Power and Interdependence Revisited

Power and Interdependence by Robert O. Keohane; Joseph S. Nye,

International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 725-753
Published by: The MIT Press
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revisited
Powerand Interdependence

Robert0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye, Jr.

1Thepassageofa
Ten yearsago we publishedPowerandInterdependence.
timeto rereadand reevaluatethatbook,
decademakesthisan appropriate
In doing
to whichitcontributed.
and to takestockoftheresearchprogram
ofthepoliticsof
understanding
this,we hopeto deepenandenrichscholarly
forthe fieldof
on directions
and to stimulatereflection
interdependence
international
relationsoverthenextdecade.2
opportunegiventhe changesin
Such a reappraisalseems particularly
worldpolitics,and especiallyin Americanpolicy,thathave markedthe
in 1979thattheauthors
intervening
years.StanleyJ. Michalakcommented
maywell
"may cringefromthe analogybutPowerand Interdependence
becomethePoliticsAmongNationsofthe1970s."3Butfromtheperspective
ofthelate 1980s,theworldmaylookdifferent:
whilethe1970swereseenas
thedecadeofinterdependence,
manyobserversregardtheuse offorceand
concernforsecurity
ofthe1980s.Indeed,theviewis wideas characteristic
spreadin some circlesthatthe 1980sresemblethe 1950smorethanthe
workis morerelevantto contempo1970s,and thatHans J. Morgenthau's

raryissues of world politics thanPower and Interdependence.

on earlierversionsofthispaperto DavidA. Baldwin,

We aregrateful
forwritten
comments
JamesA. Caporaso,AlexanderL. George,ErnstB. Haas, StephanHaggard,StanleyHoffStephenKrasner,DavidLaitin,HelenMilmann,HaroldK. Jacobson,PeterJ. Katzenstein,
ner, Andy Moravcsik,M. J. Peterson,Steve Solnick,and an anonymousreviewerfor
forWarand
to members
of theInstitute
International
and fororalcomments
Organization;
relationsfieldseminar,Harvard
and theinternational
Peace Studies,ColumbiaUniversity,
University,
spring1987.
1. Boston:Little,Brown,1977.
2. Raymond
thisevaluativeprocessbylookingback
Vernon,alwaysa pioneer,exemplified
he respondedto
at Bay, tenyearsafterits publication;
at his important
book, Sovereignty
at Bay Ten Years After,"Internaand addedhis own. See Vernon,"Sovereignty
criticisms
tional Organization35 (Summer 1981), pp. 517-30. In a recent special issue of International

StudiesNotes 12 (Spring1986),JamesN. Rosenau,KennethE. Boulding,JohnH. Herz,

on theirwork.
WilliamT. R. Fox, and RobertC. Northalso reflected
InterdeInternational
forUnderstanding
3. StanleyJ.Michalak,"TheoreticalPerspectives
pendence,"WorldPolitics32 (October1979),p. 150.
InternationalOrganization41, 4, Autumn1987

? 1987bytheWorldPeace Foundation
andtheMassachusetts
Institute
ofTechnology

Organization
726 International
Duringthe 1970s,Americanswere reactingagainstthe VietnamWar;
ofthenucleararmsrace;oil crises
detenteseemedto reducetheimportance
and the collapse of the BrettonWoods systemof peggedexchangerates
fundamental
shifts
intheworldpoliticaleconomy.A represeemedtoreflect
was that"theforcesnowascensentative
viewamong"modernist"writers
dent appear to be leaningtowarda global societywithouta dominant
in whichnation-states,
structure
of cooperationand conflict-apolyarchy
special interestsand communities
subnationalgroups,and transnational
and conflicts
wouldall be vyingforthesupportand loyaltyofindividuals,
in a
on thebasis of ad hoc bargaining
wouldhave to be resolvedprimarily
4
shifting
contextofpowerrelationships."
Bythe1980sthemoodintheUnitedStateshadchanged,undertheimpact
theseizureofhostagesbyIran,anda
oftheSovietinvasionofAfghanistan,
forces.Americanpolicyfocusedon
build-upof Sovietstrategic
continuing
ratherthanon North-South
issuesand theactiviEast-Westconfrontation
the deUnderthe Reaganadministration,
institutions.
ties of multilateral
yearsforthe firsttimesince the
fensebudgetincreasedforfivestraight
beginning
of theCold War,and theUnitedStateswas morewillingto use
weak statessuchas Grenada
military
force,albeitagainstsuch extremely
ofnuclear
andthemodernization
andLibya.Armscontrolwas downgraded
forceswas accelerated.
Yet thedifferences
betweenthe 1970sand 1980scan easilybe exaggerand ecoand moodhave changedfarmorethanmilitary
ated. Psychology
of economicproduction
nomicindicesof powerresources.The diffusion
as measuredbysharesinworldtradeorworldproduct.Sensitivity
continues
in financeand tradecontinuesto increase,althoughvulinterdependence
marnerability
to supplyshockshas eased in a periodof slackcommodity
therelationsbetweenthe
kets. Moreover,despitesome of theirrhetoric,
do not show a returnto theCold War period.Not onlyare
superpowers
on
allianceslooser,butthereare morecontactsbetweenthesuperpowers
theanalyarmscontrolanda varietyofotherissues.In ourview,therefore,
inPowerandInterdependence
hasnotbeenrendered
sisthatwe putforward
by events.The real questionsare not aboutobsolescence,but
irrelevant
aboutanalyticalcogency.
themes
The firstsectionofthisarticleexaminesthethreemostimportant
theideal
betweenpowerandinterdependence,
ofthebook: therelationship
of changesin internaand explanations
typeof complexinterdependence,
tionalregimes.In thesecondsection,we critiqueourconceptsandtheories,
for
and examinewhichelementsof our argument
have been mostfruitful
laterwork.The thirdand fourthsectionsraise questionsaboutconcepts,
suchas thoseof "systemicpoliticalprocess" and "learning,"thatwe did
D.C.: Brookings
Institution,
4. SeyomBrown,New Forcesin WorldPolitics(Washington,
1974),p. 186.

Powerand independence727
but whichwe think
not explicateclearlyin Power and Interdependence
directions
forfutureresearch.
suggestfruitful
1. PrincipalthemesofPower and Interdependence
"politicalrealism"withaccepwe identified
In Powerand Interdependence
tanceoftheviewthatstatebehavioris "dominatedby theconstantdanger
ofmilitary
andwe arguedthat"duringthe1960s,manyotherwise
conflict,"
keenobserverswhoacceptedrealistapproacheswereslowto perceivethe
conof new issues thatdid not centeron military-security
development
Relations
cerns"(p. 5). As we haddoneinoureditedvolume,Transnational
of "today'smultidimenand WorldPolitics,5we pointedto theimportance
(p. 4). Yet Power
sionaleconomic,social and ecologicalinterdependence"
or
tonefromthatofourearlierwritings,
andInterdependence
hada different
writWe criticized
modernist
ofpopularizers
ofeconomicinterdependence.
state,whichhas been
ers who "see our era as one in whichtheterritorial
sincefeudaltimesended...
dominant
inworldpoliticsforthefourcenturies
actorssuchas multinational
corporations,
is beingeclipsedbynon-territorial
(p. 3). In
organizations"
and international
social movements,
transnational
ourview,to exchangerealism"foran equallysimpleview-for instance,
benignthatmilitary
forceis obsolete and economicinterdependence
errors"(p. 5).
wouldcondemnone to equallygrave,thoughdifferent,
costlyfor
We did arguethatthe use of forcehas becomeincreasingly
risksofnuclearescalation;resismajorstatesas a resultoffourconditions:
tancebypeoplein pooror weakcountries;
andpossiblynegative
uncertain
of economicgoals; and domesticopinionopeffectson the achievement
posed to thehumancosts of theuse of force.But we also notedthatthe
or authoritafourth
hadlittleimpacton thepoliciesoftotalitarian
condition
riangovernments,
and we warnedthat"lesser statesinvolvedin regional
groupsmayfindit easierto use forcethan
rivalriesand nonstateterrorist
trendsintheroleofforceis toerode
before.The neteffect
ofthesecontrary
based on military
power"(p. 228).
hierarchy
we madeaboutsyswe thinkthatthegeneralargument
Upon rereading,
of
temicconstraints
on theuse offorcehas heldup ratherwell.The utility
ofattackby others.
limitedto deterrence
nuclearforceremainsprincipally
on the
The social mobilization
of populationshas acted as a constraint
and
in Afghanistan
as boththefailureof Sovietintervention
superpowers,
theweaknessof theAmericanresponseto Iran's takingof hostageshave
despiteits
indicated.Even in CentralAmerica,theReaganadministration,
U.S. ground
has beencautiousaboutintroducing
ideologicalcommitments,
5. Robert0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye, eds., TransnationalRelations and WorldPolitics.

HarvardUniversity
Press,1972).
(Cambridge:

728 International
Organization
oftheEisenhower
lowcostandeffectiveness
forces.Comparetherelatively
in Iran (1953),Guatemala(1954),and Lebaadministration's
interventions
encountered
bytheUnitedStates
non(1958)withthemorerecentdifficulties
the1980s.Theuse offorceagainsta
inIran,Nicaragua,andLebanonduring
of Grenadaand the limitedair
narrowlybased regimein the mini-state
strikesagainstLibya are the apparentexceptionsthatprove the rule:
Grenadawas virtually
powerless,and againstLibya, the UnitedStates
of groundtroops.Furthermore,
theuse of forceby
avoidedcommitment
has conformed
toourdescription,
andtheeffecsmallerstatesandterrorists
has beenquitelimited.
tivenessofAmericanuses offorceagainstterrorism
forcelaidthebasis
aboutconstraints
on theuse ofmilitary
Ourargument
Thisanalysis
forouranalysisof thepoliticsofeconomicinterdependence.
containedthreeprincipalthemes,whichwe did not explicitly
distinguish
fromone another:
draw1. A power-oriented
analysisofthepoliticsofinterdependence,
ingon bargaining
theory;
2. An analysisof an ideal typethatwe called "complexinterdependence" and oftheimpactoftheprocessesthatit encompassed;
to explainchangesin international
regimes-whichwe
3. An attempt
definedas "sets ofgoverning
arrangements
thataffectrelationships
of interdependence"
(p. 19).
is developedin chapter1, whichlinks
Our analysisof interdependence
interdepentheconceptofasymmetrical
interdependence
to powerthrough
we
dence as a powerresource."It is asymmetries
in interdependence,"
foractorsin
wrote,"thatare mostlikelyto providesourcesof influence
theirdealingswithone another"(pp. 10-11,italicsin original).This coninterdependence
is a sourceofpower,can be found
cept,thatasymmetrical
clearlyin AlbertHirschman's National Power and the Structureof Foreign

Trade,6as well as in KennethWaltz's articleon "The Mythof National

Interdependence."7
Ouranalysislinkedrealistand neorealistanalysisto concernsofliberals
withinterdependence.
to
realisttheory
as an alternative
Ratherthanviewing
liberal"interdependence
theory,"we regardedthetwoas necessarycomjustified,in our
plementsto one another.This approachwas analytically
bothhave theirrootsin a utilitarian
view,because realismand liberalism
by
actorspursuetheirowninterests
viewoftheworld,in whichindividual
to incentives.
Bothdoctrines
viewpoliticsas a processofpolitresponding
bybargaining.
Broadlyspeaking,
icalandeconomicexchange,characterized
6. AlbertHirschman,National Power and theStructureofForeign Trade (Berkeley:Univer-

sityofCalifornia
Press,1945).
Mass.: MIT
7. In CharlesKindleberger,
ed., TheInternational
Corporation
(Cambridge,
Press,1970).

Powerand independence729
thatmost
withthe assumption
bothrealismand liberalismare consistent
as rational,or at leastintelligent,
statebehaviorcan be interpreted
activity.
paradigms
are therefore
nottwo incommensurable
Realismand liberalism
withdifferent
conceptionsofthenatureofpoliticalaction.8
Nevertheless,
realistand liberaltheoryare in severalrespectssharplyat
disputefocusesespeciallyon the
oddswithone another.The realist-liberal
goals of actorsin worldpoliticsand on the natureof theirenvironment.
andthedangers
Realismemphasizesstates'demandsforpowerandsecurity
forrealism,themostimporforceis therefore,
to states'survival.Military
on their
tantpowerresourcein worldpolitics.Statesmustrelyultimately
own resourcesand muststriveto maintaintheirrelativepositionsin the
system,evenat higheconomiccost. Liberalismalso examinesstateaction
ecoto othergroupsas well. For liberalthinkers,
butdirectsits attention
Among
for
security.
as
well
as
concerns
are
important
nomicincentives
the
expanding
threatsmaybe insignificant,
republics,at anyrate,military
the
the
of
force
and
role
potentialarea forcooperationand reducingboth
in
the
international
their
relative
power
positions
place
on
emphasisstates
system.
was deliberately
The discussionofrealisminPowerandInterdependence
thanin
therealisttradition
indescribing
We wereless interested
incomplete.
andassessingtheirrelevancefor
examining
someofitscentralassumptions
Some reviewerstookus to
theanalysisofthepoliticsof interdependence.
to applyold approachesor
taskfor,in K. J. Holsti'swords,"attempting
"setting
modelstoareasforwhichtheywereneverintended,"andtherefore
thatour "strawmanmay
up strawmen." StanleyJ. Michalakcommented
wellbe 'parsimonious'
andeasytotest,butithas littletodo withrealism."9
Liberalismas a traditional
althoughour
theoryescaped mentionentirely:
theory,whichsharedkey
analysiswas clearlyrootedin interdependence
to locate ourselveswith
we made no effort
withliberalism,
assumptions
we wereseekingin
As we nowsee thematter,
respecttotheliberaltradition.
strandofliberalism
thathad beendevelpartto broadentheneofunctional
opedby ErnstB. Haas and othersinthe1950sand 1960s,butthathadbeen
a version
We presented
integration.
totheanalysisofregional
largelylimited
different
terms,see K. J.
8. Fora recentanalysisthatmakesthispointwell,usingsomewhat

Holsti, The DividingDiscipline: Hegemonyand Diversityin InternationalTheory(Winchester,

Mass.: Allen& Unwin,1985).

32 (Spring
Politics?"International
Organization
9. K. J. Holsti,"A New International
Perspectives,"
p. 148.Fora meaculpaanda systematic
1978),p. 525;Michalak,"Theoretical
see Robert0. Keohane,"Theoryof
to articulate
realistand neorealist
assumptions,
attempt
Realismand Beyond,"in Ada Finifter,
WorldPolitics:Structural
ed., PoliticalScience:The
D.C.: American
PoliticalScienceAssociation,
StateoftheDiscipline(Washington,
1983),pp.
in Robert0. Keohane,Neorealismand its Critics(New York:Columbia
503-40,reprinted
UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 158-203. Keohane's latervolume,AfterHegemony: Cooperation
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,

liberal
seeksto builda theoryofinstitutions,
withwhatcouldbe considered
1984),explicitly
withthoseofpoliticalrealism.
on premisesthatare consistent
implications,

Organization
730 International
arguments
andthattookthedistribuofthattheorythatavoidedteleological
power,economicpower,and the role of statesfullyinto
tionof military
account.'0If we had beenmoreexplicitaboutlocatingourviewsinrelation
we mighthave avoidedsome
of realismand liberalism,
to the traditions
subsequentconfusion.
sinceit
generatesclassicproblemsofpoliticalstrategy,
Interdependence
actors,willimnon-state
impliesthattheactionsof states,and significant
pose costs on othermembersof the system.These affectedactorswill
to avoidhaving
iftheyhavethecapacity,in an attempt
respondpolitically,
policystandforceduponthem.Fromtheforeign
theburdensofadjustment
is how to benefitfrom
point,the problemfacingindividualgovernments
as muchautonomyas possible.
international
exchangewhilemaintaining
system,theproblemis how to
Fromthe perspectiveof the international
beneficialpatternof cooperationin the
generateand maintaina mutually
actors)to
(and nongovernmental
by governments
faceofcompeting
efforts
thesystemfortheirownbenefit."
manipulate
we emphasizedthatinterdeIn analyzing
thepoliticsofinterdependence,
lead tocooperation,
nordidwe assumethat
pendencewouldnotnecessarily
be benignin otherrespects.The key
itsconsequenceswouldautomatically
madepowerobsolete-farfromit-but
pointwas notthatinterdependence
ofpotential
powerresources
thatpatterns
ofinterdependence
and patterns
in a givenissue-areaare closelyrelated-indeed,twosidesofa singlecoin.
sideby
Thuswe soughtnotmerelyto place realistand liberalperspectives
analysis.As David Baldwin
in an integrated
side,butto linkthemtogether
laterobserved,"it shouldnotbe necessaryto developa separatetheoryto
covereach issue-areaofinternational
exchangerelations."12
in chapter2,
introduced
The conceptof "complexinterdependence,"
analysisofinterdependence
reflected
withthebargaining
ourdissatisfaction
to
ofregionalintegration
fromtheories
toaddinsights
alone,andourattempt
to recognizethat"complex
its spare realistassumptions.It is important
from"interdepenas used in chapter2, is verydifferent
interdependence,"
is a verybroadtermthat
dence," as used in chapter1. "Interdependence"
or
amongcountries
byreciprocaleffects
refersto "situationscharacterized
countries"(p. 8). It is as applicabletothepoliticalamongactorsindifferent
theoryand theoriesofinterde10. For ouraccountoftheconnections
betweenintegration
inFredI. GreensandIntegration,"
Interdependence
pendence,see ourarticle,"International
teinand Nelson W. Polsby,eds., Handbookof PoliticalScience,vol. 8 (Reading,Mass.:
was equally
integration
Addison-Wesley,
1975),pp. 363-414.KarlDeutsch'sworkon regional
to thefieldas Haas's; although
we discussbothinour1975article,ourownanalysis
important
owes a greater
debtto Haas's neofunctionalism.
does nothavea problem
11. In contrast
to thisposition,
Holstiassertsthatinterdependence
focus:"The factofinterdependence,"
he says,"has to lead to a problembeforeit warrants
seriousattention,
just as concernwithwar,peace,orderandpowerled to ourfieldcenturies
ago." (Holsti, The DividingDiscipline, p. 47).

andPower:A Conceptual
Analysis,"International
12. DavidA. Baldwin,"Interdependence

Organization34 (Fall 1980), pp. 471-596.

Powerand independence731
betweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesas
interdependence
military
and Italy.
betweenGermany
interdependence
itis to thepolitical-economic
is an ideal typeof international
by contrast,
"Complexinterdependence,"
witha "realist"idealtypethat
constructed
to contrast
system,deliberately
aboutthenatureofinternawe outlinedon thebasis ofrealistassumptions
amonga numrefersto a situation
tionalpolitics.Complexinterdependence
berofcountries
inwhichmultiple
channelsofcontactconnectsocieties(that
ofissues;
is, statesdo notmonopolizethesecontacts);thereis no hierarchy
forceis notused bygovernments
towardsone another(pp. 24andmilitary
25). We beginchapter2 by statingthat"we do notargue... thatcomplex
worldpoliticalreality.Quitethecontrary;
faithfully
reflects
interdependence
willfallsomeareidealtypes.Mostsituations
bothitandtherealistportrait
wherebetweenthesetwoextremes."
at
Like thefrequently
packages,ourwarning
ignoredlabelson cigarette
thebeginning
ofchapter2 was forgotten
bya number
ofreaders,whotreated
of
as ifit wereourdescription
ourdiscussionof complexinterdependence
one. For inthereal worldratherthanour construction
of a hypothetical
theorists
withtheclaim
stance,RobertArt'sassociationofinterdependence
aredeeplyentangled
withanother's
thata "nationwhoseeconomicinterests
cannot use force . . . interestsintertwinedrender force unusable

. .

intheliberaltradition,
butnotus.13On thecontrary,
sometheorists
portrays
that
inchapter1 we arguedthat"it mustalwaysbe keptinmindfurthermore
militarypower dominateseconomic power . . . yet exercisingmore domi-

nantformsofpowerbringshighercosts.Thus,relativeto cost,thereis no
thatmilitary
thaneconomicones to
meanswillbe moreeffective
guarantee
achievea givenpurpose" (pp. 16-17). J. MartinRochesterassociatesus
witha "globalist"or "modernist"view,even thoughwe declaredat the
nor
that"neitherthemodernists
ofPowerand Interdependence
,beginning
thepoliforunderstanding
thetraditionalists
have an adequateframework
ticsofinterdependence"
position,we
(p. 4).14In contrastto themodernist
disavowedtheviewthatcomplexinterdependence
thewaveof
is necessarily
thefuture(pp. 226-29). Indeed,althoughwe beganourresearchon Power
oftransnational
relatheimportance
andInterdependence
largelytoconfirm
tions,as discussed in TransnationalRelations and WorldPolitics,our inves-

judgment.
tigations
produceda muchmorequalified
inworld
treatsall realsituations
Chapter2 ofPowerandInterdependence
betweenthe ideal typesof
politicsas fallingsomewhereon a continuum
Thus our emphasisin chapter2 is
realismand complexinterdependence.
Security
4 (Spring1980),
Power?"International
13. RobertJ.Art,"To WhatEndsMilitary
acknowledging
in print
however,forforthrightly
pp. 16-17.Prof.Artshouldbe commended,
thathe had misinterpreted
Security
4 (Fall 1980),p. 189.
ourviews.International
Organization
as a Field of
14 J. MartinRochester,"The Rise and Fall of International
mistake
occurs
1986),note52,p. 792.A similar
Organization
40 (Autumn
Study,"International

in Ray Maghrooriand BennettRamberg,eds., Globalism VersusRealism: InternationalRela-

tions'ThirdDebate (Boulder:WestviewPress,1982).

Organization
732 International
fromthatin chapter1. Insteadofseekingto explainbargainquitedifferent
we ask
interdependence,
intermsofasymmetrical
ingoutcomesstructurally
interdependence
on therealism-complex
thelocationofa situation
whether
continuum
can helpaccountforthepoliticalprocessesthatwe observe.The
chapter2 is
lineagesofthetwochaptersare also quitedifferent:
theoretical
moreindebtedto liberaltheoryin general,and theoriesofregionalintegration in particular,thanchapter1, whichrelieson a modifiedneorealist
theory,our discussionof complexinterdepenanalysis.Like integration
and transgovernmental
as wellas interstate
dencefocuseson transnational
ofpoliticalprocesses
anditseeksto examinehowcertainpatterns
relations,
to acexplanation
affectactorbehaviorratherthanto employa structural
countforaction.
concernsinternaThe thirdmajorthemeofPowerand Interdependence
arrangements
tionalregimes,whichwe definein chapter1 as "governing
(p. 19).Ourconceptofinternaofinterdependence"
thataffect
relationships
tionalregimeswas indebtedto theworkof JohnRuggie,who definedregenerallyagreed-torules,
gimesin 1975as "sets of mutualexpectations,
energiesand
andplans,inaccordancewithwhichorganizational
regulations
are allocated."'15Despite a claimmade by Susan
financialcommitments
in
didnotinventthisconcept:ithas a longhistory
Strange,socialscientists
international
law.16
elaboratesour conceptionof
Chapter3 of Power and Interdependence
modelswhichpurinternational
regimesand offersfourroughly-sketched
portto accountforchangesinthoseregimes.One modelrelieson economic
one uses overallpowerstrucandtechnological
change.Two are structural:
ofpowerwithin
tureto predictoutcomes,theotherrelieson thedistribution
ConceptsandTrends,"
15. JohnGerardRuggie,"International
Responsesto Technology:

InternationalOrganization 29 (Summer 1975), p. 569; see also Richard N. Cooper, "Pro-

29
Organization
Monetary
System,"International
legomenato theChoiceofan International
citestheworksby Ruggieand Cooperon
(Winter1975),p. 64. Powerand Interdependence
p. 20.
16. Susan Strange,"Cave! Hic Dragones:A Critiqueof RegimeAnalysis,"International
in StephenD. Krasner,ed., International
Regimes
36 (Spring1982),reprinted
Organization
Press,1983),wherethisclaimis madeon p. 344.For early
(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
see Fernandde Visscher,Le RegimeNouveaudes Detroits,
uses of theregimeterminology,
(Brussels: 1924), in Extraitde la Re'vue de Droit internationaleet de Legislation compar6e

International
Law, 5thed. (New York:Longmans,Green,
(1924),nos. 1-2; L. Oppenheim,
andtheElbe
forLuxembourg
vol. 1,pp. 207,366,on regimes
1937;editedbyH. Lauterpacht),
Mass.: D. C. Heath:
Regulatory
Regimes(Lexington,
River;David M. Leive, International
JournalofInternaofarticlesin theAmerican
Books, 1976),2 vols.; anda variety
Lexington
L. Butler,"The LegalRegimeofRussianTerritorial
Waters,"
tionalLaw, including:
1) William
vol. 62 (1968),pp. 51-77;2) RichardYoung,"The LegalRegimeoftheDeep-SeaFloor,"vol.
A NewRegime
andImmunities:
62 (1968),pp. 641-53;3) Leo J.Harris,"DiplomaticPrivileges
is Soon to be Adoptedby the UnitedStates," vol. 62 (1968),pp. 98-113; 4) W. Michael
Riesman,"The Regimeof Straitsand NationalSecurity,"vol. 74 (1980),pp. 48-76; 5) John
ontheLaw of
NortonMoore,"The RegimeofStraitsandtheThirdUnitedNationsConference
theSea," vol. 74 (1980),pp. 77-121.

Powerand independence733
model,"in which
organization
is an "international
issue-areas.The fourth
indepenare important,
norms,and institutions
of relationships,
networks
regimechange.
dentfactorshelpingto explaininternational
are to somedegreedisThe threethemesofPowerand Interdependence
can be analyzedpoliticallywithoutendorsingthe
tinct.Interdependence
regimes;andtheconorinternational
conceptsofcomplexinterdependence
regimesdoes notdependforits validityon accepting
ceptof international
ofreality.Yet we sought
as a usefulsimplification
complexinterdependence
we arguedthattheexplantorelateourthemestoone another.In particular,
theoriesofregimechangewouldbe lower
atorypowerofoverallstructure
thanunderrealistconditions
ofcomplexinterdependence
underconditions
was to someextent"decompossinceourargument
(p. 161).Nevertheless,
thatsomepartsof it fared
able" intoits parts,it shouldnotbe surprising
betterin thelaterscholarlydiscussionthanothers.
2. The researchprogramof Powerand Interdependence:
a critique
realismand liberalwe soughtto integrate
In Powerand Interdependence,
whichfocusedon bargaining.
ismbyusinga conceptionofinterdependence
force
oftherealitiesofpower,butdidnotregardmilitary
We werecognizant
andrelativeposition
as thechiefsourceofpower,nordidwe regardsecurity
in viewofourearlierworkon
goals of states.Ironically,
as theoverriding
analysisin Powerand
relations,the resultof our synthetic
transnational
and of subsequentwork such as Keohane's After
Interdependence,
Hegemony,has been to broadenneorealismand provideit withnew conframework
theoretical
a coherentalternative
ceptsratherthanto articulate
forthestudyofworldpolitics.OfthethemesdiscussedinSection1 thoseof
werebothmostcompatandinternational
regimes
interdependence
strategic
developedin Powerand Interdepeniblewithrealismand mostthoroughly
remaineda relatively
dence and later work. Complexinterdependence
and undervalued
concept.
underdeveloped
Interdependenceand bargaining

in
we emphasizedthatasymmetries
In our analysisof interdependence,
in worldpolitics:"Militarypower
remainimportant
vulnerability
military
dominateseconomicpowerin the sense thateconomicmeansalone are
force" (p. 16).
againstthe serioususe of military
likelyto be ineffective
forcewas rising,
sincein ourviewthecost ofusingmilitary
Nevertheless,
thanecomeanswillbe moreeffective
"thereis no guaranteethatmilitary
nomicones to achievea givenpurpose"(p. 17).

Organization
734 International
the role of forcethat
Indeed,we were so cautiousaboutdowngrading
ofrealism:
inourrejection
us fornotgoingfurther
David Baldwincriticized
of
"AlthoughKeohaneand Nye are clearlyskepticalaboutthefungibility
toplacetheburdenofproofonthose
powerresources,theyappearunwilling
who maintain that power resources are highlyfungible. .

. Whereas

about
Sproutsand Dahl rejectas practicallymeaninglessany statement
influence
thatdoes not clearlyindicatescope, Keohane and Nye confine
that'we mayneedto reevaluatetheusefulness
to thesuggestion
themselves
thatwe
complained
conceptionofpower." He further
ofthehomogeneous
of military
forceas a
"sometimesseem to exaggeratethe effectiveness
powerresource.",17
is nota
Baldwinwas rightto pointoutthatPowerand Interdependence
wouldlikeitto
howevermuchsomeofourfriends
"modernist"manifesto,
seeksto ask, withoutdogit consistently
have been one. On thecontrary,
liberalor realisttheorieswill
underwhatconditions
maticpresuppositions,
providemoreaccurateaccountsof worldpoliticalreality.The extentto
in a givensituation
is to us an empirical
forceis important
whichmilitary
realistor modernist
question,notone to be decidedon thebasisofdogmatic
fiat.
Bargainingtheoryhas subsequentlyclarifiedsome conceptsand has
qualifiedthe analysisthatwe, followingHirschman,offered.Baldwin's
of usingtangibleresources
workhas helpedto emphasizethe difficulties
perilsof into "explain" behavior,as well as thetheoretical
successfully
factorssuchas "intensity,""skill," or "leadership"on a posttroducing
hoc basis to patchup inadequateaccounts.HarrisonWagner18has shown
less dependentthanone's partneris neithera
thatbeingasymmetrically
in a bilateralrelacondition
to exerciseinfluence
necessarynora sufficient
It is notnecessarybecausea weakeractorwithintensepreferences
tionship.
on one issue may make greatconcessionson othermattersto attainits
withthe termsof
because in equilibrium,
objectives.It is not sufficient
power,even a morepowerfulactor
bargaining
fullyreflecting
agreements
issueifthisrequiresconcessions
on a particular
willnotexerciseinfluence
we believethatasymitsgains.Nevertheless,
on otherissuesthatoutweigh
metrical
can stillbe a sourceofpowerin bilateralrelationinterdependence
actorswill
is carefulto pointout,less dependent
ships.As Wagnerhimself
concessionsat lowercostthanmoredependent
be able to makebargaining
and weak actorsare
betweenpowerful
relationships
actors.Furthermore,
bargaining.
without
bilateral
ruleorconvention,
oftendefined
bymultilateral
17. David A. Baldwin,"PowerAnalysisandWorldPolitics:New TrendsVersusOld Ten1979),pp. 169,181.
dencies,"WorldPolitics31 (January
Powerand PoliticalInBargaining
18. HarrisonWagner,"EconomicInterdependence,
ofTexas,Austin,October1986.
paper,University
fluence,"unpublished

Powerand independence735
Undersuch conditions,strongstatesthatare willingto breaktherulesor
power.'9
bargaining
mayhave unexploited
altertheconventions
necessarilyraises questions
approachto interdependence
A bargaining
power
bargaining
aboutlinkagesamongissues, since,unlessunexploited
exists,to exerciseinfluenceon one issue meansmakingconcessionson
thisproblem
mayhavemiscategorized
PowerandInterdependence
another.
by placingitsdiscussionin chapter2, whichanalyzescomplexinterdepenissue
dence,ratherthanin chapter1. Afterall, manyof thehighest-level
affairsin relationships
linkagestakeplace betweeneconomicand security
such as thatbetweenthe UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. That is,
politicsas muchas ofcomofrealistinternational
linkageis a phenomenon
Indeed,we suggestedin chapter2 thatundercondiplexinterdependence.
than
becomelesseffective
linkagesmight
tionsofcomplexinterdependence,
underrealism(pp. 30-32).
The lack ofextensiveanalysisofissuelinkagein Powerand Interdepenreadersas one oftheoddestaspects
dencemusthavestrucksomeobservant
sources
ofourbook.Ouranalysisofregimechangefocusedonissue-specific
theory."Yet as ArthurStein
of powerand developedan "issue-structure
withan issueapproach
pointedout,"Linkageis thecentralanalyticproblem
onlygoes so far....
politics.Issue compartmentalization
to international
ofan
amenableto linkagepolitics,theviability
Because thereare situations
politicsis itselfcontextissue-areaapproachto the studyof international
of thesubject,we failedto develop
Despitetheimportance
dependent."20
any theoryof linkagethatcould specifyunderwhatconditionslinkages
ofcomplexinterdependence,
wouldoccur.We arguedthatunderconditions
by weak states(pp. 122a varietyoflinkageswouldbe made,particularly
is
thetruth
there.Thiswas notforlackofeffort:
24),butwe leftthematter
thatwe drafteda chapteron the subject,but since it turnedout to be a
andillustrative
anecdotes,we consigned
collectionofvaguegeneralizations
it to thewastebasket.
progresshas been madeon thisissue since 1977.In thefirst
Significant
place, KennethOye, ErnstHaas, and ArthurStein have developedtycategoriesfor
pologiesof linkagethathave providedmoresophisticated
betweentactdistinction
areHaas's threefold
interest
analysis.Ofparticular
beand Oye's distinction
issue-linkage,
and substantive
ical, fragmented,
(makinga threatone does notwishto carryout)and
tween"blackmailing"
is
a quid pro quo bargain).Oye's distinction
(offering
"back-scratching"
this
systemillustrates
monetary
19. Our analysisof the 1971changein theinternational
oftheU.S. posistrength
point.We emphasizednotAmericanweakness,buttheunderlying
overtheUnitedStates
influence
tion,quotingHenryAubreyto theeffectthat"a creditor's
totheoldconceptsandrules."Power
toplaythegameaccording
restsonAmerican
willingness
and Interdependence,p. 140.

A. Stein,"The PoliticsofLinkage,"WorldPolitics33 (October1980),p. 81.

20. Arthur

Organization
736 International
linkbetweencoercedand threat-induced
paralleledby Stein'sdistinction
betweena promiseand
age. Both recall Thomas Schelling'sdistinction
threat:that"a promiseis costlywhenit succeeds,and a threatis costly
whenit fails."21
has gone beyondtypologyby applyinga
Otherworkon issue-linkage
The basic
rigorouseconomicor publicchoice approachto issue-linkage.
is likeeconomicexchange:up to
is thatissue-linkage
ofthisargument
insight
moreofa scarcegoodin
byacquiring
a point,one can increaseone's utility
one. RobertE. Tollisonand ThomasE. Willett
exchangefora plentiful
articleto thiseffectin 1979,and JamesSebeniushas
wrotea pioneering
andan analysisoftheLaw oftheSea Negotiations,
employedgametheory,
issuestogether
underwhichlinking
in an attempt
to specifytheconditions
By usinga
beneficial
bargaining.22
formutually
can createnewpossibilities
rationalchoice approach,Tollison,Willett,and Sebeniushave laid out a
the elementary
conditionsforissue-linkage
forunderstanding
framework
framework.
withina rational-choice
It shouldbe notedthatthisprogresshas been madeat thecost of using
inworldpolitics
ofissue-linkage
models.Yet a keyfeature
simpletwo-actor
as wellas intergovernmeninvolvesintragovernmental
is thatitnecessarily
itto
seekstomakea gainon issueX bylinking
Ifa government
talstruggles.
someofthegoodinvolvedin issueY for
issueY, itis in effectexchanging
seeksto stopnuclearprolifthatinissueX. For example,ifthegovernment
equipfromreceiving
proliferator
erationby threatening
to stopa potential
thegoal of expandingexportsforthe
mentfornuclearplants,it sacrifices
Thispolicyis hardlylikelytobe welcomedby
proliferation.
goalofstopping
Inagencieschargedwiththetaskof exportpromotion.
thegovernmental
over the policy,
conflict
deed, thereis likelyto be an intragovernmental
fortransgovernmental
becomea matter
whichmay,in somecircumstances,
rigor
coalitions.Futureworkon linkagewillneedto combinetheanalytical
of rational-choice
approacheswithinsightsinto the complexmulti-level
in worldpolitics.23
accompanyissue-linkage
gamesthattypically
of Power and Interdependence
to the studyof
The majorcontribution
was to stressthattheanalysisofthepolitics
andbargaining
interdependence
Press,1960),
TheStrategy
21. ThomasSchelling,
(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
ofConflict
of KennethA. Oye, Donald
p. 177.Oye's discussionof linkageappearsin theintroduction
Rothchild,and Robert J. Lieber, Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World

pp. 13-17;see also ErnstB. Haas, "WhyCollaborate?

(NewYork:Longman,1979),especially
andInternational
Regimes,"WorldPolitics32 (April1980),pp. 357-402.
Issue-Linkage
"An EconomicTheoryofMutually
Advantageous
22. RobertTollisonandThomasWillett,
33 (Fall 1979),pp.
International
Organization
Issue Linkagein International
Negotiations,"

425-49; James Sebenius, Negotiating the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Harvard University

International
OrganizaArithmetic,"
Press,1984),especiallychap.6; Sebenius,"Negotiation
tion37 (Spring1983),pp. 281-316.
workinthisspecialissueofWorld
Politics,
23. Fora briefdiscussion
thatdrawsonempirical
StrateunderAnarchy:
Cooperation
see RobertAxelrodandRobert0. Keohane,"Achieving
WorldPolitics39 (October1986),especiallypp. 239-43.
giesandInstitutions,"

Powerand independence737
conceptionof bargaining,
and
requiresa sophisticated
of interdependence
forpowerand
haveimplications
thatpatterns
ofeconomicinterdependence
developa theoryof linkage,which
vice versa. We did not successfully
of worldpolitics.Instead,
ourunderstanding
wouldindeedhave furthered
towards
we simplymovedtheneorealistresearchprograma littlefurther
interactions
betweenpolitical-economic
takingintoaccountrelationships
and patterns
ofmilitary-political
conflict.
Complexinterdependence
is clearlyliberalratherthan
The conceptof complexinterdependence
with
complexinterdependence
realist.We made no attemptto integrate
we set up
On the contrary,
realistconceptionsof powerand structure.
view of
in oppositionto a realistideal-typical
complexinterdependence
worldpolitics.Yet preciselybecause we insistedthatcomplexinterdeofworldpolpendenceis an ideal typeratherthanan accuratedescription
worldpoliticsis
iticsor a forecastoftrends,itsrelevanceto contemporary
ambiguous.24

butas a thought
We didnotpursuecomplexinterdependence
as a theory,
of
experiment
aboutwhatpoliticsmightlook likeifthebasic assumptions
did notdrawuponliberaltheoryas
realismwerereversed.We therefore
fullyas we mighthave. Had we done so, perhapstheconceptwouldhave
We did,however,carry
beenbetterdevelopedandmorereadilyunderstood.
to explorethepolitical
outquitean extensivesetofempirical
investigations
and closelyexaminedtwo issueprocessesof complexinterdependence,
relain chapter5) and twocountry
finance,
areas (oceans and international
tionships(U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Australia,in chapter7) forthe period
foroceans and the
as pairedcomparisons:
1920-70.These cases function
U.S.-Canada relationship,
thereis muchevidenceof complexinterdepencentrality
forgovdence;whereasforfinance(due to itspolitical-economic
ernments)and for U.S.-Australia(due to distanceand the primacyof
was muchless evident.
concerns),complexinterdependence
security
is, we
The incompleteness
ofcomplexinterdependence
of ourtreatment
have
implications
fear,partlyresponsibleforthefactthatits theoretical
beenlargelyignored.As mentioned
earlier,ourdiscussionin chapter2 was
betweenrealismand complexinterdepenorganizedaroundthecontinuum
conthepositionofa givensituation
alongthiscontinuum
dence:In effect,
bevariableforouranalysis.Yet therelationship
theindependent
stituted
tween this independentvariableand what we soughtto explain was
somewhatmuddled.In Powerand Interdependence,
complexinterdepenin
dencehas threemaincharacteristics:
1) statepolicygoalsarenotarranged
butare subjectto trade-offs;
stablehierarchies,
2) theexistenceofmultiple
on interna24. Considering
writing
jargonin contemporary
thefondnessforphilosophical
status"ofcomplexinterdetionalrelations
we shouldreferto thisas the"ontological
theory,
pendence.Somehowwe cannotquitebringourselvesto do this.

Organization
738 International
channelsof contactamongsocietiesexpandsthe rangeof policyinstruto controlgovernofficestightly
theabilityof foreign
ments,thuslimiting
Table2.1
forceis largelyirrelevant.
relations;and 3) military
ments'foreign
of Powerand Interdependence
(p. 37) listsfivesets of politicalprocesses
ofcomplexinterdependence
underconditions
thatwe expectto be different
Theseincludethegoalsofactors,instruments
thanunderrealistconditions.
linkagesof issues,and rolesof internaof statepolicy,agendaformation,
tionalorganizations.
arises.Since we definecomplex
A methodological
problemimmediately
of statepolicy,any
in termsof thegoals and instruments
interdependence
are affectedby the
about how goals and instruments
generalarguments
or realcomplexinterdependence
approximates
degreeto whicha situation
about politicalprocesses
ism will be tautological.Thus our propositions
andtherolesofinternamustbe limitedto issue-linkage,
agendaformation,
tionalorganizations.
Since,as we have seen,discussionsoflinkageare as
we areleft
relevantto a realistworldas to one ofcomplexinterdependence,
essentiallywithtwo dependentvariables:changesin agendasand in the
Ideally,we wouldhaveprovidedcondiorganizations.
rolesofinternational
underwhichagendaschange
theconditions
tionalstatements
thatspecified
How muchprogressis actuare important.
and international
organizations
allymadeon thesequestions?
Chapter5 discussesbothprocesses.We arguethatagendachangeresults
linkedissueandfunctionally
from"pooroperation
ofa regimeina coherent
area" (p. 121).Butwe do notspecify
anymodelofagendachangethatwould
whenit wouldoccur,and in
permitan observerto anticipateintelligently
whatdirection.
RichardW. Mansbachand JohnA. Vasquez latermadean
ofagendachangebypresenting
to theunderstanding
interesting
contribution
dorgenesis,crisis,ritualization,
theirview of an "issue cycle,involving
As in mostmodels
allocation."25
mancy,decisionmakingand authoritative
by Mansofstages,thecausal processesat workwerenotclearlyspecified
bachand Vasquez-as theypointout,theissuecycleis morea framework
it goes beyondthebriefobservaforanalysisthana theory.Nevertheless,
tions about agenda change in Power and Interdependence.

partlybecauseof
We had moreto say aboutinternational
organizations,
our "international
model," and partlybecause of our earlier
organization
organizaWe viewedinternational
organizations.26
workon international
law but as entitiesthatinstitutionalized
tionsnot as sourcesof definitive
policycoordination
policynetworksand withinwhichtransgovernmental
andcoalition-building
couldtakeplace. We observedthatinoceanspolitics,
25. JohnA. Vasquez and RichardW. Mansbach,"The Issue Cycleand GlobalChange,"
on p. 274. See also Mans37 (Spring1983),pp. 257-79,quotation
International
Organization

bach and Vasquez, In Search of Theory:A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York:

ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1981),especiallychap.4.
OrRelationsand International
26. See especiallyKeohaneand Nye, "Transgovernmental
ganizations,"WorldPolitics27 (October1974),pp. 39-62.

Powerand independence739
effect
on theagendasof
seemedtohavea greater
organizations
international
moneoveroutcomes,thanin international
states,and on states'influence
as facilitators
organizations
on international
taryrelations.Thisperspective
decade. Such
ratherthanlawmakershas held up well in the intervening
ofthem,such
ofa number
andtheactivities
haveproliferated,
organizations
Monetary
Fund,haveexpanded-buttheyhave shown
as theInternational
capabilities.Keohane's
supranational
littletendencyto developgenuinely
intoa
organizations
thisview on international
AfterHegemonyintegrates
ofinternational
regimes;andmostrecentanalysesofinternabroadertheory
viewtheiractivitiesin thisway.
tionalorganizations
ouranalysisinPowerandInterdewe limited
In theinterest
ofparsimony,
system:it was essential,in our
pendenceto thelevel of the international
view,"to knowhow muchone can explainpurelyon thebasis ofinformaof
theimportance
system"(p. ix). We admitted
tionabouttheinternational
forces
to sortoutthesystemic
factorsat thedomesticlevel,butsoughtfirst
as formed
at work.27
As a resultof thisdecision,we had to viewinterests
in a way unexplained
by our theory.Thus,domestic
largelyexogenously,
on domesticpolitics-what
relations
politicsandtheimpactofinternational
-were ignored.28
PeterGourevitch
latercalled"thesecondimagereversed"
by theUnitedStatesand other
Yet changesin definitions
of self-interest,
keptappearingin ourcase studies-bothin oceans politicsand
countries,
adequateexplanation.
relations-without
monetary
appearsin chapter5, whichdescribesthe
An exampleof thisdifficulty
is approximated
extentto whichtheidealtypeofcomplexinterdependence
is
inthemonetary
andoceansissue-areasandconcludesthatitsapplicability
thisevidencecouldbe seen
in thelatter.Froma realistperspective,
greater
to
are irrelevant
thatprocessesof complexinterdependence
as suggesting
policy.Furtherforstates-such as monetary
issues of greatimportance
more,withintheoceansissue-area,manyobservershaveviewedprocesses
ratherthanexpandingsince 1977
ofcomplexinterdependence
as shrinking
thispercepreinforced
(U.S. refusalto signtheLaw oftheSea Convention
as trivial
tion). Yet such a quick dismissalof complexinterdependence
wouldbe too simple.The originalAmericanpositionin favorof narrow
by
coastaljurisdiction
andsharing
ofseabedresourceshadbeendetermined
Butthenavy'spositionwas
interests.
theU.S. Navyon thebasisofsecurity
defeatedbytransnational
andtransgovernmental
coalitionsinthecontextof
to
difficult
thisapproachwas probably
forresearch,
wise,sinceitis terribly
27. As a strategy
the
without
reducing
theoretically
linkdomesticpoliticsandtheinternational
systemtogether
Recentefforts
tobridgethisgap,usingthe
hodgepodge.
analysistolittlemorethana descriptive
See PeterJ.Katzenstein,
havemadenotableprogress.
ed.,Between
conceptofstatestructure,
Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced IndustrializedStates (Madison:

SmallStatesin WorldMarkets
ofWisconsin
Press,1978);andPeterJ.Katzenstein,
University
Press,1985).
(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
32
"The Second ImageReversed,"International
Organization
28. PeterA. Gourevitch,
(Autumn1978),pp. 881-912;and Politicsin Hard Times(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press,1986).

740 International
Organization
The UnitedStatesreverseditsconception
theLaw oftheSea Conferences.
beforeitrefusedto signthetreaty.For realiststo say
ofitsnationalinterest
on security
thattheUnitedStatesrefusedto signbecauseof"self-interest"
are definedand
interests
begs the criticalquestionof how such interests
redefined.
Our failureto theorizeaboutthedomesticpoliticsof interest-formation
seriouseffectson our analysisof thepoliticsof complex
had particularly
was definedin termsof
since complexinterdependence
interdependence,
Understandavailabletogovernments.
thegoals,as wellas theinstruments,
mustnecessarilyinvolveunderingchangesin complexinterdependence
amongstateobjectives,whichcouldonlybe
changesin priorities
standing
ofdomestic
betweenpatterns
an analysisofrelationships
achievedthrough
chanof"multiple
thecharacteristic
politics.Furthermore,
andinternational
actors-thatis, thesharp
nelsofcontact"meansthatstatesare notunitary
boundarybetweenwhat is "domestic" and whatis "systemic"breaks
to see howouracceptanceforresearchpurposesof
down.It is notdifficult
weakenedtheprospectsfora deeperanalysisof
thesystem-unit
distinction
to
The conceptwas "lefthanging"-intriguing
complexinterdependence.
relaxby many,incapableofbeingdevelopedwithout
some,misunderstood
ing the systemicperspectivewhose theoreticalparsimonyis so highly
relations.
valuedby studentsof international
regimechange
International
regimeshas been
The alacritywithwhichthe conceptof international
contrastssharplywiththe
relationsliterature
acceptedin theinternational
The conceptof international
relativeneglectof complexinterdependence.
phenomenato be eximportant
regimeshas provenits value, identifying
themtogether.
It has servedas a labelforidentifying
plainedand clustering
collectivebehavior"29
ofwhatJohnRuggiecalled"institutionalized
patterns
on a varietyof subjects.And it has even been extendedto includethe
issues.30Indeed,"regimes"seemnowto
security
analysisofinternational
be everywhere!
Responsesto Technology."
29. Ruggie,"International
inthe19thcentury;
inhisdiscussion
30. RobertJervis
identified
a ConcertofEuroperegime
ofcontemporary
international
politics,however,he lookedfora regimeinthecentralstrategic
betweentheUnitedStatesand SovietUnionandfailedto findone. JaniceGross
relationship
realmsof activity
and have discovered
Steinand JosephS. Nye have focusedon narrower
incontemporary
worldpolitics.See Stein,"DetectionandDefecsecurity
regimes
meaningful
Journal
ofInternational
International
Conflict,"
'Regimes'andtheManagement
tion:Security
Re40 (Autumn1985),pp. 599-627;and Nye, "NuclearLearningand U.S.-Soviet Security
41 (Summer1987).See also an articlebyRogerK. Smith,
Organization
gimes,"International
Regimeand
whichappearedjust as thisessay was beingrevised,"The Non-Proliferation
41(Spring1987),pp.253-82.Smithmakes
Organization
Relations,"International
International
a number
ofperceptive
ofregimetheory.
criticisms

Powerand independence741
did notintroducetheconceptof
AlthoughPower and Interdependence
empirical
itshowedhowitcouldbe usedinsystematic
regimes,
international
as a descrippromoteditswidespreademployment
analysis,and therefore
andpractices.Furtiveconceptto encompassclustersofrules,institutions,
regimechange.During
itadvancedfourmodelsforunderstanding
thermore,
on regimeshasfollowedthisline
thelasttenyears,a largebodyofliterature
ofanalysis,whichRuggiepioneeredand whichwe soughtto extend.Much
of this work has soughtto test the theoryof hegemonicstabilityregimeswitherosionof American
associatinga declinein international
The resultof thiswork,on balduringthelast quarter-century.
hegemony
aboutthevalidityof thehegemonic
ance, has been to increaseskepticism
regimeshas not been
on international
theory.But the literature
stability
ofintercharacteristics
stability:
limitedto testingthetheoryofhegemonic
domesticpolitics,and learningby elites,as well as
nationalinstitutions,
can accountforthenatureof internashiftsin relativepowercapabilities,
tionalregimesor forchangesin them.
regimeshas madesubDuringthelast decade,researchon international
of
stantialprogress.A wide consensushas been reachedon a definition
regimesas principles,rules,norms,and proceduresaround
international
Probina givenareaofinternational
relations.3'
converge
whichexpectations
whentheconcept
inparticular,
thisdefinition:
lemsexistinoperationalizing
resultsof
of international
regimeis extendedbeyondtheinstitutionalized
formalinterstateagreements,the boundariesbetweenregimeand nonregimesituationsbecome somewhatfuzzy.32Most empiricalworkon reand
agreements,
gimes,however,deals withtheresultsofformalinterstate
raised
sometimes
obscurity
to thechargeofoperational
immune
is therefore
againsttheconceptin general.
31. Krasner, ed., InternationalRegimes, p. 2.

Regimes,"Interna"TheoriesofInternational
32. See StephanHaggardandBethSimmons,

tional Organization41 (Summer 1987).

whichdiscussesmoney,trade,andoil; andthearticles
33. See Keohane,After
Hegemony,
byCharles
intheKrasnervolume,International
Regimes,ontradeandthebalanceofpayments
in
see articles
J.Cohen.In addition,
andMarkZacher,andBenjamin
Lipson,JockA. Finlayson
"Antarctica:The Last GreatLand
on regimesfor:Antarctica,
Organization
International
a Non"Maintaining
Rush" (vol. 34, Summer1980),byM. J.Peterson;nuclearproliferation,
Proliferation
Regime"by JosephS. Nye (vol. 35, Winter1981),and "The Non-Proliferation
Regime"(vol. 41, Spring1987);by RogerK. Smith;civilaviation,"Sphereof Flying:The
Aviation"(vol. 35, Spring1981),by Christer
J6nsson;ThirdWorld
Politicsof International
ofThirdWorldDebt" (vol.35Autumn
1981),byCharles
Organization
debt,"The International
"The PoliticalEconomyofInternational
EuropeverShipping:
shipping,
Lipson;international
reand international
commodity
sus America"(vol. 39, Winter1985),by AlanW. Cafruny;
Trade
Commodity
Gaps: RegimeAnalysisand International
gimes,"TradeGaps, Analytical
studiesseeking
(vol. 41, Spring1987),byMarkZacher.Threerecentbook-length
Regulation"
are:CharlesLipson,Standofinternational
orpersistence
regimes
toaccountfortheevolution
ing Guard: ProtectingForeign Capital in the Nineteenthand TwentiethCenturies(Berkeley:

TheThirdWorld
Structural
ofCalifornia
Conflict:
Press,1985);StephenD. Krasner,
University
of California
Press, 1985);and VinodK.
AgainstGlobal Liberalism(Berkeley:University
Aggarwal,Liberal Protectionism:The InternationalPolitics of OrganizedTextileTrade (Berke-

ofCalifornia
Press,1985).
ley:University

742 International
Organization
aside, much has been
and operationalization
Questionsof definition
the
workduring lastdecadeabouthowandwhy
learnedfromthisempirical
underwhich
aboutconditions
regimeschange-in particular,
international
and
to
and
seek establish,
is facilitated, aboutwhygovernments
cooperation
policythe
rules
Furthermore,
of,
regimes.33
to
to
conform
are willing
makers-not onlyfromWesterncountriesbutfromthe SovietUnionas
interms
cooperation
well-have begunto thinkandtalkaboutinternational
ofinternational
regimes.34
of international
regimes remains
Nevertheless,our understanding
in
1977ofhowand
now
than
we havea cleareridea
Although
rudimentary.
do
well-tested
empirical
have
not
regimeschange,we
whyinternational
of
this
process.
theories
explanatory
muchless convincing
generalizations,
have
theories
of
without
better
incorporasuch
change
Nor are we likelyto
regimes
tionofdomesticpoliticsintoourmodels.The natureofinternational
flow
the
as
well
versa:
as vice
can be expectedto affectdomesticstructures
and
institutions baris surelyreciprocalbetweeninternational
of influence
the
other.Although
gaining,on the one hand,and domesticpolitics,on
some aspectsof theoperationof internasocial scientistscan understand
theoriesthatare indebtedto
tionalregimeson thebasisofstylizedsystemic
we are unlikely,
of domestic
withoutclose investigation
microeconomics,
how states'preferences
change.Yet as longas we
politics,to understand
as exogenous,ourtheorieswillmissmanyof
continueto regardpreferences
in
inthepatterns
andtherefore
that
changes
statestrategies
propel
theforces
international
of
interaction.
regimeson state
We knoweven less about the effectsof international
reof
behaviorthanabout regimechange.Indeed,students international
can
make
a
difference
becausethey
gimesoftensimplyassumethatregimes
This
orchangetheircapabilities.35
oftheirinterests
alteractors'calculations
but
not
tested.
Power
and
Interdebeen
elaborated
rigorously
assertionhas
abouthowregimes
can altercapabilities,
pendencemadesomeobservations
capabilities"(p.
dependent
makinguse oftheconceptof "organizationally
the
of
the
of
on
self-interests
focused
on
impact regimes
55); laterworkhas
to
this
therefore
on
state
and
arguAccording
strategies.36
governments,
ofa regimemayhavetwotypes
rules,and institutions
ment,theprinciples,
34. On 3 June1986,forinstance,SovietFirstSecretaryMikhailGorbachevstatedin a
oftheUnitedNationsthat"it is quiteobviousthatthereis a
messageto theSecretary-General
regimeforthesafedevelopup an international
delay,setting
practicalneedto start,without
mentofnuclearenergy."New YorkTimes,4 June1986,p. A12. We do notpresumeto know
whatled Secretary
Gorbachevto use thelanguageof regimes;butSovietscholarshave inin the
formed
us thattheybeganto use thetermin relationto thelaw oftheseas conference
Moscow,June1986.
1970s.Personalconversations,
35. StephenD. Krasner,"Regimesand the Limitsof Realism:Regimesas Autonomous
Press,
Regimes(New York: CornellUniversity
Variables,"in Krasner,ed., International
1983),pp. 355-68.
see OranR. Young,Compliance
andPublicAuthor36. Foran earlyandinsightful
attempt,
D.C.: Institute
fortheFuture,1979).
ity(Washington,

Powerand independence743
First,theymaycreatea focalpointaroundwhich
of effectson strategies.
and providing
guidelinesfor
expectationsconverge,reducinguncertainty
aboutfeasible
actionsand forpolicymakers
bureaucratsabout legitimate
In thelongrun,one mayeven see changesin how
of agreement.
patterns
in directions
thatconform
to the
definetheirown self-interest
governments
statebehaviorby prorulesoftheregime.Second,regimesmayconstrain
power,powhibiting
certainactions.Sinceregimeshavelittleenforcement
measures;butthey
be able to takeforbidden
erfulstatesmaynevertheless
and therefore
to theirabilityto make
mayincurcoststo theirreputations,
future
agreements.
Arguments
such as these emphasizethatregimescan be understood
statesmayconwithinan analyticalframework
thatstressesself-interest:
formto therulesand normsofregimesinorderto protecttheirreputations.
But neithertheseworksnorotherworkson regimeshave establishedto
the impactsof regimeson state
whatextent,and underwhatconditions,
in worldpolitics.
interests
are significant
enoughto makemuchdifference
oftheimpactofregimesprovidesopporOurrelatively
poorunderstanding
we need morecarefulempirical
tunitiesforfutureresearch.In particular,
work,tracing
thebehaviorofstatesto see howcloselypoliciesfollowregime
Yet thisis onlya firststep,sinceifour
principles,
rules,and institutions.
attention
remainsfocusedon thelevelofthesystem,itmaybe verydifficult
to ascertainthecausal statusoftheregime.Perhapsthe
foran investigator
stateswouldhave followedsimilarpoliciesin the absenceof the regime.
without
anyimpactoftheir
interests,
exerting
Regimescouldmerelyreflect
own.
decisionTo ascertainthe impactof theregime,we musttraceinternal
wouldhavebeenfollowedin
makingprocessesto discoverwhatstrategies
issues on which
the absence of regimerules. We could seek to identify
withtheperceptions
of self-interest
(apartfromthe
regimerulesconflicted
Keohane has called "myopicselfregime)held by governments-what
and otherinceninterest."37
We wouldthenask whetherthereputational
theincentives
to breakthoserules.
tivesto abideby regimerulesoutweigh
internal
How muchimpactdo the regimeruleshave? Onlyby examining
debateson suchissuescouldtheanalystto go beyondtheself-justificatory
(whichis likelyto exaggeratetheirrespectforrerhetoric
ofgovernments
theirdecisions.If thissortofresearchwere
gimes)to thefactorsaffecting
internacarriedout on a numberof issuesinvolving
fairlywell-established
hada rangeof
tionalregimes,inwhichthegovernments
underinvestigation
moderate
incentives
toviolatetheregimerules,we might
learn
to substantial
of international
regimes.And iftheresearch
quitea bitabouttheefficacy
in termsof "governments'
oftherela37. Keohanedefinesmyopicself-interest
perception
coursesofactionwithregardto a particular
to themofalternative
tivecostsandbenefits
issue,
when that issue is considered in isolation from others." AfterHegemony, p. 99, italics in

original.

Organization
744 International
or enlargethescope of
examinedhow decisionsweremadeto strengthen
periodoftime,ina givenissue-area,itcould
regimerulesovera substantial
helpto promotetheirown
helpto testthenotionthatregimesthemselves
growth.It mighteven yieldsome insightsaboutthe questionof whether
definitions
of theirown
regimeshelpto changegovernments'
international
overtime.
self-interests
workthathas been done on nationaldecisionsand internaAdmittedly,
indidesignedas we have suggested,
notexplicitly
tionalregimes,although
highincentives
involving
catestherelativeweaknessofregimesinsituations
to
conform
On theotherhand,thefactthatgovernments
tobreaktherules.38
a
mostregimesmostof thetimesuggeststhatregimesdo indeedperform
in alterfunction-butittellsus littleabouttheirownefficacy
coordinating
orinotherways.
reputation
on governments'
effects
through
ingincentives,
definedintermsof
a widerrangeofincentives,
We needstudiesexamining
reof international
to breakor evade theinjunctions
myopicself-interest,
gimes,beforewe will have a betteridea of theirefficacyin situations
amountsof stress. Little such work has yet been
involvingdifferent
done, but the impactof pioneeringresearchalong these lines could be
substantial.39
theoryremains
regimes,structural
In studying
changesin international
can be
how self-interest
help to highlight
useful:its verysimplifications
institutions.
withtheformation
ofinternational
and maintenance
consistent
But structural
theoryshouldnot be equatedwithsystemictheory,since
butpoliticalprocesses,innotonlypowerstructures
systemsincorporate
Yet
ofpracticewhichwe refertoas institutions.
patterns
cludingregularized
these processesmergewithdomesticpolitics:once one adoptsa broad
theory,itbecomesclearthatsuchtheoryalonewill
ofsystemic
conception
overtimeor
regimes
be insufficient
eitherto explainchangesininternational
theory,and the
to accountfor theirimpacton policy. Both structural
versionof systemictheorythatwe soughtto debroaderprocess-oriented
inadequateby themare therefore
velop in Power and Interdependence,
nowfaceis howto linka process-oriented
selves.The taskthatresearchers
versionof systemictheorycloselywiththe analysisof domesticpolitics
monetary
regime,forexample,see
38. On thedemiseof theBrettonWoodsinternational

Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window:Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods

Monetary
Press,1983),andJohnS. Odell,U. S. International
(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity

Policy: Markets,Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity

ofthe
undertheumbrella
andcircumvention
oftextilerestraints
Press,1982).On rule-evasion
Multi-FiberArrangement,see David Yoffie,Power and Protectionism:Strategiesof theNewly

Press,1983).
Countries
(New York:ColumbiaUniversity
Industrializing
39. AbramChayes'sstudyoftheroleoflaw in theCubanMissileCrisisis an exceptionto
in
as embodied,
forinstance,
norms,
thisstatement
abouttheabsenceofworkon international
buthediscussestheimpact
international
Chayesdoesnotuse thelanguageofregimes,
regimes.
ofdisputes,as embodiedinvariousinternanormsforthepeacefulsettlement
ofinternational
theOrganization
of AmericanStatesand United
including
tionalpracticesand agreements,
Nations Charter. See Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Rule of Law (New

Press,1974).
York:OxfordUniversity

Powerand independence745
coherencethatadvocatesof systhe loss of theoretical
withoutsuffering
temictheoryhave alwaysfeared.
3. Limitationsof structuraltheory:systemicpoliticalprocesses
ofdomesticpolitics,Powerand
theimportance
Although
we acknowledged
assumedthatwe couldlearna gooddeal aboutworldpoliInterdependence
oftheinternaunderstanding
ticsbyhavinga moresubtleand sophisticated
and
structure
tionalsystem.We arguedthatsystemshavetwodimensions:
senseto referprinprocess.We used theterm"structure"intheneorealist
Processrefersto
of capabilitiesamongunits.40
cipallyto the distribution
thewaysinwhichtheunitsrelateto each other.To
ofinteraction:
patterns
refersto theplayers'cards
ofa pokergame,thestructure
use themetaphor
amongtheformal
and chips,whiletheprocessrefersto therelationships
and the patternsof interactions
customsor conventions,
rules,informal
intheabilityoftheplayersto calculateodds,
amongtheplayers.Variations
of opponents'hands,or bluffare at the unit,or actor,
inferthe strength
level.
and
byitsstructure
The processesthattakeplace ina systemareaffected
unitsinthesystem.The preferofthemostimportant
bythecharacteristics
thestructure
encesofthestatespredisposethemtowardscertainstrategies;
One needsinformation
andconstraints.
ofthesystemprovidesopportunities
to accountforstateaction.For
as wellas aboutstructure
aboutpreferences
thatsurrounded
structure
example,itis notenoughto knowthegeopolitical
German
in 1886or 1914or 1936:one also needsto knowwhether
Germany
werethe conservative
ones of Bismarck,the poorlyconceived
strategies
ones of Hitler.Yet even if we
ones of the Kaiser, or the revolutionary
we willoftenbe
and systemstructure,
understand
bothstatepreferences
other
unableto accountadequatelyforstatebehaviorunlesswe understand
andtransnaofinternational
attributes
ofthesystem,suchas thecharacter
institutions.4'Examining
and thenatureof international
tionalinteractions
at the
to lookmorecarefully
processesleadstheinvestigator
thesesystemic
example,to exinteractions
betweensystemand unitcharacteristics-for
andopportubytheconstraints
aminehowactors'preferences
are affected
and vice versa.Thatis, focusingon systemic
nitiesin theirenvironments
betweendoto thereciprocalconnections
processesdirectsour attention
beltsbestructure
and the transmission
mesticpoliticsand international
tweenthem.
Politics(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
40. KennethN. Waltz,Theory
ofInternational
1979).
41. For a critiqueofWaltz'sworkalongtheselines,see JohnGerardRuggie,"Continuity
in theWorldPolity:Towarda NeorealistSynthesis,"WorldPolitics35
and Transformation
in Robert0. Keohane,ed., Neorealismand itsCritics
1983),pp. 261-85;reprinted
(January
tothiseffect
argument
Press,1986),pp. 131-57.Anextended
(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
especiallychaps. 1, 4-7.
is providedin Keohane,AfterHegemony,

746 International
Organization
Clearly,thereis a greatdeal ofvarianceininternational
politicalbehavior
ofpoweramongstates.Neorealists
thatis notexplainedbythedistribution
do notdenythis,butassignall otherdeterminants
to theunitlevel.42This
Suchfactorsas theintensity
ofinterresponse,however,is notsatisfactory.
of internanationalinterdependence
or the degreeof institutionalization
tionalrulesdo not varyfromone stateto anotheron the basis of their
procedures
internal
characteristics
(unlikethedegreeto whichdemocratic
thedomesticpoliticaleconomyis capiare followedinternally,
or whether
not unit-level
factorsaccordingto
talistor socialist),and are therefore
Waltz'searlierdefinition.
Furthermore,
makingtheunitlevelthedumping
of
to thedevelopment
groundforall unexplained
varianceis an impediment
unittheory.Not onlydoes it complicatethetaskof analysisby confusing
with
levelfactorsreferring
to domesticpoliticalandeconomicarrangements
factorsat theleveloftheinternational
system,italso leads someneorealist
levelaboutnonto theorizeat a systemic
analyststoforegotheopportunity
determinants
structural
of statebehavior.
These non-structural
statestrategiescan be
systemicfactorsaffecting
incentivesforstate
placed intotwo generalcategories:1) non-structural
and cooperate.Nonbehavior,and 2) theabilityof statesto communicate
andaltercalculations
ofnational
structural
incentives
presentopportunities
interestby affecting
expectedratiosbetweenbenefitand costs or risks,
ofpoweramongactors.For instance,inwithoutaffecting
thedistribution
creases in the destructiveness
of weaponrymay produceincentivesfor
statesnotto engagein warfare,even ifthedistribution
of military
power
advances.Or
resourcesbetweenthemis notalteredbythesetechnological
reductionsin transportation
costs mayincreasethe benefitsto be gained
fromtradeand therefore
encouragepoliciesofgreatereconomicopenness,
powerof the actorsor the
withoutalteringeitherthe relativebargaining
differences
amongthemat theunitlevel.
for
The abilityto communicate
and cooperatecan provideopportunities
thatwouldnotbe
andforthepursuit
ofstrategies
theredefinition
ofinterests
feasiblein a worldwheretheonlyinformation
availableto stateswas about
and thepowerresourcesat theirdisposal.Justas
otherstates'preferences
withone another
allowingplayersof Prisoners'Dilemmato communicate
altersthenatureofthegame,so also institutions
thatincreasethecapability
of statesto communicate
and to reachmutually
beneficial
can
agreements
add to the commongrammar
of statecraft
and thusalterthe resultsthat
thesize of thepilesof chipsin
ensue.43To returnto ourpokermetaphor,
frontofeach playermatters,
butso does whether
theyagreeon thenature
and therulesofthegame.
42. KennethN. Waltz,"Responseto My Critics,"in Keohane,ed., Neorealismand Its

Critics,pp. 322-46.

andsystemic
abouttheanalogybetweengrammar
processesthatfacili43. For discussions
we are indebted
to HaywardAlker,Jr.
tatecooperation,

Powerand independence747
proemphasizedthesetwoaspectsofsystemic
Liberalshavetraditionally
communito
in thecapacity
and variations
incentives
cess-non-structural
cate and cooperate.For example,liberaltheoristshave stressed(with
thewaysin whichgainsfromtradeand
degreesof sophistication)
different
liberaltheorists
economicincentivesmayalterstates'behavior.Similarly,
transgovernmental)
(and
transnational
oftenstresstheeffectsof increased
And,ofcourse,theroleofinstituandcommunication.
contactson attitudes
partof liberaltheory.All
a
pre-eminent
been
tionsand normshas always
betweenthelate 1950s
theory
integration
in
thesethemeswereprominent
of
conception
systemic
of
a
components
andearly1970s.Theyarenecessary
one
with
only
equated
become
should
"system"
lest
relations,
international
ofitsaspects,systemstructure-amistakeWaltzmakes.
aboutsystemic
ofthinking
Thisis notto saythatliberalshavea monopoly
to
realistthought
are
central
instance,
for
changes,
processes.Technological
do
ofpower.Nor we arguethat
evenwhentheydo notalterthedistribution
level.Butwe
at thesystemic
belong
all factorsemphasizedbyliberaltheory
in
structure
of
the
concept
to
do contendthataddingthe processlevel
emphasis
This
to
theorize.
ability
our
enriches
systems
international
defining
movesus towardsa
on processas wellas (ratherthaninsteadof) structure
realismand liberalbetween,
disjunction
of,ratherthana radical
synthesis
systemictheory;
of
level
structural
the
at
ism. Neorealismis appropriate
combinethem
to
aspire
We
level.
process
the
at
most
fruitful
is
liberalism
structure.
well
as
as
process
that
incorporates
theory
intoa system-level
does
theories
liberal
and
of
neorealist
a
synthesis
towards
Thisapproach
are
vaguely
variables
dependent
If
reasoning.
of
tautological
raisea danger
processis howthey
definedas "how nationsbehave" and thesystem-level
to
behavior
by reference
in
behave,the tautologyinvolved "explaining"
be
must
variables
this,
dependent
against
guard
To
is
evident.
process
in termsof specificbehavior.In addition,a clearlydedefinedcarefully
lineatedtypology
of thecausal elementsinvolvedat theprocesslevel-in
theabilityto
andaffecting
incentives
non-structural
altering
termsoffactors
ecochange,
Technological
also
needed.
and cooperate-is
communicate
affecting
the
forces
among
are
density
issue
and
interdependence,
nomic
rules,norms,
ofinternational
Thecharacteristics
incentives.44
non-structural
in
abilityto
affecting
-are
crucial
"international
regimes"
institutionsand
connect
that
the
processes
causal
and
Finally,
cooperate.
communicate
on the
and
communicate,
to
cooperate
and
ability
incentives
forcesaffecting
be
we
cannot
traced:
be
have
to
other,
the
on
one hand,and behavior,
alone.45
withcorrelation
satisfied
a given
ofissuesarisingwithin
andimportance
as thenumber
defined
44. On issuedensity,
Regimes,"International
policyspace,see Robert0. Keohane,"The DemandforInternational
inKrasner,
Regimes.Thereference
ed., International
36 (Spring1982),reprinted
Organization
is to p. 155ofthelattervolume.
see AlexanderL. George and TimothyJ.
45. On this methodof "process-tracing,"

Organization
748 International
analysiswill necessarilybe incomplete.As we have
Any system-level
processessuchas thoseof
systemic
emphasizedinthisarticle,tounderstand
we need to knowhow domesticpoliticsaffects
complexinterdependence,
Thisentailsa reciprocal
and regimeformation.
ofinterdependence
patterns
suchas
and institutions
of how economicinterdependence
comprehension
andthe
theory
domesticpolitics.Bothstructural
international
regimesaffect
versionof systemictheorythatwe soughtto debroaderprocess-oriented
are inadequateby themselves.
velopin Powerand Interdependence
and cooperConsider,forinstance,theabilityof statesto communicate
theyagreeon rulesgovernthisdepends,inpart,on whether
ate. Although
bythegoalsthatstatespursue;these
itis also affected
ingtheirinteractions,
beby domesticpolitics.The classicdistinction
goalsare, in turn,affected
the
goals is relevantto understanding
tweenstatusquo and revolutionary
of
a stableorturbulent
pattern
Whendecidingwhether
abilityto cooperate.46
of
behaviorexists,we mustlook at thewaysin whichstates'formulation
theirgoals affectsthe processof the system.Changesin goals mayarise
fromthe domesticprocessesof a singlestate-witnessthe effectsof the
balanceof power.They
FrenchRevolutionon the classical 18th-century
thedomesticpolitics
processesthataffect
mayalso arisefromtransnational
the
andforeign
policygoalsofa numberofstatessimultaneously-witness
on the19th-century
andnationalism
effects
ofthespreadofdemocratization
Europeansystemremained
balanceofpower.To say thatthe 19th-century
but
ina strictmanner,
is defined
initsstructure
is trueifstructure
multipolar
thenecessity
of
theinability
ofthisconceptto accountforchangeillustrates
Moreover,a focuson
intheconceptofsystem.47
addingprocessto structure
enriches
andcooperation
ofcommunication
thesystemic
processdimension
and
betweensystemto interaction
attention
bydirecting
researchprograms
unit-level
changes.
Such a concernwiththewaysthatstategoals affectsystemicprocesses
andlearning.
(and vice versa)letsus look anewat questionsofperceptions
DecisionMaking,"Advancesin
McKeown,"Case Studiesand Theoriesof Organizational

InformationProcessing in Organizations2 (1985), pp. 21-58; or Alexander L. George, "Case

pp. 43FocusedComparison,"
StudiesandTheoryDevelopment:
The MethodofStructured,

68 in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History,Theoryand Policy

(New York:Free Press,1979).

and statusquo. Moreover,
46. Thereis actuallya spectrum
ofgoalsbetweenrevolutionary
bythetypesofmeansavailabletostates.See BarryBuzan,People,
thesegoalsmaybe affected
ofNorthCarolinaPress,1983).
Statesand Fear (ChapelHill: University
of
is emphasized
byKennethN. Waltz,whoseTheory
47. Thebipolar-multipolar
distinction
developsthenotionof politicalstructure
and systematically
International
Politicscarefully
inthisarticle.For a recentdiscussionofthe
inadequacywe are criticizing
whoseexplanatory
System:Changesinthe
International
"The 19thCentury
see PaulW. Schroeder,
19thcentury,
thedevelopment
emphasizes
WorldPolitics39(October1986),pp. 1-26.Schroeder
Structure,"
wouldnot
ofnormsfortheprotection
Whathecalls"changesinstructure"
ofsmallcountries.
be consideredstructural
changesby Waltz,and we wouldreferto themas changesin the
system.
processoftheinternational

Powerand independence749
Whiletheseare not new issues, theyhave had an ambiguoustheoretical
a richerconcepAdopting
statusas notableexceptionsto realistarguments.
and process,bringsperceptionof system,whichinvolvesbothstructure
tions and learningcloser to the theoreticalheartof the disciplineand
of how political
our understanding
of sharpening
suggeststhe importance
"learn."
organizations
4. Perceptionsand learning48
whichmaychangein
of interests,
Statechoicesreflectelites'perceptions
severalways. The mostobviousis politicalchange.An election,coup, or
ofleaderswithone setof
evolutioncan lead to thereplacement
generational
The
of nationalinterest.
perceptions
beliefsby leaderswithquitedifferent
or cognitive
changein "nationalinterest"may not reflectnew affective
maychangebecauseofdomesviewsinthesocietyat large.The leadership
mayalso
policy.Interests
toforeign
ticissuesorforotherreasonsunrelated
be redefined
throughnormativechange.Practicesor interestswhichare
in a later
or even illegitimate
acceptedin one periodbecomedowngraded
evolution.Changedviewsof slaveryor colperiodbecause of normative
onialismare examples.
learning.In its mostbasic
Nationalinterestsmay also changethrough
to
sense,to learnis to alterone's beliefsas a resultof new information;
Thisis a sparedefinition,
or skillbystudyorexperience.
developknowledge
policies,
whichdoes notimplythatthenew beliefslead to moreeffective
is that
muchless to morallysuperiorones. The advantageofthisdefinition
a givenset of
withouthavingto analyzewhether
learning
can be identified
changesin beliefsled to "more effective"policies,whateverthatwould
mean.
of"learning."Indeed,learning
Yet thisis nottheonlypossibledefinition
One sourceofconfusion
is a slippery
conceptbecauseithas manymeanings.
themoralquality
derivesfromthenotionthat"learning"impliesimproving
usage,peoplecan "learn" to do evilas
ofone's behavior.Yet in ordinary
to buildand deployoffensive
strategies,
wellas good: to deviseblitzkrieg
whodiscusslearning
genocide.Social scientists
nuclearweapons,to commit
neednotidentify
it withmorallyimprovedaction.
A more seriousconfusionarises because, in social science, a broad
we have
definition
of learningcoexistsuneasilywiththe spare definition
of an inoffered.In its broaderusage, learningcarriesthe connotation
It is markedbya
withone's environment.
creasedabilityto cope effectively
underto "complex,integrated
shiftfromoverlysimplegeneralizations
thathelpedus
forinsightful
comments
toWilliam
JaroszandLisa Martin
48. We areindebted
theissuesin thissection.
to clarify

Organization
750 International
todetail."49ErnstB. Haas, whohas
inrealisticattention
standings
grounded
of learningfortheoriesof
been the leaderin advocatingthe importance
whenstates
internationally
learning
occurring
relations,sees
international
interdepenof
strategic
in
a
situation
their
enmeshment
"becomeawareof
the
to
redefine
used
knowledge
is
occurs,
"new
dence."50Whenlearning
of
of
understood
causes
Awareness
newly
the
national
interest.
contentof
more
effecand
different,
in
the
of
adoption
results
usually
effects
unwanted
tive,meansto attainone's ends.""51
attainment
ofone's ends,
If we definelearningto includemoreeffective
as
forresearcharise.In a complexrealmsuch international
newdifficulties
even sometimeaftertheevent,
politics,we maynotbe able to determine,
"lessons of history"and inaptook
Misread
place.
whethersuchlearning
leaders
to failto attaintheirgoals.52
often
caused
have
analogies
propriate
learned
from
theexperienceof MunichTruman
S.
Did thelessonHarry
whereittookplace-make
be
of
had
to
regardless
stopped
thataggression
when
NorthKorea attacked
able
make
wise
decisions
to
himmoreor less
learned
the
lessons
American
Did
policymakers
the Southin June1950?
make
intervention
the
of
Chinese
dangers
duringthe Korean War about
were
forces
when
American
military
decision-makers
themmoreeffective
in
the
control
1970s
of
When
critics
arms
in
the
mid-1960s?
sentto Vietnam
forcestruclearnedthattheSovietswouldnotsimplyimitateU.S. strategic
and
American
less
able
to
more
security
become
or
protect
tures,did they
becases,
In
each
of
these
the
administration?
Reagan
during
worldpeace
inbecame
and
policymakers
altered
as
a
result
of
experience,
were
liefs
in
which
of
they
aware
of
the
networks
interdependence
strategic
creasingly
were enmeshed;but whethervaluableknowledgeor skillwas acquired,
remainsa matterof controversy.
enablingthemto act moreeffectively,
relations,we must
In conducting
researchon learningin international
thatitclarifies
are
We
believe
which
definition
of
we
using.
learning
specify
new
beliefs
through
with
of
to
the
definition-alteration
spare
thinking begin
easily.
relatively
thusdefined,
canbe identified
sincelearning,
informationAs Haas suggests,one formof such learningis increasingawarenessof
Underwhatconditionssuch learningleads to
strategicinterdependence.
thenbecomesan empiricaland theoretical
moreeffective
goal-attainment
one.
it
rather
thana definitional
as
should
be,
question,
Press),p. 143;also
Learn?(New York:Pergamon
Can Governments
49. LloydEtheredge,
"Government
Learning:AnOverview,"inSamuelLong,ed.,HandbookofPoliticalBehavior,
vol. 2 (New York:PlenumPress,1981),pp. 73-161.
of
50. ErnstB. Haas, "WhyWe StillNeed theUnitedNations:TheCollectiveManagement
Affairs
No. 26 (Berkeley:
International
Conflict,1945-1984,"PolicyPaperin International
ofInternational
Institute
Studies,1986),p. 68.
Regimes,"World
and International
51. ErnstB. Haas, "WhyCollaborate?Issue-Linkage

Politics 32 (April 1980), p. 390. See also JohnD. Steinbruner,The CyberneticTheoryof Deci-

and
N.J.: Princeton
Press,1974),and RobertJervis,Perception
sion (Princeton,
University

Misperceptionin InternationalPolitics (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976).

in Time(New York:FreePress,1986).
52. RichardNeustadtandErnestMay, Thinking

Powerand independence751
Whenwe analyzegovernmental
learning,
we have to considercomplexities of organizational,political,and psychologicalprocesses. Policyrelevant learning is an organizationalas well as a psychological
whose
andpoliticalpowerdetermine
phenomenon.
Shiftsin socialstructure
musthave an institutional
organizations
learningmatters.Furthermore,
iflessonslearnedbyone cohortareto
procedures
memory
andsocialization
be assimilated
by another.A criticalquestionforresearchis howdifferent
ofthe
and opportunities
theconstraints
setsofelitesperceiveand redefine
goalsandmeansofstates.Whydid
international
systemandtheappropriate
and AdolfHitlerdefinesuchdifferent
Ottovon Bismarck,KaiserWilhelm,
Wilsonand
forGermany?Whydid Presidents
interests
and opportunities
in Europeso differently-and
whywas
CoolidgedefineAmericaninterests
in 1940,oreven1936,
D. Roosevelt'sviewon thisissueso different
Franklin
becauseof sysredefined
thanit was in 1933?To whatextentare interests
redefined
becauseleadtemicordomesticchanges?How muchareinterests
ers and the coalitionssupporting
themchange,or because the views of
peoplewhoremaininpowerchange?Andifthelatter,towhatextentdo the
transnational
contactsand coalitionsstressedin liberaltheoriescontribute
thatwe observe?
to thelearning
A keyquestionforfutureresearchconcernstheimpactof international
and continupoliticalprocesseson learning.Some learningis incremental
learningoccurswhenbureaucraciesor eliteslearnthat
ous. Incremental
certainapproachesworkbetterthanothers.International
regimesprobably
they
learning
becausein suchsettings
rolein incremental
playa significant
fornationalbureaucracies;
2)
can: 1) changestandardoperating
procedures
forsubnationalactorsand improved
presentnew coalitionopportunities
conofparticipants
through
access forthirdparties;3) changetheattitudes
withrules,
aboutcompliance
tactswithin
institutions;
4) provideinformation
aboutothers'behavior;and 5) helpto de-linkone
whichfacilitates
learning
learningwith specializedgroupsof
issue fromothers,thus facilitating
Some learning,by contrast,resultsfromlargediscontinuous
negotiators.
eventsor crisessuchas Munich,theGreatDepression,or theinvasionof
Even crisis-induced
maybe facilitated
byinstitutions;
learning
Afghanistan.
theseinstitutions
regimes,
domesticpoliticalparmayincludeinternational
Contactfacilitated
by international
regimes-among
ties,or bureaucracies.
and betweengovernments
and international
secretariatsgovernments,
learning
oflargeevents.Whether
mayhelpspreada commoninterpretation
is incremental
ordiscontinuous,
regimesmayplaya rolebycreattherefore,
andnorms
Theprinciples
orreinforcing
institutional
memories.
ing,altering,
ofregimesmaybe internalized
groupsandthusbecomepartof
byimportant
and regimesthemselves
thebeliefsystemsthatfilter
provide
information;
information
thatalterstheway keyparticipants
in thestatesee cause and
effectrelationships.
AxelCooperationcan occurwithoutregimesor evenovertnegotiation.

752 International
Organization
rod has shownthatit can evolveas actorsdefinetheirself-interests
(and
in responseto others'strategies
choosenewstrategies)
ofreciprocity.
Furwill promote
thereis no assurancethatrulesand institutions
thermore,
learning,
orthatiftheydo promote
learning
inonepartofa relationship,
the
learning
willspilloverbeneficially
intootherareas. Butlookingat internaavenuesforexplorationalpoliticsin termsofregimesdoes suggestfruitful
tionand important
questionsthatare not alwayscapturedby the usual
approaches.Why has learningbeen fasterin some areas and slowerin
of institutions,
suchas
others?Whenhas learningled to thedevelopment
do suchinstituinternational
regimes,andwhenhas itnot?Whatdifference
or impeding
tionsmake?To whatextentare domesticfactorsfacilitating
learning
affected
by international
regimes?Can societiestakeadvantageof
crises to create new regimesat crucialmoments,thusinstitutionalizing
learning?53
We do notknowtheanswersto thesequestions-buttheanswersmatter.
Conclusion
The researchprogramsuggestedby Powerand Interdependence
has been,
inourview,a fruitful
one. Although
we, as wellas others,haveoccasionally
ofopposingviews,andvagueness
beenguiltyofexaggeration,
stereotyping
aboutsomeofourowntheoriesor evidence,theresearchprogram
thatwe
usefulfurther
research.It is nowconvenhelpedto develophas stimulated
tionalto analyzeinterdependence
as a political,as well as an economic,
and to examinepatternsof interdependence
phenomenon,
by issue-area.
The conceptionsofbargaining
and linkageused bypoliticalscientists
have
and
and moresensitiveto contextual
variations
becomemoresophisticated
thelimitedfungibility
reofpowerresources.The conceptof international
in
gimeshas fosteredresearchon the evolutionof rulesand institutions
worldpoliticsand,to someextent,on theimpactofsuchrulesand institutionson statebehavior.
Yet therehavebeenfailures
as wellas successesinthisresearchprogram.
It seemsdifficult
to understand
changesin regimes,and in statepolicies,
without
oflearning;
remains
havinga theory
yettheveryconceptoflearning
andno one has developeda coherent
oflearning
ininterambiguous,
theory
nationalpolitics.Furthermore,
less has been donewiththeliberalthanthe
realisthalfofourattempted
synthesis.
We haveonlypartially
incorporated
theliberalemphasison institutions,
andregularized
interdependence,
transnationalcontactsintoa sophisticated,
systematic
analysisof processand
thatthisshouldbe a goal of farsighted
53. For an argument
policymakers,
see Robert0.
KeohaneandJosephS. Nye,Jr.,"Two CheersforMultilateralism,"
ForeignPolicy61 (Fall
1985).

Powerand independence753
has
in worldpolitics.The conceptof complexinterdependence
structure
we havepaidtoolittleatteninparticular,
beenbypassedormisinterpreted;
processesshape
of domesticand international
tionto how a combination
to domesticpolitics,and itslinks
The needformoreattention
preferences.
politics,leads us to believethatresearchat the systemic
to international
returns.
levelalonemayhave reacheda pointofdiminishing
and
betweentheconstraints
nowon theinterplay
We needto concentrate
andits
bothitsstructure
including
system,
oftheinternational
opportunities
actorswithin
heldby influential
of interests
process,and theperceptions
change,as a
states.We need to examinehow conceptionsof self-interest
or
or grouplearning,
individual
institutions,
resultofevolvinginternational
willrequiredynamicanalysis,butdomesticpoliticalchange.This effort
blurring
research;and itwillentailthefurther
tressedby detailedempirical
relationsand comparative
ofboundariesbetweenthefieldsofinternational
thenextdecadecouldbe
politics.Forthosewillingto takeup thechallenge,
an excitingtimeforscholarship.