of friendshipbetweenthe peoplesin the
Northerncaucasuswasduringthat periodtheIngushandchechens,.r0*
was a most a,uthoritive
ixposition of the new
_ This pronouncement
Soviettheoryabout'good'and 'bad' peoples.
THE ABOLITION OF THE KARACHAY

PROVINCE

Another caucasian people who, together with the chechens and

Ingush, came to lose their territorial administrative unit were the Karachay, a people of the western caucasus who had sufferedgreatly in the
nineteenthcentury under the pressureof Russian cossack iolonization.
The Ka^rachayhad beendriven out into the mountains by the advancing
wave of the cossacks who took possessionof the caucasus foothills]
Confined to the rocky mountajn area the Karachay lived in conditions
of great misery and earned a scanty tivelihood through nomadic cattlebreedine.
Befori the war the Soviet Government considered that the resettle-gt:l
the Karachay into the plain was one of the great achievements
of Bolshevik Caucasuspolicy. Ii wasjust that resettleirentwhich in 1942
offered to the Karachay the opportunity of getting into touch wittr the
German armies and renderine iervice t6 tfr""rn.
From the point of view of iis ethnical composition the abolition of the
Autonomous Province of the Karachay was hardly justifiable, sinceSlav
colonizatiol in the province was iniignificant. ii iDza the Russians
representedonly 1.7 per cent and the Ukrainians 4.4 pe, cent of the
population, while the Karach.aythemselvesformed ovei three-quarters
of the inhabitants in the province. As neither Russian nor Slav national
interestswere affectedthe Soviet Government decidedio accompanythe
abolition of the Karachay province by a friendly gesture towirdi ttre
Georgians.only the northern part of tfre I(arachiy irovince was added
j" tl" *i::lan pro.vinceof Stavropol, while the southern part u4th the
'capital'
Klikhori,t was included in Georgia. The annexition of this

* Before the chechens and

rngush feil into disgracethe official Soviet history of the october Revolution and the Civir war attribxted tJthese trvo peoplesthe most
daring exploits
in support of the Bolsheviks.This is what an official Soviet'puuricution
ior i.ilig",'if"sumption said about the Ingush in 1937:,'In the Revorution this people
covereditsilf with
undying glory. During the Civil War. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, puiru.O
ti tf-r"
*u,
seek
refuge
jo
$ith
the
Ingush.
The-tngush
protected
faithfully
him,.l, "n"_v,
ft'-"-:l
f Klikhori -wasoriginally called 'Mikoyan Shalhar'. T'hetown was built in the late twenties
to give the Karachay people an aciministrativecentre.

190

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEO

tenitory comprising1,200squaremiles was a nationai triumph for

G;orgii, for ii enabledher,for the first time, to spreadout to the north
of the Caucasus.
A

' c o o D ' P E o P L E- T H E o S S E T I N S

After the expulsion of the Chechensfrom their homeland the Ossetins

becamethe largest mountain people of the Northern Caucasus.In 1939
there were alto-gether354,000ossetins in the u.s.s.R. of whom slightly
less than two-thirds lived in the Autonomous Republic of Northern
ossetia, with which we are here primarily concerned, and about onethird in the Southern ossetin Autonomous Province of Georgia. The
two Ossetinterritories adjoin each other and it would have been logical
to amalgamatethem into a single Autonomous nepgltt-c. Representatives of ihe two Ossetiaswent to Moscow in October 1925to discussthe
unification of their people with the Soviet central Government and
personally with Staiin whose own mother is of ossetin origin. This
discussionwhich is briefly referred to in the seventhvolume of Stalin's
completeworks, was inconclusive.The unification of the Ossetinswould
have been possibleonly at the expenseof Georgia and the Kremlin was
aOOarentlynot prepared to harm the interestsof one of the constituent
of a minor nationality.
r6dubtcs
'Czaristbf tne-u.S.s.R. for the sake
and Bolshevikauthoritiesagreein their appraisalof the comparatively peaceful and placid ossetins, no less than in their judgment
bn tne turbulent Chechens.Of course, both r6gimes had encountered
difficultiesamong the Ossetins,too, but never on the sa-mescaleas in the
caseof other Caucasusmountain peoples.
Czarist Russia started the conquest of the Ossetinsin the period of
catherine II and skilfully exploited the classdifferencesamong them as
well as their hostility toward their western neighbours the Kabardinrule as a
of
Russian
establishment
the
ians. Many Ossetinsconsidered
mountain
more
warlike
by
attacks
of
danger
the
against
safeguard
peoiler. Ossetin folk-songs of the early epoch of Russian conquest
iefl6ct a pro-Russian spirit and state unequivocally that living under
Russian*1. *ut identiial to living in peace.
The ossetins appreciated that Russian occupation and protection
enabled them to settle in the plain from which they had been driven by
the Kabardinians, Part of that re-settlementhad already started in the
secondhalf of the eighteenthcentury.The major part of the re-settlement
action was, howevei, carried out much later, between the twenties and
the forties ofthe nineteenthcentury.
The Ossetinswere of use to Russia not only as settlers,but also as
soldiers.As early as the last years of the eighteenthcentury a number of
Ossetin officers distinguishedthemselvesin Prince Potemkin's army in

r91

HE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

actioxs.againstthe Turks. An ossetin Major-General,K. Zankisov,

fought in Poland againstthe insurgentsof-Ig63-4 and he *u, bu no
thg
leans.
9{y ossetinMajor-Generalof that epoch.Furthermor6,arr
'ossetinDivision'
becamefamousin the courseof the Russo-Turkish
war in 1877-8,when GeneralSkobelevdescribedits .chivalrcusgallantry'asbeing'aboveany praise'.l2
Russianculturalwork amongthe ossetinsstartedmuchearlierthan
amongothermountainpeoples.The first book to appearin the ossetin
llng.uug:was-printedin Mbscowin l79g; its objectwas to r"ru" u, u
kind of introductionto the study of the Bible.A tong period of fruitful association
with the Russiansand the generalpeaifut upprou"t of
the ossetinstowards Russianmilitary aid political rule m'adethem
more open to the acceptance
of Russianpreponderance.
The ossetins
were'as a matterof fact, the only peopleof ihe Northern caucasusto
producea,gtga!writer.injle personoi Kosta.Khetagurov
(1g59_1906)
who was half Russianized
himselfand wrote in boti the ossetinand
Russianlanguages.
The Sovietr6gimegreatlypopularizedKhetagurov
as a symbolof Russian-ossetin
synthesis,
whiih^heundoubtedlv"was.
He had a completeRussianeducation,had studiedat St.petersbuieand
wasstronglyinfluencedby suchprogressive
Russianwritersas H6rzen
and.chernishevsky,
which makeshim particularlyacceptable
from the
Sovietpoint of view.
Ultil.tfe Ossetins
gaveproofof theirIoyaltyto Russiaduringthewar
-,
the sovietregimehad had to overcome
ossetinresistance
toioth the
establishment
of collectivefarmsand the suppression
of tribal customs.
During the periodof the coilectivization
osietin 'and
peasants
wageda sort
of guerilla warfare against'socialistproperty'
while Sutwardly
accepting
collectivization,
triedto transiormthe Kolkhozinto an instrument of their respective
clans.ossetinchairmenof collectivefarmsand
officialsof local Sovietsseemto haveactedon the principle.I decide
who is a kulak and an enemyof the Stateandwho is not'. t'hus,at least
during_itsinitial stage,collectivization
in ossetiabecamea downright
b,elonging
ro a rival clan wererenderedinno"uorr'by
l1l:.:
l:l"s
berngdenounced
as kulaks;realkulaks,on ihe otherhand.wereDromoted to the rank of respectable
soviet citizensif they nappeneito
belongto the clan ciominatingthe rocalvillagecounciloi the 6oilective
farm concerned.ls
All such'incidents'wereforgottenwhenthe ossetinsredeemed
their
Jeputationby their brjlliant war record.In the fightingwhich resulted
in the dislodgement
of the Germansfrom the appioachisto the caucasus,ossetinpartisansoperatingfrom behindiire enemylines greatly
assisted.
the Red Army.la.Asa mark of appreciationfoi their l8yalty,
thesovietGovernmentallowedtheossetiniio increase
suustantialiv
itre
territoryof theirnationalrepublic.A decreeof April gth,lg44,stipuiated
t92

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEO

that three districts were to be added to the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R.

in their entirety as well as parts of three other districts. The major portion of this new Ossetinterlitory was sliced off the Stavropol Territory,
but a sectionof it came from Ingushetia,which had occupiedthe western
border area of the chechen-Ingush A.s.s.R. In this way the Northern
OssetinA.S.S.R. grew from 2,390 square miles before the war to 3,250
square miles. ThiJterritorial changealtered the ethnographic character
of the Republic, for together with its new territories Ossetiareceiveda
fairlv laree number of Russians who mostly lived in the two new
.OssLtin'io*nr, Mozdok and Malgobek. Rr.rssiancommunists thus obtained a greater say in the running of the Northern OssetinA.S.S.R. at
the expeise of their Ossetin comrades. In the small Northern Ossetin
Repubiic of the inter-war period (an Autonomous Province until 1936)
the ossetins had formed 84 per cent of the entire population against
13.4 per cent Russiansand Ukrainians. In'Greater Ossetia'however,
the percentageof the Ossetinsmay have dropped to about 60 per cent
while the Siav sharemay have increasedaccordingly.
In addition to the territorial expansionof Ossetiathe Soviet Government made still another'concession'to the Ossetins.The capital of the
republic, Vladikavkaz, was allowed to assume the Ossetin name of
Dzaudzhikau - a worthless gesturesince Russian predominance in the
town was not affectedby the -hange of its name. Dzaudzhikau remained
that which was implied in its former name of Vladikavkaz, meaning
.Ruler of the Caucaius'.It continuesto be one of the centresfrom which
Russian administration exercisesits control over the mountaineers.
RE.EDUCATION

OF THE KABARDINIANS

The chechensand the ossetinsrepresentthe two extremesin the attitude

of the local Caucasuspeoplestowards the Russians the most irreconmost far-reaching
and
the
the
Chechens,
of
the
case
in
cilable resistance
appeasemelttin the caseof the Ossetins.The Kabardinians, forming part
oiih" once powerful Circassiangroup which had been broken up by
Russian colonization and conquest, stafrd between these extremes.In
the Second World War their attitude was not beyond reproach. The
Kabardinians had their desertersand traitors, but the Soviet Government did not consider they were bad enough to justify the abolition of
their Autonomous RePublic.
During the important administrative reorganizationwhich took place
in the Ciucasus iowards the end of the SecondWorld War, the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. was diminished by only 300 square miles, which were
incorporated into Georgia. This, however,was not meant to be a punishment for the Kabardinians, but was directed against the Balkars who
had inhabited the area in question. The small administrative reform
193

achieved
aduar
r,;:

l:;ffi#:;,r"

Balkars
it served

as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastenedto expresstheir loyalty towards soviet Russia in a very demonstrative.eyen
effusive.wav.
After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisableto provide for
the Kabardinians, as a means of strengtheningtheir alregiince to the
Soviet state, a clear concep,tion of history which would u-nequivocally
show that the Russianshad always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people_.The task of formulating the details of this conception was
assignedto the 'Kabardinian ResearchInstitute', whose heabquarters
are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception-implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the
national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expectedto look
up to Temryuk with the sameawe as Russianboys and giils to peter the
Great or Suvorov. According to the new official the-sisTemryuk. a
K a b a r d i n i a np r i l c e _ w h ol i v e d a r o u n d 1 5 5 0 , ' e n d e a v o u r et d
o uuila-up
a strong centralized state able to resist Turkish and crimean Tartar
oppressors'.-Temryukhad realizedthat the Kabardinians were incapable
of rvithstanding their enemiesif they were to rely on their own fbrces
only; establishmentof close contacts with MuscoW was therefore the
only wise Kabardinian policy.l5
is the sam-estory nutri.tt il told with some variation to all the peoples
^Ii
of the Soviet Union in all their many languages.Thereis alwaysa grain of
truth in the story, but never the entire truth,iince history is not so-simple
and so clear-cutthat it would fit the purposesofa one-sidedpropaganda.
It is a historical fact that Temryut aitea Ivan the Terrible for pioiection
and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in thi days of
greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stiess this fact. and
laid more emphasison the slavetrade in which the Kabardinian feudal
lords had engagedwith the crimean Tartar Khanate. However. since
events_had
pr9v9d the necessityof increasingthe attachment and loyalty
of the Kabardinians to the Russiansand th6 Soviet State,Temrwl: had
to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.
Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the iim of re-educating
.
the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian
literary almanac consisted-in showing that it was 'the friendship with
the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better hfb.,10
wlfle a great deal was done for 're-education' in the senserequired
by the Russians,education as such had been neglectedduring th'e first
post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the KabarOiniin A.S.S.R.
were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form on_
wards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively.The central
committee of the All-union communist party issued in l94g a state194

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

ment on 'seriousshortcomingsand mistakes'committed in Kabarda in

the field of national policy. It stressedthat conditions in Kabardinian
education were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., which
stipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schoolsin their own
language.
Althoueh the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advanced
than the pioples of the Soviet Far North, they sufferfrom the sameacute
shortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to the
nationil culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948,the
Kabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-six
Kabardinians out of a total of 559 students.l?
It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian culture
and Kabardinian language will become even more remote with the
increasingpressureof Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alone
the number of Russiansand Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R.
more than doubled; it increasedfrom about 37,000to 93,000.This increase was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion in
Kabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932, After the war the
'natives' and colonistschangedto the detrinumerical relation between
the forcible departureof the Balkars. Morethe
former,
owing
to
ment of
over more Russiancolonistscameinto the country to staff new factories
springing up around Nalchik.
THE CIRCASSIANS -

A RESERVE OF SOVIET MIDDLE

EAST POLICY

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people the Soviet
Government set up two Autonomous Provincesin the western part of
the North Caucasusarea; the CherkessProvince in the Caucasusfoothills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.
Surrounded as they are on all sidesby Russian territories these two
national units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies in
particular to the Adyge Province, whose capital - Maikop - used to be
the third largest Russian oil centre alter Baku and Grozny, before the
'second Baku' betweenthe Volga and'the Urals.
developmeniof the
Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, which
had a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55'7 per cent various
branches of Adyge, 42'7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and the
rest made un of other Eurooeansand Armenians). The size of the Province was inireased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus found
themselvesin the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Province
'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentageof
won doubtful
disfranchizedpeople. This was due to the arbitrary action of the local
Soviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of
'kulak', 'capitalist'
'reactionary' with the result that I2 per cent of the
and
195

tE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

entireadultpopulationof theProvinceweredeprivedoftheircivicrishts.
The Circassian(Cherkess)AutonomousFrovinceis inhabitei by
threesmallNorthernCaucasus
peoples- the Cherkess,
the Nogai Tartars and the Abazintsy,apart from Slav colonists.In 1933tlie three
indigenouspeopleshad a narrowaggregate
majorityover the Russians
and Ukrainians.
as a people,have no political future in
_ Although the Circassians,
SovietRussiaitself,theymay still be of serviceto the Sovietdiplomacy.
There are Circassians
living in Turkey,Palestine,
Syria and Tranijordan. They are all descendants
of the very Circasiianswhom the
Czaristauthoritiesforcedto leaveRussiain the sixtiesof the nineteenth
century.In Turkey the Circassians
havelargelybecomeone with the
Turkishpeople,but in the Arab countriesthey still form distinctcommunities.In Palestine
theyhavekeptto theirown customsandlanguage,
and do not inter-marrywith the Arabs. The SyrianArabs dislikethe
Circassians,
of whom both Turks and Frenchhad madeuseasainstthe
indigenouspopulationof the country.In Transjordan,too, tlie Circassianminorityhaspreserved
its individuality.r8
The survivalof circassiannationalsentiments
in Syria.palestineand
Transjordanmay tempt the SovietUnion to createa .Circassian
problem'. Sovietpropagandamay try at a givenmomentto arouseinierest
for the 'old country'amongthe Circassians
in the Arab world. It should
not be too difficultfor Russiato spreadamongthe Middle EasternCircassians
the storyof therebirthof the Circassian
peoplein the U.S.S.R.,
and of the existenceof 'CircassianStates'therein.Havine done this
preparatorywork Russiamay eitherencourageCircassianie-immigra-one
tion into the Caucasus
or shemay usethe Circassian
on the spotas
of severaltrump cards Russianimperialismholds in reseivein the
Middle East.
RUSSIA'S MOST POLYGLOT

COLONY:

DAGHESTAN

Daghestanrepresentsthe most difficult problem which the Soviet

nationalitiespolicy has to face,not only in the Caucasus,
but in the
SovietUnion as a whole.The very name of the DaehestanA.S.S.R.
indicatesthat the country occupieja specialposition"inthe U.S.S.R.
It is theonly AutonomousSocialistSovietRepublicwhichdoesnot bear
thenameof a peoplebut of a territory.
Daghestan
is one of the mostpolyglotcountriesof the world. Ethnologistsrecordthat its roughly 1,000,000
inhabitantsare split up into
thirty-two nationalities,in a territory of only 14,600squaremiles.* The
* In its original form Daghestancovered 19,800squaremiles.
In l93g the soviet Government separatedfrom Daghestanparts of its lowlands with their predominant UkrainianRussianpopulation, and its territory was thus reducedto about 13,000squaremiles. After
the war, Daghestan 'inhsrited' from Chechenia 1,600square miles.

196

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PBOPLES

languageand nationality issuein Daghestanis a new and superficialone.

The fundamental problem is that of religion; and religion unites the
Daghestanimountaineersunder the greenbanner of Mohammed.
Under the Czarist r6gime Russian penetration into Daghestan was
incomplete.The country had beena Russianpossessionsincethe Treaty
of Gulistan which Russia and Persia concluded in 1813,but there was
no real pacification of Daghestan until 1859,the year which ended the
'Gazaval',
the Holy War which the mountain peoples waged against
Czarist Russia under their national and religious leader Shamil. Even
during the pacification processthese peopleswere largely left to themselves.The Russianswere concentratedin the small Dashestanitowns of
Temir-Khan-Shura, Derbent and Petrovsk, and did nlot interfere with
the internal autonomy of the mountain villages.Only half-heartedefforts
rvere made to impose Russian civilization upon the mountaineers.By
1914only fifty-four Russian schoolsexistedin the whole of Daghestan.
In the sameylar the country had more than 800 religious schoolswhere
children learnt the Arabic language,the Koran and the Shariah.In 1917
the sketchy attempts at Russification broke down completely; the Russian schoolswere closed and mountain localities which had introduced
Russian as the official languagereverted to Arabic.
Thus Bolshevismhad to start in Daghestanright from the beginning
with the imposition of Russian rule and Russian civilization. The BolshevikParty found it extremelydifficult to gain a foothold in the isolated,
deeply religious, mountain country. As an ideology Bolshevismhas not
conqueredthe mountaineersyet. The technicalestablishmentof Bolshevik rule was, however, achievedin the greater part of Daghestanby the
late autumn of 1920,when the Russian White Guards were routed and
the Moslem nationalists withdrew to certain centresof resistancein the
south ofthe country.
THE TWO FACES OF SOVIET POLICY IN DAGHESTAN

In November 1920 Stalin came personally to Temir-Khan-Shura, the

temporary capital, and proclaimed the autonomy of Daghestan. Stalin
'extraordinary congressof the peoples
addressedan
of Daghestan' and
solemnly promised on behalf of the Soviet Government that the Shariah
rvould be respected.
'Daghestan', Stalin said, 'shall be free to administer
itself according
to its own conditions, its ways and its customs. We are informed that
the Shariah has great importance for the peoplesof Daghestan.We are
also informed that the enemiesof Soviet power are spreadingrumours
that the Soviet r6gime would ban the Shariah. I am entitled to declare
here on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative
Soviet Republic that theserumours are lies. The Government of Russia
197

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

leavesto every people the full right to administer itself on the basis of
its own laws and customs. The Soviet Government considers the
Shariah as customary law of the same standing as that in force among
other peoples living in Russia. If it is the desire of the people of
Daghestan their laws and customs shall be preserved'.1e
Stalin's statementon the respectwhich the Soviet rdsime intended to
show towards the Shariah reasiured many mountaineeis as to the good
intentions of the new rdgime. Considered retrospectively this credulity
is not surprising. At a later stage similar pledges which the Soviet
Government gave in various instancesas to the preservationof foreisn
institutions arid non-interferencein national customshave blinded oth-er
more advancednations and their statesmen.
The Daghestani,of course,did not know that a month before his visit
to Temir-Khan-Shura Stalin had already defined his Daghestan policy
to a Russian communist public in a different way. Writing in the
newspaperPrayda on October l0th, 1920, Stalin recommended with
'the
regard to Daghestan that
direct method of combating religious
prejudices must be replaced by indirect and more cautious methods'.
'Cavalry raids' with the object immediately
Instead of
of
communizing
the backward massesof the Daghestani peoples, Stalin added, 'there
must be a cautious and well-conceived policy of gradually drawing
thesemassesinto the generalstream of Soviet development'.2o
Thus Stalin wanted to give Daghestanonly a short respite,but there
was no question of Soviet Russia observing genuine tolerance for any
length of time. As Stalin's real motives were not known to Daghestan
his-proclamation of Daghestan autonomy in Temir-Khan-Shuia bore
fruit and weakened the Moslem resistancemovement led by Imam
Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky who had raised the old banner of Shamil. By
January 1922,the anti-Sovietrevolt had completely peteredout and the
'rebels' had reconciled
themselvesto the Soviet rdgime, which at that
early stage seemedto adhere to thp promise to respect the religious
'People's
customs of the local population. ,rr
Commissariat for the
Shariah' ('Narkomshariat') was set up in 1921 under the old Sheikh,
Ali-Hadji Akushinsky.
At the time of the establishmentof Sovietpower Dashestanhad about
'.iergy'
40,000peoplewho could be describedus
in t[e widest senseof
the word Mullahs, Kadis, Sheikhs,etc. It would have been unwise to
antagonize such an important group of Daghestan's population. The
Communist Party decided, therefore, to bring about a split in thc
religious front and encouragedthe establishmentof a 'progressive'proSoviet Moslem group advocating the revision of the Shariah. Quite a
number of Moslem ecclesiasticdignitaries walked into the communist
trap. In 1923 a congressof over seventy Sheikhs and Mullahs met in
the locality of Kakhib and sent a messageof allegianceto Lenin and
198

Stalin. The message,drafted in Arabic, ran as follows:

'To Lenin and Stalin, Moscow.
The congressof the clergy and the Sheikhsof mountain Daghestan
comprising seventy-sixpeople greetsthee, leader of the great army of
the toilers, liberating the whole world from the chains of slavery and
disgrace.We believein the victory of thy army. We believethat Islam
will be freed from oppressionwith its help. Together with the poor
people of our villagei we are waiting for thy recovery.x We shall
help thy army.
Sheikh of Kakhib, electedchairman of the congress'.
The Sheikhs and Mullahs who had tried to make a pact with the
Soviet r6gime found out in due course that Bolshevism had deceived
them. As soon as Soviet rule had been to some extent consolidated,the
Communist Party branch of Daghestan came out with a strong antireligious line and gradually did away with anything that recalled its
momentary weakness and apparent readiness for concessions.The
'Narkomshariat' was soon abolished.In 1925-26,death,birth andmarriage registrationswere taken away from the Kadis and handed over to
the Soviet state authorities. The'medresse', the religious schools, were
also liauidated.
Oespite all external measuresthe deep-rooted religious feelings of
the Daghestan people could not be wiped out so easily. Religion remained triumphant even in the communist ranks. As late as 1930up to
80 per cent of the communists in certain Daghestan districts observed
religious customs. Even responsibleparty officials thought it necessary
to practise the outward forms of religion so as not to give offence to
the believers.2r
Samursky, who was both the secretaryof the Daghestan Committee
of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the ExecutiveCommittee
of the Dashestan A.S.S.R.. admitted in 1935that there was then still a
large num-berof believersin the country;aithough, he added, the power
of the priests had been broken and the'new generation did not fill the
posts
of Mullahs and Kadis.zz
Samursky himself, who had done his best to annihilate Islam in
Daghestan,finally fell into disgracewith the Kremlin becausehis antireligious policy had been so unsuccessful.In 1937he was executedas a
'bourgeois nationalist' and 'enemy of the people'. He was charged with
'counter-revolutionary activities' of the
having wilfully kept alive the
Under Samursky'srule, so the official charge went on, the
ecclesiastics.
Mullahs had been able to appeal for the observanceof the reactionary
customsof the Shariah,spreadanti-Sovietliterature, and agitate against
collective farms.23Fritjof Nansen, who during a trip to the Caucasus
. The messagewas sent at the time of Lenin's illness.It is reproduced from Samursky's
book Dagestan(Moscow 1925,p. 136).

199

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

had met Samursky personally,said about the Daghestanipolitician that

he was a clever man, a good speakerand evidently had great influence
among the local people.za
THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SHAMIL CULT

After the death of Samursky the religious resistancecontinued. The

small Daghestani town of Buinaksk remained, together with Baku,
Tashkent and Ufa, one of the four most important centresof Islam in
the whole Soviet Union. Not only did the Bolshevik fieht asainsr
reiigion fail in Daghestan, but Soviet power was equally u"nsucctssful
in eradicatingthe historic traditions of the mountaineersientred around
the great Imam Shamil.
Shamil is the unchallengednational hero of the mountain peoplesof
Daghestan and Chechenia, whom he led in the fight against ezarist
Russiabetween1834and 1859.In Daghestanhis memorvis so universally respectedthat even the Soviet rdgime had to accepttlie Shamil cult.
During over thirty years Soviet historians tried hard to interpret Shamil
in accordancewith communist ideology. Some went so far as to depict
him almost as a forerunner of commiinism, and practically all agr'eed
that he was the leader of a progressivenational liberation-moveirent.
In all history textbooks as used in Soviet schools Shamil figured as a
brave and capable military leader, a skilful organizer, a pr-omoter of
trade and an opponent of local feudalism.2s
After the Second World War the Soviet leaders became more and
more convinced that the benevolentattitude towards Shamil had been
a mistake, and that it was time to put an end to all concessionsto
Daghestani anti-Russiannationalism. rn 1947members of the Institute
for History of the All-Union Academy of Scienceswere summoned for
a long discussion on the Shamil problem. Most of the historians
participating in it could find no porraibilityof reversingtheir judgment
on the progressive and democratic character of Shamil.z6Although
the party leadership might have been expected to disagree with t[e
attitude of theAcademy,it waited till 1950for its formal denunciation of
the Shamil cult. The
_campaignwas then conducted by the party
secretary of Azerbaidzhan, Baghov, and by his opposite number in
Daghestan,Daniyalov. In separatestatements,each about 10,000words
long, the two officialsdeclaredthat practically everythingwritten during
the Soviet regime concerning Shamil had been wiong lrom beginning
to
Bagirov's statementwas published in the party organ Aokhevit
9{.
a-ndDaniyalov's in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History), an organ of
the Academy. Both sought to show that Shamil was no national hero
but an agent of British and Turkish imperialism. He was no progressive
personality, they said, but had opposed the only progressivesolution
200

for the peoplesof Daghestan,namely, union with Russia. Both Bagirov

and Daniyalov produced alarge number of historical documents referring to Shamil's alleged treacherous and reactionary role. All these
documents,most of which were over 100years old, must long sincehave
been known to Soviet historians, but probably did not seem to them
relevant. The Daghestani party secretarywent as far as to say that the
annexation of Daghestanby Russiawas the only way out of stagnation,
sinceit had led to the developmentof Daghestanieconomy and brought
the country into connection with progressive Russian culture.z7The
communist offensive against the Shamil cult reduced to zero many
cultural efforts which had been made in Daghestan under the Soviet
r6gime.Many works which Daghestaniand Russianauthors had written
on Daghestani history becameobsolete.
In view of the liquidation of the Chechens, the dethronement of
Shamil could not affect Chechenia,which had likewise fought against
Czarism under his leadership,but it had repercussionsin Azerbaidzhan.
Shamil's strugglehad been very popular with the Azerbaidzhani people.
Many Azerbaidzhani historians and writers had paid tribute to him.
The sympathy which Shamil enjoyed in Azerbaidzhan was even the
primary reason for the launching of the anti-Shamil campaign. This
happened in the following way. An Azerbaidzhani scholar, Geidar
Guseinov, had written a learned thesis y'lisrory of nineteenth-century
sociql snd philosophical thought in Azerbqidzhan. The thesis was
generally believed to have considerablemerit as a book of scholarship
and was awarded the Stalin Prize in March 1950.Two months later thi
award of the Stalin Prize was withdrawn bv soecial decision of the
Council of N{inisters of the U.S.S.R. The omciit exolanation of this
gesture,extraordinaryeven for Sovietconditions,was Guseinov'sestimate of Shamil's personality. His book had, indeed, contained a few
friendly words about Shamil and his movement.2sNot only was
Guseinov hirnself sharply rebufted but also the reviewersof his book,
and in particular the Azsrbaidzhani Academy of Sciences,which had
recommendedit for the Stalin Prize.
DAGHESTAN'S LANGUAGE

PROBLEM

According to the Bible, mankind becamedivided into nationalities and

started to speak different tongues because Man had challenged God
and had built the Tower of Babel. The language problem of Soviet
Daghestan originated in a similar way from the Bolshevik challengeto
Allah and to Arabic, the sacred language of the Koran. Arabic had
acquired a monopoly as a means of education in the mountain country.
It was the inter-tribal language which made the mountaineers forget
that they belonged to different nationalities.
201

rhedifficurty
"t;;.ffi;ffi:

nes
intheractthat

there is no local languagein the country which can in any way claim
priority over others. Even the most widespreadof the local languagesthe Avar - is spoken by only 158,000people,just 22 per cent of the total
population. The other more important nationalities of Daghestan are
Kumyks (95,000), Darghinians (107,000), Lezghians (100,000) and
Lakians (40,000).
The local Communist Party leadership was at first highly sceptical
about encouraging literacy in the languages of the Daghestani
mountaineers. The party felt that a more highly developed language
should be introduced instead, to take the place of Arabic. The question
arose whether Daghestan's new lingua franca and official language
was to be Russian, which the Czarist r6gime had tried to impose,
unsuccessfully,or Turkic. The Soviet authorities consideredthat Turkic
was for many reasons a more suitable choice. First, Turkic, unlike
Russian, was not a languageof 'Unbelievers', but one spoken by Moslem peoples,and had thus a better chanceto oust Arabic. The selection
of Turkic was furthermore a tribute to the culturally most advanced
nationality of Daghestan, the Kumyks, a Turkic people, the only
ethnical group of Daghestan who had produced a national literature,
in Czarist times. Finally, the communist leadersindulged in considerable
illusions about the role which Daghestan might be able to play in
revolutionizing the East, provided that it adopted the Turkic language.
This is what the party secretary,Samursky, wrote about this aspect
of the Daghestani languageproblem, at a time when he fully reflected
the official point of view: 'If one takes the interests of the World
Revolution as the departing point one must recognize that education
in the Turkic languagecan render in Daghestan a much greater service
than education in Russian.Daghestan,on the one hand, is a land of the
Orient which has so far kept up contact with all (Oriental) countries
in the vicinity. On the other hand, Daghestanhas come within the orbit
of the Proietarian Revolution. Daghestancan and must serve as a link
between the U.S.S.R. and the Orient better than all other parts of the
Soviet Union and it must become a channel of communist ideas in the
Near East. The Near East either speaksthe Turkic languageor understands it. The Turkic language gives the Daghestani the possibility of
contact with all nationalities in the Near East and this contact will
introduce a revolutionary current into the oppressedcolonial and semicolonial countries'.2e
The Communist Party leadershipsoon found out that the hopes which
it had pinned on the introduction of Turkic as Daghestan'slingua franca
could not materialize. Daghestan was a bulwark of Oriental ideas in
the Soviet Union and could never becomea bulwark of Soviet ideas in
the East with or without the Turkic lansuase. The Daehestani Com-

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

munist Party was a tiny and weak body. In 1927it had only 651 members from the local nationalities and they were unable to convert their
own peoples to Bolshevism,let alone to become missionariesof communism in other Oriental countries.
In 1927-28 a special language commission of the Daghestan Committee of the Communist Party reconsideredthe languageproblem and
recommended that more attention should be devoted to the local
languages.On the basis of this recommendationa languagereform was
decreedproviding for elementaryeducation in eight languages.A basic
political terminology was worked out for all of them. The recognized
languageswere originally those of the Avars, Darghinians, Lezghians,
Lakians, Kumyks, Tabasarans,Nogai Tartars and the Taty.* Later on
recognition was withdrawn from the language of the Nogai Tartars,3o
most of whom lived in the territory separatedfrom Daghestanin 1938.
Even after the languagereform higher education was basedon Turkic
and Russian. Finally, however, Russian dominated the field at the
expenseof both Turkic and Arabic. It was authoritatively stated as
'diverting
early as 1930 that Turkic had already fulfilled its mission of
the attention of the massesfrom the Arab language'.3z
The triumph of the Russian languagein Daghestanwas not only due
to the need of a lingua franca in a multi-national territory; it was also
a tribute to the outstandingrole which the Russiansplayed in the central
administrationof the DaghestanA.S.S.R. In the inter-war period the
recruitment of Daghestani mountaineers into administrative jobs had
hardly made any progressat all. In 1927the percentageof the Dighestani
employed at the headquarters of the Daghestan Government was
2 l . 6 p e r c e n t ; i n 1 9 2 9i t w a s 2 5 . 3 p e r c e n t a n d i n 1 9 3 6 , 2 0 p e r c e n t
only.33It is not altogether the fault of the rdgime if it failed to recruit
civii servantsfrom among the mountain people.The mountaineerswere
more interestedin exercisingself-governmentover their villages than in
going to the towns of the plain to administer their villages from there.
The two most important towns of Daghestan,Makhach Kala (previously
* The Taty speak an Iranian language.In Daghestan they are largely identical with the
s o - c a l l e d ' M o u n t a i nJ e w s ' .A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 1 9 2 6c e n s u st h e r ew e r e 1 1 , 4 8 4o f s u c h' M o u n tain Jews'in Daghestanand 10,270inAzerbaidzhan. The returns are hardlycorrect as far
as Daghestan is concerned,where the censustook place at a time when the 'Mountain
Jews'were exposedto activepersecution.In the year of the censusthe Jewssenta delegation
to Moscow to complain about thejr plight. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee dispatched an 'instructor' to investigate the situation. He reported to Moscow:
(l) anti-semiteexcesses,
even murders, were not punished by the administration; (2) the
cultural and medical servicesof the Taty were neglectedand the central Government
deceivedby wrong information; (3) national minority rights of the Taty were not observed
in the local Soviets; (4) Taty were not accepted as workers in state enterprises;and
(5) lower administrative organs were rude in their behaviour towards the Taty. The
situation did not improve after the instructor had lelt Daghestan and the conditions in
which the Taty found themselvesremained for a while what a Jewish communist author
d e s c r i b e da s a ' p o l i t i c a l s c a n d a l ' . 3 1

203

f,PLES

Petrovsk) and Buinaksk (previously Temir-Khan-Shura) are now called

after Daghestanicommunists,but for that reason they have not become
closerto the heartsofthe Daghestani,nor are they likely to have changed
their racial composition in which the Russian-Ukrainian elementsused
to prevail. The last availablefigure referringto 1924sho',vedthat 55 per
cent of the inhabitants of Makhach Kala are Slavs while Russians
alone form three-fifths of the population of Buinaksk.
DAGHESTANI LITERATURE

The language problem which is also the problem of Daghestan's

culture is still unsettled.Even if Russian civilization triumphs there will
still remain the cultural heritageof the past, which is an Arabic heritage.
Soviet cultural workers are fully consciousof this complication and are
trying to solve it in a 'dialectical' way. They cannot ignore the literary
documents which the peoplesof Daghestan produced in Arabic during
the past centuries, but they have tried to deny the existence of a
cultural interdependencebetween the mountaineers and the Arabic
Moslem world. The Arabic literary documents of Daghestan are now
simply classifiedas'Daghestani literature',and the firc-tthat they were
written in Arabic is just an unimportant coincidence. The Arabic
heritage is still an important foundation stone for cultural activities in
Daghestan. The national poet of Soviet Daghestan, Gamzat Tsadasa
(1874-1951),a former Mullah, would probably not haveembarkedon a
literary careerhad he not beenunderihe speil ofArab poetry from his
earliest youth. Even an official Soviet publication had to admit that ar
small library of ancientArabii: texts was one of Tsadasa'smost treasured
possessions.3a
The Soviet authorities were compelled to overlook
Tsadasa's'Arabomania' as long as he wrote poems in praise of Stalin
and the Bolshevik r6gime.
Tsadasa was the second national poet of Dashestan. The first was
. e. lite Samuriky. rvasa Lezghian,
S u l e i m a n S t a l s k y( 1 8 6 9 - 1 9 3 7 )U
and it is not unlikely that this 'enemy of the people' was the fi}st to
discover him. Stalsky was built up into one of the most outstanding
poets of the non-Russianpeoples of the U.S.S.R. FIis poems were
translated into many languagesof the Soviet Union. To a remarkable
degreethey werealwayswell-informed asto the official propagandaneeds
of the moment. At one stageStalsky'spoems attacked the 'kulaks' and
hailed collectivization; then they boosted the Stakhanov movement;
finally, they exposed the deviationists and bourgeois nationalists always at the right time. This was the more amazing as Stalsky lived,
according to an official biography, in considerable retirement in a
mountain village and was unable to get any first-hand information on
political matters. Stalsky was illiterate and no 'original version' of his

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

works existed. His poems were taken down by people among the
audiencewhile he recited them. Maxim Gorky took Stalsky under his
'Homer of the twentieth century'.35This wellwing and describedhim a
meaning but somewhat exaggerated tribute was often quoted in the
Soviet Union, particularly by the Daghestani themselves,among whom
it provoked a certain nationalist conceit. If we have produced a Homer,
the young Daghestani Soviet intellectuals argued, we have made an
outstanding contdbution towards Soviet literature and are entitled to
the respectof the Russiansthemselves.Finally, the Daghestani had to
be told that their pride was based on a misunderstanding,since Gorky
did not mean to put Homer and Stalsky on the same level, but his
comparison only referred to the way in which Stalsky's works were
produced.36Stalsky'sworks are still reprinted in Russia, although some
of his poems in which he denounced the Russian conquest of the
Caucasirs are no longer in harmony with the new Soviet patriotic
ideology.
Both Stalsky and Tsadasa are poets of the past even if the subjects
of their poetry are Stalin and the Five Year Plans.The poet of the future
is Effendi Kapiyev. He belongsto the young generationof Daghestan,is
a product of the Sovietschool, and no longer believesin the romanticism
of the aul. His homeland is no longer Daghestanbut the whole Soviet
Union and his language no longer a Daghestani idiom but Russian.
The effectsof Sovieteducation on Kaoivev can be satheredfrom his own
words in praise of the Russian laneuiei which ard included in his novel
" ;
The Poet:
'Oh thou, great Russian tongue, I kneel before thee. Adopt me and
give me thy blessing . . . I belong to a very small people lost in the
mountains but I find thee and I am no more an orphan. Without thee
there was and is no future, with thee we are truly omnipotent'.37
These words represent an extreme example of the spirit which the
Soviet r6gime is trying to implant into all non-Russian territories of
the U.S.S.R.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. KavkazskySbornik,vol. 21, Tiflis 1900,p. 102.

2. Kavkauky Sbornik,vol. 2, Tiflis 1877,p. 457.
3. SovietWar News,October 6th, 1942.
4. Beoonr-Ev,The RussianConquestof the Caucasas,London 1908,p, 108.
5. E. Mrxsttr.tov and G. Vr,nrErov, Chechentsy- Chechens,Vladikavkaz
1894.
i Natsionalnosti,
Nr.50, April 1934,p. 10.
6. Revolyutsiya
205

7. Antireligioznik,Nr. 11,November1931,p. 72.

8. Revolyutsiya
i Natsionalnosti,
Nr.72, February1936,p. 41.
9. SovietWar News,September3rd, 1942.
10.Sovetskoye
Iskusstvo,February14th, 1948.
I l. U.,S.,S.fi.
in Construction,
Nr. 3, March 1937.
12. IzvestiyaSevero-Osetinskogo
Nauchno-Issledovatelskogo
Instituta. Reports
of the North Ossetin Scientific ResearchInstitute. vol. 9. Dzaudzhikau
1947,p. 182.
13. Revolyutsiya
i Natsionalnosti,
Nr.35, February 1933,pp. 59/60.
14.Izvestiya,July 8th, 1944.
15. YoprosyIstorii, Nr.12,1947,p. 148.
16.LiteraturnayaGazeta,March 31st,1948.
17. UchitelskayaGaleta,July 8th, 1948.
18. A. Hounaw, Minorities in the Arab llorld, Oxford University Press1947,
pp. 58, 85.
19.I. V. StrLnv, Sochineniya- (Complete)Works, vol. 4, Moscow 1947,

pp.3esl3e6.
20. I. V. Steltw, Sochineniya- (Complete)Works, vol. 4, Moscow 1947,
P. 362.
21. Revolyutsiya
i Natsionalnosti,
Nr.2, June1930,p. 38.
22. N. Sarr,runsry,Krasny Dagestal,'- The Red Daghestanin Revolyutsiyai
Natsionalnosti,
Nr.65, July 1935,pp. alla2.
- Church and Espionage,Moscow
23. BonrsKeNDroov,Tserkovi Shpionazh
1 9 3 8p, . 9 5 .
24. Fnrorron NaNsnN,Throughthe Caucasusto the Volga, London 1931,
p.111.
- Historyof the U.S.S.R.,vol.2,Moscow
25. PaNrnarov^,Istorila S.S.,S.-R.
1944,pp.155/158.
26. VoprosyIstorii, Nr. 11,November1947,pp. 1341140.
27. VoprosyIstorii, Nr.9, September1950,pp. 12113.
28.Pravda,May l4th and 16th, 1950.
29. Samursky,Dagestan,Moscow 1925,p. 118.
30.NarodnoyeObrazovanie,
Nr.3, March 1950,p. 60.
31. LanrN, Yevreii antisemitismv,S.S.S.R.- Jewsand antisemitismin the
U.S.S.R.,Moscow-Leningrad
1929,p. 131.
32. Revolyutsiya
i Natsionalnosti,
Nr.2, June 1930,p. 75.
33. Sovetskoye
Stroitelstvo,Nr. 123,October1936,p. 65.
206

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES TO CHA]

34.Oktyabr,Nr. 7, July 1947,pp. 164lt66'

35. SurnnanNSrusxv, Stikhi i Pesni- Yersesand Songs,Moscow1938,p' 10'
36.Literaturnaya Gazeta,July 10th, 1948.
37. Ogonyok,Nr.7, February1947'P.27'

207

X
S O V I E . TN A T I O N A L I T I E S P O L I C Y A S A
WORLD PROBLEM

An investigationof the sovietrecordterritory by territory and

nationality by nationalitydoesnot bearout the claim of the Kremlin
ttrat tire
u.s.s.R' has solvedthe probremof nationalities.soviet nationalities
policy,insteadof dcstroyingRussianimperiarisrn,
has in realitvtried
to preserve
and to consolidate
it. Thishas^red
to a crisisin ttreieiatiuns
betweenthe central authoritiesof the SovietRussianstate
unJ-tn.
dcpendent.peoples
fightingfor nationalliberation.The Secondworld
war lalo bare the extent of the crisisin a number of areas(North
Caucasus,
Crimea,Ukraine,etc.).Sincethe war the Sovieire$;_,"-nu,
jl':1::,:"1:.."'i !l-l,gh,:ling ,p security.
measures
and bv increasing
rnemrgntot thecentreat the expense
of the non-Russian
peonres.
The blamefor the failuresof Sbvietnarionalities
pori"y.i"niiie put
on thesovietGovernmentandthecommunistrarty arorie.
a numberof
a genuinesolutionof the problemon linessues.srea
factors^ols.trucl
ln rne Borshevrk
program.me.
Theyhavenothingto do with the'lhort_
comrngsot the sovietr6gime,but areinherentii conditions
within the
Empire,independent
of any politicalr6gime.rtr"r" ru"io.r u.",
l":yun
r. ,1. numerrcal
disproportion
between
the Russianpeopleand the
non-l(usslans,
particularlythe non_Slavs
of the SovietUnion, which
naturallyensuresRussiandomination.
The.geographicaldistributionof Russiansand ukrainians
ahnosr
]'
rnrougnout
theterritoryof the U.S.S.R.
3' The numericalweakness
of.maly.So-viet
nationarities
whichprevents
their.independent
cultural and politicaldevelopment.
other more weightyreasonsfor the fairureof soviet nationalities
pollcyareconnected
wirh the poriticalphilosophy
and strategy
of what
is called 'stalinism' with its^totalitarianatmoiphereof
c6'mputsion
'r"iJorrg
rendering.imp_ossibre
the curtural and poriticar
nationalitiesof the U.S.S.R.From the point of view or
"i''"ii"in"
tnJcommunist
ideologyitselfthe Sovietnationalities
policywasa failurebeca.rse
ii oio
not and couldnot succeed
in establishing
a federatiooor.quuir-in it.
territory of the U.S.S.-}.,tl!, settinga"nexampleto the
world. The
Sovietnationalitiesporicydjd not faii in an abiolute ,.nr.,
hor"u"r,

SOVIET NATIONALITIES

POLICY

sinceit greatly increasedthe efficiencyof the Russian'melting-pot',under

'IJnion of Socialist Soviet Republics'.
the neutral term of
The U.S.S.R. as a melting-pot of racesis in many ways similar to that
other big melting-pot, the United States of America. The melting-pot
process,while disposingin the long run of the problems of nationalities
in a given territory, provides no model for a global solution. Neither the
American nor the Russian pattern can be schematically applied to
Africa, Eastern Europe or South-EastAsia.
There are, of course, notable differencesbetween the American and
Russian melting-pots. The Europeans who are being Americanized as
citizensof the United Statesenter the meltins-oot of their own free will:
from the outsetthey want to becomeEngliihispeakingAmericansand
they want their children to absorb English-American culture. The
Soviet melting-pot is of a strongly compulsory character and produces
some modified specimensof Russians linked together by the doctrine
of Leninism-Stalinism. On the other hand, the colour problem which
prevents the full integration of an American nation is absent in the
Soviet Union. Becausethere are no Negroes in the territorv of the
U.S.S.R. it is impossible to assesswith ceitainty whether colour prejudice is non-existentor whether it is non-existentin the hisher senseof
complete racial equality. It is a fair assumption, horveverl that were a
largecoloured population included in the framework of the Soviet Union
it would not suffer from any speci.:lracial discrimination but only from
the same repressivemeasureswhich the Soviet Government imposeson
all peoples,iheir national cultures and traditions, within the bounclaries
of the Russian Empire. The Soviet Government would undoubtedly try
to break the Negroes spiritually just as it has tried to break other
nationalities and races. As long as the communist dictatorship lasts,
racial equality in Russia will mean nothing but equality of subjection.
As far as absenceof colour prejudicein Russia is a fact, it goesto the
credit of the Russian people and not of the Soviet r6gime. The Russian
attitude to racial problems is by no means unique but is characteristic
of all peopleswho, in the course of their history, have been exposedto
a process of drastic racial intermixture. In view of this intermixture
which educatestowards racial toleranceand broadmindedness.the Russians, irrespective of the r6gime under which they live, would never
insist on a policy of segregation,even to one slightly approaching that
prevailing in the Southern States of the U.S.A., or in the Union of
South Africa.
SOVIET NATIONALITIES

POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

The value of Soviet nationalities policy for the outside world has been
greatly reduced,not only by its failure at home, but also by its inability
304

AS A WORLD

PROBLEM

to bring abouta just solutionof the nationaland minorityproblemsof

EasternEurope. In its early years Soviet Russiahad a blueprint for
solving_thelastery Europeannationality problems:the programme
adoptedby the Fifth world congressof the communistInteriational
iy
.tS2!. This programme,if put into effect,might not havealteredanything in-the presentcommunisttotalitarian structureof EasternEurope,
but within the generalframework of a communistorder it might have
brought about a more just solution than the pax Sovietici which
emerged
from the SecondWorld War. For instance,the programmeof
the Cominternprovidedfor the independence
of the SlovakJand for a
specialr6gime of autonomy for nationally mixed territories such as
Transylvania.
For Hungary,the CommunistInternationalhad demanded a frontier revisionby which Hungarian-speaking
areasof Slovakia,
Rumania and Yugoslaviawere to be added to th-eHungarian State.
when Russiahad a chanceto carry out the principlesemboclied
in that
programmeshe ignored them completelyand worsenedrather than
improvedthe conditionscreatedby the 'imperialistpeacetreaties'of
l9l9-20.In solvingthe nationalityand minority problemsof Eastern
Europe,Russiawasnot concernedwith the estabnshment
of somesort
of abstract'proletarian'justiceas wasthe Cominternin 1924,but only
with her own nationalinterests.Russiadividedthe peoplesof Eastern
andsouth-Eastern
Europeinto thosewhichfor thetimebeingwereable,
in one way or another,to serve.herimperialistaims,and t"hosewhich
werelessuseful.Theformer,in mostbut not all cases,Slavpeoples,
were
privilegedat the expenseof the latter. Thus Russiafavoure-dciechs and
Rumanians against
_Hungarians,backed Bulgarian claims against
yugoslavambitionsa[ainst
Greeceand supportedthemostfar-reaching
Italy and Austria.
Fundamentallythesetemporarilyfavourednationswere not much
better off than those nations whose interestshad been consciously
ignored. Since all Moscow-sponsored
settlementsof minoritv and
border problems were based on expediencyand changing"Soviet
TooS, not on_firm principles,the favourednationshad aliay-s to fear
that.Russiamight drop them at any time and reverseher atiitude towardsclaimson a disputedterritorv.
Russia'sprimary concernwasto increaseher own nationalterritory
at the expenseofher satellitesand to push their westernfrontiers asfai
to the west as possible.As regardsthe internalfrontiersbetweenher
satellites,Russia assumedan unimaginativeattitude and left them
practicallyuntouched.
TheSovietGove-rnment
did not evenseeto it that
therewasrealfair play towardsthe minoritieswithin the satelliteStates.
Of all the smallEasternFuropeancountriesonly one,yugoslavia,with
its home-growncommunistr6gime,tried to solvethe natiola[ties problem on the basisof federalistprinciples.The Srovaks,insteadoflnoe305

)VIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

pendence,did not even get a proper provincial government, but only a

'Board
of Commissioners',A11other minorities of EasternEurope had to
content themselveswith the creation of totalitarian communist organizations which pretendedto defendtheir interests.Thesenew organiiations,
such as the Democratic Federation of the South Slavsin Hunearv. the
Hungarian People's Union in Rumania, the Turkish people'stouncil
Union in Buigaria,etc., etc., were modelled on the pattern of similar
totalitarian organizationswhich had existed in the Soviet union, in the
inter-war period, for small scatteredminorities like Latvians, Assyrians
and Gipsies.TheseEasternEu-ropeanminority organizationsare e(ually
indistinguishablein characterfrom the minority oreanizationswhiih the
Nazis built up from 1933onwards for the German-minoritiesin Eastern
Europe. The members of these minority organizations have not the
s l i g h t e s ti n f l u e n c eo n t h e i r p o l i c y , n o r i s a ! i n t h e s e r e c t i o no f t h e
responsibleofficials,who are appointed by the central Government. No
cultural or social activity outside the totalitarian bodies is possible;they
hold. a monopoly in the same way as does the Communist party in
relation to the people of the majority nationality. It is not even suflliient
that th-eminority organizationsare communisi; they have to adhere to
the officially approved communism of Moscow. T[re Tito-Cominform
conflict showedthat active persecutionof national minorities in Eastern
Europe is only suspendedis long as complete ideological and poiitical
uniformity prevails.Tile slightestbreach of discipline*ittrin the ianks of
international communism results in a revival bf nationalist antagonism and oppression of national minorities. Nothing is altered irithe
violent character of this oppression by the fact thlt it is nominally
carried out for the sake of the purity of a politicai creed and not admiitedly on behalf of a national ideology. the tito-Corninform dispute led
t o p u r g e so f t h e a s s o c i a t i o nosf S l a v m i n o r i t i e si n b o t h H u n g a r va n d
Rumania, to the resumption of the Serbian-Bulgarianrivalriei aiound
Macedonia and to acute hostiiitiesbetweenAlbanians and yugoslavs.

The example of Eastern Europe is important becauseit indicates the

kind of 'solution' which Russia may envisagefor the many nationarity
problems in Asiatic countries which are either near her fiontiers, lik-e
Persia,Afghanistan and Kashmir, or are the sceneof particurarlv intense
communist efforts,iike Malaya or Burma. The peoplesof theseiountries
cannot expectfrom the soviet Union any genuineconsiderationoftheir
national claims. The Soviet Government and the international communist movement, for their own purposes,will encourageand exploit
these claims only as long as they can be fitted into the gineral paitero
of Soviet and communist Dolicv.

AS A WORLD

PROBLEM

Soviet diplomacy has given abundant evidence, particularly by its

conduct in the United Nations organs, that it ignores principles, both
those related to nationalities policy and all others, and that it is guided
exclusivelyby opportunisticconsiderations.
In the caseof the Sudan,for
instance,RussiasupportedSudanese-Egyptian
unity insteadof Sudanese
independence,as lvould have been in line with the basic principlesto
which Russiapayslip-servicein her orvnterritory.l In the cise of-Libya,
Eritrea and Somalia, Russia, during a certain period, supported Italian
overlordship,not becausethe Sovietexpertsconsideredthis solution a
just one and in agreementwith the wishes of the local peoples,but
because
I t a l y i s t h e w e a k e s t ' i m p e r i a l i spto w e r ' .l n t h e c a s eo f F a l e s t i n e
Russia sided with the Jewish minority against the Arab majority, not
out of sympathyrvith the aims of Zionism, but to embarrass.imperiali s m ' . I n T n d i a ,R u s s i a ' sa g e n t s ,t h e l o c a lc o m m u n i s l sp. u r s u e da p o l i c y
opposite to that adopted towards Paiestine.So lons as India was-without independencethey opposed Pakistan's urge iowards nationhood
becausethey feared that the emergenceof a large Islamic State might
harm the causeof an Indian communist revolution and the interestsof
Soviet Russia.2
SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AND BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

In their tendency to over-simpliiy and to press all poriticar farctsinto a

narrow ideological pattern, the Russian communisf leadersconceiveall
developmentsin coloniai territoriesin terms only of classstrussle or
'imperialist
man oeuvres'.Thi s makes the undo gmitic, empiricar'b"ritish
colonial policy particularly incomprehensibleto them. Soviet experts
on nationalitiesproblems are interestedin British colonial policv. not
in order to understandits functioning, but to engagein arbitiary,"naive
comparisons between conditions in backward iolonies of iropical
Africa, for instance, and conditions in Central Asian and Tianscaucasianlands famous for their ancient civilizations.Unscrupulous
Soviet propagandistsand their syrnpathizersin other countriei compare the number of hospital beoi in cities like Tashkent and samarkand with the sanitary installationsin the forest regions of the Gold
coast, and measurethe standardof educationin Bafu with conditions
in the interior of New Guinea.3
A comparisonbetweenBritish and Soviet colonial policv can be of
c o n s i d e r a b lien t e r e s pt r o v i d e dt h a t i t d o e sn o t c o n f i n ei t s e l f - t os t a t i s t i c s
and points of detail, but is concernedwith the basic methods applied in
dealings with dependent peoples,in the British and Russian b,mpires.
such a comparison, made after the Secondworld war, is more favourable to Britain than it might have been in the thirties, owing to the
transformation of the Empire in the post-war period and the-greatly

OVIET NATIONALITIES

POLICY

acceleratedtempo in the itrplementation of constitutional reforms. Even

the boldest changescarried out in this new era of British colonial rule
seemoften to becomeoutdated in a matter of months after their coming
into force, not becauseof more far-reachingdemandsmade by colonia-i
peoples but as a result of the deliberate poficy of the colonial'power to
improve conditions in dependentterritories.
l. DEM.cRAcy AND TorALrrARrANrsM. The first and basic difference between Soviet nationalities policy and British colonial policy
springs from the difference between alotalitarian one-party state and i
democraticr6gime-The British Under-secretaryof stat6 forihe colonies,
A. H. Poynton, described the British coloni-al system as a 'practicai
illustration of democracy under tuition'.4 The political systemas established in the non-Russian Soviet Republics can be describedas totalitarianism under tuition. In the British coronial Empire to-day there is
almost unlimited possibility for the developmentof nitional mdvements.
The outlawing of a political movement may occur as the result of armed
struggle or threat of armed struggle, bui very rarely becauseof the
nature of its cultural and political activities. In the Soviet union the
olJy opportunity for
.political expression by non-Russian peoples is
offered by the All-union communist party and the All-Union communist- You-th League, while all cultural aitivity has to be carried on
through such totalitarian organizationsas the 'union of soviet writers,.
Not eventhe foundationqf an orthodox communist party, on a national
basis, is possible as was sholvn by the ban on an attempted Moslem
Communist Party in the early years of the Soviet r6gime.
2. nrcrrrrv
AND ELASrrcrry. Apart from the great differencesin
the substanceof the two policies there are also prof6und differencesin
the forms. The Russian system makes little alrowancefor the various
stagesin the development of the nationalities of the u.s.S.R. All are
pressedinto the framework of four constitutional patterns: one of these
four simply has to fit. The chief criterion for the selectionof the constitutional pattern for a given nationality is not its political and cultural
maturity but its numerical size and its geographicaiposition. peoplesof
such unequal developmentsas Armenians and Turkmenians, Estonians
and Kirghiz, volga.Tartars and Yakuts, are put constitutionally on the
samelevel. In practice,it is true, there are considerabledifferencls, since
the central authorities intervene more directly in the affairs of the less
developednationalities than in those of the more advanced.
The British system, 'with its haphazard complexity and lack of co_
ordination on any structural basis' (Amery) does mbre justice to the
great variety in the degreeof developmentamong peoplei of such vast
empires as the British or Russian. The wide ranee of British constitutional patternsincludesat one end casesin which t[e nationality or group
of nationalities is advanced enough to be given complete independ'ence,
308

AS A WORLD

PROBLBM

e.g. Burma or India, and at the other end such territories as Northern
Rhodesia or Nyasaland, where the indigenouspeopleshave acquired no
more than a token representationon the Legislative Council. Between
these two extremesthere is a wide range of intermediary stages.This
system is so flexible that there are hardly two colonies in the British
Empire with a fully identical administrative and constitutional set-up.
It means little to say that a Dominion like Ceylon or a self-governing
colony like Malta have incomparably greater political powers than any
constituent republic of the Soviet Union. The so-calledsovereignrights
of the Soviet Republics lag far behind even those rvhich the Queen
and Legislative Council of Tonga, a British island Protectorate in
the Pacific, are exercising.African chiefs, like the Emir of Kano, the
Oni of Ife, or the Kabaka of Bu-uanda,with their traditional African
councils, are, in their spheres,less dependent on the British administration than the governmentsof the non-Russian Soviet Republics are
on the Kremlin.
3 . o r s r N r B c R A T r o N A N D F E D E R A L T s MT. h e t e r r i t o r i e so f t h e B r i tish Colonial Empire are either geographical entities like the British
throughout the world, or were created as a result
island-possessions
of British conquest,like Nigeria, the Gold Coast, British Honduras, etc.,
and have subsequentlydevelopedinto economic and even political units.
The national-territorial sub-divisionsof the U.S.S.R. are in most cases
of an artificial nature. Soviet nationalities policy has been dominated
by the idea of creating a maximum number of small self-containedunits
regardlessofeconomic, geographicaland historical factors, and with the
'national
autonomy' idea
only purpose of giving formal satisfactionto a
without granting real home rule. With two or three exceptions, the
national-territorial units of the Soviet State were each formed for the
benefit of one specific nationality. Although in practice most of these
units are bi-national if not multi-national, Soviet nationalities policy
always distinguishesbetweenthe nationality after which a given autonomous territory is named and the national minorities.
British colonial policy, on the other hand, opposes the idea of
national isolation and tries to find a satisfactoryfederalist solution for
the problem of 'plural' societies.British colonial policy, as it emerges
froh the SecondWorld War, dislikes the idea of splitting up the plural
'partition'.
societies by
Britain accepted the partition of India only
reluctantly and never acceptedit in Palestine as long as that country
was a British responsibility. British policy is to induce peoples to stay
together within a given natural, historic or even geographic or only
economic unit; to find a common political platform and to arrive at a
common patriotic conception. This may often be diflicult, sometimes
even an illusion, but it is the only truly humanitarian approach to the
problem, for it expressesbelief in human progress,in sound reasoning,
309

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

and it.presupposesthe triumph of common senseover passion and

Ianauclsm.
Soviet nationalities policy, if consistently applied to the British
Empire, would mean the disintegration of most of the African colonies
into a number of national republics and autonomous provinces. The
Soviet 'solution' for Nigeria, for instance, wouid have consisted in
creatingnational Statesfor the Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo, Fulani, etc., and
other statesof a lower order for the smaller Nigerian nationalities.These
'States'would have no
links with each other, but would be directly
subordinateto a central imperial government.Every important step in
the economic life of these 'national States'lvould be decidedby this
far-away central administration. This is exactly the pattern ii,liich
Russia lbllowed in Central Asia.
Britain went the oppositeway. Insteadof splitting up Nigeria, whose
main peoplesdiffer from each other as much as Germans, English,
Russiansand Turks, the British Governrlent did its utmost to rnake it
a united country. The 1946Constitution createda LesislativeCouncil
rvith an African majority which, for the first tir.ne,iegislated for the
rvhole of Nigeria, whose population is far bigger than that of all five
Central Asiatic Republics put together.
4. NlrtoNlr cllsroMs: BRITISFI
RESrECT
AND sovIET INTERFERENCE.
The SovietRussiancolonizerconsidersthat he is entitledto abolish ail
institutions of a given nationality; to impose every possiblereform if
this is in iine rvith the communistproeramme.Thus RussianBolsheviks
never hesistatedto introduce the principles of class struggle into the
most backward atmosphere.They discoveredan equivalentto the Rus'kulaks'
sian
everywhere,
from the oasisof the Kara Kum desertin Turkmenistanto the Lapp settiementsof the Arctic coast.The most violent
measuresof coercion againstthe guardiansand symbols of primitive
n a t i o n a lt r a d i t i o n s t, h e c h i c f sa n d r r i b a t e l d c r s ,u e i e a l w a y si u s t i f i e di n
the eyesof Sovietcolonizers.
The British colonial adnrinistrator, whether he be a conservativeor a
socialist,feelshe has no right to interfere rvith the customsof the peoples
under his administrationbeyond what is necessaryto maintain order.
British colonial policy does not attempt to sweepaway tribal customs
and institutionssimply becausethey are 'reactionary'.Customsare not
abolishedunlessthey are of a criminal nature. The British idea is that
backwardpeoples,as they srow into a higher degreeof civilization,will
themselvesthrow off the ballast of their more primitive past. Graduai
transformationof the institution of Chiefsand Eldersand its adaptation
to modern conditionsis the aim, not abolition.
It may be held againstBritish colonial policy that it interfercstoo
little, rvhereSoviet nationalitiespolicy interferestoo much. This applies
in particular to British Protectorateswhich enjoy full inrernal autonomy,
310

AS A WORLD PROBLEM

and which may engasein extremefbrnrsof reiisiousintolcrlnce i','ithout

the local British ollicials preventine them.
5 . r s E L A N G U A G Ep R o B L E M . B - " o t hS o v i e tn a t i o n a l i t i e so o l i c v a n d
B r i t i s h c o l o n i a lp o l i c y a i m a t t h e c r e a t i o no f a l i n g u a f i ' r r n . . .i rn t h e i r
respectivedomaius. The Soviet Governmentconductscultural propag a n d af o r t h e R u s s i a nl a n g u a g ep. a r t i c u l a r l ya m o n g s tr h e l e s sd e v e l o p e d
nationalities, while the cultural efforts promoted in British territoiies
lead almost automatically to a further cxtension of the influence of
Enelish.
However, there is a considerabledifference.The Enelish lansllaseis
a genuinelyinternationalone and not the laneuageof6ne couritry*and
ol1nu,il9n: The peoplesin British coloniesrvho acquire a knowledge
of English have a kcy to European and not specificallyEnglish civilization. It does not necessariiyfollow that a peopleincreaseiits poritical
dependence
on rhe British Empire simply becauseit adoptsthe English
languaee as its principal cultural medium and iink with the ouiside
rvorld. The Russianlanguage,orr the other hand, cannot claim to be
international.Every cultural success
it achievesamong the non-Russian
pegplg!of the SovietUnion benefits,in the lon,srun. 6nly rhe Russians,
and it increasesthe power of Russiaas the onlv statewhere Russianis
the languagespoken.The SovietEmpirehasalwiys discouragedattempts
to introduce an alternativelinsua franca (Arabic, Azerbaidzhanirurkic,
Chagatai)insteadof Russian.The Britisir authoritieshave not tried to
piaceEnelishin the samemonopolisticposition.Indeed,British coronial
authoritieshave been instrumentalin eiving an honourabie status to
F{ausaand to Swahili as inter-tribal l;neu;ses. the tirst in Northern
Nigeria, the secondin EastAfrica.
education in both Empires is given in local languaees.
_,-Flementary
with regard to secondarveducationthe British and Sovieteducatidnal
policies adhere to different patterns. In vie'uvof the lorv desree of the
d e v e l o p m e not f t h e A f r i c r r r l a n g u a g c s e c o n d a r ye d u c a r i o n - i gs i v e ni n
Fnglish in all schoolsof British Africa. Englishis the languageoTteachl_ngeven in schools run entirelv or predominantly by Africans. ln the
Soviet Union many native schools switch over to teaching in Russian
from the fifth form upwards and in rnany others from theiighth form.
Thus in the Russian Soviet Federation forty-six lansuagesare used in
primary schools but only twenty-tu'o languagesin tie list three forms
of secondaryschools(the so-called'ten-year-schools').8
6 . o r r r r R E N C E Sr N E D U C A T t o N .g r i t i s h a r r d S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n a l
policicsin the coloniesdilTernot only in regard to the languagequestion.
The Soviet Government, with the heip of a totalitarian slatJapparatus,
has beenable to make iiteracymuch more generalthan Britisi colonial
adrninistrationcould do rvith its much slower-working democratic masseducation projects. The Soviet Government has ilso given greater
J l l

impetus
to,.iu.rrity'"*i"il"']iolnoi]j]n""

.r" British.
Four

of the five central Asian Republics have not only got universities but
even 'Academiesof Sciences'.In the U.S.S.R. the ierms ,university, and
'acaderny'
are used in a rather loose way. A Soviet .university' may be
what the British would call a 'universiiy Colleee' or even u 'coli.n"'
(the Fourah Bay College in Freetown, for instaice)
'Academies'
and 'universitjes' in the non-Russian republics and
particularly in the Asiatic republicsof the SovietUnion are nbt supposed
to servethe national interestsof the peoplesfor whorn they are aliegedly
founded. Unlike the university colleges of Ibadan and Aihimota';hich
have only African students the universities of Stalinabad, Ashkhabad,
Baku, Samarkand, Alma Ata and rashkent are half European institutions. As to the so-called'Academiesof Sciences'they have two assignments. First, they are to help in the implementation of econoilic
schemeswhich are carried out in the territory of a given Republic in
the all-Union interest,and secondlythey must watch over the ideological
orthodoxy of the local intelligentsia, their writings on history, i=heir
poetry, music and theatrical art. The existenceof the .academies;makes
it easy for the-rdgime to put into effect new directives governing the
lntellectual and artistic life of a non-Russian nationalitylnd to
iurge
'nationalist'
artists, writers and historians. If 'academies'with similir
functions existed in the British colonies the local intellectuals would
rightly consider them as redoubtableimperialistic instruments directed
t o w a r d ss p i r i t u a lo p p r e s s i o n .
/. THE coloNrzATroN pRoBLEu. The most important common
problem which both the Russianand the British Empires have to face is
that of Furopean colonization in non-European teiritories. Lenin explained imperialism as the 'export of capitalt 6 Manpower investments,
however, are a much safer basis for imperialist activities than capital
investments. It has happened that colonists have been expelled from
former colonial countries, but as a rule European manpower in the
colonies is lessendangeredby political changesthan European capital,
mines and factories are. Russial imperial poficy was almost everywhere
built on the solid basisof colonization by Russianworkers and peasants.
Thus one essentialbasisof Russianimp-eriaiismremained untouched by
the October Revolution.
The manpower export which is the rule as far as the Russian colonies
are concerned is an exception in the British colonies. The territories
which were originally colonized by the British, like the United Statesof
America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are no longer oart of
the British colonial Empire. No British masscolonization ha"sevir been
carried out in Burma, India, British west Africa and the west Indies.
Something like a mass immigration of Europeans took place only in
East Africa, in the two Rhodesias,in Kenya and Taneanvika. In tirese
312

AS A WORLD PROBLEM

territories the European colonization has createda worse nroblem than

Russian colonization in Central Asia. This is due to the fact that the
cultural, racial and economic cleavagebetween the indieenous population of East Africa and the European colonists is much greater than the
cleavagebetween Russian and Ukrainian colonists, on the one hand,
and the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Uigurs on the other.
' r o n s N r s A T S i y A ' A N D A F R I C A N I Z A T T o NM. a n v t h i n g s w h i c h
8.
are accomplishedin the Soviet Union as part of a greit revolutionary
achievementand widely publicized inside the country and outside, are
also done in the British Empire, but as part of the day's work and un'korenisatsiya' (the gradual
noticed. Thus the Soviet
replacement of
Russian party and state officials in the national territories by
'natives') has an exact equivaient in the 'Africanization' gradually car'Nigeiianization'
ried out in the African Sr;tish colonies, also called
in
'Korenisatsiya' and Africanization do not mean quite the same
Nigeria.
thiig. Soviet nationaiitiespolicy is satisfiedif a'native'canbe appointed
'Chairman
of the Council
to a job with a high-sounding title, such as
'Chairman of the Supreme Soviet' of
of Ministers', or
this or that
republic. It doesnot worry the Sovietleadershipifthe personin question
is a mere figurehead surrounded and guided by Russians.The British,
'assistant' 'deputy'
or
prefer to give an African the subordinatejob of
so that he can acquire the necessaryskill and knowledge for a higher
job, pending further promotion. But once chosenfor a top position he
will be fully responsiblefor his offi.ceand not a puppet in the hands of
English mentors.
Full Africanization will ultimately be possible at least in some African
colonies, while the large number of Russian colonists in the Soviet
dependentterritories will prevent any genuine'korenisatsiya'from being
implemented.
9. srnarpcrc coloNrEs. Some of the generalrules guiding British
'strategic
colonial policy do not fully apply to what one may describeas
colonies'. One can hardly deny that British policy towards Cyprus,
Gibraltar or Malta has beenlessliberal than the British attitude towards
the West Indian or West African colonies. However much one may
criticize Britain's handling of the Cyprus question, on the other hand, it
is a fact that Britain has not prejudiced the future of that island by
altering the composition of its population. This is precisely what the
Soviet Union has done with its strategic colonies. It has deported the
Japanesefrom Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; it has expelled all
Germans from the KoenigsbergProvince.

The peacefultransformationof the British Colonial Empire,if carried

will moreand morebecomethedemocratic
on boldly and determinedly,
J I J

western
atternative,"
rj;#,i.,

il]in

,.-rnuoins
relarions

between the former master-raceand form-erdependentp*ptir. British

colonial policy is perhapstaking the longestt"ay, but other nations have
m a d es i m i l r r e f f o r t si n t h e s a m ed i r e c t i o n T
. h e F r e n c hc o l o n i a l E r r r n i r e
has becomethe French Union. Although the French union, comp,ired
with the British En.rpire,is a centraiistic body, its principles u." d.*oc r a t i c .T o l e r a n c ea n d r e s p e cfto r h u m a nd i e n i r ya r ei r s b a i i sa n c li r r e o r c s e n t sa m u c h h i g h e r f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z l r i o nt h a n t h e S o v i e t
Empire. Nationalist organizationsin the Frinch Union have been subject to a number of vexationsand in the caseof Madagascareven to
bloody suppression.
Nevertheless.
national iiberationmoiementswhich
wouid neverbe allowed in SovietRussia,are nolv conductinga lesal or
at least semi-legal existence in Algeria, Morocco uni Tul-,iriu.
The United States have_gir1e1
a new deal to their dependentterritories; independenceto the Phitippines,far-reachingautonomv to the
virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the Hawaii Islandls,while Aiaska is
headingfor statehood.Denmark has shown for years a humanitarian
non-imperialistattitude.towardsthe_people
ofi ts only remainingcolony,
Greenland. The Dutch had to_liquidatetheir Empire under the"pressure
of events.only the Relgians,Portugueseand spaniards have refusedto
changethe status of their colonial territories.
whatever progressmay have been made, the non-communistworld
is still very imperfect and a great deal of courage will be needed to
correct mistakes and redressthe wrongs of the past in the field of
colonial p91l"y. However, if the western world livei up to its own ideals
it can establishan order in Africa, in the west Indies ind in South-East
Asia, which not only will not be overwhelmedby communist Russian
expansion and infiltration, but which will put to shame the soviet
nationalitiespolicy. of course,colonial reforms must primarilv be concerned with the welfare of the colonial peoples, but thev cin simul_
taneously be part of a great plan to take the initiative oi action anct
propagandaout of Russianhands. The western nationscan and must
prevent Russia from posing as that force in the world whose task it is
to solve the problems which the rest of mankind has left unsolved,
including the nationalities problem and the problem of deoendent
peoples. western justice in the field of coloniai policy will uliimately
acquire an explosive character in relation to those parts of the rvorld
sufferingunder political oppressionand totalitarian rule. The conviction
that western civilization implies for everybodya greaterdegreeof liberty
than Sovietpower and Bolshevism,will-becomegeneralnoi only among
the peoplesoutside the Russian grip but will spreadto the nati,onalities
within the Soviet sphereof influenceand everwithin the Soviet union
itself.
The complete news blockade by which the Kremlin has surrounded
3t4

the peoplesof Russia and the peoplestluing l,nO., indirect Soviet rule
will not be sufficient,in the long run, to conceal the truth about what is
good and progressiyein the West and about such epocir-makingchanges
as the granting of freedom to India. In the long run it will be impossi6le
to hide from the peoples of Soviet Russia and her satellite countries,
that'something has changed'in the 'imperialist world'. The first doubts
as to whether Bolshevismhas discoveredthe universal medicine against
the evils ol our time and whether Russiaholds a monopoly of pro-gress,
have already emerged among the satellites and have even crepf into
Russiaitself.
To speak of changes for the better, outside the Soviet sphere of
influence,is in itself a heresyfor every Russian communist and few can
be expectedto admit their ixistence.'The aged Hungarian-born Soviet
economist,ProfessorE. S. Varga, is the only Soviet personality, so far,
to come out with a timidly formulated statementchallengingthe official
thesis that olly communist countries are on the way to progresswhile
the rest of the world is declining. He said: 'The fact that a processof
p o l i t i c a tl i b e r a t i o ni s g o i n g o n i n t h e c o l o n i e st,h e f a c t t h a t I n d i a h a sa n
ambassadorin our country and we have one in India, is after all somelhing new. One cannot simply say that this does not mean anything,.?
In making this statement,for which he incurred the displeasureof the
Kremlin, Varga showedthat the facts which are giving the lie to Soviet
theory and propaganda are becoming so strong that even Soviet communists can no longer ignore them.
The Kremlin is haunted by the fear that the Lenin prophecy will come
true, according to which Russiawill ceaseto be the model and will again
becomethe backward country.s Russia is backward already in mlny
ways - its lack of freedom is in itself extreme backwardness- but th-e
backwardnessis still hidden under the veneerof technical prosress and
propaganda slogansabout the fraternity and equality of the pEoples.It
is up to the free nations to make the Russiansmore consciousof their
backwardnessby showing them through deeds that there are better,
juster ways of solving many problems than those adopted in Soviet territories. The British Commonwealth, as the largest federal orsanization in the world, has a specialmission in this rejpect; it can ser"veas a
living examplethat Russiatoo can becomea Commonu'eaith,that something like the 'United Statesof Russia' is not a Utopia but a practical,
political possibility.
THE FUTURE OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

To.speak of s"ch a possiblity, however, means to envisagea change of

r6gime in Russia.This changealone could guaranteeto th1 nationa]ities
of the U.S.S.R. somethingwhich one could rightly describeas a .future'.

31s

SOVIET NATIONALITIBS

POLICY

If the Soviet rdgime continues in its presentform there is no future for

the peoples of Russia in the senseof a genuine political and cultural
development.The first thirty years of the Bolshevik r6gime have shown
clearly what the nationalities of the Soviet Empire have to expect from
its continued existence:in the economic field further industrialization
and urbanization connected with Russification; in the political and
cultural field complete elimination of any genuine national initiative of
the peoples concerned, through the communist inquisition and continuous purges.
In discussinga non-Bolshevikfuture for E'trasia one can never divorce
the problem of the non-Russian nationalities from that of the Russian
people. The Russians, a people of 100,000,000,will always have an
important part to play in the destiniesof Europe and Asia. A politically
balanced world order cannot refuse to allocate to them a place which
correspondsto their numerical importance, their abilities, their cultural
and economic efforts and the vastnessof the space they occupy. To
incite the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union asainst the
Russian people and to aim at the disintegration of the Russiin Empire
would be a short-sightedpolicy. Disintegration propaganda addressed
to the non-Russiannationalitiesis perhaps]theeasiestway to embarrass
the Bolshevik r6gime, but it will never^lead to its downfall for such
propaganda would irritate the Great Russians and make them scentical
regarding the intentions of the Western world. If Bolshevism is to be
overcome at its very birthplaces, Leningrad and Moscow, the Russian
people must not be under the impression that they will have to pay for
liberation from communism with the dismemberment of their State
through the loss of all territories which at various times have been
attracted by centrifugal forces. In other words, the Western nations
should not becomethe splitters of Russiaby attaching more importance
to the local nationalities than to the Russian people. Those peoples of
the U.S.S.R. who for geographical,historical, cultural and economic
reasonswill not fit into a new Russian Federal State will leave.Russia
anyway, in the process of tremendous political upheavals which are
likely to accompany a change of r6gime. Responsibility for this action,
however, should rest with these peoples alone. The Western nations
should take no initiative in it and should not push the non-Russians
towards political separation. This non-interference should not be
dictated simply by opportunistic, tactical considerations.The emergence
of a multitude of small national States in Eastern Europe, in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, in the territory of what to-dav is the
U.S.S.R. would increasethe anarchy in the world and would not even
benefit the nationalities concerned. The creation of small and mediumsizednational States,encircling as it were the Great Russianpeople and
cutting them offfrom the rest of the world would guaranteethe interests
J to

AS A WORLD

PROBLEM

of the peoplesof Russia as little as the collapseof Austria-Hungary safeguarded the interestsof the peoplesof the Danubian monarc[y.-What
both the interestsof the peoplesof Russia and the maintenanceof world
peacereally require is the transformation of the mock federation, which
is the U.S.S.R., into a genuinefederal union. This does not mean that a
new Russia will necessarilyremain in possessionof all territories over
which the soviet Government to-day extendsits domination, nor doesit
mean that the internal divisions of the u.s.s.R. into Reoubiics and
Autonomous Republics, etc., will remain as they are now. Numerous
ldjustments will undoubtedly be necessary.Thus ihere is no justification
for the maintenance of such creations of Soviet propaganda as the
Karelo-Finnish Republic, or the Moldavian Repubiic; no-rwould it be
plopgr fo_ra democratic Russian Federation to leep 'strategiccolonies'
like the Kurile Islands or the Petsamoregion, the islands ofthe Gulf of
Finland and other territories which the Sbviet Government has wrested
from the Finns.
It would be in Russia's own interest to give the members of the
federation the maximum of freedom so as tolncrease the attraction of
joining it. Such a genuine federation might comprise, as a minimum
rather than as a maximum, the UkrainE, Byeloiussia, Armenia and
Georgia-together with-Russia ploper including all nationalities living
within the habitat of the Great Russian people. We have shown how
Russians,Ukrainians and Byelorussiansaie intertwined with each other
ald no further lengthy_explanationis, therefore,necessaryhere to prove
that a federal union ofthe three Slav peoplesis reasonableand feasible
if there is full respect for each otheis peculiarities. The inclusion of
Armenians and Georgians in the federation could be warranted by the
positive character, in the past, of relations between the two chriitian
caucasian peoples and the Russians. Moreover, the fact that a large
number of Armenians live intermingled with Russiansin the Northein
caucasusreion and elsewherein the Russian Empire, would have to be
consideredin any future settlement,as well as the interdependenceof
Russian-Georgianeconomic relations.
The Baltic nations, on the other hand, cannot be expected to join
a federal union with the Russians.A new democratic Russia will onlv
gradually gain the confidence of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuaniani
and thesethree_smallpeoplesmight prefer to enter a regional federation
centred in the Baltic Sea.
_.The problem of Russia's Moslem border republics will be the most
difficult to solve, but political reason demands^thatthev should not be
separatedaltogether from the Russian body. The .ur"'fo, the presenr
Soviet Central Asia remaining within the framework of a ltussian
federation is at least as strong as the French case for the retention of
Algeria within the French Union.
3t7

Anypolitica,
,""',", Jilil";:

orRussia,s
Mosrem

Republics must take into acco,nt the substa'tial changesbrought

about in ihese countries since the Russian conquest, 6oth in the
e c o n o n r i ca n d e t h n o g r a p h i cl i e l d s .T h e R u s s i a nm a s sc o l o n i z a t i o ni,n
p a r t i c u l a r .i s a f a c t o r u h i c h m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e dN
. ot one of the six
Moslem Republicsof the U.S.S.R.can reaily be regardedas a ,Moslern
State' in the same senseas lraq, Afghanistan or lran. Thev are even
far lessMoslem in characterthan ]vforoccoand Tunisia where European
colonization has left a fairly slrong imprint.
There is a tremendous scope for changes in the conditions of the
Moslem and other non-Russianpeoplesof the Soviet union without
disinteeratins the Russien Enrpire the esta.blishmentof freedom of
religion alone would have fbr-reachingconsequences.
It would not only
brine about the freedom of religiouscults, as such, but in the caseof
the RussianMoslemsit would mean freedom to keep up contactswith
the Mosiemsof the world. It would also imply freedomto publishbooks
i n A r a b i c l n d p e r m i s s i o nt o t e a c h a n d i e i r n A r a b i c i n q o v e r n m c n t
s c h o o l s .T h u s t h e l \ 1 o ' l e m si n R u s s i a ,r v h i l e c i t i z e n so i u R u s s i a n
federation, would have e'ery possible chance to be sirnultaneously
members of the great rvorld community of Islam.
A future Russia would also have to acceptthe principle that whatever
obligations a political and economic federation might impose on its
members,every nationality must be the suprememasler of ils language
and literature. All pressurefrom the central Government reeardi;g tle
vocabuiary and grammarrof the locai ianguagesand the conte'ntsofiheir
literature must obviously be discontinued if the peoplesare to develop
freely. If the local nationalities want to 'purify tlieir language from
Russian expressionsthey have been forced to absorb in large numbers
under the Soviet rdgirre, they should likewise be free to do s6. If two or
more p^eoples,belonging
to the samelanguagegroup should expressthe
desirefor a singleliterary languageno obstacleshould be puf in their
ryay t9 achievethis aim. The Turkic peoplesof Russia,in particular,
should be given the choice to decide whether they want to retain the
languaees created in the Bolshevik period or whether they want to
pursue those tendencies towards linguistic and cultural unification
which Bolshevism represseci.Any cultural unification rvourd also have
political consequencesrvhich would be reflected in the regional subdivisions of a future Russianfederation.While the Sovietidgime has
tried to keep non-Rr,rssian
peoplesapart as much as possible,a new
Russia would have to recosnize all trends not only towards cultural
but also towards political inion, in so far as theie union ideas are
geouraphicallyand ethnically sound.
A democratic Russian federation will be abie to establish a new
reiationship between Russians and non-Russians. cultural contacts
318

AS A WORLD PROBLEtvt

between Russiansand the peopleshistoricaily rinked q'ith them can

have no real vaiue so long as they result from politicai pressureand so
long as admirationof Russiancultureis officialiydemiindecjin the sanre
way as admiration of Stalin.
Under the Bolshevik rdgime the Russianclassicshave beendesecratecl
and reachthe non-Russianpeoplesonly as a by-productof the vast flood
of Soviet propagandaliterature.After the siamp of oflrcial Bolslievik
a p p r o v a lh a s b e e nr e m o v e dt h e R u s s i a nc l a s s i c rsv i l l a c q u i r ea s r i n t h e r r
educational.and enlightening role- aryong the non-RLssian'peoples.
Pushkin will again be read as p'shkin, Tolstoy as Tolstov'and
Belinsky's critical r.vorkswiil be studied becauseof their merits and not
within the framewo.!
a propaganda campaign against .cos_
9L
mopolitanism' or for the 'Greatnessof the Motherland'.
Not only to the nationaiitiesof Russia but to the whole worid will
the true faceof Russianculture becomevisibreagain.Russianpoetsand
writers will ngain be able to enrich literature, muiic and art to tire benefit
of all mankind, instead of.being doomed to servilepropagandaproduction. The Russianpeople,at presentrepresentedto the iorld bv a
thin strata of dipiomats and bureaucrats,will becomevisible throush
the expressionof their true politicai ideals,not those of rvorld revolutiin
and world communism u-hich are advocated on this people's behalf.
The people of Russia will resume contact with tlre outria" rvorld bv
making genuinecontributions at internationalconferencesinto whicir
Soviet representativesinvariably carry an element of discord. The
R"ussian
Christianswill enterinto a reraiionshipwith other churchesof
the world, not to serveRussianstateinterests,but to promote christian
co-operationon a u'orld-widescale.A Russianlabour movementwill
emerge,no longer issuing orders to the 'workers of the world' but keen
on_a free exchange of views with organized labour in the advanced
industrial countries. Thus in a1l fieldi the Russians lvould be equal
partners instead of stubborn, suspiciousopponents. Not to believi in
such a future for the Russian people rvould mean not to believein the
future of human civilization, in iis strength to survive and shake off
totalitarianism.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTES TO CHAPTER

TEN

7. Mirovoye Khozvaistvo i Mirovaya politika - world Economics and

Politics,Nr. 6, June1946,p.72.'
2. G: Y. AorxHanr, Paki.stanand Indiutt !{ational Lrnity, London 1943,
o.24.
319

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

3. StatisticalcomparisonsbetweenBritish and Sovietcolonial policy can be

found in the following books: Perrr.reDurr, Britain's Crisis of Empire,
London 1949,p.137; LnoNano BanNns,SoviqtLight on the Colonies,
A Penguin Special,London 1944,pp. 197l2l1; GEonce P,louonr, Ilow
RussiaTransformedHer Empire, London 1946, pp. 100/103.(Mr. Padmore's book contains interestingmaterial about the Negro policy of the
CommunistInternational.)
4. Information on Non-Selfgoverning Territories, Memorandum by the
Colonial Office on Proceedingsin the General Assembly of the United
Nations 1947,London, Her Majesty'sStationeryOffice,1948,p. 38.
5. UchitelskayaGazeta,April 4th, 1951.
6. V. I. Lurm:t,Imperialism, the Highest Stageof Capitalism, SelectedWorks,
London 1936,vol. 5, p. 81.
7. Prilozhenie k zhurnalu Mirovoye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika Supplement to the Journal, V[/orld Economicsand Politics, Nr. 11,
November1947,p. 4.
8. V. I. LnNw, Left-l(ing Communism,an Infantile Disorder,SelectedWorks,
London 1938,vol. 10,p. 57.

320

INDEX
Abashidze,Grigol, 234-5
Abazintsy, 196
Abbas the Great, Shah. 212
Abdul Hamid, Sultan.215
Abdurakhmanov,Yuiup, 272
Abkhazian A.S.S.R..23'6-7
Abkhazians,236-7,248
Abo, Treaty of, 89
Abramson.S..274
Academiesof Sciences:
AII-Union, Institute of Historv.
-- 92.
200;Polar Commission,57
Armenia.223
Azerbaidzhan, 244
Functions,312
Kazakhstan,297
Kirghiz Branch,274
Tadzhikistan,288
Ukrainian, 129, 131,143
Adyge, 182.195-6
Adyge Autonomous Province, 195-6
Adzhar A.S.S.R.,235
Adzharians, 236
Afghanistan:
Herat, 281.284
Kabul, 284
K-adaghan-Badakhshanprovince, 2g4
Maimana Province. 28u,
Mazir i Sharif Province. 284
Sovietpolicy, ?58-9, 281-5, 292-3, 306
Tadzhiks in,259.284
Turkmenians in, 259, 284
Uzbeks in.259.284
Africa:
British colonial policy comparedwith
policy, 309-14
_ Soviet,nationalities'
East.312-13
South racial policy. 304
Aibek, Tashmukhamedbv,260
Aitakov, Nederby,294
Ak Mechet: seeKzyl Orda
Akhay, Akhmet. 80
Akhmed Kh-an,Emir of Afghanistan,2g4
Akhundov, Mirza Fathali, 34,244-5
Akhverdov, A.,245
Aklavik. 64
Aksakov,S. T.,5-6
Akushinsky, Sheik Ali-Hadji, 198
Aland archipelago, 89
Alash Orda, 7, 263
Albania.306
Albaniairsin Ukraine, 145-7
Alexanderl, Czar, 119,zZ+s
Alexander III, Czar. 105
Alexander of Kakhetia, prince,224
Alexander of Macedonia. 286
Alexandrovsk. 94

Alexey Mikhailovich, Czar, 213

Alexeyev, Kuzma. 50
Algeria, 314,317
Alikhanov,A.1., 222
A l i k h a n y a nA, . L , 2 2 2
{,1!mKhqn, Emir of Bokhara,285
Alksnis, Gen., 107
Ag-1{ta (Qryerly Verny), 2s6,2634,
267-8.297-8- 3t2
Alma Ata Province. 297
Alphabet:
All-Union Central Committee for the
New.35-6
Arabic alphabetsreformed, 36
Assyrian, 249-50
Azerbaidzhani attitude. 242
Chuvash.48
Georgian, 208
Latinization, 33-7
'Novgorodov
Alphabet', 34
bf refoi ms, 34, 37
\eligious -aspect
Russian alphabet, 37-8
Turkic Alphabet, AII-Union Central
Committeefor the New. 35
. .TurkologicalCongressin Baku, 35
Altai region, 74
Alter, Victor. 165
Altynsarin, lbrai.27O
Amanullah,King of Afghanistan,
2g3
America, United Statesof: see United
Statesof America
Amery, L. S., 308
Amu Darya river, 284-5, 290-2
Amur region, 22
Anarchists.164
Anatolian Turks, 242-3, 248,294
Andizhan, 278.297
Angren, 278
Arabic language,,- Daghestan, 2Ol-2;
Central Asia. 299
Arabs in Central Asia. 298-9
Arabic alphabetreformed:seeAlphabet
Aral, Lake, 255-6.275
Archangel, 93
Arctic: seeFar North
Argentina,218
Armavir, 214,249
Armenia, 7, ,128,,209,2ll-23, 248,
' 251
Armenian Church, 214,219,223
Armenia-ns,?1, 123, 2O8,Ztl-23, 227-8,
-8,
?124t, 247 251, 260,29r, 296, 308,
317
Ashkhabad.299.312
Assyrians, 240, 248-50, 306
Astrakhan,82,85.240
Ataturk, Kemal Pasha,34,216
Attorney-General, All-Union. 20-1

321

I N D PX

Australia.l. 312
Austria, 305
,dvars,37, 202-3
Avdal. Amin. 252
Ayuka, Khan, 82
Azadi. Davlet Mamedi. 293
Azerbaidzhan,Persian:seePersia:
Azerbaidzhan
Azerbaidzhan, Soviet, 7-8, 20, 128,
200-1, 203, 209, 211, 216-7, 229,
23748.2s1.273
Azerbaidzhani Turks, 8-9, 217, 227,
23942,244-7
Azizbekov,Meshadi-Bek,239
Bagirov,M. D., 11, 200-1,242-3
Bagramyan,Ivan Khristofor ovich,222
Bagrationovsk(formerly Eulau), 119
Bakhchisaray,8l
Bakhmurov,P. M., 80
Bakikhanovfam|ly,245
Baku, 200, 211, 226, 235-7, 244, 246-7,
307,3r2
Balkars,183,185,189,193
Balkh, 285
Balkash,267
Balkash,Lake,255-6
Baltic Sea,89-90, 104
Baltic States, 104-21, 3l'7
Baltic-White Sea Canal (Stalin Canal),
100*1
Baltiisk (formerly Pillau), 119
Baluchis,296, 298-9
Bandera,Stephen,142
Banderovtsy(Ukrainian Insurgent
Army), i42-3
Bashkiria,32-3, 41-6, 265
Bashkirs,5-6, 32-3, 41-6, 81
Basmachimovement,274-5, 285
Batu. Mekhmed Maksud. 279
Batum, 235-6, 238
Batyrov Sh. 8., 295
Batyrsha,Aliev, 42
Bazhan,Mikola, 142,246
Belgiancolonial policy, 314
Belinsky,V. G., 319
Berdzhenishvili.N.. 234
Berg,L. S., 152
Beriya,Laventy, 12, 231, 239, 243
Berlin, Treaty of, 214
Bernshtam.Prof. A.. 2'74
Bessarabia.150-1.214
Bialystok, 159
Biarmia. State of. 56
Biriya, Muhammed,247
BirobidzhanCity, 175, 177-8
BirobidzhanProvince,173-9
Birofeld, 175
Bobruisk Province,120
Bogoly'ubov,Nikolay Semonovich,273
1)')

Bokhara, 257,274, 278, 284-5, 288-9, 299

Bolgarian Empire,46-7
Bolshevik Party: seeCommunist Party
Bondarenko.I. P.. 133-4
Borislav. 137
Borotbists.130. 132-3
Brazil,218
Brest Litovsk. 159
Bryansk, 126
BryanskProvince,120
Buddhists.67-8. 8 l-6
Budget,SovietState,23-5
Buinaksk (formerly Temir-Khan-Shura),
197-8.200.204
Bukharin, Nikolay Ivanovich, 9-10, 18,
277-8
Bukovina,139-40
Bulashev.
Z. G..44
Bulgaria,2 l 8, 305-6
Bulgarians,in Crimea, 77; in Ukraine,
146-7
'Bund' (GeneralJewish
Labour League
of Lithuania,Poland and Russia).I 65
Burma,300,306,309,312
Burmistenko.M. A.. 134
Buryato-Mongolia,22
Byelomorsk,100
Byelorussia, 8-9, 21, 128, 145, 149,
l 53-6i
Byelorussians,
123,136,153-61,
174,292,
317
Canada, Soviet and Canadian Arctic
towns compared,64: Armeniansin,
218; Britishcolonization.312
Cantemir,Dimiter, 152
Capitals:
Moscow, replacedby St. Petersburg
(1703),90; reinstatedunder Soviet
r6gime,91,2'76
Moving of, 23; Udmurtia, 54; Volga
German Republic, 73; Kalmuckia,
8 5 ; L i t h u a n i a ,1 l ' 1 ,2 7 6 : U k r a i n e ,
135,276; Azerbaidzhan,239: Kazakhstan,263-4:Uzbekistan,275-6
CaspianSea,255, 290-1
CatherineII, 2, 69,76, 82,92, 125,140-1,
114

Caucasus,
North, 8, 31, 182-205,229,3 l7
Census,(1926),28, 53, 73, 99, 127, 147,
154, 170-1,203,271;(1939),14, 49,
170-1,185,249,268,291
Central Asia, Soviet,8, 10-11, 14, 21,
1 2 3 ,l 7 t , 2 0 8 , 2 5 5 - 3 0 03, 0 7 , 3 1 6 - 7
Central Asiatic Economic Council.
liquidation,260
Central ResettlementBoard, 14-15
Ceylon, 212, 300,309, 312
Chagata|279
Chainikov, K., 54

INDEX

A.S.S.R.,67, 183,185
Chechen-Ingush
C h e c h e n si 8, 3 , 1 8 5 - 9 ,1 9 1 ,1 9 3 ,2 0 1
Chelyabinsk,46, 241
Cheremiss:seelvlari
Cherkess(Circassian)Autonomous
Province,22,195,196
Chernayev,
Gen. M" G.,256
Chernigov,126
Chernishevsky,
N. G., 192
Chernovitsy,139
Chernyakhovsk(formerly Insterburg),
45,1r9
Chernyakhovsky,Gen. Ivan, 119
Chervyakov, Alexander Grigoryevich,
156
Chiaturi manganesemines,229, 23|
China:
Armeniansin,212,218
Kazakhs in.259.298
Kirghiz in, 259,27|
Soviet policy, 258-9, 29'7-8
Uigurs in, 297
Chinese,91,174
ChineseTurkestan,81, 259
Chirchik, 278
Chkalov (formerly Orenburg), 74, 255,
2634
Chkalov, Yalery,255
Chubar, Vlas Y., 134
Chukchi. 59
Chuvash,3'l, 43,4G8
Chuvashia.46-8
Circassians,
182-3,185,195-6
Civil War, 8, 3l, 72, 107,244,256;Latvians' part in, 107; Volga Cermans'
part in, alleged,T2
Coalmining:
Donets,41,125
Georgra,2Sl
Kazakhstan.263.267
Komi Republic,57-8
KuznetskBasin,41
Ukraine, 20, 41, 123, 125
Uzbekistan,278
Coatsof arms, Baltic States,109;
Byelorussia,157; Annenia, 217
Collectivization:
Abkhazia.237
Estonia.112
Kazakhstan,265-6
Kirghizistan,2T2
Latvia, 115
National Collective Farms, 22-6, 106,
296-7
Resistance
to,1'7,41, 55,61,132,192,
272,2'.77-8
Ukraine. 132
Volga German Republic, 74
Colonization, early Soviet policy, 3;
change in policy from agricultural to

industrialcolonization,13-14; Cirection to military vital areas,15; Russians'dornination.

i6
Azerbaidzhan,24I
British poiicy compared wfth Soviet
policy,3l2-3
Catherine II. under. 69
Czaristr6gime,under, l-6
Crimea, 77-8
Forced labour, by. 57, 100-l
Germans,by,69-71
Kaliningrad Province,120
Kalmucks, by, 81
Karelia, 99-101
Karelian Isthmus. 15. 102
Kazakhstan,263, 267-8
Kirghizistan,27G-1
Komi Republic,57
Latvians, Lithuaniansand Estonians,
by, 105-6
Murmansk Provincc.l5
Orenburg,256
Ukraine. 125
Colour problem, absenceof, in Soviet
Union, 304
Cominform conflict with Yugoslavia,306
Comintern:
Congress,First, 128; Fifth, 129, 305;
Sixth,116
Eastern European minorities, policy
on. 305
ExecutiveCommittee,132
Lithuanian independence,defence of
( 1 9 2 8 )1, 1 6
Nationalities pohcy, 129, 142
Ukraine, Western,propagandain, 136
CommunistParty, 7-12, 26, 308
Central Asiatic Bureau, liquidation,
260
Central Committee,ll-12,26, 44, 47,
61,109,136,156,160,189-90,194-5,
288
Chuvashmembershio.47
Congress,12th, 10;-13th,9; l5th, 9;
18th,11-12
Daghestani membership,202-3
Estonianmembership,107, ll2
Ethnical composition,8-9, 12
Jews'membership,164-5
Karakalpakia,260
Kazakhstan, 264-5
Komi membership,56
Latvian membership,107
Lithuanian membership,107
Moldavian rnembership,150-l
Politbureau,107,144
Russianelement.8-9
Tadzhikistan, 260
Tartar membership. 8-9

INDEX

TranscarpathianUkraine membership,
139
Turkmenistan. 260
Ukraine, Western.139
Uzbekistan,260
^ Volga German membership, 72
Communist Youth Leazue:
Assyrians, 249
Congress,first post-war,
28
Function.308
Ingush members,188
Ukraine, 135
Co_ns^tit$ion,-(
1923),25, I28; (1936),23
128,231,294
Cossacks,4,6, 124-5, l4l-2,237
Cotton-growin g, Azerbaidzhan, 243;
Uzbekistan.276-8.282
Crimea, 76-81
CrimeanTartars, 67-8. 7G8l
CrimeanWar (1853-6),j7, 81, 244
Culture, Sovietmeasuresagaiist
national:
Armenians, 222-3
Assyrians, 249-50
Azerbaidzhani
, 243-6.273
Balticpeoples,108-9.'ll3
Bashkirs. 43-4
Byelorussians,
155-8.160-l
Caucasus,Northern.'I 80-90
Central Asia. 260-2
Daghestani, 197-205
Far North, 6l-3
Finns. 102-4
Jews,165-8
Kabardinians. 194-5
Kazakhs, 268-70
KirgYtz,2724
Kurds. 252
Moldavians,152
Tadzhiks. 285-7
Tartars, 38-40. 79-81
Turkmenians, 293-5
Ukrainians, l4l-4
Uzbeks,279-82
Cyprus, 218,313
Czechoslovakia,
129, 139.305
Czechs.77.146-7
DaghestanA.S.S.R..196-205
Danilevsky,G. P., 70-l
Daniyalov,A. D.. 200-1
Darghinians, 202-3
Dashava,137
Dashkesan,241
Dashnaks,7, 216
Denikin, Gen., 187
Denmark,colonial policy. 314
Derbent. 197
Derzhavin,Prof.. N. S.. 89
Dimanshtein,semyon f,4.,,72,z5g

Dinmukhametov,Galey Afzaletdinovich. 38-9

Dniepr_opetrovsk,Latvians in, 106; Jews
in. l7l
Dolgano-Nenets National Area, 60, 62
Dolgany,6O
D o n e t sB a s i n ,1 4 , 1 2 5 , 1 2 j ,I 3 3 , 1 3 5
Dostojevsky,
F. M.,270
Dovbysh: seeMarchlewsk
Drogobych, 137
Dudinka,62
Dungans,29G8
Dzaudzhikau,183,193.214
Dzerzhinsky,Feliks, 148. 157
Dzerzhinskyfatlonal District, 157
Dzhanashia,S. N.. 234
Dzhaparidze, Alyosha, 239
Echmiadzin.214
Education:
Arabs, 299
Armenian schools,241
Assyrian schools.249
Baku schools.24i
Baluchis, 298-9
Bri-tishcolonial policy comparedwith
Sovietpolicy, 3l l-12
Central Asia,26l-2
Far North, 62-3
Georgia,233
German schools, 120
Kalingrad Province. 120
Karakalpakia,261
Kirghizistan.261
Polish schools,100-ll. 157
Russianlanguaggcompulsory,lg
I urkmenistan.298-9
Uigurs, 298
Uzbekistan,261
Egypt,218
107
Pilg-ul, Robert Petrovich,-107
Eikhe, Robert Indrikovich.
Elista: seeStepnov
Elphinston,Cbl. W. c..251
Emba.267
Fngels (formerly Pokrovsk), 73
Enskoye, 94
Epics,_national,Soviet interpretation of:
seeLiterature: Epics
Erenburg,llya,179
Erevan,2ll, 214, 218. 22O
Eritrea. 307
Erlich,'Henryk, 165
Estonia,21,104-13
Estonians,37, 49,7j,104-13, lg9, 309,
31'7
Ethiopia,218
Eulau: seeBagrationovsk
Europe, Eastern,minorities: effect of
Soviet policy, 304-6

324

INDEX

Evenki, 60-3,174
Evenki, National Area oi 60, 63
Executions: seeTrials and purges
Fadeyev,Alexander 28 286-j
Far East, 13, 31, 126
Far North, 22, 59-64,91-6
Farkhad Hydro-Electric Station, 281
Farms. National Collective: seeCollectivization: National Collective Farms
Feffer. Itzik. 167
Feodosia,214
Fergana, 289
Fet. A. A.. 55
Finland:
Arctic Highway, 95
Communist exiles.Provisional Finnish
Peoples'Government, 101
Karelia, Western, 97-8
Petsamo,inter-war development,95
St. Petersburg,effect offoundation of,
90
Sovietpolicy:
Karelian Isthmus, annexation of,
101-2
Petsamo,annexation of, 94-5
Viborg (Viipuri), annexation of,
101-2
W a r , ( 1 9 3 9 )1, 0 1 ;( 1 9 4 1 ) , 1 0 2 ;
armistice(1944),95
Finnish peoples,21, 37, 43,48-58, 90-1,
93,99, 102-3
Finnmarken : seeNorway: Finnmarken
Fioletov, Ivan,239
Firdausi, 286
Five-Year Plans,14-16,934,236-7, 241,
267-8,276-8
Forced labour:
Murmansk railway line, on, 9l
Komi Republic industrialization, 57
Peter the Great, under, 90
Stalin Canal, on, 100-l
France,Armenians in, 218; colonial
policy,314,317
Francis JosephLand, 64
Fraydorf National District, 172
Friedland: seePravdinsk
Frontiers, changesin national territories,
2 3 , 4 ' 1 , 1 0 r , 1 8 3 ,1 9 6 ,2 5 7 ,2 6 4 ;N o r wegian-Sovietfrontier established,94
Frumkin. A. N.. 179
Frunze,27l,297
Frunze, Mikhail Vasilyevich, 8, 27l-2
Fyodor, Czar,224
Gafurov, BobozhdanG., 285-6
Gagauz, 152
Gagry,237
Galicia, Eastern, 137, 13940
Gammal Svenskby,ll0

Gandzha:seeKirovabad
Gasprinsky,Ismail Bey, 78
Geller (Birobidzhancommunist),177
Genocide:seeLiquidation of nationalities and autonomousterritories
Georgia,21-2, 74, 128, 190-1, 193,209,
211,223-37, 248
Georgians,37, 123,190,208-9,211,
223-37, 247,260, 317
Germans,Azerbaidzhan,in, 248; Baku,
in, 240; Baltic States, repatriation
from, 110;Black Seaareas,in, 71, 75;
Georgia, in, 74, 248; Kaliningrad
Province, in, 120, 313; Ukraine, in,
146; Volga Germans:seeVolga Germans
Germany, anti-Soviet carnpaign, 74;
recognitionof Soviet claim to Baltic
States,110
Gibraltar,313
Gikalo. N. F.. 156
Ginzburg, Baron, 175
Gipsies,175,306
Glavsevmorput,
60, 64, 9l
Glazov,54
Gogol, N. V., 124, 134-5
Gold Coast, 307, 309, 312
Goloded, Nikolay Matveyich, 156
Goloshchokin, Filip Isayevich, 265-6
Golovanivsky,Sawa, 168
Gomel, 155
Gomel Province, 120
Gorky (formerly Nizhny Novgorod), 49
Gorky, Maxim,205
Gorky Province, 14, 120
Gorno-Badakshan, Autonomous Province of, 283,290
Gotsinky, Imam Nazhmuddin, 198
'Great Kara Kum Canal project,29l
Grechukha,M. S., 142
Greece,218,305
Greeks, Baku, in, 240i Georgia, in,248;
Ukraine, in, 146
Grinberg, A. A., 179
Grinko, Grigory Fyodorovich, 134
Grodno, 159
Grozny, 186,188
Gudauti,237
'Gummet',239
Guseinov, Geidar, 201
Gylling, Dr., 100
}{afi2.286
Heckert District, 74
Herzen.A.4.. 192
Hitler, Adolf,226
Honduras.British, 309
Hrubeshov.142
Hrushevsky,Prof. Mikhail, 129,131, 143
Hughes,John, 125

325

INDEX

Hugo, Victor, 113

National Districts. 172
Hungaria,minorjties'policy,305_6
Stalinabad,
in, 286
Hunganans.work on Murmansk rail_
Ukraine,in, 145-6,168-9,178_9
I3J, 91; in TranscarpathianUkraine,
138
Kabardinian-Balkar
A.S.S.R,,183,185
-K a b a r d i n i aAn. S . S . R 1
. ,8 5 ,t 9 3 - . 5 '
Ibrahim Beg, 285. 289
K a b a r d i n i a n1s8, 3 ,t 9 l . l 9 l - 5
lgarka,63-4
Kleggyryh. Lazar Moiseyevich,8, 131,
Ignatov,I.,63
167,179,265
Ikramov, Akmal, 277-8
Kakhetia,224
Ilminsky,N. N., 38
Soviet interpretationof, 103
{ral-evalg,
l l o v a i s k yD
. i m i r r yl v a n o v i c hg, 9
KalevalaDistrict. lOi
lmber, Vera,179
(ypipo93. Sovierinterpretarionof, 109
In{1q a^nd_
P.,ak-isr-an,
212, 219, 259, 282, t(atrntn
(lormerlyTver).9g
287-8,298,300,307,309_10,312,31i
Kalinin.
Mikhail:
Armeniansin.212.218
Birobidzhan,associationwith, 174_5,
282,287-8,298,307
lovie,tpolicy,2_59,
r a d z h l k si n , 2 5 9
Caucasus,
policyin. decreeon North_
I n d o n e s i ai , 2 1 8
crn ( aucasus
fl 9_16),
lg4; sratement
Industrialization
of nationalterritorics.
(
1
9
4
2
)
.
1 8 4 - 5 i; n t e r v e n t i oi n
-s. _8.7i, 23| _3,267_8jii
!?-t7.,.44 s7
ChechenL'anditrv.187
bashkrna,.l4-5
CrimeanRepublic.
iecrecestablishing,
Georgia,23l-3
78
Komi Republic,57-8
Jewishquestion.inrerestin. lj4 _5,lj|
Kazakhstan,267-8
Proletariatleadership
Uzbekistan,278
o\er peasanrry,
statementon. 7
- Volga German Republic,73
Kalinin Province,99
Ingush,183,185.187-90
Kalinindorf NationalDistrict, I72
I nster_b^u
rg : SeeChernyakhovsk
Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg),
rnra, )6
'Intourist',
118-9
74
K a l i n i n g r a dP r o v i n c eI,I 9 - 2 0 ,3 1 3
Irakli II, King, 224, 235
Irlq.,^A_rmenians
in. 218; Assyriansin, Kalmuckia.67-8. 85-6
Kalmucks, 5, 67-8, 81-6
249-50;Kurds in.250.
Kalyandar.Sadvk.279
Ishimbay, 45-6
Kamenev,L. B.. 165
Ismail Province,137, 152
Kandalaksha(formerly Kennanlahti),
Israel,Srateof, 165,178.307
mo\ed trom Kareliato Murmansk
I t a l y , 3 0 5 ,3 0 7
Province,101
tv111tri
e,2,4,3e,e2.
to+5.
t2B,
fergluJ
Kannanlahti: seeKandalaksha
r>+,z++,
I l+
Izhevsk,54
Kapiyev, Effendi,205
Kara Kum desert,290-1. 310
Jalil, Jasmeh,252
Karabakh Autonomous Province,217
JewishAnti-FascistCommitteein
Karachay,183,185.i90
Karachay-Cherkess
Moscow, 167-8
Autonomous
JewishAutonomous Republic, 173-9
Province,l83
Jews,8-9, 78, 1t-l, 12i, 145_6,1'49,154_5, Karachay Autonomous Province, 185,
159,163-80,203,2t2, 240,292
190-l
Baku, in, 240
Karasar
Karaganda, 267
Baltic States,extermination by
Kale,lo-FinnishS.S. Republic, 21, 97,
Germans,1l I
1024.317
Byeigrus_sia,_in,
tS4-5, 159, 166,
Karakalpakia,260-1.27s
169-71,175,t79
Karakalpakian
s, 275.27E
C e n t r aA
l s i a t i cR e p u b l i c si n, , l 7 l
Karakhan. L. M.. Z3l
g-9,
Co.mmunistParty membership,
Karakol: seePrzhevalsk
164-5
Karelia, 92, 97, 99-103
Crimea,in,78, 1i2, 175.
' 17g
Karelian Isthmus, 15, l0l-2
Moldavia, in, 149, 152
Karelians,21,92,9i-9
Moscow,in, 163,165.174
Kale]o-Fi-nn_ish
S.S. Republic, 21, 97,
'Mountain
Jews',203
1024.311

326

INDEX

Karl LiebknechtDistrict, 74
Karsakpay.267
Kashka Darya Province,299
Kashmir, 306
Kaspiskoye(formerly Lagan),85-6
Katayama,Sen,265
Katherinenstadt:seeMarxstadt
Karrel,M. 4., 177
Kaunas(Kovno), lli, 2i 6
Kautsky, Karl,226
Kazakhs,8, 21,257,259-60,261-'11, 275,
278.291,296,29&,3r3
Kazaklrstan,'7, 20-1, 126, 257-8, 260,
262-10,296-7
Kazan,2, 255
Kazan Tartars: seeTartars
Kazem-bek,4.,245
Kenya.3l2-3
Kerbabayev,Berdy, 291
KhakassAutonomous Province,22
'Khanbudagovism',243
Khandzta,234
Khanti-Mansiinsk,
62
Khanty,61
Khanty-Mansi,Nationai Area of, 60, 63
I 35,139,241,276
Kharkov,106.129,133,
K h e r s o n , ' l l , 1 2 5 ,1 7 1
Khetagurov,Kosta, 192
Khibinogorsk (formerly Kirovsk), 93-4,
101
Khmelnitsky,Bogdan, 142
Khodzhayev,Faisulla,277-8, 280
Khodzhibayev,Abdurakhim, 288-9
Kholm, 142
Khorezm (formerly Khiva), 257,274
Khorezm Province,296
Khvylovy, Mikola, 130-l
'Khvylovy-ism',130,144
Kiev, 126-7,129,133,135,139,171, 213,
249,276
Armeniansin, 213
Assyriansin, 249
Capital of Ukraine, 135,276
Ethnical composition,127
Jewishpopulation, 171
Kiev, Stateof, 123
Kingisepp,Victor, 106
KingiseppDistrict, 106
Kirghiz, 8, 49, 189, 25'7,259-60,262,
2 7 1 4 , 2 9 6 , 2 9 83, 0 8 ,3 1 3
Kirghizistan,2l, 209, 257-8, 260-1,
270-82,296-7
Kirillov, I. K.,256
Kirov, SergeyMironovich (Kostrikov),
8, 91, 242-3
Kirov Province,120
Kirovabad(formerlyGandzha),239,241,
1A/

<

Kirovsk: seeKhibinogorsk
Kishinev, 152

Kizlyar.2l4
Klikhori, 190
Klaipeda(formerlyMemel),I17-8
Klyuchevsky,Vasily Osipovich,13
Koenigsberg:seeKaJiningrad
Kokand, Autonomous government of,
111

Kokhtla-Jdrve,111
Kola,92,94
Koia Peninsula,9Z-3, 96-7
Kolarov, Vasii, 147
Kolarov District, 147
Kolarovka, 147
Kolas, Yakub, 157-8
Komi, 37, 48, 53, 55-8
Komi A.S.S.R.,55-8
Komi-PermyakNational Area, 56
'Komzet' (Committeefor
the agricultural
settlementof Jewish toilers), 171*2,
t7 5-6
Kondopoga, 100
Koreans,in Birobidzhan, 174;in Central
Asia,296
K o r n e i c h u k4, , . Y . , 1 4 4
Koryaks, 59
Kosior, Stanislav,132-4
Kostomarov,Nikolay Ivanovich,89
Kostroma Province,120
Krasnodar,249
Krasnovodsk,291
Krasnoyarsk Territory, 22
Krumin, Y., 108
Krushchov,Nikiia Sergeyevich,
134-5
Kruus, Hans, 113
K r y l o v ,I . 4 . , 2 7 0
Kuli-zade,Mamed,245
Kulumbetov, U. D., 265
Kumyks,37,202-3
Kunanbayev,Abai,27O
Kunta, Hadji, 187
Kupala, Yanko, 157-8
Kupradze,V. D.,233
Kurbanov, 289
Kurganov, Grigory, 239
Kurdish Republic,251-2
Kurds, 250-2
Kurile Islands,15, 313, 317
Kursk, 126
Kursk Province,120
Kutuzov, Field-MarshalMikhail, 38
Kuusinen,Otto W., 101
Kuybishev,ValerianVladimirovich,8
KuybishevProvince,120
Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbass),41
Kzyl Orda (formerly Ak Mechet), 25(
zo5-4

Kzyl Orda Province, 296

Ladoga,Lake,97-8, 100
Lagan: seeKaspiskoye

327

INDEX

Lakhuti, Abulkasim, 287

Lakians, 202-3
Lakoba, Nestor Apollonovich, 237
Languages:
Alphabetic Revolutions: seeAlphabet
Baltic States,Russian introduced. 109
British policy compared with Soviet
policy, 311
Daghestan,201-4
Finnish in Kareiia. 98-9
Hebrew, ban on, 166
Far North native languages,63
Northern Caucasus,decrees,183
Karelia, Soviet decreeon equal rights
fgr Karelian, Finnish and Russian;
Finnish as official language,98-9
Political terminology, introduction of
internationalterms, l8
Russianlanguage,imposition and obligatory teachingin schools,18, 37;
introduction into Baltic States.109:
domination in Daghestan,203
Turkmenistan.294-5
Lapps:
Norway, in: seeNorway: Lapps
Russia.in: seeSaami
Soviet policy, 95-6
Sweden,in: seeSweden:Lapps
Larin, Yury, 175-6
Larindorf National District. 172
Latinization of Atphabet: seeAlphabet
Latvia, 21, 106-9, lll, ll+6
Latvians,8-9,37,104-l I, 114-6,306,317
Lazarev,I. L., 222
Lazi.235-6
Lazistan,236
Leagueof Militant Godless,18, 166
Lebanon.2lS
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov:
Bashkirs' relations with Tartars. views
on. 32
Central Asia, policy towards, 258
Central Asiatic State University, sanctioning offoundation of, 280
Crimean Republic, decreeestablishing,
78
Daghestani Moslem dignitaries, messageof allegiancefrom, 198-9
Georgia, policy on,227
Imperialismas 'export of capital', 312
Kalmuck Autonomous Province.
decreeestablishing,85
Kalmucks, proclamation to, 83, 86
Karelian folklore, in, 103
Letter to the Communists of Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountain Republic.
10,228,230
Letter to the Workers and Peasantsof
the Ukraine, l0

328

Stalin as expert on nationality problems.appreciationof, 2l I

Tartars' relations with Bashkirs, views
on,32
Turkestan, statementon, 258
Ukrainian independence,attitude towards. 130
kninakan.220
Leningrad(lormerly St. Petersburg),14,
5^7.-9,
62-3,90-1, 93, 96, tO2, lo6:'t 14,
249
Assyrians in, 249
Latvians in, 106
Migration to, 14
Port, as, 114
Leningrad Province, Karelian Isthmus
incorporated, 102; Estoniansand Latvians in. 106
Leninsk,278
Lenkoran. 248
Lermontov,M. Yu., 181,209,2'70
Lezghians, 202-3, 240
liberbe-rg @irobidzhan communist), I 77
Libya, 307
Liquidation ofindividuals: seeTrials and
purges
Liquidation of nationalities and autonomous territories:
Armeniansin Turkey,215
Balkars. 185. 193-4
Baltrc minorities, I l0-1
Chechens,189.201
CrimeanA.S.S.R.,67-8, 7 6-81
Crimean Tartars, 67-8, 7 6-,81
Greeks, 146
Ingush,185
Jews,146, 163
Kalmuck A.S.S.R.,67-8, 81-6
Karachay, 190
Volga German A.S.S.R.,67-76
'Lishentsy' (disfranchised
persons),170
Literature:
Azerbaidzhani, Soviet attitude. 273
Bashkirs, counter-revolutionary organizationsdefeated,43; plays criticized. M
Central Asia,26L2
CrqneqnRepublic,Soviet policy,
79-80
Daghestani, Soviet influence, 204-5
Epics, national, Soviet interpretation
of, Kalmuck Dzhangar,35; Finnish
Kaleuqla, 103; Estonian Kalevipoeg,
109; Kirghiz Manas,272; Azetbaidzhant Dede Korkud.273
Georgia,234-5
Kabardinian, Soviet influence, 194
Kirghiz, Sovietinterpretation,2j 24
Latinization of alphibet, effeit of, 35

INDEX

Literature:continued
Michael. Grand Duke. 221
Persian, Soviet interpretalion, 245-6. Middle East, Soviet policy, 196, 241,
286-'7
250-l
Tadzhikistan,286-7
Migration (seealso Colonization):
Turkmenistan, Soviet interpretation,
Abroad, ban on, 16
293-5
Asiatic territories.to. 13
Ukraine,l2+5,1434
Caucasianmountaineers'exodus,I 82,
Uzbeks,Sovietpolicy, 279
185
Lithuania, 104-l I, 116,ll8-20, 149
Crimean Tartars emigrationto
Lithuanians,37, 104-ll, 116, 118-9, 317
Turkey, 76-8
Livonian War (1558-82),104
Finns from Karelian Isthmus, 102
Loennrot, Elias, 103
German emigration,74
Luft (Volga German Premier), 74
Kalmuck emigration,82
Luxemburg District, 74
Kazakhsto Sinkiang,268
L v o v . 1 3 9 .1 4 1
Mass populations,transfersof, 6'l-8,
Lyubchenko,PanasPetrovich,133
75-6
Military vital areas,to, l5
Macedonia,306
Resettlementorganizations, l4-1 5, 99
Machine Tractor Stations,24, 120,291
Uzbeks,279
Madagascar,314
Mikhoels, Prof. Solomon, 167
Madatov,PrinceV. G.,222
Mikoyan,Anastas,8,12
Maikop, 195
Mikoyan Shakhar:seeKlikhori
'Milli
Maikov. A. N..270
Istiklal',279
'Main Turkmenian Canal', 291-2
Minchegaur,24l
Makeyevka,127
Minsk, 154,156,159
Makhach Kala (formerlyPetrovsk),197, Mirzoyan,C. I.,265
2034
Mitskevitch-Kansukas,
V. S., 108
Makharadze,Philip, 228-30
Mogilev, 126
Makhtumkuli (Turkmenianpoe0, 293
Mogilev Province,120
Maksum. Nasratullah.288-9
Moldavia, Soviet,21, 149-52,317
Malaya, 306
Molotov, V. M., as Prime Minister, 10;
Malta. 309.313
on incorporation of Western ByeloMalgobek,193
russia,l53
Manos,Soviet interpretation of , 272-3
Molotov-RibbentropPact, ll0, 149,159,
Manchurian border regions, coloniza166
t i o n ,1 5
Monchegorsk, 93-4
M a n s i . 6 G - 16. 3
Mongolia, Outer, 31
Manuilsky, Dimitry, 145
Mordvinian A.S.S.R.,48-50, 53
Mar Shimun,248-9
Mordvinians,37, 47-50,296
Marchlewsk (formerly Dovbysh), 148
Morocco,314,318
Marchlewsky,Julian, 148
Mosashvili,IIo, 235
MarchlewskyDistrict, 148
Moscow:
M a r i , 3 7 , 4 8 ,5 1 - 3
Assyriansin, 249
M a r i A . S . S . R .5, 1 - 3
Capital as, replaced by St. Petersburg
Mariupol (Zhdanov),125, 127, 146
(1703),90; reinstatedunder Soviet
Marr. N. Y..236
r6gime,91,276
Marshak. Samuel.179
CommunistParty members,12
Marxstadt (formerly Katherinenstadt),
J e w si n , 1 6 3 , 1 6 5 , 1 7 4
"12-3
Latviansin, 106
Maty.ushkin,Gen.,237
Mari belief re foundation. 52
Mazeppa,Hetman, 124, 153
Migration to, 13
Mdivani.Budu.228-30
Population, l2
Medvezhegorsk,100
Moscow Province,Tartar workers, 41;
Mekhti, Gusein,245
Kareliansin; population,99
Melitopol, 147
Moslems, 42-3, l8'7-8, 197-8, 2O0,202,
Memel: seeKlaipeda
235-6, 243, 264, 275, 296-300, 317-8
'Mountain Jews': see
Mensheviks,16+5, 22G7, 229
Jews: 'Mountain
Menshikov.Prince.77
Jews'
Merv, 290
Mountain Republic(Gorskaya),I 83, I 85
Mgaloblishvili,c., 230
Mozdok, 193,214

329

INDEX

M.T.S.: seeMachine Tractor Stations

Murmansk,31,914,96
Murmansk Province,15, 93-4, 101
MurmanskRailway:seeRailways:Kirov
Railway
Mussavat Pafiy, 7, 239-40
Nakhichevan,2l4
NakhichevanA.S.S.R..217
Nalchik, 194-5
Namangan,278
Nanai, 174
Nansen,Fritjof, 199-200
Narva, I 12
'Narimanovism',243
National Areas,22-3, 25, 59-63
National CollectiveFarms: seeCollectivization: National CollectiveFarms
National Districts, 22-3, 74, 96, 99,
146-8,157,t72,297
Dungan, 297
Bulgarianin Ukraine, 146-7
German. 74
Gipsy, planned,172
Greek. 146
Jewish,172
Karelian in Kalinin Province,99
Polish, in Ukraine, 148; in Byelorussia,157
Saami,96
Ukraine, in, 14G8, 112
National Village Soviets,22-3, 146,298
Albanian in Ukraine, 146
Baluchis.298
Navoi. Mir Alishir. 280-l
Nekrasov,N. A., 75
Nenets National Area. 59. 62
Nentsy, 59-63
Nestorian Church. 249
Netherlands,colonial policy, 314
New Guinea, 307
New Zealand.l. 312
Nicholas I. Czar. 141
Nicholas lI, Czar,215
Nigeria,309-13
Nikolay, Grand Duke, 248
Nikolayev, 125
Nikopol manganesemines,231
Nizami,244-6
Nizhny Novgorod: seeGorky
Njemen,117
Nobel, Ludwig,238,240
Nobel, Robert, 238, 240
Nogai Tartars, 196,203
Norilsk, 63-4
'Norman theory'of origin of first
Russian
State,88-9
North, Institute of the Peoples of, 59,
62-3,9r,96

Northern Pechora Railway Line: see

Railways: Northern Pechora
Northern SeaRqute, Chief Administration of: seeGlavsevmorput
Noteborg, treaty of (1326),92
Norway:
Finnmarken,Soviethistorian'sdenial
of Norwegian rights to; early Russian settlements,92
Fishermen'ssettlementsin Russia,93
Hammerfest, 94
Lapps,Sovietpolicy,96
Arctic townseclipsedby Sov.iettowns,
94
Vadsoe,92, 94
Yardoe,92,94
Novaya Zemlya Island, 64
Novgorod,98,102
r-ovgorodov,N., 34
Novosibirsk,106
Novozlatopol National District, 172
Nyasaland,309
Nystad,treatyof (1721),89
Ochemchiri,237
Odessa,125
oil:
Azerbaidzhan, 20, 238, 24A3
Bashkiria,45*6
Chechenia,188
Georgia,231
Crozny oilfields,188
Komi Republic,57
Kazakhstan,263,267
Ukraine, Western,137
Uzbekistan,278
Oirors, 37
Oistrakh, D., 179
Oktyabrsk,45-6
'OId Believers',
4
Old Bolsheviks,164-5,229
Olenogorskoye,94
Onega,Lake, 100
Omsk, 255-6
Omsk Province,Germancollective
farms, 76
Oranienbaum,90
Orazov,Ak Murad, 293
Ordzhonikidze,
189
Ordzhonikidze,Grigory Konstantinovich (Sergo),8, 90, 23G-l
Orozaliev,K.,2734
Orel Province,120
Orenburg:seeChkalov
Orii, Israel,213
Ormon Khan, 274
Orthodox Church, persecutedsects,4;
Sovietcampaignagainst,18,52; Baltic
States,104;new Sovietapproach,167;
Uniatesforced to join, 14O-l

330

INDEX

Osel Island: seeSaaremaaIsland

C)ssetin
Autonomous Province,
Southern,19l
OssetinA.S.S.R.,Northern, 183. 191-3
Ossetins,
37, 183,191-3,236,248
'Ozet' (Societyfor the agriculturalsettlement of Jewishtoilcrs),I7l-2, I75
Pakistan:seeIndia and Pakistan
Palestine,
165,178,196,307,309-10
Pamir,255,283-4
Pan-Iranianism,244-5, 286, 290
Pan-Turkism,18, 244, 294
Panch,P., 144
Pdrnu,112
Pasternak,Boris L., 179
Pechenga:seePetsano
Pechoraregion, 57-8
Peipus.Lake, 106,109
Persia:
Armeniansin, 212-3, 218-9
AsterabadProvince,292
Assyriansin, 250
Azerbaidzhan,219, 246-7, 292
Baluchistan,
298
Karun river, 2[J7
Khorazan Province,292*3
Kurds in, 250-2
Literature,Sovietinterpretationof,
245-6,286-7
Sovietpolicy,245-7,25U2, 258-9,282,
28s-7, 292-3, 298, 306
Turkmeniansin, 259
Pcrvomaisky,Leonid, 168
Peterthe Great. 2, 4, 38, 44, 82, 89-90,
92-3, t02, 104-6,128, 152, 186,194,
2t3, 224, 237-8, 246
Peterhof, 90
Petrovsk:seeMakhach Kala
Petrovsky,Gr.igoryIvanovich, 134
Petrozavodsk,90, 99-100
Petsamo,91-5, 317
Philippines,314
Pillau: seeBaltiisk
Pilsudsky,Marshal,116
Pionersk(formerly Neukuhren),I 20
Pogodin,Nikolay Petrovich,89
Pokrovsk:seeEngcls
Poland:
Continentalexpansionin Middle
Ages,2
Jewsin, 163
Sovietpolicy, 104, 135-7
Vilna, claim to, I I 1
Poles,8, 110-11,146-9,157.159
Byelorussia,in, 147-9, 157, 159
CommunistParty membership,8
Lithuania,in, evacuation,110;schools
and newspapers,1l0-11
S c h o o l s1, 1 0 - 1 1 1, 5 7

Ukraine. in. i46-9

Polesia,1-s9-60
Poltava,126
PoltavaProvince,126
Polyarnoye,94
Portugal,colonialpolicy,314
Postyshev,Pavel, 132-l
Potseluyevsky,
Prof. A., 29.1-5
Poynton,A. H., 308
Pravda, 1942 article on Russiansin the
army, 19; accusationsagainst Tartar
ideology, 39; criticismsof Ukrainian
C o m m u n i sP
t a r t y .l + 4 1a c r i o na g a i n s t
Byelorussian'Stsepuro
Affaire', 156;
Stalin's article on Daghestan(1920),
198
Pravdinsk(formerly Friedland),119
Pripet Marshes,159
ProvincesAutonomous,22-6
Prussia,East, 15, 118-20
Przhevalsk(formerly Karakol), 272
Przhevalsky,N. M., 272
Pugachov,Emelyan,42, 50
Pulatova.Nure. 252
Purges:seeTrials and purges
Pushkin,AlexanderS., 90, 138, l8l ,270,
319
Pushkino,138
Quazi Mohammed (Kurdish leader),
t<1

Radek,Karl 8., 165

Railways:
Kirov Railway Line (Murmansk Railway),91,98-100
Komi Republic,57-8
Mari sectopposition,52
Murmansk Railway: see Kirov Railway, above
Northern PechoraRailway Line, 57-8
Transcaucasianline from Baku to
Batum,238
Turksib, 265
Rakhimbayev,Abdullah, 289
Rakovsky,K. c., 128-9,132
Razin, Stenka,50, 237
Reindeer-breeding,
collectivizationin
Far North, 60-1
Religion:
Alphabeticreforms,aspectof, 34, 37
Anti-religious departmentof Society
for the Disseminationof Political
and ScientificKnowledge,18
Baltic States,104
Daghestani,197-9
Ingush,187-8
Karelians,97-8
Jews,165-7
Lcagueof Militant Godless,18. 166

331

INDEX

Religion: continued
Lithuanians, 104
Local religions, Soviet campaign
against,17-18,33,37
Mari national religion, 51-2
Mordvinians' national religion revival
attempt, 50
Ukraine. Western. Soviet interference
with Uniate Church, 141
Resettlementorganizations, 14-15, 99
Rhodesia, Northern, 3O9,312-3
Rhodesia,Southern,312-3
Riga, l14
Riga, Peaceof, 153
Rilsky, Maxim, 144
Rizenkampff,Prof.,290
Rogri Island (Pakrisaared),evacuation
ofEstonian Swedes,110
Roman Catholic Church, Lithuanians,
104; WesternByelorussians,160;
Western Ukraine, 140, 141
Rostov,146,183,249
'Rot Front' District, 74
Rothschilds,238,240
Rovno, 139
Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich,107
Rumania,129,137,139,150-1,218,
305-6
Runo Island (Ruhnu), evacuationof
EstonianSwedes,110
Rykov, Alexey Ivanovich,9-11, 18, 278
Ryskulov, Taras Ryskulovich, 272
Saadi(Persianpoet), 286
Saami(Lapps),95-6
SaamiNational District. 96
SaaremaaIsland, 89-90, 110, ll2
St. Petersburg:seeLeningrad
S a k h a l i n1. 5 . 3 1 3
Salekhard,62
Samarkand, 256, 2'15-6, 280, 289, 299,
307,312
Samoyeds:seeNentsy
Samursky,N., 199-200,202,204
Saratov.49. 74
Scandinavia,history, 88-9; Soviet ideology; Czarist r6gime, under, 89-92;
founding of St. Petersburg, 90-1;
building of Murmansk Railway, 91-2;
evolution of Murmansk Province,
93-5; Soviet policy towards Lapps,
95-6; significanceof Karelia, 97-102;
building ofStalin Canal, 100;annexation of Karelian Isthmus, 101-2
Scandinavianorigin of Russian State,
88-9
Sciences,Academy of: seeAcademy of
Sciences
Scythians,89
113
Semper,Johannes,

Semyonov-Tyanshanky,P. P., 270

Senchenko.I.. 144
Serbsin Ukraine, 125
Sevastopolsieges(1855and 1942),80-1
SevernayaZemlya,64
Shamil,Imam, 186, 197,2W-1
ShenShi-tsai,298
Shaskolsky,
l. P.,92
Shaumyan, Stepan, 239-40
Shchusev,A. V., 152
Shemakha,244
Shevchenko,Taras, 138
Shikhlinsky,Gen. A. 4..,245
Shiraz.286
Shirokogorov,S. M., 6l-2
Shiroky (Moldavian Communist), 150
Shirvani, Khagani,244
Shishkov,Vyacheslav,I 18
Shotemor (Tadzhik Communist), 289
Shumsky,Oleksandr,130, 131
Shuro Islamiya movement, 7
Siabandov,SamandAlievich, 252
Siberia,colonization,6, 13; lack of racial
prejudice, 6
Siberia,Central, 3l
Siberia,Eastern,22, 3l
Siberia,Northern, National Areas, 59
Siberia,Western,106-'7,126,255
Estonianand Latvian immigration, 106
KuznetskBasin: seeCoalminine:
Kuznetsk Basin
Ukrainians in, 126
Siberian Tartars. 6
Simbirsk: seeUlyanovsk
Sinkiang,268,29'7-8
Skobelev.Gen.. 192
Skrypnik, Mikola, 128-9, 132-3
Skvortsov,Nikolay, 11
Slepoy,Metropolitan, 141
Smolensk,106
| 64, 240
Socialist-Revolutionaries,
Societyfor the Disseminationof Political
and ScientificKnowledge,18
Sofronov,Anatoly, 284
Solovyov,SergeyMikhailovich, 89
Somalia,307
Soronbayev(Kirghiz Communist),273
Sovietsk(formerly Tilsit), 119
Spain,colonial policy, 314
Spinoza,Baruch, 167
:
Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich
plot, alleged,
Abkhazian assassination
237
Azerbaidzhan. views oru 242
Bashkir oil workers,letter to, 45
Central Asia, policy towards,258
Daghestan policy, proclamation on
autonomy (Nov. 1920), 197-8;
article in Pravda (OcL 1920), 198;
messageof allegiancefrom Moslenr

332

INDEX

Tadzhiks, 49, 189, 257, 259, 260, 278,

282-90.298
Tagirov, 4,. M.,44
Taimyr National Area, 61
Tallin, 112
Talyshi, 248
Tanganyika, 3 12-3
Tannenberg,Battle of (1410),109
Tartar-Bashkir Republic, 32-3
Tartar A.S.S.R.,3240
r65
Tartars (Kazan or Volga), 5, 8, 3243,
Nationalities policy, early, 9-ll, 32
47,91,242,308
Nizami, views on, 246
Crimean Tartars: seeCrimean Tartars
Ossetins,discussionswith (1925),191
Nogai Tartars: seeNogai Tartars
Persia, interest in, 246
Siberian Tartars: seeSiberian Tartars
Russianpeople,toast to (24 May 1945), T a r t u . 1 1 2
t9
Tashkent, 2W, 261-2, 275-6, 279, 281,
'Skrypnik affair', liquidation of, 132
290,298-9,307, 312
Tadzhikistan, policy towards, 283, 287 Tashkent Province, 296
Transcaucasia,policy in, 128-9, 2ll,
Tatishchev,V. N., 256
227-8,23r
Taty, 203
Tavrieli,T.M,247
Turkestan, statementon (1923), 258
Tbetl234
Ukraine, policy in, 128-9, l3+5
'feheran,247
Stalin Canal: seeBaltic-White SeaCanal
Temir-Khan-Shura: seeBuinaksk
Stalin Prizes, 2Ol, 235, 288
Temir Tau, 267
Stalinabad, 288-9,312
Temrluk Idarovich, 194
Stalindorf National District, 172
Teptyars, 42
Stalingrad, 74
Terijoki, 101
Stalino (formerly Yuzovka), 125, 127
Tevosyan,I. T., 12
Stalino Province, 127
Thaelmann District, 74
Stalsky, Suleiman, 204-5
Tiflis, 211, 224-7,229,236-7
Stavropol, 22, 190, 193, 214
Tigran the Great, 208
Stephenthe Great, 152
Tikhonov, Nikolay, 281
Stepnoy (formerly Elista), 85-6
Tilsit: seeSovietsk
Stolbovo,treaty of (1617),97
Timoshenko,Marshal, 152
Sudan,307
'Sukhorukovism', 50
Timur the Lame,256
Tiraspol, 150
Sukhum,237
Tokombayev,Aaly,273
Sultan-Galiyev,M., 33
Tolstoy, Count Alexey, 125
Sumgant,24l
Tolstoy, Count kon Nikolayevich,l8l,
Surkhan-Darya Province, 289
319
Suvorov,Gen.,38, 194
Tonga, 309
Sverdlov,Ya. M., 165,167
Topchibashev, Mirza D zhafar, 245
Svetlogorsk(formerly Rauschen),120
Toroshelidze,M., 230
Sweden:
Towns, new: seeUrbanization
Karelia, Western, under, 97-8
Trade Unions, lOth Congress(1949),28
King Charles XII, 89, 124
Transcaucasia,14, 3l, 17l, 208-52, 307
King Gustavus Adolphus II, 97-8
Transjordan,196
Lapps, Soviet policy, 96
Trebizond,235
Territories lost to Russia. 88-90
Trials and purges:
Swedesin Estonia, evacuation of, 110
Lbkhazia.237
Sydykov, Abdukerim, 272
'Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and
'Sydykovism',272
Trotskyites', I I
Syr Darya river,256,28l
Azerbaidzhan,243
Syria, Circassiansin, 196; Armenians in,
Bashkiria, zl4
218; Kurds in, 250
Birobidzhan Province. 177
Byelorussia,156
Tabasarans,203
Crimea. 79
Tabriz,247,25O,287
Daghestan, 199
Tadzhikistan, 22, 257, 2@, 282-90, 296

Stalint continued
dignatories (1923), 199
Georgia,policy towards, 165,225-31,
23G7
Jews,policy towards, 165-6, L74,179
Kalmuck poem on 60th birthday, 83-5
Karelian poem on, 103
Mari letter. 52-3
'Marxism and the National
Question',

JJJ

INDEX

Trials and purges.continued

Georgia,229-31
Glavsevmorput,64
Jews.165.177
Kazakhstan,265
Kirghizistan,272-3
Latvians, 107
Tadzhikistan,288-9
Tartaria,33
Turkmenistan,293-4
Ukraine.131.133-4
Uzbekistan,278
Volga German Republic,74
Trotsky,Leon,33, 165
'Isadasa.
Gamzat. 204-5
Tsarskoye,Selo,90
Tsitsianov,PrincePavelDimitrievich,
238
Tukay, Gabdullah,40
Tukhachevsky,Marshal, 107
Tumanyan,Ovanes,212
Tunisia.314.318
Turkestan:seeCentral Asia
Turkestan-SiberianRailwav: see Railways: Turksib
Turkey:
Arabic script, abolition of,34-5
Armenian claims, 220-l
Armenians in, 214-5, 217
Circassiansin, 196
Communist Party, Crimean Tartar
leadership,78
Crimean Republic as Soviet
propagandain, 78
CrimeanTartars,immigrationof, 76-8
Georgianclaims,234-5
Kars Province,221
Kurds in. 250.252
Soviet policy, 216-8, 220_1,233-5
Turkic Alphabet, Al1-Union Central
Committeefor the Nerv, 35
Turkic peoples,28,32-3,42, 78, 217,242,
247-8, 259, 275, 318
TurkishCeorgians:seeLazi
Turkish language,demandsfor creation
of, 78
Turkmanchai,treaty of (1828),214
Turkmenians,49, 91, 189, 257, 259-60,
275,2,18,284,291-6,308
Turkmenistan,29M, 298, 310
Turksib: seeRailways:Turksib
Tursun-zade,
Mirzo, 286-8
Tver: seeKalinin
Tychina, Pavel, 144
Tyutchev,F. I., 55
Udmurt A.S.S.R.,53-5
Udmurts, 37, 48, 53-5
Ufa. 43, 45,20O
Uganda, 309
JJ+

Ugro-Finnish peoples,28, 43,99

Uigurs, 296-8,313
Ukhta-Pechoraregion, 57-58
Ukraine, ll, 14, 20, 41, 12349, 152-3,
/Jl

Ukrainian InsurgentArmy: see

Banderovtsy
Ukrainians, 8-9, 78-9, 123,137-8, 142,
r49, 153,174, 190,196,260,264,267-8,
2',7
1, 288,291-2, 303,3 13,3 17
Communist Party membership, 8-9
Crimea, in, 78-9
Polish areas,repatriation from, 142
Ulyanov, I. N., 48
Ulyanovsk, Chuvashclaims,47
Umarov, Sultan, 261
UniateChurch,history,140;Sovietinterference,l4l
United Statesof America, colonization
by Europeans,1; Jewishimmigration,
I 63; Jews'contributiontowardsAutonomous Provinceof Birobidzhan,175
Armeniansin, 218
Alaska,314
Colonial policy, 3t4
HawaiianIslands,314
Puerto Rico, 314
Racial policy, 304
Virgin Islands,314
Universities:
Alma Ata, 26'l, 312
Ashkhabad,312
Baku, 312
British and Sovietcolonialuniversities
compared,3i2
Central Asiatic State,261,279-80
Samarkand,3l2
Stalinabad,3l2
Tashkent,312
Uzbek State,280
Urbanization:
Arctic towns foundcd, 63-4
Azerbaidzhan, 241
Bashkiria,45-6
Foundation of new towns (.191r--47),
14
Karelia, 99-100
Kazakhstan,267
Komi A.S.S.R.,58
Mari A.S.S.R.,53
Murmansk Province,93-4
Uzbekistan,278
Uruguay, 218
Uzbekistan, 2l-2, 209, 257, 260-1,
274-82, 296-7, 299
Uzbeks,8, 91, 257, 259-62.274-82, 281,
291,296
Uzun, Hadji Sheikh, 187

INDEX

Validov. Akhmed Zak-, 13

'Vaiidovism',43
Valikhanov,Chokhan, 270,272
Vandervelde,Emile, 226
Vares,Johannes,113
Varga,Prof, E. S., 315
Vasilkov (Ukrainian Communist), 136
Veli-Ibragimov,79
'Veli-Ibragimovism',79
Vepsiansin Karelia 99
Verhaeren,Emile, 113
Verny: seeAlma Ata
Viborg (Viipurt 101-2
Village Soviets: seeNational Village
Soviets
Vilna, 110-11, 116-'/, 160,222,276
Vinnitsa Province,126
Vipper, P. Y., 104
Vitebsk,106,126,155
Vladikavkaz:seeDzaudzhikau
Voguls:seeMansi
Volga German Republic,67,12-6
Volga Gennans,69-75
Volga Tartars: seeTartars
Volynsky, Artem, 213
Volobrinsky (Birobidzhan communist),
r77
Volzhsk, 53
Vorkuta, 58
'Vorkutugol' (coal trust), 57-8
Vorrnsi Islands,110, 112
Voronezh,126
VoronezhProvince.120
Vorontsov-Dashkov,Count, 215
VoroshilovgradProvince,127
Votyaks: seeUdmurts
Voytinsky, Vladimir, 226
Vurgun,Samed,.241-2

WachtangVI, King, 22.1

Waldheim, 175
Weitzmann.Chaim. 167
Werfel. Franz.22Vl
West Indies, 312-4
Yakovlev, I. Y., 48
Yakutia, 22
Yakuts, 308
Yamalo-NenetsNationalArea. 59-60.63
Yangi-Yul,278
Yanovsky, Y., 144
Yaroslavl,98
Yaroslavl Province,120
Yekaterinoslov:seeDniepropetrovsk
Yenukidze,Abel, 230-1
Yermolov,Gen., l8l, 185-6,189,225
Yermolayev,Col.,290
Youth League, Communist: see Communist Youth League
Yugoslavia,
YugoslavCommunists
conrpared with 'Borotbists', 130; nationalities' policy, 305-6
Yulayev, Salavat,42
Yusupov,Usman, 11,282
Yuzovka: seeStalino
Zankisov, Maj.-Gen. K., 192
Zeittn,22Vl
Zelenogradsk(Cranz), 120
Zelili (Turkmenianpoet), 293
Zelinsky,Prof. N. D., 152
Zhdanov: seeMariuool
Zhdanov,A. A.,91,-146
Zinoviev, G. E., 165
Zionism, Sovietpolicy, 165, 168,307
Zlatoust, 46
Zola, Emile, 113
Zyryans: seeKomi

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