ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Poli Review 092015)

Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal

does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated
of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as
distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the
offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative
offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense
charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for
the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The Civil Service
Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated
declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where
the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often
described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this
case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his
bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) never gave him referrals to continue his
medications as recommended by the foreign doctor despite his call on 8 July 2003
to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical
evaluation abroad, Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for
his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and
sickness allowance. Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
185352, August 10, 2011.
Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is that public
officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. This is otherwise
known as the no work-no pay principle. However, back salaries may be awarded
even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees
based on the constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. In order,
however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with: (a) the
employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension must be
unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were present. The first condition was
met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of
reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log
out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure
to render overtime work) that he was charged with. The second condition was met
as the respondents committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor
suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand. In sum, the respondent
is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to

his former position i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending
appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the
respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The Civil Service Commission vs.
Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
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Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive
suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii)
preventive suspension pending appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of
preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately
exonerated. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858,
August 9, 2011.

CSC VS. CRUZ [G.R. NO. 187858; AUGUST 9, 2011] (Exoneration)

Doctrine: If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of
lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered
exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains
the same.
Facts: The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water
District (CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD
General Manager (GM ) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and
damaging statement against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors
which stemmed from the respondents act of claiming overtime pay despite his
failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three working
days. GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the
expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of
the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty,
and dismissed him from the service. The CSC however reversed the ruling and
stated that respondent should not be held liable for grave misconduct.
Issue: Whether the respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his
reinstatement to his former position.
Held: The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government
employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the
exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete
exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the
offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have
been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee

cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the
lesser penalty remains the same.

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MARTINEZ VS. VILLANUEVA[G.R. NO. 169196. JULY 6, 2011] (Prohibited

Loans)
Doctrine: Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which prohibits public officials and
employees to solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of
their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office is malum
prohibitum.
Facts: Petitioner Martinez is the General Manager of Claveria Agri-Based Multi
-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.(CABMPCI) while respondent Villanueva is the Assistant
Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Regional Office
No. 02, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Respondent solicited several loans from
CABMPCI. The Ombudsman later found thatRespondent abused her position when
she solicited a loan fromCABMPCI despite the fact that she is disqualified by its bylaws. The relevant provision under whichrespondent was charged is Section 7(d) of
R.A. No. 6713 which reads:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts Public officials and employees shall
not solicit or accept directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course
of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated
by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their
office.
On appeal, Respondent argued that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
erred in treating the loans he obtained from CABMPCI as a prohibited loan under
Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 because she was an official of the CDA. Respondent

argued that although Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 prohibits all public officials and
employees from soliciting or accepting loans in connection with any operation being
regulated by her office, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 6938 or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines allows qualified officials and employees to
become members of cooperatives and naturally, to avail of the attendant privileges
and benefits of membership. She contended that it would be absurd if CDA officials
and employees who are eligible to apply for membership in a cooperative would be
prohibited from availing loans. On appeal, the CA that respondent should not have
been held liable for grave misconduct because of the supposed failure of Martinez
to show undue influence
Issues:
1.Whether the Cooperative Code impliedly repealed Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.
2.Whether the prohibition under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 requires undue
influence.

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Held:
1.NO. True, the Cooperative Code allows CDA officials and employees to become me
mbers of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant
to membership. However, it should not betaken as creating in favor of CDA officials
and employees an exemption from the coverage of
Section7(d), R.A. No. 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to
membership in acooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all
cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to
their members. Thus, the limitation on the benefits which respondent may enjoy in
connection with her alleged membership in CABMPCI does not lead to absurd results
and does not render naught membership in the cooperative or render R.A. No. 6938
ineffectual contrary to respondents assertions. We find that such limitation is but
a necessary consequence of the privilege of holding a public office and is akin to the
other limitations that, although interfering with a public servants private rights, are
nonetheless deemed valid in light of the public trust nature of public employment.
2.
NO. Said prohibition in Section 7(d) is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of
that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is
immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the
mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of

R.A. No. 6713.Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA

official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability.

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DUMDUMA VS. CSC [GR NO. 182606, OCTOBER 4, 2011] (Defense of good
faith)
Doctrine: Only those who can live up to the constitutional exhortation that public
office is a public trust deserve the honor of continuing in public service.
Facts: Petitioner, a PNP Officer in Leyte, took the Career Service Professional
Examination in 1998. In 1999, he filled out a Personal Data Sheet pursuant to his
promotional appointment as Police Inspector and stated that he passed the Career
Service Professional Examination Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City with a
rating of 81%. His appointment was forwarded to the PNP-CSC for verification and
approval where it was then discovered that he did not have the proper civil service
eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His appointment was
disapproved on the ground of spurious eligibility and was charged with Dishonesty.
Petitioner denied the charged and alleged that a certain Dilodilo, who was allegedly
a retired CSC director promised him total support in his examination and that he
was in good faith when he wrote the information of his eligibility in his PDS. The CSC
found him guilty of Dishonesty and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
service,forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. He reiterated his defense of good faith in his
appeal to the CA, but the appellate court was unconvinced. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner may be dismissed from service for falsification of his
eligibility for appointment purposes.
Held: Yes. The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the undisputed facts, as
revealed by the evidence, make out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma.
When Dumdumas claim of eligibility was contradicted by the CSC Register of
Eligibles and the List of Passing/Failing Examinees, it became incumbent upon
Dumduma to explain why he made the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS
entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and made in the regular course of
official business. In explaining his action, however, Dumduma dug a deeper hole
from which he could not extricate himself. Dumdumas contention is in start
contrast to his admissions and does not merit belief. The concept of good faith in
administrative cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of
intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquire; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of
all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render a transaction
unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although
this is something internal, we can ascertain a persons intention not from his own
protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct
and outward acts.

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DANILO MORO V. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO (Restoration in Position

after suspension)
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Generoso, Chief Accountant of the AFP
General Headquarters Accounting Center with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the service. By virtue of AFP Special Order 91 dated April 1,
2006, , the AFP reassigned Generoso to the PAF Accounting Center. His position was
taken over by Danilo, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy. On August 30,
2006, Generoso was place under preventive suspension. He was eventually
dismissed from the service on February 5, 2007, which he appealed to the Court of
Appeals. After the lapse of his six-month suspension (April 2, 2007), Generoso
attempted to reassume his position at the AFP General Headquarters but was
unable to do so, since Danilo declined to yield the position. Generoso then filed an
action for quo warranto before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that Danilo was
merely detailed at the GHQ Accounting Center when he placed under preventive

suspension, hence after the lapse of his suspension, he is entitled to reassume the
position being held by Danilo, who is a usurper. On his part, Danilo claimed that his
assignment to the position was a permanent appointment, Generoso having been
assigned to the PAF Accounting Center even before his suspension.
The RTC dismissed Generosos petition, holding that Danilo is holding the position
on a permanent appointment. Generosos reassignment to the PAF is valid up to one
year, and since his suspension took only six months, he is still required to report to
the PAF Accounting Center. Upon petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
the latter reversed the RTC decision, holding that SO 91 was void because it did not
indicate the duration of the reassignment. Further, the order of dismissal of
Generoso was appealed to the CA, hence, not yet final and executory. Danilo thus
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court: An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by
the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who
filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the
position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on March
11, 2007. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center
was valid, the same could not exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took
effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31, 2007. By
then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ Chief
Accountant.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he
is entitled to the subject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same
has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be
dismissed.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007,
months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5,
2007. As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even
pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo
warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting
Center.
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