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MACEDONIA: PUSHING FOR PROGRESS ON NAME ISSUE BEFORE NATO SUMMIT

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2008 February 5, 06:50 (Tuesday)

CONFIDENTIAL
-- Not Assigned --- Not Assigned -GR - Greece; Crete | MK - The Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty
Organization | PGOV - Political
Affairs--Government; Internal
Governmental Affairs | PREL - Political
Affairs--External Political Relations
-- Not Assigned --- N/A OR BLANK --- N/A OR BLANK -MACEDONIA SKOPJE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY |
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
SKOPJE | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY | GROUP DESTINATIONS
EUROPEAN POLITICAL
COLLECTIVE | JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF | NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL | RUEHPS USOFFICE
PRISTINA | RUESEN SKOPJE BETA
| SECRETARY OF DEFENSE |
SECRETARY OF STATE | UNITED
NATIONS (NEW YORK)

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Canonical ID: 08SKOPJE91_a

Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Character Count: 7145
Locator: TEXT ONLINE
Concepts: -- Not Assigned --

Type: TE - Telegram (cable)

Archive Status: -- Not Assigned -Markings: -- Not Assigned --

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B. SKOPJE 64 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY

1. (C) We are continuing efforts to persuade Macedonia of the need to

maximize chances for a NATO membership invitation by embracing the
Nimetz framework and proposing a differentiated name for use in
international organizations (ref A).

Our GoM interlocutors are

sticking to their long-standing dual-name proposal and are preparing

for an expected Greek veto.

They expect to be able to weather the

negative fallout in Macedonia and in the region.

They also harbor

hope for an 11th-hour change in Athens's position that would allow an

invitation to go forward.

We are trying to persuade them that

putting an offer on the table offers the best hope, though certainly
not a guarantee, of avoiding a veto.

The Ambassador's meetings on

Feb. 6 with the two main decision-makers here, Prime Minister

Gruevski and President Crvenkovski,
should provide a clearer indication as to whether Macedonia can be
persuaded to take that step.

End summary.

REINFORCING THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON THE NAME DISPUTE

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Greece - Ta Nea
Guatemala - Plaza Publica
Haiti - Haiti Liberte
India - The Hindu
Italy - L'Espresso
Italy - La Repubblica
Lebanon - Al Akhbar
Mexico - La Jornada
Spain - Publico
Sweden - Aftonbladet
UK - AP
US - The Nation

2. (c) DCM and P/E Chief met with the Prime Minister's
Chief of Staff, Martin Protoger, and Foreign Policy
Adviser, Andrej Lepavcov, February 4 to reinforce the
Ambassador's message to Deputy PM Stavreski the previous
week (ref A) regarding the need to show progress on the
name dispute with Athens prior to the NATO summit this
April.

The DCM reiterated the Ambassador's point regarding

the need to maximize Macedonia's chances of receiving a

membership invitation by proposing a differentiated name for
use in international organizations, while maintaining their
constitutional name and using that bilaterally with all
willing countries, as in the framework proposed by UN
Special Negotiator Nimetz in November 2007 (ref B).

3. (C) The DCM noted that the GOM could sell to the public
such a proposal by pointing out that it would amount to ridding
Macedonia of the despised provisional name "former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia," in exchange for a more dignified
name that would be much closer to the constitutional name.
That position would require a consensus among all major governing
and opposition parties that the compromise was worth the benefits
the country would reap from NATO membership, including securing
their identity as a full member of the Euro-Atlantic community.

GOM PLANNING FOR "DAY AFTER" SCENARIO, EXPECTING VETO

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4. (C) Protoger said the name dispute was a "17-year

problem that would affect future generations."

He said the

government saw no reason why the issue had to be resolved

"in this generation."

At any rate, the GOM already was

analyzing the possible post-veto scenario and how Macedonia

would react to that outcome.

Skopje had recognized that

Athens's position had "hardened" and expected that it would

veto Macedonia's NATO membership based on lack of an
agreement, on Greece's terms, on the name issue.

The

government understood the consequences of a veto, Protoger

said, but "some decisions could not be taken under
pressure."

5. (C) A veto would cause "unpleasant consequences" for both

Macedonia and the region, Protoger continued.

In that event,

he expected "greater political uncertainty" in Macedonia and a

rise in the influence of "radical structures," including
separatist elements in the ethnic Albanian community.

He

said the government would take "political decisions" and

other measures after a Greek veto, but did not specify what
shape those decisions would take.

Any solution leading up

to Bucharest would, he emphasized, have to "protect the

identity of the Macedonian people."

THE END OF MACEDONIA'S EURO-ATLANTIC IDENTITY?

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6. (C) The DCM pointed out that Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic

identity would be undermined by a Greek veto and urged the
GOM to consider "putting something on the table within the

SKOPJE 00000091

002 OF 002

Nimetz framework" to give Athens a chance to be flexible on

the question of a veto.

He enumerated the benefits that

Macedonia would gain from resolving the issue, including

greater stability, greater confidence in Macedonia's future
among its younger citizens and ethnic minorities, greater
attractiveness to investors, as well as likely expanded
business and travel opportunities with Greece, and urged his
interlocutors to balance those against the likely negative
fallout from a failure to gain a NATO invitation.

The

negative consequences included having to explain to the

Macedonian public why Croatia and Albania had succeeded
in advancing their Euro-Atlantic agenda, while Macedonia had not.

7. (C)Protoger said PM Gruevski understood the consequences

of a Greek veto, but his position was "clear."

Macedonia

could not accept a compromise under pressure, or one that

undercut Macedonia's identity.

No other political leader

in Macedonia could do otherwise, he said, adding that

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Macedonia "always had been the one to make concessions to

its neighbors" throughout its history.

AN 11TH-HOUR SWITCH IN ATHENS?

8. (C) Lepavcov asked whether it was likely the Greeks

would change their position at the last minute and allow an
invitation to proceed, but under the condition that Skopje
agree to resolve the issue before ratification.

The DCM

replied that a serious Macedonian proposal in the Nimetz

framework might help move things in that direction in
Athens, and would at any rate give us more compelling
arguments to use with other NATO Allies regarding the need
to include Macedonia in NATO enlargement.

9. (C) DCM held a similar exchange with MFA State Counselor Vasko
Grkov on February 1.

Grkov said that Macedonia's strategy was to

count on Greece to allow the invitation to proceed, which would then

offer greater scope for reaching a settlement prior to parliamentary
ratification.

He absorbed the argument that Macedonia should take

action (i.e., propose a name for international use) to maximize these

prospects, and he made sure to brief Foreign Minister Milososki prior
to his current trip to Washington.

COMMENT

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10. (C) Macedonian officials, and PM Chief of Staff Protoger in

particular, feel compelled to defend the party line in these
discussions.

We believe they are processing the idea that this

problem will not solve itself and that the Nimetz framework offers a
reasonable way to protect and advance Macedonia's interests.
However, it is clear that the true decision-maker is the Prime
Minister, with the President having the power to act as a spoiler
should he choose to do so.

The Ambassador's separate meetings with

those two leaders on Feb. 6 should provide a much clearer indication

as to whether Macedonia can be persuaded to make a serious new offer
to Greece in the Nimetz negotiations.
MILOVANOVIC

References to this document in other cables

References in this document to other cables

08SKOPJE87
09SKOPJE87
If the reference is ambiguous all possibilities are listed.

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