Mind Association

Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic VI.-VII. (I.)

Author(s): F. M. Cornford
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 161 (Jan., 1932), pp. 37-52
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2250143 .
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AND DIALECTIC
III.-MATHEMATICS
THE REPUBLIC VI.-VII. (I.).

IN

BY F. M. CORNFORD.
THIS paperhas two objects: (1) to definethe mentalexperiences
as noesisand dianoiac;(2) to disentangle
whichPlato distinguishes
certainthreadshe has woven togetherin his schemeof higher
education. The Republicis a long book, and Plato saves space
themeswhich a modernwriterwould
by treatingconcurrently
keep apart. It is hardlytoo much to say that Plato, at the
height of his powers, never wasted a wo'rd; whereas many
readersof Book VII. musthave been troubledby an impression,
do nothingto remove,that dialecticis
whishthe commentaries
describedover and over again' for no clear reason. I hope to
show that each of these descriptionshas a special purposeand
whenthey are assignedto
meaning,whichcan be distinguished
one of education,the otherof research-with
two programmes,
aims and methods.
different
I.

NOESIS AND DIANOIA.

In settingforththe analogybetween the Good and the sun,

alreadyfamiliar,'between
Plato has drawnthe main distinction,
the objects of intelligence(POr' ), namely the Ideas-Good,
Beautiful,and the rest-and the manythingsseen or otherwise
perceived(aoC-OTrda). The diagram of the Line again divides
each region into two. Ther6 are four corresponding'mental
experiences ' ('rnaOIatara E'V Ty JvXj, 511D). We are not concernedwiththe two lowest,confinedto perceptionof,and beliefs
about, sense-objects,but only with the two highest,noesis and
dianoia, whose fieldis the intelligible. This is the firstplace
wherePlato contraststwo modes of operationof the reasoning
part of the soul. The distinctionis then allowedto lapse in the
long reviewof the mathematicalsciences in VII., where,with
8tatota,
Plato's usual avoidance of technicallanguage,v&O',o-Sv,
or intelligence
all meaningreflection
and Xoytaoj6S,are synonyms,
1 507A,a'XXorE 1rOXXaKls
diprIuE'va, e.g., at Phaedo,78C-79C,of which
i'&7
this passage mightbe a summary.

38

F. M. CORNFORD:

or abstract thinking.' But noesisand dianoia become distinct

againin thesubsequentaccountsofdialectic(531D-535A). What
is the groundof the distinction?
It firstoccursin the contrast of mathematicsand dialectic
(510B-511E). Here it will be convenientto keep apart four
elementsin thecontrast: (a) Objects; (b) Methodsofprocedure;
(e) Movementsof thought,deductiveand intuitive,shownin the
procedures; (d) States of mind, characteristicof the mathematician and of the accomplisheddialectician.
(a) Objects. Where the intelligiblesection is subdivided,
clearlysomedistinctionof objectsis meant. I agreewithcritics
who hold that nothinghere points to a class of mathematical
numbersand figuresintermediatebetween Ideas and sensible
things. Further,whatevermay be said elsewhereabout the
extentof the intelligibleworld,the onlyIdeas that figurein the
whole schemeof educationare the moral(607B) and the mathematical (510D) Ideas. These, and truthsabout them,form,so
far as can be seen,the wholerelevantcontentof'the intelligible
realm. It appears also that the moral Ideas are not a higher
class, apprehendedby noesis,the mathematicala lower,apprehended by dianoia; for the mathematicalcan be objects of
noesis whenseen in connectionwith a firstprinciple' (voyr6v
,uETa apXiq, 51lD).
OPT(V
What difference,
then,is therein the
objects?
The only distinctionindicated is not a differenceof higher
and lower,but lies in the natures of the two classes of Ideas.'
Mathematicscan use 'visible images ': a numbercan be representedby a collectionof things,a square by a picture. Such
aids have always'been employed; the mathematicianis not
blamed here for using them; he knows he is not thinkingof
these collectionsand pictures,but of Ideas (510D). Of moral
Ideas thereare no visible images; their likenesses(eb1c6>ve) in
this world are invisiblepropertiesof so'uls(402C). Hence it is
hardertQ see the difference
betweenthe justice'of.a particular
action or characterand Justiceitselfthan to distinguishtwo
apples fromthe number 2, also representedby other visible
pairs. Accordingly,mathematicsserves as the easiest bridge
fromthe sense worldto the intelligible,and should precedethe
studyof moralIdeas.2 The distinctionof objects is a matterof,
1 Cf. 7rapaKaXoio-a rrv v6otv 523B, XoyLoG6v re Ka't vorcrtv lrapaKaXOtNTa
524B, TrapaKX?7)TKa nis 8tavolas . . . E'YEpTLKa' n7 voCecos 524D.
2 Nicomachus,
TrIM Kai ye/nSpatv E'OlKE
Introd.Arithm.,
I., 3, 6, KX4L,uLa$t
. n7v dlavotav i'g&v adrow-rv aor-074&v Kal
-ravra ra MaOqr,uara iaf3t/3a6ovra
voirraKal fE7rtO7Tj,LOVtKa. The context refersto Rep. vii.
ao6aurTwvE'7 ra%

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

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Vi.-VII.

39

expediencyin teachingand of no furtherimportancefor our

purpose.'(b) Procedures. The contrast of the two procedures,in
mathematicsand dialectic,does not correspondto the'difference,
just dismissed,between mathematicaland moral Ideas. The
dialectical procedurewill be found to apply to both fieldsof
objects.
and the
Plato firstdescribesthe procedure of mnathematics
conditionofthe sciencein his time. The main pointis that the
prevailingmethodis deductive,a downwardmovementfrom
premissto conclusion: 'the mind is constrainedto start its
investigationfromhypotheses,travellingnot towardsa beginning (principle)but towardsan end (conclusion)' (510B). The
geometer,forinstance,takes as hypothesesthe figuresand three
kindsof angle,and treatingthemas known,gives no accountof
themto himself'orto others;as if theywereevidentto anyone.
he 'proceeds throughall the rest
Startingfromthesehypotheses,
and reachesa conclusionupon the qutestion
he set otutto investigate.'
We must firstfix the meaning of 'hypothesis' in mathematics. Aristotlerecordstwo uses o[ the word,both relevant
to Plato's accountof mathematicsand dialectic. He is writing
primarilyabout logic, not geometry,and we may take it that
his definitions
of ' hypothesis','postulate', 'axiom ', etc., were
and probablyformulatedin'the
cuirrent
amongmathematicians,
Academy.
(1) The firstis the ' hypothesisrelative to the pupil'. The
word here bears its old sense of a supposition'suggested' or
TMv) for his acceptance
'put to ' anotherperson (v57roTrOeo-Oa[
as a basis ofargument-thesensewhichwe shall meetwithagain
in the techniqueof philosophicconversation.2In the middle
of a discussionof the basic truthsof demonstrativescience
(Anal. Post., 1, 10), Aristotlerecallsthis usage. 'That whichis
1 Plato does not say thatgeometers
are 'forced'touse sensiblediagrams'
eitherbecause theirscience 'depends on hypothesesof whichthey can
give no account' or because 'the hypothesisof threekindsof angleshas
a spatial character'(Burniet,
Greek.Philos.,i., 229). The word 'forced'
onlyto the use of deductiveprocedure,
510B, 511A) appphes
(1valyKaerat,
we are 'forced'
and at 511Cit is remarkedthatin studyingmathenmatics
to use abstractreasoning(M'vota) and not the senses.
2 Burnei (GreekPhilos., 1, 162) explains vi'rornOErOat
as meaniing
'setting beforeoneselfor othersa task to be done' or ' a subjectto be
treated.' He appears to me here to confusethe hypothesiswith the
enunciation(irporaO-ts'), the Q.E.D. or Q.E.F., whichstatesthe conclusion
or construction.
desired,not a premiss,of a demonstration

40

F. M. CORNFORD:

capable of proofbut assumed by the teacherwithoutproofis,

ifthe pupil believesand acceptsit, hypothesis-thatis, relatively
to the pupil; if the pupil has no opinionor a contraryopinion
on the matter,the same assumptionis a postulate.'I Here the
makingof an hypothesisis simplyan expedientin conversational
teaching.-Anypropositionin-thesciencemay,on someoccasion,
be taken as an assumptionby agreement2 betweenteacherand
pupil.
A special case fallingunder the head of the ' relative' or
ad hoc hypothesisis any assumptionmade with a view to the
solutionof a problem. This procedure'by way of hypothesis'
is illustratedat Meno,86E ff.,wherethe geometer,asked whether
a givenarea can be inscribedin the formof a trianglein a given
circle,repliesthat he does not know yet, but thinkshe has a
hypothesisthat will be useful: onlv if the givenarea is of such
and such a kindcan the inscriptionbe made. 'Accordingly,by
usingan hypothesis,
I am-readyto tell youwlat results-whether
the thingis possibleor not.' This is an example of St6OptlrO',w,
' the determination
of the conditionsor limitsof the possibility
ofa solutionofthe problem,whetherin its originalformor in the
formto whichit is reduced.'3 The process (to whichwe shall
returnlater) is analytical,involvingthe divinationof a premiss
that must be true if the requiredconclusionis to follow. The
methodcan be applied to the problemspresented,
by observed
factsin nature. Thus Plato is said to have set the Academythe
out on whatassumptions('ri-iwv
problemoffinding
vw7roTEO6'-vT)V)
the apparent irregularityof the heavenly bodies' movements
can be reconciledwith theirreal regularityso as to ' save the
appearances'. The Republic says that the treatment of
'problems' shouldfigure,not onlyin geometry,but in-astronomical inquiry(530B) and in harmonics(531C).
(2) The science itself,on the otherhand, has its own hypotheses (in a narrowsense), whichare not 'relative', but-basic
truths (JpXal). Aristotle5 explains that any demonstrative
1 76b, 27. Cf. Proclus,Fucl. I.,
p. 76,,6 (Friedl.) Throughoutthis
paper I have made much use- of Proclus' Commentary,
which,when
allowanceis made forneoplatonicmysticism,
illuminatesthe Greekconceptionof mathematicalscience and its methods.
'2 Cf. E.N., 11-33
b, 20, coin as an agreedcommonmeasureof commoditiesis 'hypothe.tical', E6 v6roOE'TEcov
to vo-lua
KaXeZTraL,
or 'conventional',
ToVTo
avvOi'KtZV
KaF
ala
vrvo-, rovivoya
E'XEL
l a (a 29). The
% Kara
*twoexpressionsare heresynonymous.
3 Heath,GreekMath.,i., 303. Proclus,Eucl. I., p. 66.
4 Simplic.,de caelo, 488, 21; 492. 31 (Heiberg). Cf. Burnet,Greek
Philos.,I., 222.
5 Anal. Post., I., 10. Cf. Heath, Thirteen
Books of Euclid, I., 117 ff.

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

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vI.-vii.

41

science must start from necessarytruths taken as indemonstrable. Thus geometrytakes forgranted(Xa,u,4dayet),
besides
the common axioms, (a) the definitions
of its subject-matter
(magnitude)and of certain'essential attributes' of magnitude,
such as 'straight', 'triangular', and (b) the existence of
magnitudeand of certain other primarythingscorresponding
to the definitions,vtz., points and lines. The .existence of
everythingelse (e.g., the various figuresand their properties)
has to be proved by constructionand demonstration. Definitions are not hypotheses: they do not assert 'the existenceof
anything,but only state a meaningthat must be understood.
-Hypothesesare assumptionsof the existenceof thingsdefined.
In speakingof the hypothesesof mathematics(510 C), Plato
primarilymeans the 'absolute' kind of hypothesis,not the
'relative'. He seems, moreover,like Aristotle, to restrict
'hypotheses' to assumptions'of existenceand not to include
definitions;a definitionin 'mathematicsis' itselfan ' account'
of the meaningof a term,and no ' account of it ' can be
(X6oyo9)
demanded. His instancesare 'odd and even (arithmetic),the
figuresand threekindsof angles (geometry),and otherkindred
thingsin each branchof study' (510 C). Accordingto Aristotle,
arithmeticand geometryassume the meaning(definition)
of odd
and even, etc., straightand triangular,etc., but the existenceof
these thingsshould be demonstrated. The only thingswhose
existencethese sciencesare entitledto take forgrantedas ultimate hypothesesare the unit (arithmetic)and magnitude,points,
and lines (geometry). He thus would agree with Plato in condemningmathematicianswho should treat as ultimate hypoof 'odd and even,the figuresand threekinds
thesesthe existence
of angles'.
Probably Plato has in mind also the originalmeaning of
and thinksof the mathematician'sassumptionsas
w7roted7-Oat,
put to the learnerfor acceptancein the processof instruction.
The whole descriptionwould fit the conversationalmethod of
teaching. When he says, 'starting fromthe hypotheses,they
go throughall the rest and reach a conclusiofi6,ctOXOy/OV,ct6'VCO','
this ambiguousword may mean eitherthat the whole demonstrationhangs togetherconsistently
(thoughit hangs,so to say,
in the air so long as the hypothesisis not proved), or that it
rests on agreementbetween teacher and pupil to accept the
hypothesis. The same ambiguityrecurs at 533 C, 'How can
such 0,obXo7yta
(consistencyor agreement)ever become knowledge ? '
Geometrystill awaited its codificationby Euclid. Solid

42

F. M. CORNFORD:

geometryhad 'not yet been discovered' in Socrates' time

(528B), and was in processof beingdiscoveredat the Academy
whenthe Republicwas written.e The text-bookof geometryfor
the Academywas to be the workof Plato's pupils; Theudiusof
Magnesia and others; whenwritten,it was a less perfectstructure than Euclid'AElements.' At presentthe science consisted
of a numberof theorems,withalternativeproofsestablishedby
hypotheses; thetheorems
usingdifferent
variousmathematicians
had not yet been fittedtogetherin a singlechain of deduction.
No one had reduced the primitivehypothesesof the science
itselfto the smallestpossible number,or made out what-they
were. Plato saw that hypothesessuch as those he mentions
oughtnot to be laid down as 'evident to everyone'or taken as
principlesof which no account could rightlybe demanded.
They could be traced back to a higherprinciple. We should
then arrive at the genuine hypotheses(or hypothesis)of the
science itself. Then?e the whole structurecould be deduced in
a singlechain of reasoning,and the gaps betweqnthe scattered
theoremsfilled'in. Arithmeticand the otherbrancheswill be
submittedto the same treatment. This belongs to the programmeof researohthat will be outlined.
procedureof mathematicsto the
Turningfromthe dedutctive
descriptionof dialectic (511B), we findthat the ascent to the
firstprincipleis part of the task of dialectic,'whoseprocedurein
the currenthypothesesof mathematicswill thus be in
criticising
the'reversedirection.'In mathematicalproofthemind' travels'
,downthroughan argumentlimitedby the premissesassumed,
'as if the mind could not mount above its hypotheses' (t)V
V7rOOeoeWo avco TEpw EK,/a1VeLv,511A).

an opDialecticincludes

posite movementof thought,upwards,' treatingits hypotheses

positionslaid down,
not as principlesbut literallyas hypo-theses,
like steps2 whichdiscoursecan mountupon and take offfrom,
in orderthat,advancingall the way to that whichrestson no
and
1Proclus, Eucl., 1., p. 66 (afterEudemus): Leodamas,Archytas,
Theatetus increasedthe ntimberof theoremsand broughttheminto a
more scientificconnection;Eudoxus added to the numberof universal
towards
theorems;Plato's pupilscarriedthe wholeof geometryfurther
'.
perfection;and The-Ldiusdrewup a good statementof the ' elemenits
are recordedbeforeEuclid completedthe structure.
Otherimprovements
The metaphor'is fromclimbingstairs:
'rE Kal oppp-a.
2 O eV E7rtf3a'eLst
Symp., 211C, 6aT2ep

J7rava8aOjzo7siXp(i/LEVoV,

Ar., Met., 990 a, 5, apXayst'Kavasy

primaryand common
meaningof 6p,unis 'impulse' or 'effort' or 'impetus'. It is nearerto'
' spring'thanto spring-board
'.
fEravaf3?va&

Kat

E'T7 Ta

aVo)TapC)

TroV OrVTrc)V. The

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

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vI.-vII.

43

hypothesis'-to the principleof the whole-it may apprehend

that'. We shall discusslater the scope,of researchin the dialectical criticismof mathematicalhypotheses. Here we must
considerthe two contrastedmovements-downwardsin mathematical deduction,upwa'rdsin dialecticalcriticism.
ofThought.-I shall arguethat,where
(c) The Two Movements
Plato observesa distinctionbetweennoesis and dianoia, noesis
(in one of its senses) means the upwardmovementof intuition,
dianoia,(in one ofits senses)the downwardmovementof reason,ing in deductiveargument.
Plato realised that the mind must possess the power of
takinga step or leap upwardsfromthe conclusionto the premiss
implied in it. The prior truthcannot, of course,be deduced
or proved fromthe conclusion; it must be grasped (aiaoaOat,
511B) by an act of analyticalpenetration. Such an act is involved in the solution 'by way of hypothesis' at Meno, 86,
already quoted; the geometerdirectlyperceives,withoutdiscursiveargument,that a priorconditionmust be satisfiedifthe
desired constructionis to follow. Now in a certain passage
Proclus has been understoodto associate Plato's methodof
dialectical ascent to genuine principleswith the method of
analysis in geometry. Aftermentioninga contemporarywith
an exceptionalgiftfor obtainingthe requiredresult fromthe
fewestpossibleprinciples,withoutworkingby method,Proclus
adds: 'Neverthelesscertainmethodshave been handed down.
The finestis the methodwhichby means of analysiscarriesthe
thingsoughtuip to an acknowledgedprinciple(eqr'apx?7lv o,uov6ayovo-To -rTov/Epov); a, methodwhichPlato, as
XoyoV/evpePnv
they say, communicatedto Leodamas, and by whichthe latter
too is said to have discoveredmany thingsin geometry'.2 Sir
ThomasIHeathremarks:
'Analysis being accordingto the ancient view nothingmore
of a theoremor problemtill
than a seriesof successive,reductions
it is finallyreducedto a theoremor problemalreadyknown,it is
difficult
to see in what Plato's supposeddiscoverycould have conused in
sisted; foranalysisin thissensemusthave been frequently
[of whichexamplesare given]. On the other
earlierinvestigations
hand,Proclus'slanguagesuggeststhat whathe had in mindwas the
1 uXpL 7r0v avv7roOErov, 511B. Mr. Ross notes that, Aristotle(AMet.
'quite in the Platonic sense .ofthe word'
1005 b, 14) uses avV7roOeOrov
of principles'about whichwe cannotbe deceived,whichare best known
and whichmust be knownif one is to know
and rest on no hypothesis,
ad loc.,pp. 262-263).
anvthing' (Commentary,
(Greek
2 Proclus,Eucl., I., p. 211, 18, Sir Thomas Heath's translation
Math.,1, 291).

44

F.

M. CORNFORD:

philosophical
methoddescribedin the passageof the Republic[511B],
which of course does not referto mathematicalanalysis at all;
it may therefore
well be that the idea that Plato discoveredthe
methodof analysisis due to a misapprehension.But analysisand
synthesisfollowingeach otherare relatedin the same way as the
in the dialectician'sintellectual
upwardand downwardprogressions
that Plato's achievement
method. It has been suggested,therefore,
was to observethe importance,fromthe point of view of logical
rigour,of the confirmatory
synthesisfollowinganalysis.'

No doubt Plato did not inventthe.methodof analsis, but

the connectionwith dialectical method is closer than is here
suggested. Plato may well have been the firstto recogniseas
distinctthe movementof thoughtinvolved in what Aristotle
calls the 'analysis of a mathematicaldiagram'. Describing
deliberation,which proposes an end to be achieved by action
and then works backwards along the chain of means to that
end, till it reaches,as a firstlinkin the chain,an actionthat can
be at once performed,
Aristotlecomparesthis regressiveprocess
in the solutionof a practicalproblemto 'analysing a mathematical diagram', wherethe last step in the analysis becomes
the firstin the construction
thatfollows. The Paraphrastadds a
descriptionof the subsequentdeduction: 'the mathematician
having reachedthe last step in his analysis,then assumesthat,
and, travellingfromit throughthe othersteps,so demonstrates
the conclusionproposed'.1
The processof ' analysinga diagram' is describedin a curious
passage where Aristotle,with instructiveambiguity,uses the
worddiagrammaso that commentators
doubt whetherhe means
geometricalproofs(Bonitz) or geometricalconstructions
(Ross).2
Met., 1051 a, 21, 'Diagrammataare discoveredby an activity.
For it is by dividing(drawinglines in the givenfigure)that people
discoverthem. If theyhad alreadybeen divided,theywould have
been obvious; as it is, theyare presentpotentially. Why are the
anglesofthe triangleequal to two rightangles? 'Because the angles
about one pointare equal to two rightangles. So if the line parallel
to the side had already been drawn,the reason would have been
immediately plain to inspection.

. .

. Clearly, then, the potentially

existing(diagrammata)
are discoveredby beingbroughtintoactuality.
The reason is that the activityis intuition' (or, readingi1 v07jut
employedis an activity').
evepyeta withRoss, 'the intuition

v La avaXveLV rov ELp7A EVov

'E.N., iii., 3,et 11, t6 j30VX)EVO'/oEV0O. Et OLKvE
^
St
T
3
-J
rpo7Tov (0Y-Ep o3aypa/I/Ja . . . vatro EXarov
ev 77/ dvav v TE 7rpcorov eivat ev
Tr, yEVELTEl. Paraphr. KaOdarEp o uaO?ua7LtKoV, 7po0
o c'oXaT7ov ag/LtETaL
avaXvwov, ToVTo V7rotOEL.
KUata7ro TovTov Ala T6Ov a'XXcov08EVva'7ro8TE0KVV(tL
To
t

73pOKEL/.UEVOV. See Stewart,Notes,ad toc.

2 Cf. Xen. Mem., IV., 7, Socrates thoughtgeometry
should not

studieduEXpL TWv 8vaT$vvE'Trov ataypauuaTwv.

be

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

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VI.-VII.

45

'If they (the 'diagrams' = the given figures)had already

been divided,they (the '.diagrams'
geometricalconstructions
or proofs)would have been obvious'. Aristotleuses the word
ditgrammato mean: (1) the givenfigure,in whichthe divisions
exist potentially; (2) the figurecompleted by making the
divisionsactual and thus exhibitingthe proofin a picture,so
that one has onlv to 'look at it to see the reason (priortruth)
actually displayedin the construction
itself; and (3) the proof
whose 'elements' are so made obvious to inspection. What
concernslls is the processby whichthe reason or priortruthis
discerned. The geometer contemplatesthe given figure,a
triangle,eitherdrawnon paper or in the mind'seye. Knowing
already that the angles about a single point,are equal to two
right,angles (Eucl., I., 13), he divines that this prior truthis
latent in the given, figure(8vvalec E'vmrapXe).
He makes it
explicitby producingthe base of his triangleand drawingthe
line parallelto the side ( \L ). He thus bringsthis ' element' in
the demonstrationinto actual existence,making it visible to
simple inspection. He has next to demonstratethat he has
solved his problem. Having laid bare the 'elements' neededto
compose the proof,and ascertainedthat they are all theorems
in
previouslyestablished,he will now framehis demonstration
full discursiveform-a deductionstartingfromthe hypothesis,
'Let therebe a triangleABC' (Eucl., I., 32). Aristotlespeaks
and of demonstraelsewhereof the.' elementsof diagrammcata
tionsin general' as analogousto the elementsinto whichbodies
are said to be ultimatelydivisible. They are' the primarydecontainedin a largernumberof consequentdemonmonstrations
strations".l The titleofEuclid's Elements
preservesthismeaning.
a true conclusion
Themistius2 definesanalysis as ' as-suming
and then discoveringthe premissesby which it is inferred.'
the geometermay startby
Wherethe problemis a construction,
a pictureof the conclusiondesired. In the Meno
contemplating
instance, he -would draw the given rectangleand a triangle
a
,'Met., 1014 a, 31, ra rTovocouarTOVarTOLXELa XEyOVOTLV OL XEyoVTE
ELv
taLpET7aLra mooyaTaEoXara . . . 7raparXro-1ov 8& KacLTa rT(v 8aypaq/I/aT7ov
LTTOLXELaXESyEraL Kat oXco9Ta Tv a7rO&L$Eo&v * aL yap rpcorat a7ro8LE$EtV KaL EV
IrXELOoltVad7OaE$EmLv Evv rapXovoaL,

a5TaL O-TOLXELa7t)V

a7ro&L'Ecov

XeyovTaL.
XEyETcIL
OQX(CO . . . To KaTaOLKEVaCov ELTT Tov KaT-acrKEvaCo/iE'vOv LTTOLXELOV,CT TO
TO
vpOTov 7rap' Ev1KXEL?y &ro
VTepoV . . . aXX&s & . . . ElS O l7rXovOEpov

Cf. 998a, 25. Menaechmus

ap. Procl.,Eucl., I., p. 72, roT roTLXEov

virapxov

&aLpELrat ro ovvOETov . . . co7rep

Ta

aLT/IaTa

OTOLXELa Tov

OIE(P?7u'rcoav.
2 On Anal. Post. I., 12 (p. 26, 23, Waflies), avaXvELv8& XE'yC VvV To
&
at
V
ras 7rpoTaoTEtvE$EVplLtKElV
TLvos aXr .ov Ov/-rEpado-aTro
TEOEVTOV
0VV?X OiJ

46

F. M. CORNFORD:

inscribedin the given circle,and then considerwhat properties

his rectanglemusthave. Those propertiesare ' elements' in the
solution. Thus he takes,the constructiontb pieces. The opposite processis synthesis,
'putting together,'this elementand
others,inthe properdeductiveorder. So Aristotlesays that one
may ' analyse a diagram and not be able to, put it together
again '.1 Each step in the demonstrationis a component
'contained in' the completediagramma(diagram,construction,
proof).
Pappus (VII., Introd.) gives a clear account of Analysisand
Synthesis,whichhas been lamentablymisunderstood:
' The Treasuryof Analysis'is a collectionof materialspecially
providedforthose who, afterdoingthe ordinaryelements,wish
to acquire, in dealing with lines (as distinctfromproblemsin
a powerofdiscovering
thesolutions
sciencesotherthangeometry),
of problemsproposedto them....
.
' Analysisis the procedurewhich starts fromthe desiredconclusion,taken as agreed,throughthesuccessionof sequentt
.step(&at
T,O)V
KO
thatin Analysisare traversed
dcoX5oCWVz-steps
upwards,
fromeachproposition
to a priorproposition
impliedin it) to something
agreed upon in Synthesis (some propositionpreviouslyproved and now

admitted). For in Analysis we suppose (V7roO@EEvoL) the desired

and lookforthat(priorproposition)
resultto be alreadyaccomplished,
fromwhichit results,and thenagainforthepriorproposition
leading
to that,until,by tracingour stepsbackwardsin thisway, we meet
withsomething
alreadyknownor holdingtherankofa firstprinciple.
Such a methodwe call ' Analysis' as beinga ' solutionbackwards'
(ava7aXLv

XVclV).

'In Synthesis,on the otherhand, reversingthe process,we take

as already done the last step reachedin the Analysis; the steps
that followedone another in the former(upward) process (Ta
E73rO.Eva
EKEi) we 'hereput into theirnatural(logical)orderas leading
on one to another(downwards),and put them togetherone after
of the desired
another; so finallywe arriveat the establishment
result. This we call Synthesis.'
Analysis,he continues,is either(a) theoretical
(to provea theorem)
or (b) problematical
(to solve a problemof construction).'(a) In the
theoretical
kind we assume the conclusionsought as existentand
true; and then, throughthe sequent steps, taken as true and
as hypothetically
existing(s d)Xi1Ocv Kat Cs 6'E(TL KaO' VTrOeotLVthese assumptionsof existenceare as yet, unprovedhypotheses
in the Synthesis),advance (upwards)as far
awaitingconfirmation
as somethingadmitted(some proposition,
true or false,admittedto
be implied,as a necessarypremissor 'element', in the conclusion
we startedfrom), Then,if (1) that admittedthingis true,the con1 Top., 175,a, 27, ovy,3atVEL 86' 7rOrEKaOa'7iep ev rots aLaypa4qaaoLv
evtore o-vvOeivat 7raaXtv advvaTovyev.
Even in

EKEt avaXvfavrev

- Kat yaip

so early a

as Eucl.,I., 32,a largenumberof 'elements'are involved,and

proposition
it is a nice question'howmany shouildfigurein the demonstration.

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

IN THE REPUBLIC VI.-VII.

47

willcorrespond,
elusionsoughtwillbe truealso,and thedemonstration
in thereverseorder,to theAnalysis(theSynthesistraversesthe same
seriesof steps,but in deductiveorder); but if (2) we come upon
somethingadmittedthat is false,the conclusionsoughtwill also be
kind, we assume the (construction)
false. (b) In the problematical
propoundedas ifit wereknown; and nextadvance(upwards)through
the sequent steps,taken as true,as far as somethingadmitted(a
construction,possible or impossible,admitted to be a necessary
elementin the desiredconstruction).Then if (1) the admittedthing
sayis possible and obtainable given', as the mathematicians
the construction
propoundedwill be possibletoo, and once morethe
will correspond,
demonstration
in the reverseorder,to the Analysis;
but if (2) we come upon somethingadmittedthat is impossible,the
problem also will be impossible'.'

It is quite possibleto accept the statementthat Plato ' discovered' the methodof Analysis,in the same sense as Aristotle
discoveredthe syllogism; that is to say, he was the firstto
reflectupon the processof thoughtinvolved and to describeit
in contrastwith the process of Syiithesis. And it 'is certain
that in his account of the dialecticalascent Plato is describing
the upward movementof thoughtwhich has been illustrated
fromgeometricalanalysis. Since he assignsthe mental experience called noesis to the corresponding
section of the Line, it
seems justifiableto say that the intuitionused in this upward
1I gatherfromSir T. Heath's discussionof this passage (Thirteen
Booksof Euclid,i., 138) that modernhistoriansofmathematics-'careful
studies' by Haiikel,Duhamel,and Zeuthen,and othersby Ofterdinger
and Cantorarecited-have madenonsenseofmuchofit bymisunderstanding the phrase 'the successionof 'sequentsteps' (T&v r aKoXovOco) as
', as if it were ra' o-v,If3aLvovTa. Some may
meaninglogical 'consequences
have beenmisledby Gerhardt(Pappus,vii.,viii.,Halle, 1871),whorenders
it ' Folgerungen'. They have thenbeen at greatpains to showhow the
can be the consequencesof the conclusion.
premissesof a demonstration
The whole is clear when 'we see-what :Pappus says-that the same
in Analysis,from
sequenceofstepsis followedin bothprocesses-utpwards
the consequenceto premissesimpliedin that consequence,and downwards
in Synthesis,when the,steps are reversed to framethe theorem or
' in thenatural(logical)order'. You cannot
demonstrate
theconstruction
followthe same seriesof stepsfirstone way, thenthe oppositeway, and
in both directions. And Pappus never
arrive at logical consequences
said you could. He added 66s to indicate that the steps ' followin
' but are not, as aKoXovOa alone would suggest, logically
succession
ofAnalysisand
'consequent' in theupwarddirection. In the definitions
in Euclid XIII. (Heath,ibid.,I., 138)thephrase tLa
Synthesisinterpolated
T7v

aKO?OV'OcV

is

usedinthesameway: 'Analysisis a takingofthething

thesequentstepsto some
soughtas admitted(and the passage) through
admittedtruth'. Here again it is translatedby Heiberg(Teubneredit.,
', and by Heath 'throughits consequences'.
III., 365) 'per consequentias
fromPappus'
may have been copied,withabbreviation,
These definitions
statement.

48

F.

M.

CORNFORD:

springof thoughtis one of the meaningsof noesis. I cannot

point to a passage wherethe word must have this sense to the
exclusion of its more general uses, but that is because Plato
constantlysubstitutesthe metaphorsof 'grasping' (aua-Oat)
and ' seeing' (tcaTLIEZ, OeacaOat,etc.), for vOELl) in this sense.
The importantthing is not the name, but the fact that the
intuitive movementis unmistakablyrecognised. For similar
reasons I inferthat the deductive reasoningcharacteristicof
mathematicalprocedureis one of the meanings of dianoia.
Noesis is an immediateact of vision; the ascentis made by one
ormoresuddenleaps. Dianoia, on theotherhand,is a continuous
process; themind' journeys' (wropevopvl&,,510B) alonga pathof
discoursewhichthe reasoner'traverses' (8teftf6zvesTa Xowra',
510D) frombeginningto end.
The next point to be noted is that the dialectical method
includes also a downwardprocessfollowingafterthe ascent to
the principle. The descriptioncontinues: ' havinggraspedthe
firstprinciple,turningback again and holdingto that which
depends on it, then and only then discoursemay descend to a
conclusion,makingno use at all of any sensiblething,but only
of Ideas (passing)throughIdeas to Ideas, and end withIdeas'.
The wholeof this firstaccount of dialecticis closelycompressed
and framedin termschosento fitthe dialecticaltreatmenteither
of mathematicsor of the moral Ideas. As we shall see later,
wherethe two fieldsare separatelyconsidered,the procedureis
not altogetherthe same in both. But both movementsof
thoughtare employedin both fieldsof objects. Neitherthe
analyticalpowerof noesisnor the processof deductivereasoning
is limitedto mathematicalobjects; and 'lhypotheses' (though
of a different
sort) are used in the effortto definemoral Ideas
and are subjectedto criticism.
Even in mathematicswe can conceive the geometeras dispensingwith diagrams,visible or imagined,and contemplating
the Idea of the triangle-the essential nature of all triangles
(of which in fact no picture can be made without adding
irrelevantproperties,'equilateral', 'scalene', or 'isosceles ').
This nature is, I believe, conceivedby Plato and Aristotleas
containingimplicitin itselfall the 'essential properties' that
can be drawn out and demonstratedin the indefinitechain of
theorems
about the triangle. The problemwas somethingto be

done; its solutionwas the fruitof action-(7rpa'TT61V) ' which

IProclus,

Eucl., I., p 77, 12.

KaOa7rEp %yapal %r0t?)TLKaL

Ttv
e7TLOT?7/MOv
avra 8?J KaL at OIEcp?rTtKal Ta 7rpof3X;kaTa 7aLc
7rot?)oTE(tV vav6Xoyov 7rpoo-EtXr)4ao-t.Rep., 527A, XEyovot dlEv
7rov uaXayEXoocv
oecopLav

/LETEXOVOIL

Kara

Ta

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

IN THE REPUBLIC

vI.-vII.

49

broughtout into actual existencethe elementaryconstructions

divinedby intuitionas latentin the givenfigure,and exhibited
' is the fruitof
t\hemin a completeddiagram. The ' theorem
contemplation(6ewpetzv),which penetratesby intuitionto the
latent properties'contained in' the essence. The 'demonof theseproperties
as
stration'(AroSeltitS') is the exhibition
belongingto the essence,in the formof explicitstatementsset
out in logical sequence,deductiveor syllogistic.
Further,not only mathematicalIdeas like the Triangle,but
moral (and other)Ideas are genera,whichcan be conceivedas
containing,potentiallylatent withinthem,the species.' These
species are made explicit in the tabular Division (e3ta'peort,),
that will isolate the lowest species from
aiming at a definition
every other species. When dialectical method is applied to
of an Idea,,the ascent is made by the 'synoptic'
the definition
act of diviningby intuitionthe unity pervadiiiga manifold
'gathered together' (o-vvaywy). This unity becomes the
'genus' that must stand at the head of the table. The downward processis ' Division', discerning' differences'withinthis
unity and arrangingthem in proper logical sequence.2 An
analogy betweenthese upward and downwardmovementsin
and the upwardand downwardmovements
obtainingdefinitions
of the geometer'sanalysis and synthesisin obtainingconstructions was perceived by Proclus. Hence the passage above
quoted (p. 43) goes on to connectthe PlatonicDivision of genus
into-specieswiththe solutionof a problemby construction:
'The second is the method of-Division,which dividesinto its
parts (species)the genus proposedfor consideration(as a resultof
forthe demonstration
and giv6sa starting-point
previouso-vvaycoyfi),,
ofthe other'elements
by meansofthe elimination
iFithe construction
of what is proposed,whichmethodal.soPlato extolledas being of
assistance in all sciences.'

Tovs Xoyovs
EveKa 7ravTas
There are tracesof an Academic
of 'operations'in mathematics,
as to thenatureandpossibility
controversy
whoseobjectsare eternal; but thisquestioncannotbe pursuedhere.
'Thus at Timaeus,30C, the Idea of Animal embraceswithinitself
Te

KcLLav&yKaL(G

*Gon

VrOLOv,uEVOL XEyOVOL

EaVTC

(ev

7rEpLXaO3Ov

four species of 39E,

yap 7rparrovrE .TE

TETpayomvLlEtv,

KaL 7rpa'eOS

KTX.

exEL), all the 'intelligible animals' falling under the

Evovi-asv

L8Eas.

TCO e'rTl

CGTOV..

In the Sophistand Politicusmanyrulesare laid downforobservance

in thedownwardprocessofDivision; but no rulesare,or can be, givenfor
oVVaywoyi. MVVO+#L is an act, not a methodicalprocedure. It is a case
of hit or miss,and you cannottell which,tillyou have deducedthe consequences.
2

50

F. M. CORNFORD:

To Proclus the dialectician'scontemplationof the genus proposed for divisionseemed analogous to the geometer'scontemplation of his given figure. The finaldefinitionof the species
consets out in explicitform(Xo6yos~)
the elements(differences)
tained in the essencedefined,as the geometer'scompleteddiagram exhibits the elementsin the demonstration.Each, in
reachinghis results,eliminates,stepby step,irrelevantelements:
the dialectician,as he selectseach differentita,
rejectsits alternative; the geometerretainsonly the elementsthat will figurein
his demonstration
and rejectsothersthat occur to him but are
foundnot to lead to his conclusion.1
(d) States of mind.-It remains to note anotheruse of the
wordsnoesis(or nous)and dianoia. Glauconsays he understands
the account of dialectic as meaningthat ' the fieldof the real

and intelligible
as studiedby the science(6qr1rT

,Uq)

ofdialectic

has a clearertruth(o-aOE'TepoV)
than what'is studied by the
mathematical' arts' as they are called,-whose hypothesesare
taken as starting-points
'; and that ' althoughstudentsare compelled in studyingthese arts to'use abstractreasoning(Stavoota)
and not the senses,yet, because they proceedfromhypotheses
withoutgoing up to a firstprinciple,they do not, you think,
come to have nous (vovovL'Oxev),albeit their objects can be
objects of nous in connectionwith a firstprinciple (KcairoT
I understandyou to describethe
VO0rT6lV 6'VTW /iCTa apXqs,).
state of mind (e4ts) of geometersand othermathematiciansas
not nous but ditanoia,regardingdianoia as somethingbetween
is said to
beliefand nous' (511CD). Later, the mathematician
live in a sort of dream,not seeing realitywith wakingvision
but
(533B); his so-called knowledgeis not science (etT71.kv)
only dianoia (533D).
The contrastbetweenthe two states of mind may be illu-.
stratedfromthe Meno. The slave who is therequestioned2 at
firstproducesfalse beliefsabout the solution of the problem,
then-truebeliefs; but these will become knowledgeonly when
he has been taken throughthe proofrepeatedly'and graspedits

on thereason'(aiTia9 XoctUO'j).
logicalnecessity
'by reflection

The mathematicianand his pupil in the Republichave done all

this, but now Plato will not call theirstate of mind ' scientific
1 Elsewhere (p. 57, 22) Proclus mentions 'Division of species from
genera' as a method also used by geometryin obtaining definitionswhich
figureamong its firstpremisses.
2 Referringto this experiment at Phaedo, 73B, Plato uses the phrase
Eav Ttv E7rtra 8&ayp 4qpara A'yy. The slave is confrontedwith a given figure
and a problem of construction.

MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC

IN THE REPUBLIC VI.-VII.

51

knowledge' or nous, because the reason they have reflected

upoa is an assumptionthat is not eitherdemonstratedor seen
to be indemonstrable.Their intellectualunderstandingof a
coherent,but isolated,piece of deductivereasoningis dianoita;
they will not 'come to have nous' or genuineknowledgeuntil
they have gone up to intuitiveapprehensionof the indemonstrableprincipleoftheirwholescience. By nous,hereand later,
Plato means the perfectlyclear vision,or unshakablegrasp,of
the completedstructureof mathematicaltruth,throughall the
so far discovered,as illuminatedfromabove, by
ramifications
the lightof the ultimatepremiss,intuitivelyseen and such that
it cannot be questioned. So long as bits of the structureare
allowed to depend on questionablehypotheses,therewill be an
atmosphereof dimnessand uncertaintyin the state of mind.
prove to be
The structuremight fall, should the prenmisses
unwarranted;and anyhowthe truthof the assumptionsis not
eitherprovedor certainly'clear to anyont'. The intuitionof
the ultimatepremisswill dispel this mist of uncertaintyand
irradiate the whole science.' The, mathematicianwill then
' come to have nous', the state of mind comparedto vision,no
longerin a dream,but in the lightof day.
Conclusions.-I concludethat the terms noesis and dianoia,
is observedbetweenthem,are used in several
wherea distinction
senses,just as the curiousname ebcaota forthe fourth' mental
'
experience' includes ' perceptionof images' and ' guess-work
(the prisonersin the Cave watchthe sequence of the passing
shadows, and divinewhich will come next, 516 CD) 2. Noesis
or 80'a, thecogmas opposedto at'Offlo-t9
means: (A) generally,
tion of any objects or truthsin the intelligiblerealm; (B) as opby an
posed to dianoia, (1) the intuitiveact of apprehending,
upwardleap, an Idea or a priortruthimplicitin a conclusion(for
thissenseal*rao-at,KcaW8TFev,
Oeao9at,etc.,areusuallysubstituted
forvaoev)'; (2) the state of mind (properlycalled vovIJ
6'XEtvor
of one who sees with perfectclearnessa completed
wtraTmnjuX)
structureof truthilluminatedby the unquestionableprinciple.
Dianoa -means: (A) generally,'abstract thinking' (withvzorstand Xoyta6po, as synonyms); (B) as opposedto noesis,'(1) the
downwardmovementof understandingfollowinga deductive
OCf.Proclus, Eucl. I., p. 27, 13, VOv IcaraMapLrovrova'v()BEv rT?V Ert?)AU)kVA knowledge of nature consisting of empirical observations and predictions based on them, is to Plato not ' science ' or even ' art ', but
,EFTELpta 'merely preserving a memoryof what usually happens' (Gorg.,
501A) without being able to give any account of the reason, and involving
a naive ' trust ' (71rirts)in the reality of the appearances it records.
2

52

F. M. cO6RNFORD: MATHEMATICS AND DIALECTIC,

ETC.

argumentfrompremissto conclusion; (2) the uncertainstate of

mind of one whose so-called 'knowledge,' consistsonly of isolated clains of reasoningdependingon an assumptioneithernot
demonstratedor not seen to be indemonstrable.There are
many degreesof dimnessin this twilight; but, if perfectenlightenmenthas never been, attained, all human knowledge
moves in this region of dream. All our own mathematical
knowledgestill lies somewherein the vast range between a
child's 'true belief' that two and two make fourand the perfect
not yet (I gather) certainlyachieved by any
comprehension,
humanintellect,of all,the logical conc;eptsand propositionsimplied in 2 + 2 = 4.
(To be concluded.)