G.R. No.

L-48944 February 26, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADULFO TERROBIAS, defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes convicting the accused,
Adulfo Terrobias, of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
acknowledge the offspring of Delia Bonion as his natural child with all the rights granted her by law; and to
indemnify the victim, Delia C. Bonion, in the sum of P10,000.00 as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
to pay the costs. 1
To the charge of rape, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He does not, therefore, deny the truth of the
testimony of the complainant, the 17-year old Delia C. Bonion, as to her sexual experience except only to
disclaim any participation therein with his assertion of never having had sexual intercourse with her. The
testimony of the complainant on how she was sexually assaulted, and the events that intervened thereafter,
may, therefore, be quoted from the appealed decision which set forth the said testimony as follows:
... Complainant Delia C. Bonion narrated how on the night of February 17, 1977 as she was fast
asleep because of the days work, she woke up to find Adulfo Terrobias already on top of her
holding her hands and when she resisted was told not to shout under threats of harm. As Delia
continued to struggle, Adulfo covered her mouth with a wad of cotton soaked with medicine
which smell weakened her and caused her to lose consciousness. When she came to, Delia still
saw Adulfo getting his pants and went out the room. Still laboring under the fear of harm
because Adulfo warned her that nobody should know what he did, Delia continued her usual
household work, awaiting the arrival of her parents. Adulfo did not take breakfast at the table the
following morning, Delia's mother visited her February 27 and she confided to her what Adulfo
did. Florencia Terrobias was informed by Dolores C. Bonion same day within the hearing of
Delia, and after condemning Adulfo as a salvaje her Lola Insay asked the two to wait for the
arrival of Gregorio Terrobias who was in Naga City. The defense miserably failed to present
Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias to rebut the claim of Delia and Dolores about the report of the
RAPE to both of them. Neither did the defense deny that Gregorio after knowing his son's
perfidy told complainant and her mother Dolores to have the child removed or aborted thru the
help of an 'arbulario'. The proposal of abortion refused, Dolores demanded that Adulfo marry her
daughter which the Terrobias Fay scorned. Delia was thereafter taken away by her own parents.
The case went to Court. In retaliation, Dolores and her husband were summarily removed as
tenant-encargado. 2
The assault took place in the house of appellant's parents, Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias, at Bato,
Catanduanes, where complainant was a house helper, her parents being the "encargado" 3 of the properties of
the aforesaid spouses, whom Delia called "Lolo Goyong" and "Lola Insay", 4 and treated as her foster parents.
Appellant, then single and thirty-three years of age, was living with his parents in the same house. Delia's room
was between appellant's room and that of the latter's mother. 5 It is in complainant's room that the rape took
place.
From her plain and straightforward testimony, We have no doubt as to complainant's candor and sincerity. A
17-year old girl at the time, she could not have merely concocted the story she narrated in court, directed
against a thirty-three-year-old son of her masters. Only truth and a feeling of deep grievance could have
impelled her to charge appellant with the grave offense committed against her, even at a price she has to pay
in terms of her honor being exposed or even tarnished not to mention the discharge of her parents as
"encargados" of appellant's parents.
The circumstances as duly established following the sexual assault could not but strengthen belief in
complainant's honesty and truthfulness. As soon as she had the chance to report the offense done her to
someone of her fullest confidence and who could look at her plight with sympathy and understanding, she did
so. This was on February 27, 1977 on her mother's first visit to her after the incident when she told her mother

about the harrowing experience. 6 The mother, in turn, told appellant's mother what the latter's son did to her
daughter. Right after hearing the daughter's whole story, appellant's mother, instead of expressing disbelief in
what was told her, reproached her son for the act, calling him "salvage", and suggested that Delia remain until
the matter is reported to her husband who was then in Naga City. 7 When the father of appellant heard of the
incident as narrated to him by complainant's mother, he told the latter to return on April 2 to afford him time to
investigate the matter. On her return as agreed, Delia's mother told appellant's father that Delia was on the
family way. Thus informed, appellant's father suggested abortion by an "arbulario", 8 to which Delia's mother
disagreed, and instead demanded that appellant marry Delia who was with her. Appellant's father answered in
Bicol: "Carabaos should be with carabaos and cows with cows." 9
On the same date, April 2, 1977, Mrs. Bonion took her daughter Delia to Virac to seek advice of her aunt who
suggested that a medical certificate be secured as to the condition of Delia. Dr. Masagca who examined Delia
found her one and one-half month pregnant, her last menstruation being on January 29, 1977.
Because of the complaint filed by Delia and her parents who forthwith reported what happened to their
daughter to the PC at Virac the Terrobias spouses discharged Delia's parents as their "encargado". 10 Delia
later gave birth to a baby girl on October 28, 1977. 11
With the complainant pointing to appellant as the person who ravished her in her room in appellant's residence
on the night of February 17, 1977 the latter's alibi of not being in his house on said time and day because he
attended the birthday part of Teodulo dela Providencia in San Andres, Catanduanes, some 25 kilometers from
Bato where he had to spend the night Teodulos house because he had drunk too much is unavailing. No
motive was given why the complainant should falsely charge appellant with so grave an offense, considering
that she had treated appellant s parents with so much affection that she called their, "Lolo" and "Lola".
Complainant might have incurred in some inconsistencies, in her testimony during the trial in relation to
statements she gave before the trial as appellant tried graphically to demonstrate in his brief (p. 11). They refer,
however, to minor details that do not detract from the truth of the central fact of rape having been committed by
appellant on the complainant. They arise from or are caused by, the natural weakness, or even fickleness, of
memory and rather strengthen credibility, as they erase suspicion of coaching or of a rehearsed testimony. On
the important and decisive details, however, she was consistent in all the statements she made, such as
appellant's being already on top of her when she woke up, how she resisted his action despite appellant's
threat, which was followed by the latter pressing a wad of cotton soaked with medicine in her mouth and nose
which rendered her unconscious, her feeling pain in, and the bleeding of, her private parts, her "bra" being torn
and her skirt, rolled up.
On the other hand, complainant's mother's testimony that on her first visit to her daughter at her masters'
residence after the incident, Delia reported to her the outrage committed on her, and appellant's mother called
her son a savage on being informed of what he did, while the father advised the removal of the fetus by an
"arbulario," were not rebutted by appellant's parents. They did not take the witness stand despite that the
aforesaid testimony against them lent full credence to complainant's story. The acts of appellant's parents as
aforestated would show that they had no reason to disbelieve said story, specially considering that the father
had all the time he asked for to investigate the matter. Indeed, a young simple barrio girl like Delia could not
have fabricated a charge of rape against a man twice her age, the son of her masters at that, for whom she
had none but affectionate respect.
Appellant claims of having been denied his constitutional right by the mere fact that the trial of the case took
only four days is entirely without basis. He had presented all his evidence which was duly submitted by his
counsel who never asked for more time to do so. His right to cross-examine the witnesses against him was
exercised to the fullest.
Neither is his claim of lack of authority of the trial judge to decide the instant case with any legal support to
stand on. While by the Resolution of the Supreme Court 12 the authority of the trial judge to try criminal cases in
Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes was up to March 2, 1978, it does not preclude
submission of memoranda even after such date, as long as the trial was completed, and the order to file
memorandum given, before the expiration of his authority to try the case. Much less was the trial judge
divested of the authority to decide the case which he can do anytime after the trial of the case, under Section
51 of the Judiciary Act, the filing of memoranda not being a part of the trial, nor is the memorandum itself an
essential, much less an indispensable, pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. It is intended

primarily to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and the evidence, and should
not, therefore, be the cause for the loss of the authority of the judge who heard the case to decide it.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the judgment appealed from being in accordance
with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 178778

Present:

- versus -

T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR.,

Accused-Appellant.

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114,
which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 18, convicting appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. of the crime of parricide in Criminal Case No. 2002587.
Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information [3] dated June 7, 2002, as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 2002, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, more or less,
at Lanis[i] Patrol Base, Lanis[i], Municipality of Claveria, Province of Misamis Oriental, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, choked and strangled the neck of his legitimate wife
Betty Angus, thereby causing her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty[4] to the offense charged.
The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-trial, to wit:
1.

That the accused and the victim were legally married.

2.

That the incident happened on January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis
Oriental.

3.

That T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the
Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. [5]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo A. Padulla, Staff Sergeant Romeo Rhea,
Dr. Alex R. Uy, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at, and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members Romeo I.
Malaran, Leoncio P. Jintapa and Alejo O. Carpio. Their testimonies may be synthesized into the following narration of
events:
The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on January 9, 2002. Appellant
fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later, CAFGU members Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2)
arguing about appellants relationship with another woman. Appellant was also seen go out of his bunker
aroundmidnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables for dinner.[6]
The following day, January 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had breakfast at the mess hall with Jintapa,
Malaran and Carpio. As appellant was not with his wife, Jintapa reminded appellant to call her. When appellant returned,
he told them that he would just leave some food for his wife because she was still sleeping.
After eating, Malaran and Jintapa asked for permission to fetch water near the barangay elementary school about
a kilometer away. While they were gone, Carpio went to the outpost and started cleaning his firearm. Appellant went to
the comfort room then decided to join Carpio at the outpost. On his way to the outpost, appellant passed by his bunker
and peeped through the door which was open by about 1 inches. [7] Carpio was able to see the door because it was facing
the outpost.[8] A few minutes later, Malaran and Jintapa returned and joined appellant and Carpio at the outpost. The four
(4) shared funny stories and joked for a while, after which Carpio went to the mess hall while Jintapa went to his
bunker. Malaran and appellant decided to continue their conversation at the mess hall. [9]
On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not able to open the door at once because
something was blocking it from the inside. When appellant pushed the door, Malaran saw the back of the victim in a
slanting position and leaning at the door. Appellant went inside and almost immediately shouted for help. Malaran and
Carpio saw appellant embracing his wife. They helped appellant carry Bettys body to the bed. Malaran observed that her
skin below the jaw was reddish and her knees were covered with mud. [10] There was food on the table and a multicolored tubao[11] was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a meter away from the victim. The lower tip of thetubao was
in a circular form and was hanging about four (4) feet from the ground. They heard appellant repeatedly say, Why did
you do this? How can I explain this to our children?[12]
Carpio called Jintapa and told him that something had happened to Betty. This was around 10:00 a.m. When
Jintapa entered appellants bunker, he noticed that the tubaowas still hanging from the roof. He also saw appellant
embracing his wife and crying hard. Appellant exerted effort to revive his wife by pumping her chest. Malaran tried to
help by massaging Bettys hands, feet, and legs. When Carpio and Malaran left to look for a vehicle, Jintapa took
Malarans place and also massaged Bettys hands and feet which were already cold. Appellant, who continued to cry very
hard, covered Bettys neck with his tubao and draped a blanket over her body. The tubao that was hanging on the roof was
not removed until Corporal Teodoro Guibone ordered a meat collector to remove it. [13]
At the Claveria Municipal Hospital, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at concluded that Betty was already dead upon
arrival for she no longer had a pulse. She asked appellant as to the cause of her death, and after two (2) minutes, he replied
that maybe she suffered a heart attack as she had a history of heart ailment. Dr. At-at wanted to thoroughly examine Bettys
body but she was not able to do so because appellant was crying very hard. A commotion also took place at the hospital
when a soldier, later identified as Sgt. Romeo Rhea, tried to box appellant, saying that appellants crying was only an act.
[14]

Rhea and appellant were companions at Bravo Company, while Betty was Rheas neighbor in Basilan. Appellant is also

the godfather of Rheas child. According to Rhea, he knew about appellants illicit relationship with a certain Jennifer Abao,
with whom appellant had been sweethearts for about three (3) years prior to the incident on January 10, 2002.[15]

Dr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory of Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City, conducted the autopsy. His examination revealed the following findings:
HEAD AND NECK
1.
2.

Abrasion: Right Mandibular Region: measuring 4 x 2 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior midline.
Ligature mark: extending bilaterally around the neck at the level below the hyoid bone,
measuring 42 x 1 cm., bisected by the anterior midline, directed horizontally and
posteriorward. Larynx and Trachea are markedly congested and hemorrhagic. [16]

Dr. Uy stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking her last meal due to the presence of partially
digested food inside the stomach. [17] He believed that the cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation and not by
hanging, as the victim did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone and there was no hemorrhage above the
trachea and larynx. He explained that the sudden gravitational force would usually cause a fractured bone. Dr. Uy
clarified that the absence of a fractured bone would only happen if the person hangs herself very slowly without a sudden
force or if she was in a kneeling position.[18]
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Angeles S. Ociones, Senior Police Officer 1 Victorino Busalla,
Cheryl Ann A. Siarez, Master Sergeant Benedicto Palma, Emeliano Bolonias, Bobby Padilla Lopez and appellant. Taken
together, their testimonies present the following narrative:
Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only daughter of Betty and appellant. In the afternoon of January 9, 2002, at
around 1:30 p.m., Betty went inside Cheryl Anns bedroom and told her to be serious in her studies. Betty also intimated
to Cheryl Ann that she wanted to go to a far place where there would be no more rumors, no backbiting, and nobody
would recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City. Betty disembarked at Villanueva,
Misamis Oriental to transfer to a passenger jeepney going to Claveria. [19]
From Villanueva to Claveria, Betty sat beside Angeles Ociones, an old friend, in the front seat of the jeepney. She
confided to Ociones about her jealousy towards her husband. She also mentioned that she was angry that she was not able to
catch him and his mistress. Ociones advised Betty to confront her husband regarding the rumors she had heard, as it was
common to hear such rumors every time a soldier is assigned to a place away from home. Betty revealed that she planned to
commit suicide because of the many stories she had heard about her husband. This was the third time she shared thoughts of
suicide. Betty further said she wanted to go to a far place where nobody would recognize her. At around 7:00 p.m., Betty
arrived at Lanisi Patrol Base.[20]
Appellant met his wife at the gate and went with her to his bunker. Appellant testified that they talked about only
three (3) things: his whereabouts on January 7, 2002, the conference in Mat-i, Claveria, and whether he was able to borrow
money for the renovation of their house. He later admitted, however, that Betty also confronted him about his relationship
with another woman. At around 11:00 p.m. they went to bed. He asked Betty if she has eaten dinner but she said she did not
want to eat. Nonetheless, he brought her some food then went back to sleep. He woke up the following day at around 6:00
a.m. and heard Emiliano Bolonias knocking at his door. Bolonias confirmed that when the door was opened, he saw Betty
sleeping on the bed. Since Betty was still asleep, appellant suggested that they proceed to the mess hall to talk about their
financial dealings. He did not lock the door to his bunker when they left. At around 8:00 a.m. appellant went back to his
bunker to invite his wife to have breakfast with them.[21]
After having breakfast, appellant, Malaran, Carpio and Jintapa went to the outpost while Bolonias left the patrol
base. Malaran and Jintapa asked permission to fetch water but later arrived and stayed at the outpost. Appellant went to his
bunker and found the same locked from inside. He knocked and called his wife, but there was no response. He forcibly
opened the door and saw his wife hanging with the use of a tubao which was tied at the purlins of the roof. Her body was

hanging and almost in a kneeling position. He shouted for help as he untied the knot around Bettys neck but was not able to
carry her since she was heavy. The other CAFGU members helped appellant put Betty on the bed. Malaran massaged
Bettys feet while appellant massaged her chest and even did a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When the vehicle appellant
had requested arrived, Betty was brought to the hospital. The tubao that was used by the victim was left hanging at the
purlins.[22]
That same day, Cheryl Ann was informed that her mother was in serious condition. She was fetched and brought to
Claveria, Misamis Oriental, where she saw her father crying. Appellant told Cheryl Ann that her mother had committed
suicide. The burial was originally scheduled on January 16, 2002 so her grandmother could attend. Bettys relatives who
attended the wake did not attend the burial because they got angry when appellant did not allow them to bring Bettys body to
Basilan. Her grandfather, SPO4 Cesar Ocay, told Cheryl Ann to bury her mothers body in Basilan so that they will not file a
case against appellant. Cheryl Ann believes her mother committed suicide.[23]
M/Sgt. Benedicto Palma testified that on January 15, 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., he was at the funeral parlor of
Poblacion, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, assisting Dr. Alex Uy, who was conducting the autopsy on Bettys body. When
he asked Dr. Uy regarding his findings, the doctor replied that appellant had nothing to do with the death of his wife, and
that she indeed committed suicide. [24] Aside from appellant, his brothers-in-law, Edgardo De Vera and Mariano De Vera,
Sgt. Rhea, and appellants sister-in-law, Jerry, were also present at the funeral parlor when Dr. Uy announced his findings
that Betty committed suicide.[25]
On May 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Parricide, punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, including its accessory penalties. He is also directed to pay
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as indemnity, to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, May 20, 2003.[26]
Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[27] which modified Rules 122, 124 and
125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to
this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case
was referred to the CA for intermediate review.
On December 5, 2006, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC. The fallo of
the CA decision reads:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision convicting T/SGT. PORFERIO R.
ANGUS, JR. of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is additionally
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and P50,000 as moral damages
on top of the decreed indemnity. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Hence, this appeal. In his brief,[29] appellant raises a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and how she was killed. He asserts that
the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen Betty alive on the night of January 9, 2002. Thereafter, they
heard the couple arguing about a woman. The following morning Betty was found dead. Although there was more than

one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that the combination thereof leads to the
inevitable conclusion that he killed his wife.
We find merit in appellants contentions.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and must not
rely on the weakness of the defense. [30] And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, the defense may logically
not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.[31]
We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court
draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. [32] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section
4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given
case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one (1) fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required. [33]
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is
more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one
(1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. [34]
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of the assailed
judgment of conviction. The crime of parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall
be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse.[35]
The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of January 9,
2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latters illicit relationship with another woman. The
following day, appellant went out of his bunker at around 6:00 oclock in the morning. He had breakfast at the mess area
with his companions, but went back to his bunker at around 8:00 oclock to ask his wife to join them for breakfast. When
he returned, he told his men that his wife could not join them for breakfast because she was still asleep. At around 10:00
a.m., appellant returned to his bunker followed by Malaran who saw the dead body of the victim.

The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to the
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied on the testimonies of
Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latters illicit relationship with another woman,
which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on
the night before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill his
wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of
appellants responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.
[36]

In the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to

convict him.[37]
Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a person hangs herself, most of the time there will be a fracture on the bone of
the neck because of the pressure caused by gravity that pulls the rope. However, he also testified that if the person hangs
herself slowly, there will be no fracture on her neck or hyoid bone. Thus, the fact that Betty did not sustain a fractured
bone on her neck or hyoid bone, as the doctor observed, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that appellant
strangled the victim. Given the evidence that the victim had intimated her wish to commit suicide a day before the
incident, it is not farfetched to conclude that she indeed chose to take her life.
An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds innocence may be doubted, for a
criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. And, if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one (1) of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction. That which is favorable to the accused should be considered. [38] After all, mas
vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.[39] Courts should be guided by the principle
that it would be better to set free ten (10) men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one (1)
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[40]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114 is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is
ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless detained for some other lawful
reasons, appellant is hereby ordered released immediately.
SO ORDERED.
ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164443

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 18, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecutions evidence. The evidence must be such that the
constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown and guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutorial burden is
not met when the circumstances can yield to different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a lack of moral certainty to support a
judgment of conviction.
This Petition for Review[1] assails the March 16, 2004 Decision[2] and the July 9, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of Six (6)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional minimum.
SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena), Cesar Masangkay (Cesar)
and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI)
which was incorporated in June 1990.[5]
On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for the Involuntary
Dissolution[6] of MFI for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and
Elizabeth.[7] The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged among others:
3.
At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused to be
prepared a Secretarys Certificate which states:
That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its
principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the
directors present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and adopted:
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay,
Bian, Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the corporation worth or valued
at P370,000.00 by way of a Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
xxxx
4.
Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged meeting of
the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.
xxxx
5.
Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed
another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a land (Lot
No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay is void.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning.
xxxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality
be waived.
The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.
Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian
Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.
x x x x[8]
The case remains pending to date.[9]
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the Board held on December 5, 1992 and
that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a
complaint for perjury[10] against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is primarily an intra-corporate
controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant to Section 6 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758. He also insisted
that there was a prejudicial question because the truth of the allegations contained in his petition for involuntary dissolution has yet to
be determined by the SEC. These defenses were sustained by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the complaint for perjury was
dismissed for lack of merit.[11]
It was however reinstated upon petition for review[12] before the Department of Justice.[13] Chief State Prosecutor Zenon L.
De Guia held that the petition for involuntary dissolution is an administrative case only and thus cannot possibly constitute a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also rejected the claim that the SEC has exclusive authority over the case. The Chief
State Prosecutor explained that the prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has jurisdiction only over criminal and civil
cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is not within the SECs authority. [14] Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary
investigation, which eventually resulted in the filing of the following information:
That sometime in the month of December 1992,[15] in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of perjury in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of Megatel Factors, Inc. based on
violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel Factors, Inc., Cesar Masangkay, Jr. and
Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a notary authorized to receive and administer oath and filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a
material matter when he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated September 1, 1993,
proposed by Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated because the alleged December 5, 1992, meetingnever
took place; and, b) the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious document, whereby the
respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, by exchanging the childs 3,014 square meters
lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the corporation, when in fact no consideration for the transfer was made as
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay or his guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been a stockholder of the Corporation at
any point in time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same statements he made in his petition
and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his evidence in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
are false.[16]

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59.
Eriberto filed a motion to quash,[17] insisting that it is the SEC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. He also argued
that the truth of the allegations contained in the information is still pending resolution in SEC Case No. 12-93-4650, thereby
constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury case.

The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.[18] It held that the fact that the parties to the criminal case are
mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not automatically make the case an intra-corporate dispute that is within the SEC
jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the parties are stockholders is merely incidental and that the subject of the case is a
criminal act and hence within the general jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of prejudicial question, the MeTC ruled that
the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth of the statements for which he is being indicted is a
matter of defense which the defendant may raise in the criminal case.
Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to assail the denial of
his motion to quash. The denial was affirmed.[19] He then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was denied for being a
wrong mode of appeal.[20]
Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment.[21] He then waived the
conduct of a pre-trial conference.[22]
During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole witness. [23] He testified that on December 5,
1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 oclock in the morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Bian,
Laguna. He presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details contained therein indicating that the Board
unanimously approved Magdalenas proposal to exchange her sons (Gilberto Masangkay [Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of
stock.[24] The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes belongs to Eriberto. [25] This allegedly belies
Eribertos statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize, and shows that he knew his statement to be
false because he had attended the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The prosecution also pointed out that in the proceedings
before the guardianship court to obtain approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified in support of the exchange.
[26]

The guardianship court subsequently approved the proposed transaction.[27] The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eribertos

signature as first party.[28]

As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution disputed this by again using the
minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of Gilberto will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares.
For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually take place. While he admitted signing,
reading and understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he explained that the minutes were only brought by Cesar and
Elizabeth to his house for signing, but there was no actual meeting.[29]
To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented Elizabeth, the MFI corporate secretary, who
could not remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any copy
thereof.
The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called for the MFI boards initial meeting
since its business operations started, to be held on November 9, 1993. Emphasizing the words initial meeting, Eriberto argued that
this proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the December 5, 1992 meeting) had ever taken place.
As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious and simulated for lack of
consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock certificates in favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth
corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.[30]
While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the guardianship court, Eriberto maintained
that he did so because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar that the exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He however
reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received any consideration for the exchange.

On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eribertos claim that the board had its first actual meeting only on November 9, 1993. It
explained that the November 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting since business operations began, because MFI obtained
permit to conduct business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first meeting ever held by the board of
directors. The prosecution presented the secretarys certificates of board meetings held on April 6, 1992[31] and September 5,
1992[32] -- both before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto.[33] At this time, business operations have not yet begun
because the companys hotel building was still under construction. The said secretarys certificates in fact show that MFI was still
sourcing additional funds for the construction of its hotel.[34]
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment[35] holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the December 5,
1992 meeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for
Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious, the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and execution of
the document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous
statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged and sentenced to imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and
medium, as minimum, to one year and one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as maximum.[36]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Eriberto appealed[37] his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which eventually affirmed the appealed
judgment.[38] The fallo of the Decision states that:
WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
59, Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime of perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[39]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in
the petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eribertos signatures on the two allegedly fictitious
documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in the December 5,
1992 meeting. Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in
his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition.[40]
The CA rejected petitioners argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that they were material because
petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary dissolution.[41]
The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the result of the petition for involuntary
dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal case, which can be resolved independently.[42]
The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was imprecise in its application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and one day of prision
correccional minimum.[43]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[44] which was denied.[45]
Hence, this petition.[46]

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for review:
I
WHETHER THERE WAS DELIBERATE ASSERTION OF FALSEHOOD
II
WHETHER THE TRUTHFUL ALLEGATION IN THE PETITION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING IS MATERIAL TO THE PETITION
III
WHETHER PERJURY COULD PROSPER WHILE THE MAIN CASE REMAINS PENDING[47]

Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to whether the prosecution was able to
prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 183 of the RPC provides:
False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties
provided therein.

For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be made under oath before a
competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a
material matter.[48]
The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are indeed present in the instant case. The
sworn statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the petition for involuntary
dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.
The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public [49]an officer duly authorized by law to administer
oaths. This verification was done in compliance with Section 121 of the Corporation Code.[50]
It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution
which are contested.
On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance
which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the
subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.[51]
Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the Corporate Code, which states:

Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. In addition and without prejudice
to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this Title, any stockholder of a close corporation
may, for any reason, compel the said corporation to purchase his shares at their fair value, which shall not be less
than their par or issued value, when the corporation has sufficient assets in his books to cover its debts and liabilities
exclusive of capital stock: Provided, That any stockholder of a close corporation may, by written petition to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, compel the dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the
directors, officers or those in control of the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being misapplied or
wasted.
He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:
xxxx
4.
Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the alleged meeting
of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.
xxxx
5.
Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
xxxx
The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.
xxxx
8.
The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and in conspiracy
with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegal because they constitute estafa through falsification of
documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
9.
Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of MFI,
including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted.
10.
MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this Honorable
Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New Corporation Code x x x.[52]

The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied upon in his petition for corporate
dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly
justify corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these statements are material to his petition for
involuntary dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.
The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioners statement that
the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting
in fact took place, i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time and conferred with each
other.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by
the accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that theDecember 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to
the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the petitioners statement in the petition for dissolution,
the meeting did not actually materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent with each other.
But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us
which of the two statements is actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally possible that

the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought
to his house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the prosecutions burden to
affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the
petition for dissolution) is the false one.
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent
or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the
two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.[53] The rationale
for requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is explained thus:
x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be
sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the
defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony
contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of
the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show
perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused.[54]

In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the minutes, that
the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant
Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is therefore not a neutral or disinterested
witness.[55] The prosecution did not present the testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have
testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any explanation why such testimony was not
presented. It likewise failed to present any evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were
physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably, the
prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the
petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the directors for the alleged December 5,
1992meeting. The lack of certainty as to the sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for
how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly notified that such a meeting would be taking
place?
The insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence is particularly glaring considering that the petitioner had already explained the
presence of his signature in the minutes of the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes
were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he believed that the proposed exchange of the
assets, which was the subject of the minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported the
approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that the petitioners statement denying the same was a deliberate
falsehood.
The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious reads:
5.
Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another fictitious document
known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of land (Lot
No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Masangkay is void.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx
(2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
xxxx
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality
be waived.
The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.
Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian
Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that the deed of exchange is fictitious. To
support the accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to the said Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the
minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and his participation in procuring the guardianship
courts approval of the transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious and that Eriberto knew it.
We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioners imputation of fictitiousness to the Deed of Exchange should not be
taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5 of his petition for involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange is simulated
and fictitious pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto Masangkay of his property without any
consideration at all. To justify his allegation that Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange, he stated in the same paragraph
that Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be the consideration for Gilbertos land). This fact
was subsequently proven by the petitioner through the corporate secretary Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in
favor of the stockholders. This testimony was never explained or rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, petitioners statement that the
exchange was simulated and fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own property without any consideration at
all cannot be considered a deliberate falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did
not receive consideration for the exchange of his land.
As importantly, petitioners statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary dissolution about the nature of the Deed
of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are susceptible of truth or falsity. They are his opinion
regarding the legal character of the Deed of Exchange. He opined that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious or simulated under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, because MFI supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue stocks to Gilberto in exchange for
his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure of consideration does not make a contract simulated or
fictitious),[56] but it is an opinion or legal conclusion nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an intentional false
statement of facts.[57]
We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not.[58] However, it is also at the heart of every criminal proceeding that every person is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the propriety of proceeding with the perjury
case while the civil case for corporate dissolution is pending.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay
is ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground of REASONABLE DOUBT.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG,
AMADEO VIERNES* AND SALVADOR BAMBILLA,accused-appellants.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by the appellants from the decision, dated March 23, 1992, of Branch 42 of the
Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City, finding them guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
On August 28, 1990, Estela Eng y Ulalan lodged her criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape
against Ninoy Malbog, Amado Viernes and an unnamed suspect (John Doe).
Filed by on August 29, 1990 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Daniel Terrado, the Original Complaint alleged:
That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and JOHN DOE, with violence and
intimidation against persons, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to
INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside, with the use of force, accused JOHN DOE have carnal
knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter. [1]
Upon arraignment thereunder on December 28, 1990, with the assistance of counsel de parte, Atty. Santiago
Marcella, Ninoy Malbog @ Saturnino Malbog and Amado Viernes entered negative pleas.
Appellant Salvador Bambilla, who was a member of the Philippine National Police (then known as
Integrated National Police) and whose case was first referred to the office of the Judge Advocate General
(JAGO), was included in the charge in the Amended Complaint, dated January 10, 1991, alleging:
That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and
SALVADOR BAMBILLA, with violence and intimidation against persons, confederating together, acting jointly and
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan,
by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside with the use
of force, accused SALVADOR BAMBILLA have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. [2]
With Bambilla pleading not guilty upon arraignment on June 17, 1991, trial proceeded.
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Estela Eng y Ulalan, and Dr. Rico
Reyes, the examining physician.
Estela Eng y Ulalan, who was 19 years old at the time of the incident and a nursing student at Lyceum
Northwestern University in Dagupan City, testified that at about six o clock in the morning of January 30, 1990,
she boarded a Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City to attend her classes at Northwestern University.
Appellant Salvador Bambilla also boarded the same bus and sat beside her. Upon reaching Dagupan, the bus
stopped in front of the Post Office. She was about to alight from the vehicle when Bambilla held her hand and
threatened her. Bambilla continued to hold her hand tightly even after they had alighted. While standing in front
of the Post Office, he told her that he would kill her if she shouted or made noise. Then, a blue car stopped in
front of them and Bambilla opened the door of the car, pushed her inside and also boarded. Once inside the
vehicle, she recognized appellant Ninoy Malbog as the driver. Seated beside him on the front seat was Amado
Viernes. She recognized Malbog because he was their former family driver, and she recognized Viernes only
by face until he was later identified. She shouted for help but kept quiet when Bambilla threatened her and
poked his gun at her waist.

Upon the order of Bambilla, Malbog drove the car to Calasiao and stopped in front of what she later came
to know as Inawa Lodge-Inn. Malbog drove the car into a garage, and a man immediately closed the gate after
which Viernes and Malbog went out of the car and left while Bambilla pushed her (victim) out and forced her to
go up a staircase. Upon reaching the door of a room, Bambilla pushed her inside, followed her and locked the
door. She screamed and when nobody heard her, she kneeled in front of Bambilla and pleaded to him not to do
anything to her. Bambilla pushed her to the bed, instead, went on top of her, and began kissing her cheeks,
neck and lips. Then, he pulled her white uniform up to her waist and removed her underwear, after which he
(Bambilla) took off his pants and brief. She struggled and fought against him but he was stronger. Thereafter,
he tried to insert his penis into her vagina while making an up and down movement but she closed her
legs. Later, she felt hot fluid on her thighs. According to her (victim), she did not know if Bambilla was able to
penetrate her private parts because she was too tired and lost consciousness.
When she recovered, she went to the comfort room to wash her private parts. She looked for a window
through which to escape but she found none. When she went out of the comfort room, Bambilla told her that he
was leaving to buy for her a shirt because her uniform was all wet and dirty.
When Bambilla returned, he brought a skirt and T-shirt and ordered her to change her clothes, after which
he told her that he was bringing her to Manila. When she had dressed up they left the Inawa Lodge and rode
on the same blue car driven by Malbog earlier but this time, it was Bambilla who drove the car. On the way, she
gypped Bambilla by telling him that she would go with him to Manila but he should first take her home to
Pozorrubio to get some clothes. When they reached Pozorrubio at around 12:00 noon, she alighted at
Barangay Talogtog and took a tricycle. Upon reaching their house, she told her brother Cesar what happened.
The following day, January 31, 1990, she submitted herself for medical examination by Dr. Rico Reyes, at the
Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital. Two days after the incident, or on February 1, 1990 to be precise, she reported
the incident to the Pozorrubio Police and also to the Dagupan City Police.[3]
The victim-complainant denied the theory of appellant Salvador Bambilla that he was her boyfriend and
she voluntarily went with him to Inawa Lodge-Inn on January 30, 1990.
The second prosecution witness, Dr. Rico Reyes, recounted that on January 31, 1990, the victimcomplainant, Estela Eng, went to the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital for physical examination,which
examination revealed that there was:
erythema on left labia minora xxx; hymenal laceration, healed at 6:00 o clock and 10:00 o clock position; vaginal
introitus admits 1 finger; cervix closed; uterus was small; adnexae-free; vaginal smear was done for detection of presence
of spermatozoa and the findings was negative for spermatozoa.
Aside from the said findings, there was no other sign of physical injury. Dr. Reyes explained that erythema on
left labia minora meant that there was reddening on the left labia which might be an irritation caused by tight
underwears; and that the healed hymenal laceration at six o clock and ten o clock positions could have been
sustained more than seven days prior to examination.[4]
Evidence for the defense consisted mainly of the testimonies of all the three appellants, Ninoy Malbog @
Saturnino, Amadeo Viernes and Salvador Bambilla.
According to appellant Bambilla, he and the complainant were sweethearts. He first met her in February
1988, when he was assigned as traffic policeman near complainants bakery in Barangay Poblacion,
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Since then, he began courting her and after she answered him on March 14, 1988,
they began going out and he would take her to and from the school.
On January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, as he was already off-duty, he boarded a
Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City, to go home to Amagbagan. The bus was already half full when
he boarded it. Upon seeing the complainant, Estela Eng, inside the bus, he sat beside her. They reached
Dagupan at around seven oclock a.m. and they alighted together in front of the Post Office. As Estela Eng was
already late for her class, he invited her for a date and she acceded on condition that she was to be brought
back to her school at 12:00 noon to attend her afternoon classes. He then told her that he was going to bring
her to Inawa Lodge in Calasiao. She was reluctant at first, asking him if there was no other place where they
could go to but later on she agreed to go with him but asked him not to touch her - (Anggapoy galawan).

They were about to board a tricycle for Calasiao when an oncoming blue car blew its horn. He recognized
the driver as Ninoy Malbog who used to drive a passenger mini-bus he usually rode on. He then approached
the car and talked to Malbog. When he found out that Malbog was going to Dagupan City to buy materials for
his employer, he requested him (Malbog) to take him and Estela to Calasiao. When Malbog agreed, he and
Estela sat in the backseat. As they were leaving, they saw Amado Viernes, waving at them and asking them
where they were going. Malbog told Viernes that he would first bring Bambilla and his companion to Calasiao,
buy spare parts for his employer and then go back to Pozorrubio. Viernes asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride
back to Pozorrubio. After asking permission from his mother, Amado also boarded the car and sat beside him
(Malbog).
While they were on their way to Calasiao, Estela Eng was worried that Malbog and Viernes might tell her
brother that she went with them to Calasiao. When they reached Inawa Lodge, he instructed Malbog to bring
the car inside the compound. A man directed them towards a garage where they parked the car. He asked
Estela to go ahead upstairs because he had to tell the two not to report to her brother. When Estela left, he
asked Malbog to leave the car so people would not see him (Bambilla) and Estela when they leave the
place. He assured Malbog that his employer, Rocky Cancino, was his good friend and he would explain to
Cancino when he brings back the car to him. With such assurance, Malbog agreed to leave the car and he and
Viernes left Inawa Lodge.
After the two left, Bambilla proceeded to pay the motel bills after which a roomboy accompanied him to
Room B, handing him a towel and pitcher of cold water. When he went inside the room, he saw Estela sitting
on the bed. When he asked her why she was quiet, she told him that she was worried that Malbog and Viernes
might report to her brother. He told her not to worry and began to kiss her until both of them were lying on the
bed. He then removed her dress, her bra and her panty and continued kissing her. Then he stood up to remove
his clothes while Estela covered her body with her clothes because she was ashamed of his seeing her naked.
When he was already undressed, he laid on top of her but Estela kept her legs closed. When he tried to open
her legs, she told him not today because we have pregnancy test next week. [5] Thus, he simply inserted his
penis in between her thighs just above her knees because she continued to clutch her dress and covered her
body from the knee up. He ejaculated on her thighs.
Afterwards, Estela got up and went to the comfort room. After a few minutes, she went out of the comfort
room, lied on the bed beside him, embraced him and told him Do not abandon me. After assuring her that he
will not because he loves her, he suggested that they leave Inawa Lodge as he was already hungry. While
Estela was putting on her clothes, she noticed that they were all crumpled and told him that she needed new
clothes. As he could not convince her to go with him, he went out alone.
Using the same car driven by Malbog, he went to Ang Ka Tong Store in Dagupan City and bought a shirt
and a blouse. He went back to Inawa Lodge after about 45 minutes. The door to Room B was locked when he
arrived so he knocked and called out to Estela. When Estela opened the door, he gave her the shirt and blouse
he bought and asked her to change. However, she did not immediately put on the clothes; instead, she sat on
the bed and told him, If you truly love me, do not abandon me. I will go with you. It was at that point that they
agreed to elope and go to Manila. After Estela was dressed, they checked out of Inawa Lodge riding in the
same car that he (Bambilla) borrowed from Malbog. They agreed to go home first to Pozorrubio so they could
get some clothes and money. They arrived in Pozorrubio around noontime and upon reaching Barangay
Talogtog, Estela suggested that it would be better if she would get off there and take a tricycle home so nobody
would see them together. They agreed to meet at one o clock in the afternoon of the same day at the
Pantranco bus terminal near the Pozorrubio town plaza.
While Estela took a tricycle and proceeded to her house, he also went home to Amagbagan to get money
and some clothes. He was two minutes late when he arrived at their meeting place and he did not find Estela
there. He waited for her for forty-five (45) minutes but she did not arrive. Thinking that she probably changed
her mind, he went to her school, Northwestern University, in Dagupan City. He waited for her until 4:30 but he
did not find her. He then went back to Pozorrubio and returned his clothes in his house, after which he drove to
the house of Rocky Cancino to return the car.
He (Bambilla) reached the house of Cancino at around six thirty. While he was in the house of Cancino,
two policemen, Patrolmen Mina and Perez, arrived and informed Bambilla that he was to go immediately to the
police station because the family of Estela was there. They also instructed Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Cancino
to go with him. Thus, he, together with Malbog and Cancino, went to the police station in Pozorrubio. Upon

arrival at the station, he saw Estela Eng, her two brothers, her sister and their family maid inside the station.
Outside the municipal hall, the Chief of Police P/Capt. Conrado Rosete asked him what happened and why he
tried to elope with Eng (angipatik) and he told him that nothing happened between him and Estela. Bambilla
also claimed that he tried to talk to Estela after the incident to ask her about the problem but to no avail. Later,
he learned that Estela filed a criminal complaint against him.[6]
Appellant Amado Viernes, a fish vendor, testified that in the morning of January 30, 1990, his mother Maria
Viernes asked him to accompany her to get the fish she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City. They
boarded the Balbin-Fernandez mini bus in front of their house in Barangay Talogtog, Pozorrubio. Inside the
bus, he saw Salvador Bambilla, whom he knew to be a policeman, and Estela Eng, his townmate, seated
together and talking to each other. He and his mother alighted in front of the Meles Restaurant in Dagupan
City. They found out, however, that the fish they left was already sent to Pozorrubio so they immediately
walked back towards the bus stop to get a ride home. After waiting for some time and no bus arrived, they
walked towards the Post Office. Upon reaching the said spot, he saw Bambilla and Eng talking. As he knew
Bambilla to be a policeman, he greeted the latter by saying Sir. Bambilla replied by asking him, Where are
you going? and he told him that they were going back to Pozorrubio. Fifteen more minutes passed but no bus
arrived. When Eng and Bambilla were about to board a tricycle, a car arrived and Bambilla waved at the car,
approached the same and talked to the driver whom he recognized as Ninoy Malbog. Thereafter, he saw
Bambilla and Eng board the car. He (Viernes) also approached the car to ask Malbog where he was
going. When he found out that he would be going back to Pozorrubio, he asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride
back and when the latter agreed, he went back to his mother to inform her that he would be hitching a ride
back to Pozorrubio with Malbog. When she agreed, he immediately boarded the car, on the front seat beside
Malbog.
He learned that Malbog would first take Bambilla and Eng to Calasiao, buy spare parts for Rocky
Cancinos truck, and then go back to Pozorrubio. When they reached Calasiao, they took the left route towards
the place called Inawa Lodge Inn. Upon reaching the said place, Bambilla instructed him to leave and asked
Malbog to leave the car, promising that he would be responsible for explaining what they did to
Cancino. Afterwards, he and Malbog left Inawa Lodge together and took a ride back to Dagupan. Malbog told
him that had he known that Bambilla would be asking him to leave the car, he would not have brought the two
to Calasiao. When they reached Dagupan, Malbog walked towards Perez Boulevard to buy spare parts while
he alighted in front of Carried Lumber to get a ride back to Pozorrubio.[7]
Amado Viernes allegations were corroborated by his mother, Maria Viernes, who attested to the fact that
she was with him on January 30, 1990; that her son went to Dagupan because she asked him to accompany
her to get the fish they were supposed to sell which she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City; that
while waiting for the bus to take them back to Pozorrubio, Malbog arrived in a blue car; that his son
approached the car and talked to Malbog; that after a few minutes his son told her that he would be hitching a
ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog.[8]
Appellant Ninoy Malbog narrated his version of the incident as follows:
In the early morning of January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, he was sent by his
employer, Rocky Cancino, to buy spare parts for their delivery truck in Dagupan City. When he reached
Dagupan City, he saw Bambilla with Estela Eng about to board a tricycle. Since he knew Bambilla, he honked
the horn to get the latters attention and Bambilla approached and asked him if he could take him and Estela to
Calasiao. As it was early and the shop where he was supposed to buy the spare parts was still closed, he
agreed. They met Amado Viernes on the way and the latter also hitched a ride. When they reached the Inawa
Lodge, Bambilla asked him to leave the car because he did not want anybody to see him and Estela checking
out of the motel. He was reluctant at first but when Bambilla assured him that he was a good friend of Cancino
and he (Bambilla) would explain to Cancino when he returns the car later in the day, he (Malbog) agreed. He
and Viernes then went back to Dagupan City and parted ways at the junction of Perez Boulevard and del Pilar
Street. He proceeded towards Sampaguita Auto Supply to buy the spare parts while Viernes went to the
Carried Lumber. After buying the spare parts, he took a ride back to Pozorrubio.[9]
Rocky Cancino, employer of Malbog confirmed that in the early morning of January 30, 1990, he sent the
latter to Dagupan City to buy spare parts of a delivery truck and allowed him to use his blue car because he
wanted the delivery truck repaired immediately. When Malbog went back around ten a.m., he was told that he
(Malbog) lent his car to Bambilla so that he got angry; that around six o clock in the evening of the same day,

Bambilla arrived and explained to him what happened; that while he and Bambilla were still talking, two
policemen came looking for Bambilla and the policemen told Bambilla to go with them to the police station such
that he and Malbog went with Bambilla to the police station.
Cancino further testified that he was of the belief that Bambilla and complainant Eng were sweethearts
because on several occasions since the year 1988, he had seen the two together on dates.[10]
Willy Napacena, roomboy of Inawa Lodge Inn, testified that he was on duty in the morning of January 30,
1990; that about seven thirty a.m., Bambilla, with three companions, two males and one female, arrived in a
blue car and he was the one who let them enter the garage; that upon getting out of the car, the two male
companions of Bambilla left while the latter and his female companion went up to Room B; that after 30
minutes, Bambilla went out of the room alone and boarded the same blue car; that during the time Bambilla
was out, he did not hear any call or buzzer from Room B, and neither did he hear any noise coming therefrom;
that Bambilla returned at around nine a.m.; and about an hour after Bambilla was back, he and the lady
checked out of the lodge.[11]
On March 23, 1992, the trial court found all the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced them accordingly. In finding for the prosecution, it
ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xxx
2. It is very unnatural for two lovers to have a date early in the morning, especially in the case of Estela who had to attend
her classes.
3. It is also unnatural that Estela would voluntarily go with him for a date in the company of the other two (2) accused,
Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes.
4. There were no pictures, cards and letters allegedly given to him by Estela which he allegedly surrendered to her on
January 31, 1990, because he was not foolish enough to return them to her considering that he was invited to the police
station, together with Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Bell Cancino, to shed light on what happened between him and Estela in
the early morning of January 30, 1990, and that on the same night he saw Estela, together with her brothers and sister and
their maid, being interrogated by Pat. Credo, and considering that he appeared to be smart as borne out by the way he
concocted his defense and the manner he answered questions; and considering further that the pictures, cards and letters
were very important pieces of evidence.
5. Estela Eng immediately reported what the accused, Pat. Salvador Bambilla, and his companions did to her. For it is hard
to believe that she would sacrifice her honor, being a good looking girl, to tell a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and thereafter present herself to be the subject of a public trial.
xxx xxx xxx
And the circumstances which negated his claim that Estela voluntarily went with him and made the Court to rule that
there is evidence of forcible abduction, are:
1. The testimony of Estela Eng is clear and convincing, the complainant declaring that she and the accused Bambilla were
never sweethearts; that when the mini-bus which she rode from Pozorrubio to Dagupan City stopped in front of the Post
Office and she was about to alight, Bambilla held her hand and threatened her with bodily harm; that upon alighting from
the mini-bus Bambilla again held her right hand with his left hand tightly and told her that he will kill her if she will shout
or will make some struggle or noise; that just as the mini-bus moved forward, a car suddenly stopped in front of them and
Bambilla pushed Estela inside; that she asked for help by shouting, but Bambilla immediately poked his gun to her waist
and because of fear, she stopped and just cried. On the way to Calasiao she even awked (sic) help from Ninoy Malbog, but
the latter ignored her.
2. And the fact that Bambilla at that time was armed with a hand gun.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court believes that the following circumstances have sufficiently established the commission of the crime of Rape:

a] The threat, which is continuing, by Salvador Bambilla, who is a policeman and at that time armed with a hand gun,
against the life of Estela Eng from the time the latter was abducted in front of the Post Office up to the time said Salvador
Bambilla satisfied his desire in having sex with Estela Eng, which threat put her to crouch in fear, keep silent and obey his
orders.
b] There is resistance or struggle put up by Estela Eng against the intention of Bambilla to lie and have sex with her. This
resistance or struggle is evidenced by the fact that once they entered the garage of the Inawa Lodge Inn, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan, and after accused Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes have left upon instruction of Bambilla, the latter pushed
Estela out of the car and into the room of the hotel and, thereupon, pursued his intention. Such resistance or struggle by
private complainant is also evidenced by the fact that her white nursing uniform dress was, as testified by accused
Bambilla, crumpled , got wet and dirtied. If really Estela Eng did not put up a resistance or struggle when Bambilla went
on to satisfy his carnal designs, why was her dress crumpled, wet and dirtied? The Court believes that the foregoing
circumstances are indications of the criminal intent of Pat. Bambilla to lie and have sex with Estela Eng, without the
latters consent and against her will.
c] There is consummated crime of Rape. This conclusion is evidenced by the findings of Dr. Rico Reyes who was the one
who attended to and examined Estela Eng.[12]
The lower court disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Salvador Bambilla, Ninoy Malbog, alias Saturnino Malbog, and Amado
Viernes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the offended party Estela Eng the sum
of P50,000.00, and to pay proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal.
In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on
the strength of its evidence.[14] Conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence;[15] otherwise, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Under the criminal justice system in this country, the overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
[16]
Speculation, conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway judgment.[17]
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[18]
The lone testimony of the victim of rape, if it meets the test of credibility, may be made the basis of
conviction.[19] It is therefore incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of
the testimony of the victim and to carefully sift through her allegations because such testimony, standing alone,
if it passes the test of credibility, may lead to a finding of guilt.
As a general rule, the factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of the case.[20]
A judicious review of the case under scrutiny, however, shows that the trial court did overlook some facts
and circumstances of weight and substance which cast doubt on the truth and credibility of complainants
accusations.

The complainant alleged that while they (she and Bambilla) were still on the bus, the latter poked his gun
at her and threatened to kill her if she shouts. She further claimed that she did, in fact, shout but the other
passengers were probably frightened.[21]
Such allegation by the complainant cannot be given credence by the Court. It is belied by her very own
testimony with respect to the time and place where the alleged forcible abduction took place. She herself
admitted that the bus was already full when they left Pozorrubio. [22] Most of the passengers were her
townmates from Pozorrubio and schoolmates from Lyceum Northwestern University. Moreover, the alleged
threat happened in broad daylight. Given all these circumstances, the Court finds the testimony of the
complainant incredible. If indeed Bambilla threatened her by poking his gun, it was impossible that nobody
noticed if she put up a struggle against him. Then too, if she tried to shout as she claimed, somebody could
have heard her and responded to her shouts. At the very least, if she shouted, as she theorized, a commotion
inside the bus would inevitably occurred. If Bambilla carried a gun that day, it was sufficiently explained by his
being a policeman, and at the time of the incident, he just got off from his duty and was on his way home.
Complainant likewise averred that Bambilla continued to poke his gun at her and to threaten her when
they alighted from the bus in front of the Post Office. Again, such allegation is unworthy of belief. Complainant
herself admitted that the bus regularly stops in front of the Post Office, [23] where she and Bambilla alighted
because students of Lyceum usually get off thereat. The said testimony of complainant makes her allegations
of threat unlikely because it would be impossible for anyone not to notice Bambilla poking a gun at her and
threatening her. Not only that, a few meters across the Post Office was the Dagupan City Police Station. If
there was truth to the allegation that she was forcibly abducted by Bambilla, her normal reaction would have
been to resist and struggle against her abductor. And considering the circumstances of time and place where
complainant was supposedly abducted, there was every opportunity for her to seek help by the simple
expedient of shouting. As earlier mentioned, the road in front of the Post Office is a major bus stop and a lot of
people alighted thereat, as it was already seven oclock in the morning. [24]The police station was only a few
meters from the Post Office and there were passenger jeepneys parked right in front of the Post Office. [25] All
the aforesaid circumstances taken together negate the plausibility of the forcible abduction complained of.
Another significant circumstance overlooked below was the fact that Bambilla went out of the motel, left
the complainant alone and was out for more than thirty (30) minutes. This fact was testified to by Bambilla,
[26]
corroborated by the testimony of Willy Napacena, the roomboy of the motel, [27] and admitted by the
complainant herself.[28] What is more, Napacena attested to the fact that the doors to the rooms of Inawa Lodge
did not have outside locks and could only be locked from inside. [29] Complainant cannot therefore claim that
Bambilla locked her up. Said roomboy also testified that inside each room was a buzzer which could be used
by customers calling for room service.[30] Napacena, declared under oath that he did not hear any call from the
buzzer nor any shout for help coming from Room B where the complainant was left alone for at least half an
hour.[31]
It is thus decisively evident that Estela Eng had ample opportunity to escape or, at least, to shout for help if
she was really brought to the motel against her will and raped, as complained of. But she never tried to escape
nor asked for help, something unnatural for a woman who had been forcibly abducted and raped. It would have
been different if the complainant was physically unable to get up and escape, because she was beaten up and
rendered unconscious. Then, it would have been understandable why she could not escape even if there was
an opportunity to do so. In the case under scrutiny, there were no signs that complainant Eng was too
weakened to even get up and walk. Unacceptable is complainants explanation why she did not try to go out of
the room and escape, to wit:
Q You also mentioned in your previous testimony that the accused Salvador Bambilla went out for about 30
minutes?
A Yes, sir.
Q When he was out, do you mean to say that he left you from the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q And for that 30 minutes what did you do in order to escape?

A I was trying to open the door by turning the knob but I could not and how could I also escape since my
clothes were wet and dirty and the jalousies because there are also jalousies, there is still a screen
covering the said window, so how could I go out , sir.[32]
It is simply unlikely for a woman who has just been robbed of her honor and chastity to still think of wet
and dirty clothes instead of seizing upon every opportunity to escape from her malefactor.In the case under
consideration, the complainant admitted that she waited for Bambilla to return:
Q Do you mean to say that you waited for Salvador Bambilla to return?
A It is like this, before he left he told me to stay because according to him he will buy me a skirt and a t-shirt,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words, you want to tell the Honorable Court that it was Salvador Bambilla who suggested to buy
you skirt and t-shirt?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you trusted him to still come back and give you the skirt and t-shirt, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.[33]
As to the accusation of rape, the trial court did not consider the fact that complainant herself did not know
if Bambilla was able to insert his penis into her vagina:
Q Did he ever make any movement while on your top and his penis reached your vagina?
A He tried to insert his erect penis into my vagina but I dont know if it was inserted because I lost
consciousness, sir.[34]
Q You also stated that he ejaculated on your thigh?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you mean to say that his penis was not able to penetrate your vagina?
A Thats what I dont know anymore because I was already tired and had lost my consciousness, sir.[35]
Then too, the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant indicated the probability
that no rape was committed. The medical certificate stated that there was no sign of external physical injuries
on the whole body of the complainant, no spermatozoa was found but there were erythema and healed
lacerations.[36] When asked to explain, the medico-legal officer opined that the erythema or reddening on the
left labia could have been caused by tight underwears and the hymenal lacerations could have been sustained
more than seven days prior to examination or several days before the alleged rape happened.[37]
In light of the foregoing circumstances coupled with complainants admission that her legs were closed all
the time she was inside the motel, [38] the fact that she did not try to escape although a second assault was very
likely, did not try to shout for help and instead, waited for Bambilla to return, effectively contradict the
protestation of complainant that she was raped. If there was sexual intercourse, evidence is utterly wanting to
show that the same was against her will.
Equally unaffirmable is the lower courts finding that all the three appellants conspired together to forcibly
abduct complainant Eng against her will and to bring her to Inawa Lodge so that Bambilla could have carnal
knowledge with her. As sufficiently shown in the testimonies of the appellants, the fact that they were together
on January 31, 1990 was a mere coincidence. Malbogs presence in Dagupan City that morning was duly
explained by Rocky Cancino, his employer, who attested under oath that he sent Malbog to Dagupan City on
that day to buy spare parts for his delivery truck. The presence of Viernes in the same place was likewise

adequately explained by his mother, Maria Viernes, who recounted that her said son accompanied her to
Dagupan City upon her request.
While the Court has, time and again, stressed that if a woman states that she was raped, she in effect
says all there is to show that she was indeed raped, experience has also shown that it is not at all impossible
that unfounded charges of rape may be proffered by women who are actuated by some sinister, ulterior or
undisclosed motive.[39]
And as held by this Court in the case of People vs. Alvario,[40] judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim
goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice according to law.[41]
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the others may be compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.[42]
In the case under review, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellants
Salvador Bambilla, Amado Viernes and Ninoy Malbog forcibly abducted complainant Estela Eng y Ulalan,
brought her to the Inawa Lodge and had carnal knowledge with her. With the inability of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of proof, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellants prevails and therefore,
pursuant to law all the three appellants are entitled to acquittal.
Once again, the Court has occasion to quote what Alfonso El Sabio was reputed to have said a long time
ago [m]as vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.[44]
[43]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED, and on the ground of reasonable
doubt, appellants Saturnino Malbog, Amado Viernes* and Salvador Bambilla are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
The Director of Prisons, National Bureau of Prison, Muntinlupa City, is ordered to cause the immediate
release of appellants unless there be any other legal ground for their continued detention, and to report to this
Court within ten (10) days the action taken under the premises. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 191261

Present:

- versus -

JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO,

Appellant.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,*
DEL CASTILLO,**
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

March 2, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case is about how the credibility of the rape victims identification of her attacker often depends on her
spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape.

The Facts and the Case

The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal Case 04-227897
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
DK,[1] the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights on,
at her cousins rented room. She was startled when somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The
intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DKs clothes and
undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her.

When the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on and

she saw his face. DK recognized him as the same person who passed by her cousins room several times in the afternoon
of the previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist.
On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign of resistance on her
body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.
Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of his
employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never
left his employers house that night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he
went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he learned that
he had been suspected of having committed rape.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to indemnify DK of P50,000.00 and pay
her P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On November 12, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 the decision of the RTC in
its entirety, prompting Tumambing to appeal to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in finding that accused
Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned.
The Ruling of the Court
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author
of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the
prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offenders identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an
accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties. [2]
Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DKs testimony. They maintained that DK categorically and
positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v. Reyes[3] where the Court ruled that it would be easy for a
person who has once gained familiarity with the appearance of another to identify the latter even from a considerable
distance.[4] Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial court and the CAs findings regarding the credibility of the
witnesses.[5] But the courts mentioned appear to have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical evidence in the
case. This compels the Court to take a look at the same. [6]

DKs identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The Courts reading of her
testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that
it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DKs uncertainties regarding the rapists identity when
the barangaychairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. PO2 Crispulo Frondozo, one of the apprehending officers,
testified as follows:
Q:
A:
Q:

Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant pinpointed
accused as the person who abused her person?
No, Sir.
What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant
positively identified the accused?
A:
No, Sir.[7]

Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident testified:
Q:
A:

When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next?
Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence.

Q:
A:

Then what happened?

He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was akala ko
pakukunan niyo ako ng dugo.

Q:
A:

What was the reaction of the accused?

As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't be
afraid. Tell me. I will protect you.
I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to turn left,
right and backways.

Q:
A:

After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next?
The suspect told the complainant huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako. So she
could not pinpoint the suspect.
I said, Iha, [i]to ba? But she cannot point to.[8] (Underscoring supplied)

DKs above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no confidence that,
as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as
he passed by her cousins rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would
have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite
the barangay chairmans assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a
wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value. [9]
The barangay chairman continued:
Q:
A:

As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came to know
that there were other suspect, what did you do?
I invited the suspect.

Q:
A:

Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect?
His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And confrontation
ensued between her and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect?

Q:
A:

What was her answer?

She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s] makunan ng
cells.
The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya.

Q:
A:

Presumably to get some sperm?

Yes, Sir.

Q:

What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]?

A:

I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do.

Q:
A:

After that what happened?

So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect. She could
not pinpoint.[10] (Underscoring supplied)

That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and presumably compared with
that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the possibility that it was Quiatcho, rather than accused
Tumambing, who raped her. The Court cannot thus accept DKs testimony that she had been familiar with the looks of
the man who violated her and that she could not possibly be mistaken in identifying him as Tumambing.
Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated the barangay chairmans testimony:
Q:
A:

So what was the question?

The question was that, Is this the person you saw and who rape you?

Court: Referring to?

Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing.
Q:
A:

What was the reply of the victim, if any?

She did not answer, Sir.

Q:
A:

What happen next when [DK] did not answer?

And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped her
and point to him.

Q:
A:

What was the reply of [DK] if any?

She did not reply, Sir.

Q:
A:

Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]?
Four times, Sir.[11]

The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually attacked her. They pointed
out her insistence at the police precinct that it was Tumambing who really raped her and that she positively identified him
in open court. But this came about much later. The fact is that she did not refute the testimonies given by neutral
witnesses that she could not point to accused Tumambing as her rapist during their initial confrontation at
the barangay chairmans residence. These witnesses had no motive or reason to fabricate a story for the defense.
By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the victim. For this reason, the
court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot afford to overlook details
that are essential to an understanding of the truth. [12] Here, as shown above, DKs testimony is anything but believable and
consistent.
Although she categorically said on cross-examination that she saw her attacker enter the room, [13] she did not
shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape. [14] She just lay in bed. [15] In fact, she maintained that position in
bed even when her attacker was standing before her and removing his clothes. [16] She did not shout nor struggle when he
penetrated her.[17]
There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. [18] But this is inconsistent with her
testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko
siya ng tingin.[19] Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his
clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a chance
to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt?

With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of
accused Tumambing.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 12, 2009 in CAG.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 04227897, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful
cause.
The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision forthwith and to
inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINES,

OF

G.R. No. 184170

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

-versus-

JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y

TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and
LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ,
Accused.
x------------------------x

Promulgated:

February 2, 2011
VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN,
Appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02610
affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes in
Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099 and 3100 finding appellant Vicente Bongat y Tariman (Vicente) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe
Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an Information for Rape allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, in barangay [XXX],
municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a common
purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA], [4] a minor 16 years of age, against her will and without
her consent.
[3]

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that
[AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused. [5]
Appellant Vicente, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested while Larry remained at large. Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
The alleged rape victim, AAA, her mother, BBB, [6] the medico-legal officer, Dr. Elmer Tatad (Dr.
Tatad), Barangay Kagawad Fernando Tajan (Fernando) and Barangay Tanod Eddie Tajan (Eddie) testified for the
prosecution.
AAA narrated that on 29 August 2002 at around 9:45 p.m., she attended a wake in Barangay YYY,[7] Virac,
Catanduanes. Upon leaving the wake to go to her grandmothers house in Barangay XXX, she noticed that Jerwin was
following her. AAA recognized Jerwin because they go to the same school. When she was about to enter the house of her
grandmother, Jerwin and Felipe, who were with a certain Maria, approached AAA and invited her to attend a birthday
party. AAA acceded and went with the trio towards Barangay ZZZ.[8] They went inside a dark nipa hut near a rice field
and AAA saw Vicente and Larry thereat. AAA was then made to sit on a bench by Felipe and the four accused went to
converse with each other outside the nipa hut. When the accused came back, they covered her mouth with a handkerchief,
and tied her hands and feet to the posts with a nylon string. The accused watched in delight while each of them took turns
in raping her. Jerwin ravished her twice while the rest of the accused raped her once. After they finished with AAA,
Jerwin untied her hands and feet. Vicente and Larry went home while Jerwin and Felipe accompanied AAA to her
grandmothers house.[9]
Two days later, AAA told BBB about the incident only after the latter noticed and asked her why she could not
walk properly. They went to Fernando, who is a Barangay Kagawad and later to Eddie, a Barangay Tanod to report the
incident. Fernando summoned the accused and they were made to sign a document containing their statement regarding
the incident.[10]
Eddie testified that on 1 September 2002, Jerwins parents came to him and expressed their intention for their son,
Jerwin to marry AAA. Appellant Vicente, Jerwin, Larry, Fernando, and BBB were also present at the meeting. Eddie
saw Fernando prepare a one and a half sheet of yellow paper containing the admissions made by the accused that they
raped AAA.[11]
BBB fetched Fernando and brought him to the house of Eddie to talk about a marriage proposal by Jerwin. BBB
asked Fernando to put into writing all the conversations that transpired inside the house. He did so while BBB was
dictating to him what to write. He stated that the accused admitted the crime. [12]
AAA and BBB then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. On 2 September 2002, they went to the
medico-legal and AAA was examined by Dr. Tatad, who later issued a medico-legal certificate stating his findings as
follow:
Abrasion Labia Minora
Round the Clock.[13]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of Jerwin, Felipe, appellant Vicente, Maria Talan (Maria),
Ricardo Rin (Ricardo), and Federico Rey (Federico) to prove that there was no crime committed.
Jerwin, Felipe and Maria attended the wake of Federicos nephew in Barangay YYY on 29 August 2002 at
around 7:00 p.m. While they were playing cards, AAA approached their table and sat beside Jerwin. [14] Federico saw
AAA play with Jerwins group on the table. [15] They stayed at the wake until 11:00 p.m. As Marias group was about to
leave, AAA asked Jerwin if she could go with him. Jerwin then introduced AAA to Maria as his girlfriend. While on their
way home, Jerwin and AAA were trailing behind Maria and Felipe. At that juncture, both Maria and Felipe saw Jerwin
place his arm around the shoulders of AAA, while AAAs arm was wrapped around the waist of Jerwin. Thereafter, AAA

invited Maria to go to the dance with her and Jerwin in another barangay. Maria turned down the invitation and went
home. While Felipe was about to enter his house, Jerwin called him and asked if he likes to go to the dance, but Felipe
declined because he needed to drive his pedicab on the following morning. [16]
Jerwin claimed that AAA was his girlfriend; that they had been together since 31 December 2001; and that they
had sexual intercourse for three (3) or four (4) times to date. He admitted that coming from the dance, it was around 1
a.m. when they proceeded to a nipa hut in Barangay ZZZ where they had sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they went to
sleep. When Jerwin woke up the following morning, AAA had already left. [17]
On 30 August 2002, Jerwin saw AAA crying at the house of Maria. AAA told her that she was scolded by her
mother and grandmother when she arrived home in the morning. Jerwin suggested that he would talk to BBB and let her
know that he wants to marry AAA.[18]
Ricardo, who lives just a few meters away from the nipa hut where the alleged rape was committed, stated that he
did not notice any untoward incident that transpired in thenipa hut. He however admitted that he went to sleep at
around 10:30 p.m.[19]
Jerwin and Felipe went to the house of Eddie on 1 September 2002 when they were summoned by the
latter. Felipe saw the mother of Jerwin and AAA talking about marriage, but BBB did not consent to the wedding. His coaccused were also present at Eddies house. Felipe denied raping AAA when he was asked. Jerwin also denied raping
AAA and replied that AAA was his girlfriend. [20] After a while, they all went home. In 2004, Jerwin and Felipe were
arrested for the crime of rape.[21] While Jerwin was detained, AAA visited her several times.
Appellant Vicente came to know AAA when she was introduced to him by Jerwin as his girlfriend sometime in
January 2002. On 29 August 2002, appellant was harvesting rice at the back of Catanduanes National High
School from 7:00 a.m. until 4:45 p.m. He got home at 4:50 p.m. and slept at 8:00 p.m. He woke up the following day
at 6:30 a.m.On 30 August 2002, he was summoned to go to the house of Eddie. Upon reaching the house, he saw the
parents of Jerwin and AAA conversing about the wedding of Jerwin and AAA. He was asked by Fernando if she raped
AAA, but Vicente answered in the negative. He was made to sign his name on a blank sheet of yellow paper by Fernando.
[22]
While in detention, Vicente saw AAA visiting the jail house once. [23]
The defense also presented the entries in the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) logbook, certified
by Jail Officer Bernardo Azansa to show that AAA visited Jerwin six (6) times in jail. [24]
On 16 November 2006, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds VICENTE T. BONGAT, JERWIN B. QUINTAL AND FELIPE A.
QUINTAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098,
3099, 3100 and hereby sentences them as follows:
1)

Vicente T. Bongat is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each

crime.
2)
Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Jerwin B. Quintal is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1
day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.
3)
Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Felipe A. Quintal is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day
ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.
Vicente T. Bongat, Jerwin B. Quintal and Felipe A. Quintal are ordered to individually pay the
private complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each crime.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 9344, the judgment of conviction against Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal
is suspended. The parents or guardians of Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal; the Social Worker of this
Court, Nonita Manlangit; the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes Josefina T.
Ramirez, the Provincial Social Welfare Officer of Catanduanes Priscilla T. Navar, the Director of Region
V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or his duly authorized representative;
and the Head of the Social Services and Counseling Division of DSWD or his duly authorized
representative are enjoined to attend the disposition conference on November 28, 2006 at 1:30 oclock in
the afternoon.[25]
Jerwin and Felipe were both confined at the Home for Boys in Naga City for rehabilitation pursuant to the ruling
of the RTC.
The RTC found AAAs testimony as credible and rejected the sweetheart theory and alibi of the defense. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 29 September 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective supplemental briefs. Appellant manifested that he would merely adopt their appellant's brief before the
Court of Appeals.[26] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation stating that it would no longer file
any supplemental briefs and instead adopt its appellee's brief filed on 31 August 2007.[27]
On 27 November 2009, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the cases against Jerwin and Felipe. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and upon the recommendation of the DSWD, the cases
against JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal, whose sentence have been suspended, are
hereby DISMISSED.
Finding that the objective of the disposition measures has been fulfilled, the Court orders the final
discharge of the said JICL. Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Regional Office of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, Baraguis, Legaspi City and Office of the Regional Director of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Home for Boys, Naga City, for them to cause the
discharge of JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal and their return to their respective
families.
The Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes is ordered to submit a periodic report
on both JICL within one (1) year after their discharge. [28]
In the main, appellant assails the credibility of AAAs testimony. He insists that it was impossible for AAA to have
clearly and positively identified him as one of the perpetrators considering that AAA claimed that it was very dark inside
the nipa hut where she was supposedly raped. Appellant assails the testimony of AAA that she went with Jerwin to a place
unknown to her, despite not personally knowing him. Appellant claims this incredibility in her testimony created serious
doubt as to the reliability of her allegations. Appellant argues that contrary to AAAs allegations, there was no clear intent
on her part to resist the alleged sexual acts. AAA failed to shout for help. Neither did she present any proof of body
injuries to clearly prove that she resisted the alleged rape. Moreover, AAA told her mother about the incident only
because the latter noticed her to have been walking in an unusual manner. Appellant asserts that he should have been
convicted only of simple seduction as conspiracy was not proven among the accused. [29]
The OSG maintains that AAA positively identified appellant as one of the four rapists. It counters that the visibility
inside the nipa hut was not that poor as to render AAA incapable of seeing her rapists faces. AAA had a good view of
appellants face because the moonlight illuminated the surroundings. It contends that there is nothing unusual when AAA
voluntarily went with Jerwin and Felipe before she was raped. According to the OSG, AAA had a false sense of security
because the two accused were minors like her and were even accompanied by another girl. The OSG avers that force and
intimidation were employed against AAA because her hands and feet were tied to the nipa huts posts during her
ordeal. There is likewise no basis for the claim that AAA did not immediately report the incident. When AAA saw her
mother, she informed her at the earliest possible opportunity. Finally, the OSG asserts that there is conspiracy among the
accused in committing rape considering their actions before, during and after raping AAA.

[30]

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.
Hence, the elements necessary to sustain a conviction in the crime of rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal

knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when
the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
[31]

The prosecution, with whom the burden of proof rests, seeks to establish these elements through the testimonies
of its witnesses, particularly that of the victims.
There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and where
her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. [32] A dangerous precedent as
it may seem, there is however a guideline provided also by jurisprudence in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim,
namely: (a) while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.[33]
Guided by these principles and upon a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court is not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, as well as the other accused, committed the crime of rape against AAA.
The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the inconclusive medical finding, tends
to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped. The RTC and the Court of Appeals relied largely on the testimony of AAA that
she was raped. This Court is well aware of the rule that findings of trial court relative to the credibility of the rape victim
are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, more so, if they are affirmed by the appellate court. It is only in
exceptional circumstances that this rule is brushed aside, such as when the courts evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or
when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could affect the result of the case.[34] And one of these exceptions obtains in this case.
This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAAs testimony, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod andbarangay kagawad, the purported confession put into writing
and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents relating to the case.
First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly invited
her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen
playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.
Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA
readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Incidentally, it was unclear how AAA
was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never asked, not by the prosecution nor the defense, on how she
came to know the two accused.
Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a round-the-clock abrasion in the labia
minora. This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA
had sexual intercourse. We find the medical finding lacking in relation to the testimony of AAA on how she was ravished
by four men. Although a medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution of rape, it could have
corroborated an otherwise vague and dubious testimony of the victim. In fact, Dr. Tatad admitted that he only examined
AAAs private parts based on her statement that she was raped, thus:
Q: Do you remember Doctor, the date when the examination was conducted?
A: 9/2/02, sir.

Q: That was on September 2, 2002?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when the person of [AAA] came to you, what did you do?
A: She consulted me and told me that she was raped, sir.
Q: And after informing that she was raped, what did you do?
A: I told her to lie down as if she was to deliver a child and I examined the vagina. There was abrasion
in the labia minora round the clock, sir.
Q: How about laceration?
A: There was an abrasion, sir.
Q: What might have caused that abrasion round the clock?
A: It could be that something was inserted, sir.
Q: What kind of object might have been inserted?
A: According to the patient, penis was inserted in her vagina.
Q: Did she tell you as to the number of penis which were inserted in her vagina?
A: According to the patient the penis inserted to her was pushed and pulled, sir.[35]
Furthermore, in her sworn statement before the police, AAA related that her mouth was injured. [36] She also
testified in court that her hands and feet were tied to a post by a nylon string. [37] Naturally, AAA would have sustained
injuries in her hands and feet. But all these injuries were never examined by the medico-legal officer nor did AAA allege
the existence of those injuries.
Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that she
really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was walking in an
unusual manner. AAA stated:
Q: You said a while ago that your mother discovered your unusual movement in the morning of the
following day of August 29, 2002, is that correct?
A: It was after two days when my mother noticed my unusual movement during the birthday of my
brother, sir.
Q: Did you not go out of the house of your grandmother on August 30, 2002?
A: No, sir.
Q: When your mother noticed your movement, what did she do?
A: She asked me, sir.
Q: After she asked you, what did she do?
A: She asked me why I was walking that way and I told her that I was raped, sir.[38]
Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin, to report the
rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they were initially informed by BBB
about a marriage proposal by Jerwins parents. It was only during the meeting that they learned about the alleged rape.
Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB never bothered to ask AAA
about the whole incident.[39] She accepted AAAs testimony hook, line and sinker. In the same breadth, it can be recalled

that Eddie, the Barangay Tanod, testified that BBB dictated to him what was written in the yellow paper which contained
the supposed admissions of rape by the accused. Eddie did not appear to have asked or interrogated the accused about the
incident. Likewise, Dr. Tatad merely examined AAAs private parts on the basis of her claim that she was raped.
Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6)
times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the
prosecution.
The combination of all these circumstances are more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether first,
rape was actually committed and second, whether the accused were the perpetrators.
It is thus unnecessary to belabor the issues raised by the defense for it must be reiterated that conviction always
rests on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
For the reasons cited above, we are constrained to entertain reasonable doubt. Hence, we acquit.
WHEREFORE, appellant Vicente Bongat y TARIMAN is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. He is
ordered RELEASED unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43602 January 31, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Raul T. Montesino for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine years
old. 1 The prosecution will have to contend not only with the presumption of innocence but also of impotence.
The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971 in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of Bago. 2 It was
reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and the corresponding criminal complaint was filed on July
10, 1972. 4Judgment was rendered on January 30, 1976, sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the costs. 5 He now wants this decision reversed.
The complainant is Anita Ibaez, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. She says that on
the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-appellant to a bushy place on the seashore where she
was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because he was threatening her with a scythe he was
carrying. In the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then forcibly took her. She could not cry out
because she was afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother because the accused-appellant bad
warned her he would kill her if she did. 6
The accused-appellant has a different version. He does not deny he had sexual intercourse with Anita, but he
insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it was the complainant who enticed him into the bushes,
where she wantonly opened herself to him. He was unable at first to have an erection because of his age. But
Anita herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus stimulated, he succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards,
noticing some people nearby who might have seen them, the girl put back her panty on and left. He followed a
few minutes later.7

As the medical examination of the complainant was made more than two months afterwards, there naturally
could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that usually attend forcible rape. But there was the
tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the accused-appellant could not dispute. 8
Given the choice between the separate accounts of the complainant and the accused-appellant, the court
inclines in favor of the latter. It is in our view more believable. Anita never spoke of any difficulty on the part of
Pailano in violating her. She simply said he removed her panty and entered her. No effort was mentioned; it
seemed she was talking of a vigorous stud. Yet, the accused-appellant was not a teenager or even only in the
prime of his life at the time of their sexual encounter. He was all of sixty-nine years old.
Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the moment, we doubt if Pailano could have accomplished
the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution has not offered any proof of his sexual prowess, and
under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant did not hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride,
that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with Anita and that it took some fondling from her before
his organ could respond. This was a hard and humiliating fact but it had to be admitted.
We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita coupling on the
day in question, 9 but not on the other previous occasions claimed by him. His presence in all of these
meetings seems too much of a coincidence to be credible. However, Pailano is also corroborated by Natividad
Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and Pailano caressing each other, with the girl in fact assuming the
more aggressive role. 10 There is no reason not to believe this witness.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method although the
prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so
is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she
was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the criminal
complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then
provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age, against her will." No
mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or
otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged would
have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 11 This right is
safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge
against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accusedappellant.
In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified
seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People v.
Montes, 13 the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide of
the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of and acquitted was not homicide
but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines,14 where the accused was charged with the
misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under
paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The Court said such conviction
would violate the Bill of Rights.

It may be argued that although initially deficient, the criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the
prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby
waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has not been adequately establish established.
In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita reported that he saw no evidence of insanity in her family
history nor was there any indication of such condition in the complainant herself. 15 He did observe that she
had the mentality of a thirteen-year old, 16 which was not that serious an impediment as her age at the time
was only fifteen.
Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not proved that during that encounter in the bushes,
Anita's mental condition was so weakened that she could not resist Pailano's supposed advances.
The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not been
overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno reported the incident in the bushes on the same day to Anita's
mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, for reasons not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half months later
that she decided to complain to the authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The only possible
explanation for her delay is that the liaison between her daughter and Pailano had already become a scandal
by that time and she must have thought she could redeem Anita's honor by initiating the criminal complaint.
The delay, however, blunts the charge of rape.
What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last lustful fling and a young girl with a rather weak mind and
a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his youth. We do not mean to romanticize this sordid affair. It is
wrong and is not here excused, made light of, or dismissed. It is disdained for what it is an unseemly seduction
where it is not clear who the tempter and the tempted are although neither can really claim to be blameless.
But, in our view, it is definitely not rape.
WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 172953

Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 30, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the
hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by
obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.

In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution [3] dated 30 May 2006 denying his
motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofSorsogon City, Branch 52[5] which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.
The antecedent facts follow.
On the strength of a warrant[6] of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five
police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot,
SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence
of barangay kagawad

Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, [7] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4 th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four
empty sachets containing shabu residue, without having been previously authorized by law to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioner entered a negative plea. [9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon
as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the
search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the
search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had
previously been requested in executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned
themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a
meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with
suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence
of petitioner.[10] On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to
petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon. [11]
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found behind the door of the
bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith
called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. [12] On cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted
the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to
him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;[13] that he brought
the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a true inventory, then to the trial court [14] and thereafter to the
laboratory.[15]

Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized items, was
presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets
were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance.
[16]

She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same

day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items
from Esternon at the laboratory.[17]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police
operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside.
However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioners wife,

Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas
body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the
room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a
police officer to buy

cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheilas body.
[18]

Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children. [19]
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and

once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told,
Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him sachet
ofshabu which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. [20] Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated
in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawadLicup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively
declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by
Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. [21] Licup for his part testified
on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were
found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside
the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. [22]

On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to
pay a fine of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner
was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things
which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted
petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him. [24]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [25] In his Appeal Brief[26] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner
called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was
conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence
sufficed for petitioners conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding
team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly
performed their duties should prevail.[27]
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as
maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court. [29] Hence, the instant
petition which raises substantially the same issues.
In its Comment,[30] the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its duties in the
conduct of the search.[31] It points to petitioners incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that
the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence. It likewise notes that petitioners bare denial
cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima
facie existence of animus possidendi.
This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.
Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied
in a case under appeal.[32] In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a
conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a
prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.[33] Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.
[34]

Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral

certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. [35]
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [36] It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.[37]
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain,
an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness.[38] The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination[39] and even substitution and exchange. [40] In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness
in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their
daily lives.[41] Graham vs. State[42] positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as
heroinwas handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition
and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the
court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least
between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible. [43]
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood,
or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized
or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only

Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom
Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to
whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the
question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in
court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same
is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the
same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallineraand Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure.
In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility
of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the
two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted
in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police
officers from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission of the seized items to the
laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife,
that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby
store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of
petitioners house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be
conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers
were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled
sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such
that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be
searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human
behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed
therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheilas body was brought up by a member of the raiding
team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila
tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioners household away from the
search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise
takes note of Esternons suspicious presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The
confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecutions claim of regularity
in the exercise of duty.
Moreover, Section 21[44] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the postseizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates
that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical
inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was
elicited from him that at the close of the search of petitioners house, he brought the seized items immediately to the

police station for the alleged purpose of making a true inventory thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true
inventory could not be made in petitioners house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the
seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough
opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its
implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the
same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternons course of action.
Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in
the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the
same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46] of the Rules of Court. People v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties. [48] Thus, as a
reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is
necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain
possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency. [50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary
practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby
defeats the very purpose for the enactment. [51]
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the
implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The
presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. [52] Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. [53] In
the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the
irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a
finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an
accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. The rule is invariable whatever may

be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.
[54]

In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably

becomes a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification
the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court ofSorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006
denying

reconsideration

thereof,

are REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y

Lopez

isACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being
lawfully held for another offense.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City, reported over print and
broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were
undergoing an endurance run as part of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much effort was
spared for the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos (hereafter GLENN)
immediately surrendered to local authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City. The information reads as follows:
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to
kill, taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from behind in a sudden and unexpected manner with the use
of said vehicle members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class
07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an Endurance Run of 35 kilometers coming from their
camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City,
running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic] three
lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to defend themselves, because the
accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous
warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez
Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of
said run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway,
going to the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away from the joggers rear portion, but which accused failed and
refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the
joggers, thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping, or
ramming the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking
said windshield, and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of
applying his brake, continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding
joggers on said 1st line, as a result thereof the following were killed on the spot:
1. Vincent Labis Rosal

7. Antonio Flores Lasco

2. Allan Amoguis Abis

8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas

3. Jose Arden M. Atisa

9. Roberto Cabussao Loren

4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio

5. Romil Gosila Legrano
6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin

10. Raul Plaza Martinez

11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito

While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while the following eleven (11)
other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause other than said
accuseds spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered on the following victims
which prevented their death, to wit:
1. Rey Go Boquis
2. Rene Tuako Calabria
3. Nonata Ibarra Erno
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil
5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez

7. Melchor Hinlo
8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
9. Charito Penza Gepala
10. Victor Malicse Olavo
11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza

6. Arman Neri Hernaiz

While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:
1. Romanito Andrada
2. Richard Canoy Caday
3. Rey Cayusa
4. Avelino Chua
5. Henry Gadis Coubeta

6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera

7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano
8. Dibangkita Magandang
9. Martin Olivero Pelarion
10. Flordicante Martin Piligro

after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-enumerated
helpless.
Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training held at Camp
Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of
the training was the endurance run from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5 October 1995
started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the first and second of which had 22 trainees each,
and the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black combat shoes. At
the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer
vehicle was instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were
occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to
jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles to take the left lane. [1]
Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were assigned as rear guards of the
first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed
them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so. [2]
While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards them. The
vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands for
the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and
coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told their co-trainees to
retract. The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by the

said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The
driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The guards then stopped oncoming
vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again. [3]
The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted an ocular inspection of
the place where the incident happened. They then proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City
Prosecutor manifested, thus:
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which [was] involved in the October 5,
1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue with strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well
as in front. We further manifest that the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just below the
windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower portion was likewise damaged more
particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut of the
plastic used as a bumper; that the right side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal light, right
side was likewise damaged. The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from the ground to the
lower portion of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front level is 5 ft. [4]
PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro City,
and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members of the PNP came to their station and reported that they had been
bumped by a certain vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to the traffic
scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle remained on the
highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to conclude that the brakes of the vehicle had
not been applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. long. [5]
GLENNs version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:
At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latters fellow band
members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu Forward, that would bring their band instruments, band
utilities and band members from Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there, they were
supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored Sabado Nights of the
Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from him. [6] Since
the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN immediately went to
Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back to his house at Bugo, Cagayan
de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go to Bukidnon to get his aunts Isuzu Forward truck because the twenty band
members and nine utilities and band instruments could not be accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends
asked to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Pea, and a certain Akut. [7]
After leaving GLENNs house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant. GLENN saw his kumpare
Danilo Cosin and the latters wife, and joined them at the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer. When
the Cosin spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight for
Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them sometime looking for the Isuzu
Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had
mechanical problems. Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use the
Isuzu Elf truck instead.[8]
GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no moon or star; neither were
there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his companions used the national highway, traversing the right lane
going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve going
slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of the national
highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to
dim. GLENN switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It was
only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other cars headlights were switched
from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to sudden darkness. [9]
It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after passing the oncoming vehicle,
that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot
on the brake pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and could not see
what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to pump the brake, nor did he notice that his
foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions woke up and said to him: Gard,

it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die. Due to its momentum, the Elf continued on its track and
was able to stop only when it was already very near the next curve. [10]
GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right headlights of the truck had
been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did not
report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only when he
reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side mirror and round mirror, missing; and the
windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred, and he realized that it
was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor Emano.[11]
The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA Office, Cagayan de Oro
City. The former testified that when he went to GLENNs house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy
rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate. He corroborated GLENNs testimony that he (Crescente) went to
GLENNs house that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring the band instruments, band utilities and band
members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival. [12] Almazan, on the other hand, testified that based
on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain from 8:00 p.m. of October 1995
to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October
1995. What she meant by overcast is that there was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and stars could not be
seen.[13]
The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100 meters away from the place
where the incident occurred. He testified that he was awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter,
a man came to his house and asked for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo further stated that
the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not muddy.[14]
In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each of the
victims of attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in finding that he caused the
Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that
he caused the truck to run even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still have avoided the
accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the oncoming vehicle.
In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that the accused out of mischief and dare-devilness [sic], in the
exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the rear
guard[s] and see them scamper away as they saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them down. [15]
Likewise, the OSG posits that the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging trainees was probably brought
by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles of beer earlier before the incident. [16]
Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., the possibility that [GLENN] could have
fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in the early morning, and thus was not able to stop his Isuzu
Elf truck when the bumping thuds were occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up upon hearing the
shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already occurred. [17]
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in weighing the
evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial courts finding that GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards,
then intent to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be indulged. [18]
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of
reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENNs part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was very dark, as there
was no moon. And according to PAG-ASAs observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City
covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no

break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars to be
seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and
green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither
reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.
Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees
were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENNs vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same
direction as GLENNs truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENNs testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by
the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He
must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the
group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow,
dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It
would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young
children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging trainees was
premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying
his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene.
For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENNs vehicle to the confluence of the following
factors:
1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied the truck would
have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped
only after a certain distance.
2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine and smooth asphalt, free
from obstructions on the road such as potholes or excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little bit
downward, more particularly from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and faster to
traverse a distance of 20 to 25 meters which was the approximate aggregate distance from the first
elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.
3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only) could hardly make an
impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour.
4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and the under chassis was
elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat on the ground without its rubber tires running
over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires.
5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding, the forward
movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum of the forward-moving truck such that there was
even much lesser force resisting the said ongoing momentum.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations -- one consistent with
the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -the Court should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused. [19]
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured,
was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had
an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is positively identified,
such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be

true.[20] Thus, in People v. Godinez,[21] this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes
decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely accidental.
Neither is there any showing of a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements disguised in a
vehicular accident.[22] Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion
movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the case, the proper charge would be rebellion, and not
murder.[23]
GLENNs offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the moment
he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.
We have once said:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. [24]
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person
or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on
the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. [25]
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or
swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his
own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the
incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent
man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the
opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that
he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was
exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).[26] In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[27] we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus,
in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,[28] the accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of
the complex crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence, and
was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also,
in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the accused was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with damage to
property through reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight
passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they
been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be
treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of
the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect. [30] Under
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted a
light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides
that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore, constitutes a
qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree. [31] Moreover, the fifth paragraph
thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances
need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.[32]
In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN escaped from the
scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims. It being crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims,
the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said
penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca [33] and of GLENN that the
latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant
to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is
that which could properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries,
qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor in
its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the
maximum term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.
As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same. Conformably with current
jurisprudence,[34] we reduce the trial courts award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of
the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of those who suffered
serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby SET ASIDE,
and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2) months of arresto
mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000;
and the awards in favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERVANDO SATURNO, ARMAN
ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ, BENIGNO ANDRES and DELFIN GREGORIO, accused.
SERVANDO SATURNO, ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ and BENIGNO ANDRES, accused-appellants.

SOLIMAN,

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal interposed by accused Servando Saturno, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres from the
decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of multiple murder and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the victims, and to pay costs.
On July 4, 1989, the provincial prosecutor of Nueva Ecija filed with the Regional Trial Court an information
charging accused as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1989, in Barangay Agupalo Este, Municipality of Lupao, Province of Nueva Ecija,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating and aiding one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery, in that they perpetrated their crime upon their
victims without the latter having any means to defend themselves, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
and for and in consideration of the sum of P2,000.00 given by accused Delfin Gregorio, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault and shoot, with the use of firearm namely: pistolized caliber .22 without
serial number and a caliber 22 Magnum Smith and Wesson revolver, with Serial No. 88463, the persons of Rodelito
Valdez, Florencio Bulatao, Protacio Pasalusdos and Jose Lopez, Jr., hitting them on the different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them fatal wounds which directly caused their instantaneous deaths.
The trial court arraigned the accused separately. Accused Servando Saturno was arraigned on July 7, 1989. He
pleaded not guilty. Accused Delfin Gregorio, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres were arraigned on August 11,
1989. They pleaded not guilty. Accused Arman Soliman remains at large. Trial ensued.
The facts are as follows:
On June 23, 1989, at around 7:00 in the morning, Rodelito Valdez, Benigno Andres, Jose Lopez, Jr., Protacio
Pasalusdos, Florencio Bulatao and Matias Andres were having a drinking spree at Rodelito Valdezs house at Agupalo
Este, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Matias Andres only had a few drinks and proceeded to the farm. Benigno Andres left around
lunchtime. Lucila Valdez, Rodelitos wife, heard Benigno say that he was going to Muoz, so she asked him to buy her a
kilo of pinapaitan (cow meat) and oil. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, all the others were already dead drunk and went to
sleep.[2]
At around 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Lucila heard a tricycle park near their house. There were four
passengers, and the last one to alight was Benigno Andres.
Thinking that he was delivering her pinapaitan, she went down to meet him. However, one of the men (wearing a
light brown jacket and a fatigue cap) met her downstairs and asked for her husband Rodelito. She told him that Rodelito
was dead drunk and could not be awakened. The man did not heed her and went straight to their house. Lucila followed
him inside. He woke up Rodelito, who was sleeping in the bedroom, and asked for his gun. When Rodelito answered that
he did not have a gun, the man shot him. Lucila, who was carrying her one-year old child, started to cry for help but the
man ordered her to be quiet and to stay in the corner of the room. [3]
The mans companions brought Jose Lopez, Jr. and Protacio Pasalusdos to the bedroom and hog-tied
them. Florencio Bulatao arrived later and was also hog-tied. Lucila, who was covering her face and trembling in fear,
sensed that those who were hog-tied were separately brought downstairs. Every time a body was brought downstairs, she
would hear gunshots. When she tried to open her eyes again, she saw that the man in light brown jacket was still there
and was pointing his gun at her. She closed her eyes and heard two gunshots. When she looked again, the man was no
longer there. She realized that the two shots were aimed at her husband. [4]
A few hours after the incident, the police authorities interrogated Lucila and others who may have knowledge about
the crime. Lucila repeatedly stated that she could not identify the assailants. [5] Five (5) empty shells of cal. 22 and two (2)
deformed slugs were recovered from the cadavers of Rodelito Valdez and Florencio Bulatao. [6]
After investigation, constables from the 182nd PC Company apprehended accused-appellants. Sgts. Romeo Pillonar
and Anastacio Apostol and other policemen invited accused Servando Saturno, a fireman, on June 28, 1989. He went with
the police officers after having been told that their Commanding Officer Capt. Undan wanted to talk to him. He brought
his tricycle so he would have a ride home later that evening. He was not able to bring it home because it would be
identified by the widow of Rodelito Valdez. The police officers asked him to return to the camp the following day. [7]
On June 29, 1989, Lucila arrived at the camp in the morning. Sgt. Pillonar escorted her. He pointed at Saturno and
told Lucila, Mrs., this is the suspect. Lucila answered that she does not know Saturno, and that Saturnos tricycle was
not the same as the one used by her husbands assailants. Sgt. Pillonar brought her inside the office. Later, Saturno was
asked to go inside the office as well. In the afternoon of that same day, pictures were taken which showed Lucila pointing
at Saturno, a gun, a light brown jacket and a fatigue cap which were later identified as belonging to Saturno. [8] Lucilas
testimony also revealed, however, that she initially pointed at a fatigue cap and a jacket inside the camp office, but the
soldier on duty laughed at because those belonged to him. [9]
The other accused were arrested later. On July 1, 1989, they executed affidavits admitting their participation in the
crime and implicating Delfin Gregorio as the one who gave P2,000.00 for them to kill Rodelito Valdez. [10]
All the accused denied the charges against them.

Servando Saturno, a native of Sapang Cawayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, claimed that he was at home from June 22 to
25, 1989, because he was sick. His immediate supervisors, Capt. Peter Torres and Jose Gania also testified that they asked
Saturno to go home on June 22 because he looked sick. Saturno reported back to work on June 25. He claimed that he
had not been to Agupalo Este, Lupao in his entire life. [11]
Saturno testified that when he was apprehended, he was asked about his participation in the killing. When he insisted
that he was innocent, he was repeatedly maltreated and tortured at the back of the PC barracks. He was made to lie upside
down, nude, and water was poured on his mouth and nose, which directly went to his forehead. He was coerced into
admitting that he killed the victims as he could no longer endure the pain. [12]
A few minutes after he was maltreated, accused Saturno was asked to write a letter to his wife asking for his gun, one
of his brown jackets and one of his fatigue caps. His first letter was badly written because his hands were shaking. He
wrote a second letter, but it was lost, so Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol asked him to write a third letter. The prosecution
presented the third letter as its evidence. Saturnos wife testified that she never saw this letter. It was Saturnos mother-inlaw who was at home when the police officers came to their house and got Saturnos belongings. [13]
When accused Saturno realized that he was being implicated in the crime, he requested the police officers who
maltreated him to subject his gun to ballistic examination and to give him a paraffin test. They did not heed his request
and they retorted that he acted as if he knew better. On July 1, 1989, Sgt. Apostol fire-tested Saturnos gun. On July 3,
1989, the day before the information was filed, they brought the gun to Manila for ballistic examination, after asking
accused Saturno for P100.00, to buy new bullets. Accused Saturno was given a paraffin test, and the result was negative.
[14]

Lt. Peter Torres, accused Saturnos immediate supervisor at the Muoz Fire Station, testified that the gun used in the
killing was with him prior to June 22, 1989. He never gave it back to accused Saturno because he was supposed to have it
licensed. However, on June 28, 1989, Sgt. Pillonar took it from him upon Capt. Undans orders. [15]
Delfin Gregorio, who was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, testified that he accompanied Lucila Valdez to the
PC headquarters on June 29, 1989. After Lucila talked to the police officers, she told him that Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol
had asked her to point at accused Saturno and at his tricycle. [16] When she was first asked upon her arrival whether she
recognized accused Saturno, she did not say anything. [17]
At that same day, Delfin Gregorio was left behind at the stockade. Sgts. Pillonar and Apostol maltreated him. He was
undressed and made to lie down with his head downward and was repeatedly asked whether he knew accused Servando
Saturno. Every time he answered that he did not know accused Saturno, they would pour water on his nose. They also
applied a lighted cigarette butt on his private part, and when he could no longer endure the pain, he said that he knew
accused Saturno. Later, they brought him to the office and called in a photographer. He was ordered to point at
accused Saturno and his jacket.[18] Gregorio testified, however, that it was the first time that he saw accused Saturno.
On June 30, 1989, Gregorio was again brought to the back of the barracks and asked to undress himself and was
maltreated again. They asked him if he knew Abraham Rodriguez from Muoz. He answered that Rodriguez was an
acquaintance who visited him on June 18, 1989, because he (Rodriguez) bought a dog. They also asked him who were
Rodelito Valdezs drinking companions in the morning of June 23, 1989. When he was mentioning their names, the police
officers stopped him and said that there are too many already and that would already be in excess. Afterwards, Sgt.
Pillonar stated that the four of them (Delfin Gregorio Servando Saturno, Abraham Rodriguez and Benigno Andres) would
be included in the case.[19]
Later that day, the same PC soldiers maltreated acccused Gregorio and Abraham Rodriguez. While he was
blindfolded, he was instructed that his story should be that he saw accused Saturno, Andres and Rodriguez come out of
Rodelito Valdezs house immediately after the killing on June 23, 1989. [20]
Accused Abraham Rodriguez was apprehended on June 30, 1989. He denied the charges against him. He testified
that he was at home in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, at the time the incident took place. Aside from Delfin Gregorio, he did not
know the victims and his other co-accused.
He only came to know accused Saturno and Andres when they were in jail. [21]
He was shown to Lucila Valdez, and the latter told the police officers to release him because he had nothing to do
with the killing.[22] Instead of releasing him, Sgts. Pillonar, Apostol and other PC men brought him to the back portion of
the barracks and repeatedly tortured him for about half an hour. They interrogated him whether he had any participation in
the killing. He insisted he was innocent. He was again severely maltreated. He was coerced into admitting that he was
involved in the killing.[23]
Afterwards, the police officers brought him inside the office and his affidavit was purportedly taken. Rodriguez
testified that aside from a few immaterial questions, he was not asked any other questions but the police officers continued
typing. A few days later, he and his co-accused were brought to a certain Atty. Evangelista and were sternly ordered to
answer yes to every question Atty. Evangelista may ask. He and the other accused were not allowed to read the contents
of their affidavits.[24]
Accused Benigno Andres denied any participation in the killing. He testified that he had not known accused Saturno
and Rodriguez prior to June 23, 1989, and that he only met them at the PC Company compound on July 1, 1989. He
admitted that Rodelito Valdez asked him to drink gin with him in the morning of June 23, 1989, but he only stayed for a
few minutes because he had to go to Muoz. He arrived at Muoz early in the afternoon. His tricycle broke down and he

stayed there overnight in the house of Florencio Bulataos (one of the victims) distant relative. The following day, he
learned about the killing and he immediately went to Agupalo Este together with Florencio Bulataos sister and her
husband.[25] Florencio Bulataos sister did not testify in court.
Accused Andres testified that when he was apprehended on July 1, 1989, he was brought to the back of the barracks
of the 182nd PC Company compound, was maltreated, and was coerced to admit his participation in the killing. He was
also forced to sign a document purportedly his affidavit admitting his guilt. He testified that he had no participation in the
preparation of the document and was never informed of his constitutional rights. [26]
The trial court found accused-appellants guilty of multiple murder. The trial court acquitted accused Delfin Gregorio
for insufficiency of evidence.
Hence, this appeal.[27]
In their brief, appellants raise as issue the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
contended that prosecution witness Lucila Valdez was not able to positively identify them. They claim an alibi, that is, it
was physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time the incident occurred.
The Solicitor General contends that the trial court correctly gave credence to the testimony of Lucila Valdez and that
the defense of alibi is weak. He maintains that appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
witness Lucila that they were the perpetrators of the crime as it is an entrenched jurisprudential doctrine that positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi.[28]
We find the appeal meritorious.
It is a basic rule that the guilt of an accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. [29] Before he is convicted, there
must be moral certainty of guilt--a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it that he is guilty of the crime charged. [30] Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [31]
The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime has been committed, and second, that the accused
is the person responsible therefor. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence with evidence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. [32]
The fatigue cap and the light brown jacket (and the bloodstains found on it) were the basis for implicating accused
Saturno. These were not identified during the trial nor formally offered in evidence. As a matter of fact, the jacket was
never seen after it was submitted for examination. The chemist who examined the bloodstains in the jacket was not
presented to identify the report and the jacket.
There was also no convincing proof that the slugs, which were presented during the trial were the same slugs
recovered from the scene of the crime. Barangay Chairman Jaime Collado admitted that after he removed the slugs from
the cadavers, he did not immediately give them to the police officers. The slugs, which were submitted for ballistic
examination, could have been those used when Sgt. Apostol fire-tested the gun on July 1, 1989. There was no sufficient
proof that they were fired from accused Saturnos gun. The ballistician, after testifying that there is no margin of error in
his report, could not estimate when the gun was last fired. The other homemade gun also alleged to have been used in the
killing was tested in court and it was shown that it could not be operated easily. Using the courts own words, the gun was
pasumpong-sumpong.[33]
Witness Lucila Valdez hesitated at first to point at accused Saturnos tricycle because it looked different from the one
used by the assailants which was color red and with a tail. [34] She did not also recognize the inscription SATURNO
FAMILY at the back of the tricycle.[35]
Witness Lucila Valdez was covering her face during the incident. She claimed that the man who was wearing a light
brown jacket had a well-chiseled or occidental nose and his face was oblong; that the gun used in killing her husband
appeared to have a circular object in the middle; that the man who hog-tied the other victims was of medium height, a
well-built man, dark skinned and the other who helped him was also well-built and fair-complexioned and a little bit
handsome.[36] She stated that the person who dumped Florencio Bulatao in front of the other victims was wearing a belt
which was borrowed from my husband, and she assumed that it was Benigno Andres because she remembered the latter
borrowing her husbands belt.[37]
Witness Lucilas testimony regarding the identity of the accused, however, is too general to deserve
consideration. On the other hand, accused-appellants were able to present convincing evidence that they could not
possibly be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Bgy. Chairman Collado and Mayor George Castaneda testified that Lucila Valdez told them that she was not able to
recognize the assailants.[38] It is inconceivable for Lucila not to tell the barangay officials that her longtime compadre Benigno Andres assisted in the killing. On rebuttal, she said that she had not seen accused Saturno and
Andres prior to June 23, 1989. [39] Witness Lucila testified that she was afraid and trembling after she saw that her husband
was shot,[40] yet she also testified that she was composed and normal all throughout the incident. [41] Her conflicting
testimony as to her disposition at that time creates a reasonable doubt on her capability to positively identify the killers.
The identification of appellants as the assailants could in no way be considered as positive and credible.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of the killing; however, it failed to prove that
appellants perpetrated the crime. Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a pronouncement of

guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused will result in acquittal.
[42]

Accused-appellants testified that they were somewhere else when the killing occurred, and that it was impossible for
them to have committed the crime. The court a quo gave weight to the affidavits executed by the accused wherein they
admitted their participation in the killing. [43] However, they were able to prove that their affidavits were solely prepared by
the police investigators, that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights, and that they were forced to sign the
affidavits lest they be maltreated again.
True, the settled rule is that alibi is a weak defense. It has been held that courts will not at once look with disfavor on
the defense of alibi. Alibi may be considered in light of all the evidence for it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. [44]
Appellants alibi and denial gain considerable strength in view of the unreliable identification of the perpetrators of
the crime.[45]
Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [46] The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence
in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
[47]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case No. L-15 (89). The Court ACQUITS accused-appellants SERVANDO SATURNO,
ABRAHAM RODRIGUEZ and BENIGNO ANDRES for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellants unless they are lawfully
held for another cause, and to inform the Court of their release within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83810 January 28, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REY BERNARDINO y MOLINA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:p
The informant's telephone tip was terse: a certain Rey Bernardino was selling marijuana at Malaya St.,
Malanday, Marikina. 1
The police acted promptly. A team consisting of Patrolmen Roberto Jocson, Isidro Mariano, Romeo Caviso and
Mateo Garcia proceeded to the said place to look for their quarry. They brought with them a ten peso bill
previously marked on its four corners with the initials of Pat. Wilson Balauitan. 2
Upon arrival in Malaya St., Jocson sought Bernardino, whom the informer pointed to. The other members of
the team positioned themselves in various unobtrusive places where they could watch Jocson and Bernardino.
Jocson approached Bernardino and asked if he could "score," meaning if he could buy marijuana. Bernardino
left and returned after a while, bringing with him three sticks of marijuana, which he gave to Jocson. Jocson
paid him the marked bill and scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal. The other policemen then moved in
and arrested Bernardino. 3
They took from him the marked ten-peso bill and a black wallet containing some residue of marijuana leaves
and personal identification papers.
Bernardino was taken to the Eastern Police District Headquarters, where, after being apprised of his
constitutional rights, he refused to give any written statement. The three sticks of marijuana and the residue
found in his wallet were turned over to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. 4
The following information was then filed against Bernardino:

That on or about the 25th day of August, 1987, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to another person three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, which is a
prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
All the members of the team testified on the incident as above narrated. 5 Pat. Balauitan related his
investigation of Bernardino. 6 The prosecution also presented Capt. Lina Sarmiento, the PC forensic chemist,
who declared under oath that the cigarette sticks and the leaves found in Bernardino's wallet were positive for
marijuana. 7 These were offered as exhibits, together with the marked money. 8
Bernardino was the only witness for the defense. He denied the charge against him, claiming he was digging a
"pozo negro" when he was arrested and was not at all involved in the sale of marijuana. 9
In his decision dated May 13, 1988, Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig found
the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, plus
the costs.
Bernardino is now before us asking for a reversal of his conviction. He claims the trial court should not have
given credence to the prosecution's evidence nor should it have presumed that the policemen had regularly
performed their functions. His contention is that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
In questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the accused-appellant points to certain
discrepancies in their respective testimonies that he avers prove they were not telling the truth when they
testified. Among these are the inconsistencies on why they commenced the operation in the first place, who
bought and who sold the marijuana, and who among them actually frisked him upon his arrest.
These are minor matters that do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
do they reflect on the witnesses' honesty. Differences in the recollection of details relating to the same incident
may be expected from the several persons testifying thereon; but as long as there is basic agreement on the
main points of the incident, their respective declarations may not be rejected as totally untrue.
As for the statements of Mariano and Balauitan, referring to Bernardino as the buyer rather than the seller,
these were rectified later when, on further questioning, they declared that the buyer was Jocson. These
statements are in the record and cannot be denied. 10
The argument that the accused-appellant would not have sold marijuana to a total stranger is at best
conjectural and in any case not convincing. Drug pushers have become increasingly casual about their
activities and less cautious about isolated transactions like the one at bar. Bernardino evidently considered the
sale an ordinary transaction and Jocson an ordinary user.
Pat. Balauitan's testimony that the accused-appellant verbally admitted the sale of the marijuana to Jocson is,
of course, inadmissible as violative of the constitutional rights of the accused, who was not properly informed
thereof. Nevertheless, even if that testimony were discarded, the rest of the prosecution evidence would still
suffice to sustain his conviction.
Street pushers like the accused-appellant have contributed immensely to the aggravation of drug abuse, and it
is only just that they be punished severely in accordance with the Dangerous Drugs Act. But it is hoped that the
government will exert more efforts against the big and powerful drug syndicates that have so far evaded the
clutches of the law. These are the real culprits that, for evil gain, are sapping the strength and morality of the
nation with the terrible poison they are spreading. They must be stopped.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-65647 August 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO FLORES, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose C. Espinas counsel de oficio for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:
Ernesto FLORES appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, finding him
guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to life
imprisonment as well as to pay a fine of P20,000 and the costs.
The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information against FLORES as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1980, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, a
person not authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, without
authority, sell and deliver fifteen (15) dried marijuana stalks to a poseur-buyer in the amount of
ten pesos (Pl0.00) along E. de los Santos Avenue, Balintawak, Quezon City, in violation of the
aforesaid Republic Act No. 6425.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 4.)
On arraignment, FLORES entered a plea of not guilty. After due trial, the court a quo rendered a
decision dated 17 October 1983, finding him guilty as charged, the decision's fallo reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ernesto Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana described and penalized under Article II,
Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended. He is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000. Costs against accused.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46.)
In arriving at its conclusion, the court relied on the prosecution's version of the incident, culled from the
testimony of Sgt. Angel Nieves as follows:
On 20 August 1980, at about 5:00 p.m., Sgt. Angel Nieves and CIC Godofredo Fider, both of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit, (CANU for short) conducted a "test-buy" operation in Balintawak, Quezon City in
connection with the government drive against violators of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, also known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act. They were assisted by Annalisa Santos, a confidential informer who acted as the
buyer. After Santos was given P10.00 to buy marijuana, they all went to an alley in the vicinity of the squatters'
area near the Cloverleaf interchange. The CANU agents waited out of sight as Santos bought five sticks of the
illegal drug. The CANU agents then left with the informer, but did not arrest the pusher.
The next day, the agents planned a "buy-bust' operation in order to nab the culprit. Sgt. Nieves, with CIC Fider
and Pfc. Wilfredo Tamondong, again gave two P5.00 bills to the confidential informer to purchase marijuana in
the same place. From a distance, Sgt. Nieves followed the confidential informer into the interior of the
squatter's area. He saw her talking to a young boy. The boy left, and the confidential informer, Annalisa Santos,
waited beside a store. Sgt. Nieves approached the store and talked to the storeowner in the pretext of looking
for a boarding house. While there, he saw the accused arrive and give the marijuana stalks to Santos, who in
turn gave the two P5.00 bills to him. Sgt. Nieves then introduced himself as a CANU agent and then arrested
the accused. He confiscated the two (2) five peso bins and the 15 marijuana stalks which were turned over to
the NBI for laboratory examination and were later confirmed to be marijuana as attested to by NBI Forensic
Chemist Nelly Carriaga.
On that same day, Sgt. Nieves and his fellow agents submitted a joint affidavit giving their account of the event
(Exh. "A".)
Refuting the prosecution's version, the accused presented his own testimony corroborated by his witnesses,
Quintin Carpio and Benita Cleofas. He alleged that in the moming of 21 August 1980 he worked as a painter in

the residence of barangay councilman Quintin Carpio. At noontime, he passed by the store of Benita Cleofas to
buy viand as he usually did. Suddenly, without warning, somebody, poked a gun at him and hit him in the
breast and at the back. A man then placed a plastic packet in his right hip pocket. He was forced to board a car
and brought to a building, which he found out later, was the CANU headquarters in Malabon. He was frisked,
and the plastic packet, taken from him. He was tortured and beaten, and then forced to sign a written
confession. He vehemently denied selling marijuana to the buyer-poseur.
From the decision, FLORES interposed this appeal, and contends that the trial court erred:
FIRSTLY IN ADMITTING THE "CONFESSION" OF THE ACCUSED GIVEN DURING CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION WITHOUT BEING SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS, WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND WITHOUT AN EXPRESS WAIVER OF SUCH RIGHT.
SECONDLY IN GIVING "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT' TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, SGT. ANGEL
NIEVES DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL INCONSISTENCIES THEREIN WITH RESPECT TO THE ELEMENTS
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY AS TO THE TIME OF THE APPREHENSION, THE ALLEGED
MARKED MONEY USED TO ENTRAP THE ACCUSED, HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED, THE
CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF OTHER WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, AND OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCES TO NEGATE SUCH BLANKET FAITH IN THE ARRESTING OFFICER.
THIRDLY IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING THAT HE
WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING THAT THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS, THE
BUYER POSER WAS NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESS, AND THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, NEGATE A CONVICTION. (Rollo, p. 71.)
The principal issues here are: 1) whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible in evidence
against him, and 2) whether from the evidence presented, the guilt of FLORES has been proved to a moral
certainty.
Anent the question of the inadmissibility of his confession, FLORES's statement reveals the following:
PASUBALI: Ikaw ginoong Emesto Flores ay nasa ilalim ng pagsi siyasat sa
kasalanang paglabag sa ipinagbabawal na gamot gaya ng marijuana, ngunit
bago kita tanungin ay nais kung (sic) ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan
alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, ng gaya ng mga
sumusunod:
Na ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag sumagot sa mga itatanong sa
iyo."
Na sa anumang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring gamiting
evidensiya laban pabor sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman dito sa ating Bansa."
Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng manananggol upang sumubaybay sa iyo
at kung hindi mo kaya ang humirang ng isa ang tanggapang ito ang bahalang
humirang ng isa para sa iyo.
TAGASIYASAT: Naunawaan at naintindihan mo bang lahat ang mga ipinaliwanag
ko sa iyo?
SINISIYASAT: Opo.
TANONG: Matapos mong maunawaan ang iyong mga karapatan nakahanda ka
bang magbigay ng malaya at kusang loob na salaysay, na ikaw ay hindi pinipilit,
tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng anumang bagay ?
SAGOT: Opo sir.
(Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.)

Precedents abound showing that this kind of "advice" given to the accused does not satisfy the constitutional
guarantees accorded a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. This protection given
under the 1973 Constitution is further expanded by the 1987 Constitution [Article III, Sec. 12 (l)-(4).] In People
v. Jara[G.R. Nos. 6135657, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 5161], this Court had the opportunity to assail the
kind of recitation of rights similar to the one in the present case:
This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even
copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create
an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing
of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
This Court has observed that the long question of the investigator informing appellant of his right to remain
silent and to counsel followed by a monosyllabic answer, does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution [People v. Taruc, G.R. No. 74655, January 20, 1988,
citing People v. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465.] The questioned confession shows
that while the accused was informed of his right to counsel, he was not definitely asked whether he wanted to
avail of such right, contrary to our ruling in the case of People v. Velasco [G.R. No. 54335, December 14, 1981,
110 SCRA 319 (1981).] Furthermore, he was not made to understand that, if at any time during the interogation
he would wish to have the assistance of counsel, the interrogation would cease until an attorney is present
[People v. Lasac G.R. No. 64508, March 19, 1987,148 SCRA 624, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).] With the manifest failure to comply with this constitutional sine qua non, the confession must be held
inadmissible.
In People v. Nicandro [G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986, 141 SCRA 289], this Court explained the essence
of the right of the accused to the apprised of his constitutional rights, thus:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos,
122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2. In other words, the right of a Person under
interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed'
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending
upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.
This was reiterated in People v. Duhan [G.R. No. 65189, May 28, 1986, 142 SCRA 100] and recently in People
v. Albofera [G.R. No. 69377, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 123] and People v. Taruc [G.R. No. 74655, January
20,1988.]
Without the extrajudicial confession, the resolution of the question of whether the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt hinges on the credibility of the apprehending officer who allegedly witnessed
the sale, Sgt. Angel Nieves. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that the trial court's findings on credibility of
witnesses are, as a rule not disturbed on appeal except where certain facts of substance and value are
overlooked, which if considered would affect the result of the case [U.S. v. Estrada, 24 Phil. 401 (1913), People
v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927), People v. Caboverde G.R. No. 66646, April 15, 1988, and People v.
Capulong, G.R. No. 65674, April 15, 1988.]

The testimony of Sgt. Nieves is vital, because it is the only evidence left to support the conclusion that
FLORES was indeed selling marijuana when arrested, since Annalisa Santos, the alleged buyer-poseur, did
not testify nor did she appear before the investigating fiscal or, even execute a statement. Considering the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, the testimony of Sgt. Nieves must be
subjected to close and careful scrutiny.
After a close and painstaking examination of the record, the Court finds that standing alone, the testimony of
Sgt. Nieves fails to satisfy the quantum of proof necessary to support a judgment of conviction. The
inconsistencies and material discrepancies, in his testimony engender serious doubt as to its reliability and
veracity.
In the sworn statement that he and the other CANU officers executed on 21 August 1980, the time of the
apprehension in flagrante was indicated as 12:10 p.m. When he first took the witness stand however on 19
June 1981, Nieves testified that they conducted the "buy-bust" operation at 8:30 p.m. When he next testified on
22 July 1981, still on direct examination, he reversed himself and said that the incident indeed happened at
12:10 p.m. On 27 November 1981 on cross examination, he again reverted to his original answer, stating that it
was really at 9:30 p.m. when the arrest took place. The record reveals this series of conflicting answers of Sgt.
Nieves.
When he first testified on 19 June 1981., he said:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now you said that on the following day you continued yo ur operation, about
what time was that when you started that operation the following day?
A 8:30 p.m.
Q And who were your companions?
A CIC Tamondong and confidential informer and myself. [tsn, p. 6, June 19,1981]
Later, during the continuation of the direct examination on 22 July 1981, Sgt. Nieves reversed himself.
Q Sgt. Nieves, this operation that you conducted on August 21, 1980 where you
apprehended accused Emesto Flores concerning fifteen sticks of marijuana what
time of the day did this happen?
ATTY. MARTINEZ
We object because earlier the witness testified that the apprehension was 8:30
p.m.
FISCAL
That is why the witness is going to explain that.
COURT
May answer.
A Noontime of August 21. [tsn, p. 10, July 22, 1981]
When cross examined on 27 November 1981, he went back to his original stance that the arrest took place at
9:30 P.M., thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Q So, let us make this clear. On your oath, you will say that on August 21, 1980
at 9:30 p.m., your CI bought from the person you call Nestor Flores these 15
marijuana stalks, which is the same testimony you gave on June 19,1981?
A What I know is that our CI bought the 15 stalks at 9:30 p.m. of August 21, and I
was there. I was the one who poked him.
Q You are sure now of the date, August 21, and the time, 9:30 p.m., that your CI
bought from the person of Nestor Flores these 15 stalks of marijuana?
A Yes sir.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes sir.
Q So, it is not August 21, at 12:00 noon?
A No, it was 9:30 p.m.
Q On July 22, 1981, you remember you testified here?
A Yes sir.
Q And on that date you also declared that you had an operation on August 21,
1980, and you apprehended Nestor Flores as you claimed his name was, at
12.00 noon?
A No sir, the question of the fiscal at the time was wrong. The truth is that as I will
now affirm is 9:30 p.m.
Q But is it not true when I asked you to clarify whether it was 12:00 noon or 9:30
when you made the apprehension, you said it was noontime and you were
changing your testimony of June 18?
A No sir, that is not correct. The truth is that it is at 9:30 in the evening. If ever
there was a mistake before, the truth is that it is 9:30 p.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you Exhibit A, will you inform the Court whether this is the joint
affidavit the three of you executed?
A Yes sir.
Q And I will quote to you this paragraph "that on or about 12:10 p.m. August 21,
1980, we arrived in the target area and placed ourselves in strategic positions so
that we can arrange signals from our CI-" (counsel reading entire paragraph) you
remember having said that in your affidavit?
A Yes sir.
Q And the time is 12:10 p.m., August 21, 1980?
A Yes sir.
Q And this is your declaration as the date and time when you apprehended the
accused in this case?
A That is a clerical error, sir. The truth is it was 9:30 in the evening.

Q What is this 12:10 p.m. stated in you affidavit ?

A There must be a mistake when the affidavit was typed.
Q Why did you not correct that before signing it?
A Sometimes we overlook some things sir.
Q Is it not true that you swore to the contents of this affidavit before Capt.
Gutani?
A Yes, but there were portions I overlooked.
Q May we ask that the paragraph be encircled and marked as Exhibit 1. And it
was only July 22, 1981, on direct examination by counsel that you sought to
change the date and time from your earlier testimony of June 19, 1981 that your
apprehension was 9:30 as you are now insisting today and changed it to 12:00
noon when you testified on July 22, 1981, when this particular affidavit was
shaown to you?
A Did I not say before that that is only a clerical error. It is true that I was the one
who apprehended that person and he has long been selling marijuana, and it
was at 9:30 p.m..
Q Did you not declare on July 22, 1981 that your apprehension was August 21, at
twelve noon?
A I did not understand the fiscal's question before, but now I understand it very
well and I'm trying to explain it because my mind is clear. [tsn, p. 6, November
27, 1981].
The trial court attached little importance to this discrepancy in the testimony of Sgt. Nieves. According to the
court, the mistake was due to the numerous CANU operations Nieves had participated in. [Rollo, p. 44.] This is
untenable. It is precisely because of these numerous operations that the witness must be sure that what he is
testifying to is the same incident and not any other. Furthermore, he had no reason at all to mistake that arrest
for some other apprehension as he in fact was allowed by the Court to refer to certain notes to refresh his
memory while testifying [tsn, p. 5, June 19,1981.]
As a lingering doubt remains as to whether Nieves was testifying to the same incident, or whether it was some
other, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Due to the harshness of the penalty imposed by
law and specially where a person's liberty for the rest of his life is at stake, the time of the incident becomes
material to prove to a moral certainty, that when arrested, the person charged was indeed committing a crime.
Thus, the contradictory testimony of Sgt. Nieves, on the vital matter of the time the apprehension took place
casts a grave doubt, nay, destroys his credibility.
If, as Sgt. Nieves insists, he arrested FLORES at night, in the act of selling marijuana, his testimony is
discredited by other evidence tending to show that FLORES was arrested at noontime. After the arrest, the
CANU officers executed a statement (Exh. "A") indicating the time of the arrest as 12:10 p.m. Sgt. Tamondong,
one of the arresting officers, also testified that the arrest took place at 12:10 p.m. (tsn, p. 5, February 26, 1982)
and that he investigated FLORES that same afternoon. FLORES himself admitted that he was arrested while
buying viand for his lunch from Benita Cleofas's store, and the latter confirmed this fact.
In the light of this contradictory evidence, the detailed account by Sgt. Nieves of the nighttime arrest cannot be
taken as basis to establish that at noontime, on 21 August 1980, FLORES was arrested in flagrante.
The record further reveals certain traces of prevarication which cast serious doubt on the credibility of Sgt.
Nieves. He testified that during the "test buy" operation, the day prior to the arrest, he was with both CIC Fider
and Sgt. Tamondong and that the latter was waiting inside the car while they waited for the informer [tsn, p.
1,19 July 1981.] Sgt. Tamondong however testified that he was not with Nieves and Fider during that day.

Secondly, Sgt. Nieves stated that the accused had long been selling marijuana. On cross-examination
however, he admitted that he came to know the accused only after apprehending him.
Furthermore, Nieves testified that the two five peso bills he gave to the buyer-poseur were marked, and that
these same bills were the ones taken from FLORES. The evidence on record however shows that only one bill
was marked (Exh. "B") and that the other bill had no markings at all.
While Courts generally give credence to testimonies of police officers, as it is presumed that official duty has
been regularly performed [Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), Rules of Court] this presumption cannot by itself, prevail over
the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
The testimony of Sgt. Nieves being highly suspect, the prosecution is left with no evidence to establish that
when apprehended at 12:10 p.m., FLORES was indeed selling marijuana, the act which is the essence of the
offense sought to be punished.
This fact could have been established by other evidence. But not even the testimony of Annalisa Santos, the
alleged buyer-poseur was presented. Even as this Court is aware of the principle that it is the prosecution's
prerogative to weigh and determine the evidence to be presented, we consider the non-presentation of Santos
as witness to be fatal to the prosecution's case. Being the only alleged eyewitness other than Nieves, Santos
could have corrected the material inconsistencies in the latter's testimony and, more importantly, could have
positively testified on the fact necessary for conviction: that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana to her when
apprehended.
As has been oft repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into
account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is satisfied that
the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction [People v. Ramos,
G.R No. 76744, June 28, 1988, citing People v. Bania G.R No. L-46524, January 31, 1985, 134 SCRA 347].
In a fairly recent case, the Court had occasion to pass upon the competing interests of waging a determined
campaign against drug addiction and respecting constitutionally protected rights of the accused, thus:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions and the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble paint." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself [People v.
Aminnudin G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988].
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and judgment is entered ACQUITTING the
accused-appellant of the offense charged.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-56013. October 30, 1987.]
LIWANAG AGUIRRE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION

CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Liwanag Aguirre seeks a review of a Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty of the
crime of direct bribery which is punishable under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information filed against him reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THAT on or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an Acting Deputy
Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously demand and obtain from one Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of
the business firm Guardsman Security Agency, the sum of FIFTY (P50.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, as a consideration for the said accused refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately
implementing a Writ of Execution of a final judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Regional Branch XI against said security agency in NLRC Case No. 905-MC-XI-78; that
the accused, in the performance of his office as such Deputy Sheriff, should have immediately
implemented the said writ of execution by then and there immediately seizing personal property
of the judgment-debtor Guardsman Security Agency, to satisfy the judgment. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)
After petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the charge, the case proceeded to trial. Thereafter, on
the basis of the aforequoted Information and the evidence adduced during the trial the
Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as principal of the crime charged. The lower court
appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance, in favor of the petitioner and sentenced him to:chanrobles law
library : red
. . . Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of Arresto mayor; with the accessories provided by law: to
suffer special temporary disqualification for Six (6) Years and One (1) Day; to pay a fine of Fifty
Pesos (P50.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465; to indemnify Hermogenes
Hanginon in the same amount of Fifty Pesos (P50.00); and, to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 50)
Petitioner in this case assails the judgment of conviction upon the ground that the evidence
presented failed to prove his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. The main
thrust of the Petition is that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving weight to the uncorroborated
testimony of the lone prosecution witness.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well as its
conclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed, the question before the Court
being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable weight, since said court is in the best
position to observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial [People v.
Refuerzo, 82 Phil. 576 (1949); People v. Gumahin, 128 Phil. 728 (1967), 21 SCRA 729; People v.
Mercado, L-39511, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 232]. However, this court may choose to pass upon
the credibility of a witness if it appears from the decision under review that the trial court has
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result
of the case [People v. Alban, L-15203, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 931; People v. Espejo, L-27708,
December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400, People v. Garcia, L-44364, April 27, 1979; People v. Mercado,
supra; People v. Dagangon, G.R. No. 62654-58. November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 464].
In the instant case, the conviction is anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of a single
prosecution witness. The Sandiganbayan justifies its reliance upon said testimony,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . (E)ven as witness Hanginons version stands sans corroboration, the same is sufficiently
impeccable and carries the ring of truth. He could not have been mistaken as to the time and
circumstances of the visit of the accused to the office of the Agency and nothing in his demeanor
and reactions during his sojourn on the witness stand tends to suggest that the story he
threshed out in open Court was a fabrication .. The forthright and spontaneous manner with
which the version of the prosecution witness, as advanced by Hanginon, was disclosed and
recorded speaks well of the veracity thereof. More importantly, no sufficient and compelling
motive had been pointed to which could have impelled witness Hanginon to deliberately perjure
himself and consciously impute the commission of a nefarious offense to an innocent man and
thus railroad him to a stretch in jail . . . (Rollo, pp. 40-41).

The constitutional presumption of innocence imposes upon this Court the duty to ascertain in
every case that no person is made to answer for a crime without proof of his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt [Constitution, Article III, Sec. 14 (2)]. To overcome this constitutional
presumption and to justify a criminal conviction, there must exist in the record, "that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" [Rule 133, Sec. 2; Rule 131, Sec.
2].chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
That the prosecution evidence consists of the testimony of a single witness does not necessarily
indicate insufficiency of evidence to convict. It is settled that the testimony of only one witness
may be sufficient to support a conviction if it convinces the court beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the crime charged [U.S. v. Dacotan, 1 Phil. 669 (1903); U.S. v. Olais, 36
Phil. 828 (1917); People v. Argana, 119 Phil. 573 (1964), 10 SCRA 311; People v. Salazar, G.R.
No. L-32858, Aug. 19, 1974, 58 SCRA 467; People v. Tan, Jr., G.R. No. 53834, November 24,
1986, 145 SCRA 614].
However, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness in this case that do not inspire
belief. It appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from him, a mere
employee of the security agency, without authority to accept any writ or legal paper and without
money. It is also doubtful if said employee could have voluntarily parted with his personal funds
without any expectation of refund. Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in this situation
where it could have been quite easy to catch the petitioner red-handed with the bribe money. As
testified to by Hanginon, petitioner allegedly told him that the balance of the P200 Pesos bribe
money was to be delivered at the Davao Famous Restaurant upon the arrival of the owner of the
agency (Rollo, pp. 206-207). If, according to this witness the owner had decided to press
charges and had gone to his legal counsel the day after his (the owners) arrival (Rollo, p. 207),
why was the police not called in to entrap the petitioner at the place indicated by him? That
would have been a more logical and usual procedure in preparing for the prosecution of a bribery
case which almost always suffers from a dearth of witnesses.
The petitioner, in his defense, asserts that there is serious dispute as to the fact of the
commission of the offense; that the uncorroborated testimony of Hermogenes Hanginon fails to
prove its commission and the petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and that notice of
garnishment had been served upon the bank for satisfaction of the NLRCs judgment against the
Guardsman Security Agency before the alleged bribery took place.
After careful examination of the decision under review, the pleadings filed and the evidence
relied on, the nagging doubt remains as to whether the testimony of Hanginon, the sole witness
for the prosecution, proves the petitioners guilt. As aptly observed in People v. Opida, "The
scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact should be tipped in favor of the accused because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence." [G.R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986, 142 SCRA 295,
303].cralawnad
This Court finds that in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction under review must yield to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is
REVERSED. Liwanag Aguirre is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88400 April 6, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMMANUEL GUINTO and FEDERICO VALENCIA, accused-appellants.

CRUZ, J.:

As counsel for the prosecution in criminal cases on appeal, the Solicitor General usually supports the decision
of the trial court and asks for its affirmance. In the rare case now before us, he instead questions the conviction
of the accused-appellants and moves for their acquittal. 1
Emmanuel Guinto and Federico Valencia were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having
sold 28.83 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. 2 After trial, they were found guilty by Judge Eutropio Migrio
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, and sentenced to life imprisonment. 3
The trial court found that on October 7, 1986, a team of the Narcotics Command conducted a "buy-bust"
operation against the two accused-appellants at Hulo, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The team leader was Sgt.
Salvador Aladano, who acted as the poseur-buyer and dealt directly with Guinto, to whom he gave the marked
money for the marijuana he was pretending to buy. Guinto left to get the narcotic and returned with Valencia.
Upon receipt of the marijuana, Aladano gave the pre-arranged signal and the rest of the team then arrested the
two accused-appellants. 4
The above findings were based on the sworn narration of Pat. Benjamin Vitug, whom the trial court found to be
"positive, clear and convincing in his testimony" and without any motive for framing the accused-appellants,
and the exhibits submitted by the prosecution. Among these were a receipt for the seized marijuana, signed by
Valencia; 5 the dried marijuana, fruiting tops themselves; 6 and the chemistry report thereon 7 by Capt. Nelly
Cariaga of the PC Crime Laboratory who explained and confirmed her findings when she testified at the trial.
Both Guinto and Valencia denied the charge against them and were corroborated by Socorro Valencia, the
latter's wife. Guinto claimed that in the evening of October 7, 1986, while he was cooking, Sgt. Aladano and
Pat. Vitug entered his yard and arrested him after their companion, Boni Sapatero, pointed to him as a
marijuana seller. 8There was no warrant of arrest. He was handcuffed and taken to a waiting vehicle and they
then proceeded to look for Valencia, whom the agents also arrested in his house. 9 Valencia said his house was
searched without warrant, but the peace officers found nothing. 10 The two were later taken to Camp Crame,
where they were investigated without the assistance of counsel and detained. 11 Guinto and Valencia were
forced to sign a paper they were not allowed to read, which turned out to be the receipt for the marijuana later
offered as Exhibit "A." 12
The trial judge expressed disbelief, pointing out that while Valencia and his wife swore that they had visitors
when the Narcom agents entered their house, none of the visitors was presented at the trial for corroboration.
He noted that while the wife testified that the officers knocked on their door, the husband disagreed, saying
they just "barged in" The couple also differed on the number of Narcom agents composing the team, the
husband saying there were five while the wife said there were six of them. 13 These claimed defects were
considered substantial enough by the trial court to justify rejection of the evidence for the defense.
There seems to be a misconception here. The trial court apparently believed it was for the defense to prove
that the accused-appellants were innocent, not for the prosecution to prove that they were guilty. Settled is the
rule that innocence is presumed; it is guilt that must be proved. Yet the decision emphasized the supposed
shortcomings of the defense (as trivial as they were) while accepting in one brief paragraph the testimony of
Pat. Vitug as the correct account of the commission of the crime.
The decision did not observe that the case for the prosecution had its own flaws too, and more serious at that
than those it noted in the defense evidence. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office specifies many of these
defects in its well-prepared brief for the accused-appellants. The Office of the Solicitor General adds its own
criticism of the prosecution evidence and also prays for the reversal of the judgment.
It is significant that the principal protagonist from the Narcom team in the buy-bust operation, the agent who
posed as the buyer and allegedly dealt directly with Guinto and Valencia, was not presented at all at the trial.
This was Sgt. Salvador Aladano, whose silence is not a little intriguing. One may well ask why he did not testify
when he was the person on top of the operation, so to speak, and actually negotiated with the accusedappellants. He was the logical witness, but he was never called to the stand.
In People v. Rojo, 14 decided only last year, this Court held that the failure of the prosecution to present the
alleged buyer of the marijuana was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.
The rest of the team, including Pat. Vitug, merely watched surreptitiously as the negotiation was going on and
had at best only a peripheral view of the transaction. Like the other team members who were waiting to make

the arrest, Vitug could only observe covertly, and from a distance, as Aladano transacted with Guinto and
Valencia. The poseur-buyer was Aladano, not Vitug. Yet it was Vitug and not Aladano whom the prosecution
chose to testify on the details of the alleged sale.
No wonder Vitug's testimony was conflicting and confusing if not concocted. As the Solicitor General notes, this
witness offered no less than four inconsistent versions of how the crime was committed by the accusedappellants, all of which, analyzed together, reflected on his credibility.
In the first version, Vitug said they arrested Guinto after he received the marked money but there was no
mention at all of the delivery of the marijuana to him or of the presence of Valencia. 15 In the second version,
Vitug had a change of mind and said there was a simultaneous exchange of the money and the marijuana
between Aladano and Guinto, but again made no mention of Valencia's participation. 16 In the third version,
Vitug, becoming more complicated, said Aladano delivered the money to Guinto, who then left to get the
marijuana, after which the team arrested Guinto, who then led them to Valencia. 17 There was still a fourth
version, where Vitug contradicted himself again and said the team arrested the two accused-appellants not
separately but together when they all returned to Guinto's house after the supposed sale. 18
In addition to these inconsistencies, the Court notes that Guinto had not known Aladano earlier when they met,
apparently for the first time, at the appointed place on October 7, 1987. 19 There was therefore no reason for
the two to trust each other, more so since they were negotiating an illegal transaction. Yet, in one of Vitug's four
versions of the crime, Aladano willingly gave the marked money to Guinto and then naively allowed him to
leave (with the money) to get the marijuana. It would have been more believable if Aladano had waited for the
marijuana first before paying for it, as befitted a cautious buyer who had not met the seller until then.
Curiously, the marked money was not offered in evidence, and for the quaint reason that it was delivered to
some unknown and mysterious person. 20 It is not explained why this was done. Not even the serial numbers of
this alleged payment were given at the trial although Vitug claimed he had carefully noted them down before
the buy-bust operation. 21
The prosecution did present the supposed receipt for the marijuana allegedly confiscated from the accusedappellants, 22 but both Guinto and Valencia claim they were forced to sign the paper without being allowed to
read it, and in the absence of counsel. 23 This has not been refuted. The receipt is completely worthless and
should not have even been admitted, much less considered by the trial court. In the recent case of People
v. Turla 24 Justice Teodoro Padilla wrote thus of a similar matter:
The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the Receipt for Custody (Exh. B)
is inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by the accused during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel of his choice and without having been first informed of his
constitutional right to silence and to counsel. The said Receipt is a declaration against interest
and a tacit admission of the came charged, since mere unexplained possession of prohibited
drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as extrajudicial confessions
outlawed by the Constitution.
Coming back to the decision, we find the following perplexing observation:
Emmanuel Guinto testified that the Narcom team did not find anything when they searched the
house of the accused Federico Valencia. Yet, the defense did not explain where the Narcom
team was able to let the 28.83 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, Exhibit E.
This is nothing if not amazing. The trial court was actually asking the defense where the narcotics agents got
the marijuana if it was not from Valencia's house. By some strange process of reasoning, the judge was saying
that because of their denials, the accused-appellants were now under obligation to explain where else the
narcotics team might have gotten the marijuana. This is really incredible. Even this Court is non-plused.
Illogically, the trial court was in effect asking the accused-appellants: "Where did the agents get the marijuana if
it was not from Valencia's house?" The only logical and common sense answer to such a queer question would
be: "How should we know?"
The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the
prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has repeatedly declared

that even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker, for
the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a right to
be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence.
In People v. Tempongko 25 this Court, applying the above principles, declared:
The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the
satisfaction of this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and
so cannot be affirmed in this appeal. The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive
arguments of the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced
that the appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying, and there is
evidence of this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the
complainant was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our
condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that
he is guilty.
So too must it be in the case before us. The accused-appellants have been condemned for life by an
improvident sentence based on uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt
and not their innocence that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their guilt that should have been
pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the Constitution is to be observed
and justice is to be served: Guinto and Valencia must be released at once.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and the accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. It is
directed that the accused-appellants must be released IMMEDIATELY. No costs.
SO ORDERED.