Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
XXX
XXX
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17587
CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister
Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land
in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square
meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into
Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan
street on one side. In it are two residential houses with
entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah
Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters
lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a
Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong
had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the
property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the
owner of the entire property as her sister died with no
other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being
at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid,
she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only
companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8
maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened
now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who
had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the
trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts
for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at
the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the
rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of
the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also took care of the
payment; in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral
expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security
guard, and her household expenses.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Agreed what?
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went
with the contract just the same?
A She agreed first . . .
need not pass from one party to the other at the time a
contract is executed because the promise of one is the
consideration for the other.16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all
probability Justina Santos could not have intended to
part with her property while she was alive nor even to
lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it,
suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and
lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in
question, Atty. Alonzo:
The ambition of the old woman, before her death,
according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that
these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by
Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she
did not have any relatives, near or far, and she
considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her
grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was
when she would hear the children reciting prayers in
Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen
(17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and
she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong
Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of
the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of
adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng
might acquire Filipino citizenship; being the adopted
child of a Filipino citizen.18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff
Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted,
while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina
Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we
view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional
prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens. "The
illicit
purpose
then
becomes
the
19
illegal causa" rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is
necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they
reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection
what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a
lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is
an option giving an alien the right to buy real property
on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such
as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE X
2. This Agreement shall have no effect after 3 July
1974. It may be terminated by either the United States
or the Philippines at any time, upon not less than five
years' written notice. It the President of the United
States or the President of the Philippines determines
and proclaims that the other Country has adopted or
applied measures or practices which would operate to
nullify or impair any right or obligation provided for in
this Agreement, then the Agreement may be
terminated upon not less than six months' written
notice.
September 3, 2007
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
SO ORDERED.19
SO ORDERED.
PLANA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's
action for annulment of contract with damages.
In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a
1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan
Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein
respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children
Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan
and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.
Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one
of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized Filipino. Six
years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962,
his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate
with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was
alloted to Joaquin.
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against
the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for
alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of land to aliens.
LEE v. REPUBLIC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128195
October 3, 2001
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a petition for review
on certiorari of the decision1 of the court of appeals
nullifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City,
in Reconstitution case No. R-1928,2 pertaining to lot
398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr.,
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano,
Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal, and Jimmy, alll surnamed
Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, A Chinese citizen, a
parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631
square meters, designed as lot 398 and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the
corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.3
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the
Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the
heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery
of land.4 The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale
because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring ownership of private agriculture land,
including residential, commercial or industrial land.
Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27,
1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:
"granting the sale to be null and void and can not give
title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow
"JOSE O. ALOVERA
"Judge"16
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003
Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and
upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor
(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989,
while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot
(Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration
of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the
latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and
tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. 7 All
required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyns sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and
Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise
enter into contract with third parties with respect to
their Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner
Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement
of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property
for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental
ofP12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the
parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164584
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as
community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the
consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any
contract involving the property. Benjamins right over
the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts
findings that the property was purchased and improved
through funds provided by Benjamin. Although the
Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the
trial court refused to consider the alleged participation
of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily
because his signature appeared only on the last page
of the document and not on every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a
favorable decision. In its December 19, 2003
Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by
the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that if,
indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the
questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement
should have used the phrase "with my consent"
instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted
that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of
Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was
therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the
execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these
circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that
the contract was null and void having been entered
into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in
this petition for review on certiorari based on the
following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT
BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE
AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992.
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS CONSENT IS
REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO
HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED
HIS SIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE
AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES
PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE
8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE
AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO
CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC,
G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED
ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
MORAN, C.J.:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated
August 18, 1970, of the Court of Appeals, 1 rendered in
CA-G.R. No. 41318-R, entitled "Victoriano T. Cuenco,
Plaintiff-appellant, vs. Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de
Barsobia and Pacita W. Vallar, Defendants- appellees,
" declaring Victoriano T. Cuenco (now the respondent)
as the absolute owner of the coconut land in question.
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the
northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land
located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin,
Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province), with an
area of 29,150 square meters, more or less. 2
The entire land was owned previously by a certain
Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses
Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania
Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are
Filipino citizens.
On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa then a
widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong
King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00 (Exhibit "B"). Ong
King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits
thereof.
On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated
property to Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a
naturalized Filipino, for the sum of P5,000.00 (Exhibit
"A"). Respondent immediately took actual possession
and harvested the fruits therefrom.
On March 6, 1962, Epifania "usurped" the controverted
property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania (through her
only daughter and child, Emeteria Barsobia), sold a
one-half (1/2) portion of the land in question to Pacita
W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein (Exhibit "2").
NARVASA, J.:
The chief question presented in the appeal at bar
concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential
land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
The Trial Court's description of the factual background
is largely undisputed. The case principally concerns
Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who became a naturalized
Filipino citizen, taking his oath as such, on January
7,1977. 1 He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes
Uy Un.
The case involved three (3) parcels of land, which
were among those included in Land Registration
Cases Numbered 405 and 14817 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon Province: Lots Numbered 1 and 2,
plan Psu-57676, 2 and Lot No. 549 of plan AP-7521identical to Plan Psu-54565. 3 These were respectively
adjudicated in said land registration cases to two
persons, as follows:
1) Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, to the Spouses Benigno
Maosca and Julia Daguison (in Opposition No.
51 ); 4 and
2) Lot 549, AP-7521 (Psu-54565), to Gaspar Marquez,
married to Marcela Masaganda (in opposition No.
155). 5 However, no decree of confirmation and
registration was entered at the time.
Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, were sold by the
Maosca Spouses, to Gregorio Reyes Uy
30, 1934. 6 Lot 549, Psu-54565, was also
Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes
December 27, 1934. 7
owners, the
Un on Dec.
sold by the
Uy Un on
the
the
of
the
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action to rescind the sale of a parcel of land
together with the improvements erected thereon,
described in the complaint, which was sold by the
plaintiff to the defendant Li Seng Giap on 22 January
1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and
under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title
to lands. The case was decided upon the following
stipulation of facts:
III.
VIII.
IV.
That defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a
Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under Certificate of
Naturalization No. 515, the records of which were duly
reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in
Case No. R-603 dated May 24, 1946.
V.
IX.
That William Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino
citizen on November 1, 1948, under Certificate of
Naturalization No. 2 of the Court of First Instance of
Daet, Camarines Norte.
X.
That Sofia Lee Teehankee is a Filipino citizen being
married to Dr. Rafael Teehankee, a Filipino citizen.
XI.
I
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land
located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to private
respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee. The
latter, the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po, died in
January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in
October 1986. The said sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale written in English.
Subsequently, the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated September 2, 1947
in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the
administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong
Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo.
When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be
vacated because she was going to sell it.
Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said
premises.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993, which dismissed
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 2839192.
If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign
said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral
testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore,
she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the
plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she
apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was
executed. The Court does not believe that she was
present during the execution and signing of the deed
of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her
pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6, Records p.
414).
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax
receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale
(Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in their
possession, private respondent explained that she and
her husband entrusted said lot and building to
petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not
necessarily reflective of dominion, as even a mere
administrator or manager may lawfully perform them
pursuant to his appointment or employment (Rollo,
p. 10).
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the
name of private respondent and her husband. The
rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FRENZEL v. CATITO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143958
The Antecedents3
As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner, the
case at bar stemmed from the following factual
backdrop:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent. He is an electrical engineer by
profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea
Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started
engaging in business in the country two years
thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino
citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from
bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney,
Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a
night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met
Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada,
Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time
in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a
German national. She left Germany and tried her luck
in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as
a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. She was
fluent in German, and Alfred enjoyed talking with her.
The two saw each other again; this time Ederlina
ended up staying in Alfred's hotel for three days. Alfred
gave Ederlina sums of money for her services.4
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he
persuaded her to stop working at King's Cross, return
to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome
business of her own. He also proposed that they meet
in Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her
money for her plane fare to the Philippines. Within two
weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her.
Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the
Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her two
sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and
live with Ederlina. He returned to Australia and sold his
fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid for $7,500.00 on
May 4, 1984.10 He also sold his television and video
business in Papua New Guinea for K135,000.00 to
Tekeraoi Pty. Ltd.11 He had his personal properties
shipped to the Philippines and stored at No. 14
Fernandez Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in
Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch under
Bank Account No. 018-2-807016.12 When Alfred was in
Papua New Guinea selling his other properties, the
bank sent telegraphic letters updating him of his
account.13 Several checks were credited to his HSBC
bank account from Papua New Guinea Banking
Corporation, Westpac Bank of Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group Limited and Westpac BankPNG-Limited. Alfred also had a peso savings account
with HSBC, Manila, under Savings Account No. 01725-183-01.14
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong Kong,
they opened another account with HSBC, Kowloon,
this time in the name of Ederlina, under Savings
Account No. 018-0-807950.15 Alfred transferred his
deposits in Savings Account No. 018-2-807016 with
the said bank to this new account. Ederlina also
opened a savings account with the Bank of America
Kowloon Main Office under Account No. 30069016.16
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New
Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983
from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin,
Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina
had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a
blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus
stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's amorous
relationship, and discovered the same sometime in
November 1983 when he arrived in Manila. He also
begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her
to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build his
future on his (Klaus') misfortune.17
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close
friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there was any truth to
Klaus' statements and Sally confirmed that Klaus was
married to Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina,
she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed,
married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce
Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue
the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of
33
...
5. That defendant made no contribution at all to the
acquisition, of the above-mentioned properties as all
the monies (sic) used in acquiring said properties
belonged solely to plaintiff;36
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered
in his favor:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor
of plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the
corresponding deeds of transfer and/or conveyances
in favor of plaintiff over those real and personal
properties enumerated in Paragraph 4 of this
complaint;
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all
the above real and personal properties or their money
value, which are in defendant's name and custody
because these were acquired solely with plaintiffs
money and resources during the duration of the
common-law relationship between plaintiff and
defendant, the description of which are as follows:
I. Real Properties
SO ORDERED.44
and
Yes, sir.
A.
Ederlina Catito because I was informed being
not a Filipino, I cannot own the property. (tsn, p. 11,
August 27, 1986).
Q
Would you tell us who is that particular person
you are married since 1976?
xxx
COURT:
Q.
So you understand that you are a foreigner
that you cannot buy land in the Philippines?
In Australia.
xxx
xxx
A.
That is correct but as she would eventually be
my wife that would be owned by us later on. (tsn, p. 5,
September 3, 1986)
xxx
Q.
xxx
xxx
Q
You were only separated, in fact, but not legally
separated?
A.
She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos
to buy property.
Q.
Q
Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who
became an Australian citizen?
A
Thru my counsel in Australia I filed a separation
case.
Q
A:
I said thank you very much for the property I
bought because I gave you a lot of money (tsn., p.
14,ibid).
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a
non-citizen of the Philippines, he was disqualified from
validly purchasing any land within the country.61
The petitioner's claim that he acquired the subject
properties because of his desire to marry the
respondent, believing that both of them would
thereafter jointly own the said properties, is belied by
his own evidence. It is merely an afterthought to
salvage a lost cause. The petitioner admitted on crossexamination that he was all along legally married to
Teresita Santos Frenzel, while he was having an
amorous relationship with the respondent:
ATTY. YAP:
Q
When you were asked to identify yourself on
direct examination you claimed before this Honorable
Court that your status is that of being married, do you
confirm that?
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the
February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification
the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and
respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August
13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and
the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make
any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed
for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over
the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the
house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing
in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is
hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land
and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction
of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting
therefrom the amount respondent spent for the
preservation, maintenance and development of the
aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost
of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house
and lot in the event respondent does not have the
means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own
money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the
petitioner of the cost of the land and the house
deducting the expenses for its maintenance and
preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be
profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the
equity each has over the property. The case is
REMANDED to the lower court for reception of
evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents
for the preservation and maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the
following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS
WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
xxxx
YAP v. GRAJEDA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31606
xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED.
XXX
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