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PARAS, J

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The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

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We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

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There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

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Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of

law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

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Black defines "practice of law" as:

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G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an

attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling

clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrickv..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice
by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citingIn re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in
the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a
kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession,
and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I
make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that
"They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members
of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they
are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the
floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the

COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this
is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in
Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In
some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common
of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task
or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of
major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of

action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction
to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning
at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation
for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred
to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may

include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs
to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the
few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international
law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small
number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in
law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching
method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the

Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern

management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction
to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to
think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained
a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as
barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be

learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All

integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation

support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate
the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach.
It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability
exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decisionmakers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is
not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him
a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even
if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects
on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will
the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day,
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL.Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod,
in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's

Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action
for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321).( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat
of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3)
conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for
a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the
equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only

condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications

required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of
law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the
eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice
once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and
all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute
of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of
a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would

amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result;
it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Separate Opinions

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming
the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience
and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for
respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to
established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not
possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It
is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. To "practice" law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented

himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term "practice of law" (ErnaniPao, Bar Reviewer in Legal
and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards
State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice
to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for
legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of
law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law
books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law,
he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and
the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do
not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law,
there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject
to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have
the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under
the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in
litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That
covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC
under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be
part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his
own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge
and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle
as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with

some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.

international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he
has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue;
and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to
see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the tenyear period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law
firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of

Pennsylvania

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,

Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development

Corporation and affiliated companies

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup

Attempt Member

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the

following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as
would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least
ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving
receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.

b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged
in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this
country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive,
legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor,

and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they
are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It
is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection
with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the
giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal
skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument,
the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill.
282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.People's
Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice
or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as
being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently
or customarily, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the
parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one
years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be

more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did
not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that
he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally
answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as
real estate is concerned."
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged
in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxxxxxxxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of
a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants
in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at
law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;"
but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person
may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says
Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties
of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to
manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep
his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets
confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his
services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as
defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or
habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to

carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to

exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxxxxxxxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued
by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one
takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxxxxxxxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been

assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions
are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this
Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral
integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only
on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes
the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending
the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion
in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court
or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without
the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed
the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers
oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the
complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the
19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He

explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an
attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date.
He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May
2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the
claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
(Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared
as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim
that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent
appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of
law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends
that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a

government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted.
Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x xx

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent
as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty.
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party
and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence
clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. [5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to
the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. [8] Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to
the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May
2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. [10] ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to
practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO,

SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO
MERCADO,
Complainants,

- versus -

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA,

Respondent.
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For our review is the Resolution [1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional
malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner, [2] are undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P.
Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City
Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in

A.C. No. 5859
favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank
(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded
that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming
Present:
that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys
CORONA, C.J.,
fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the
CARPIO,
[4]
CARPIO MORALES, respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and
BRION,
PERALTA,
recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. [5]
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series
VILLARAMA, JR.,
of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also
PEREZ,
instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of
his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman
Promulgated:

and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from
the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry,
forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he
filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family
members, their lawyers, and the family corporation. [6] They maintain that the primary purpose
of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice
of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be
disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, [7] Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file
lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the
complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on
strong facts.[8]
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that
he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to
seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he
could justify his attorneys fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He
argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from
their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held
accountable for the public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional
language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate
and vulgar language in accusing him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable
attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions,
we find ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [10] Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during
good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license
or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. [11] In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12] we
explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the
legal profession should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent
filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former client,
the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said
Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a
favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12)
different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the

Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court. [13]
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which
had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of
the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139;
and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing
of previously dismissed cases.[14]
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in
different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without
any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case,
however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client
and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the
respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with
a renegade member of the complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the
foul language used in the pleadings and motions [15] all indicate that the respondent was acting
beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be
an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed
the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16] the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,

efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the

prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help
attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he
is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[18] Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers
must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated
his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did
so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility[19] provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his
client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel.
Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents,
and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the
respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client
relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not
be tolerated by the Court.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded

complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the
right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good faith. [17]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in

the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.

Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy,

SO ORDERED.
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN,
- versus ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of

complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional

CORONA, J.:

Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the

LinsanganLinsangan&Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,

personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules
of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning
that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire his services,

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.

he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.

complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
Hence, this complaint.

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES

SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and

circulation of the said calling card.[7]

not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

[8]

[13]

To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,

degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless
high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

respondent could produce a more favorable result.

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY

ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise
disbarment.[16]
of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court notes that
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.

Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.

[21]

Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He

cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty. [18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,

respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,

stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his undivided

based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce
their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]

rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
clients cause.

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The

[24]

phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for

counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure

the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants

clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress

serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining

and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and

employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the

deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to

Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal

prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and

profession.

directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02

prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere

and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138

reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to

of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one

its findings.

year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. RizalinoSimbillo, was
an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six
months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at
the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues
of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served
by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that
the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. [4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of
similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 [9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.
[10]
Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis
of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering
is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
[14]
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1.

A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2.

A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3.

A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4.

A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance

and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he
had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised
his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue
of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a selfstyled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines
not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite
the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
[20]
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
[21]
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list

the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only
a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10,
1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the
Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar
during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo,
counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T.
Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr.
Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr.
Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-

chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the
appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a
duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an
Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing.
In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum
of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to
supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A
should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its
Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear
unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound
discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the
Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2.Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the
supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale
behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a
result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not
having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are
presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school
clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious
liability arising from some culpable action by their law students;
and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no
person is allowed to practice a particular profession without

possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required

by law.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ALBERTO MINA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a
supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly
states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision
of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule
must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted
only to those who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v.
Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or
the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants
in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs.
Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the
Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who
cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice,
the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more
stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge
should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and
supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34.By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace,
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.
G.R. No. 154207

April 27, 2007

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated
May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil
Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; 1 and
the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry
of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling
of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that
his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down inCantimbuhan; and set the
case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking
to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice
Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;
III.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of
a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of
Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the
RTC.

IV.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion
for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC
had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law
student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns
the following errors:

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING
FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS). 4

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in
behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an
attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE138-ALAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1.Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2.Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus: 8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In
the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in
his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in
denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that
Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioners appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution
of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from
Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor
may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.

himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a
Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then
remarked, Hay naku, masama yungmarunong pa saHuwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the
pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,

FERDINAND A. CRUZ - versus - JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City,
Metro Manila,

[4]

praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected

partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from
the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in
uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief

NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this
Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 [1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand
A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge
Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

that justice will not be served.[5]

In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition
stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough
to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pretrial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the said order.

The antecedents:

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the same Order,

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his

the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and

appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in

jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of

Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,

the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-lawyer may
appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for

In a motion for reconsideration, [9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two

Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge

extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted

denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.

by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.[13]

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition
and assigns the following errors:
I.THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE
OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE
ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE
TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant
and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule
138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this
Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the
Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as
it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule
138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

Section 1.
Conditions for Student Practice. A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may
appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute,

unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. [11] A
becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.
[12]

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student

authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself
and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In
denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the
fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which
eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record
that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education
program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the
law school.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student
and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in
applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The
former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter
rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section
34 of Rule 138, which provides:

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of
Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released
the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a

justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of
Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to

be heard by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be
conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the
right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a
party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or
with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant
may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14] Considering that a
party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner,
not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and
hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 010410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.

counsel cannot be waived.[17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
Holgado,[18] where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The
solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution
obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that
he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim,
may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and

impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is
aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice
by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,
[20]

as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound

discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section

her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.

34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without

[21]

need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who,

Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil
Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed

manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition
despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku,

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823 August 28, 2006

ARCELY Y. SANTOSvs.JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM

masama yungmarunong pa saHuwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the
respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice,
causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

impartiality.

We do not agree.

This is an administrative complaint filed by Arcely Y. Santos ("complainant") against Judge

Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("respondent judge"), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30. Complainant charged respondent
judge with gross misconduct, grave abuse of judicial authority, gross bias and partiality, and
gross violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
The Facts

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative
case[19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact
in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

The complaint stemmed from respondent judges alleged bias and partiality in favor of one
Rogelio R. Santos, Sr. ("Santos"), who had three pending cases 1 before respondent judges
sala, as shown by the following:
1. Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-lawyer, to appear in court and litigate personally
the three cases. Complainant pointed out that Santos was already represented by
counsels2 who have not withdrawn their appearances. Complainant alleged that respondent
judge is guilty of gross misconduct and grave abuse of judicial discretion for having allowed a
non-lawyer to engage in the practice law.

In Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent judge, in an Order 3 dated 28 February
2003, even "appointed" Santos as lead counsel for the petitioners. As early as 26 September
2002, complainant had been questioning the appearance of Santos as "counsel" during the
proceedings in court.4 On 11 November 2002, complainant filed a motion to expunge a
pleading signed by Santos, claiming that Santos, a non-lawyer, is not allowed to sign
pleadings.5 In a Joint Resolution dated 7 February 2003, respondent judge denied
complainants motion and stated that Santos is qualified to conduct his litigation
personally.6 Then on 20 February 2003, complainant filed a motion to reconsider the Joint
Resolution and suggested that, since Santos is now representing himself and, at the same
time, is being represented by counsel, respondent judge should appoint a member of the Bar
as lead counsel.7

In its 1st Indorsement dated 15 May 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
required respondent judge to comment on complainants allegations and to show cause why
he should not be sanctioned as a member of the Bar for violation of Canon 9, Rule 9.01 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In an Answer dated 27 June 2003, respondent judge offered the following explanations:
1. Respondent judge, citing Section 34, Rule 138 18 of the Rules of Court (Rules), admitted that
he allowed Santos to litigate personally his cases before the court.

2. Respondent judge always granted, with dispatch, all the pleadings of Santos.

On Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, respondent judge explained that he merely
"recognized" Santos as lead counsel because his counsel was often absent from the
proceedings.19 Respondent judge added that complainants counsel did not object to the
appointment of Santos as lead counsel, but merely suggested that lead counsel should be a
member of the Bar. Respondent judge also added that, if complainant did not agree with
respondent judges decision on the matter, complainant should have filed a petition for
certiorari.

3. Respondent judge had unduly delayed the execution of the 28 April 2000 Court of Appeals
decision against Santos in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF.

Respondent judge also explained that complainant was allowed to address the court directly,
though not at length because complainant was represented by counsel.

4. Respondent judge denied complainants letter-request 8 dated 16 March 2001 for

respondent judge to inhibit himself from the cases to avoid suspicion of bias, prejudice,
conflict of interest and partiality. Complainant alleged that respondent judge used his office to
advance and protect the interests of Santos, respondent judges "close friend," to the
prejudice of complainant and in violation of Canon 29 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code).

2. Respondent judge denied that he always granted the pleadings of Santos.

On the other hand, complainant alleged that she and the other oppositors were not allowed to
address the court directly and respondent judge even compelled them, under the pain of
contempt, to secure the services of a lawyer to represent them.

Complainant pointed out that in an earlier case 10 respondent judge inhibited himself because
Santos is respondent judges "close friend."11
Complainant also added that respondent judge refused to inhibit himself because he was
protecting his interest in Villa Benita Subdivision ("subdivision"). Complainant explained that
all three cases involved properties in the subdivision 12 and that respondent judge is an
incorporator,13 a director, an officer and a legal adviser 14 of Villa Benita Homeowners
Association ("VBHA"). VBHA allegedly filed several cases before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) against Faberns Inc. and complainant. Complainant asserted that
respondent judge had personal knowledge of the facts of the HLURB cases. Complainant
added that in refusing to inhibit himself, respondent judge violated Rule 3.12 (a) 15 and Canon
516 of the Code.

3. Respondent judge denied that the Court of Appeals decision in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF
has remained unenforced because of his bias in favor of Santos. Respondent judge stated
that he had ordered the implementation of the decision as early as 25 September 2000 20 and
issued a writ of execution on 25 October 2002.21
4. Respondent judged stated that he denied complainants request to inhibit himself because
he can fairly hear and decide the cases.
On respondent judges inhibition in Civil Case No. 3074-AF, respondent judge explained that
he inhibited himself from the case because Santos was his "close friend," while respondents
were not respondent judges friends. In these cases, respondent judge pointed out that he
was friends with both Santos and the other parties 22 to the cases, in effect, "neutralizing"
respondent judges close friendship with Santos.
Respondent judge explained that Santos became a "close friend" when Santos lent his
portable bunker to Dr. Ferdinand Lacurom ("Dr. Lacurom"), respondent judges son, during the
construction of Dr. Lacuroms house in the subdivision. Respondent judge also admitted that

the officers of Faberns Inc. extended a favor to Dr. Lacurom when they facilitated the
cementing of the road in front of Dr. Lacuroms house. 23 However, respondent judge denied
that he received any favor from Santos.

compulsorily retired on 16 May 2003. However, his retirement does not render this
administrative case moot.25
The Courts Ruling

On the matter of VBHA, respondent judge denied that he had any interest to protect in the
subdivision, as respondent judge is not a landowner, or homeowner, or lessee in the
subdivision. Respondent judge clarified that Dr. Lacurom is the one who owns property in the
subdivision and that respondent judge stayed there only on some occasions. Respondent
judge admitted that he is a "nominal" incorporator and adviser of VBHA. 24 Atty. Napoleon
Reyes, president of VBHA, requested respondent judge to agree to be an incorporator of
VBHA "to lend a bit of prestige to the association." However, respondent judge stated that his
only participation in VBHA was to sign the registration documents of VBHA. Respondent judge
clarified that he never attended any of the meetings of VBHA, nor has he any knowledge of
any case filed by VBHA before the HLURB.
Respondent judge also stated that if complainant filed the proper motion for inhibition, he
would have granted the same.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 21 November 2003, the OCA recommended that the complaint be redocketed as an administrative matter and that respondent judge be fined P5,000. The OCA
found respondent judge administratively liable for recognizing Santos as lead counsel despite
the fact that Santos had two counsels of record. The OCA did not find respondent judge liable
for the delay in the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals in Cadastral Case No.
384-AF, as the delay was brought about by the parties themselves. On respondent judge
being an incorporator and adviser of VBHA and his refusal to inhibit himself from the cases,
the OCA opined that the subject cases are not covered by the rule on mandatory
disqualification of judges, hence, respondent judges inhibition rested upon his own discretion.
In a Resolution dated 21 January 2004, the Court resolved to docket the case as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they
were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings on record. Respondent
judge manifested affirmatively. Complainant filed a memorandum dated 9 August 2004
reiterating her allegations. In turn, respondent judge also submitted a memorandum on 21
August 2004.
Complainant filed the present administrative complaint on 5 May 2003 when respondent judge
was still presiding judge of Branch 29 and pairing judge of Branch 30. Respondent judge

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial

evidence the allegations in the complaint. 26 In this case, complainant failed to prove that
respondent judge granted with dispatch all the pleadings of Santos and that respondent judge
was responsible for the delay in the execution of the Court of Appeals decision in Cadastral
Case No. 384-AF. Hence, the Court dismisses this particular charge.
On a Partys Right to Self Representation
The Rules recognize the right of an individual to represent himself in any case in which he is a
party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and that his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the Bar.27 The individual litigant may personally do everything in the progress of the action
from commencement to the termination of the litigation. 28 A partys representation on his own
behalf is not considered to be a practice of law as "one does not practice law by acting for
himself, any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself." 29
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the cases personally. Santos is not engaged in
the practice of law if he represents himself in cases in which he is a party. By conducting the
litigation of his own cases, Santos acts not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself. Certainly, Santos does not become a counsel or lawyer by
exercising such right.
The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive word "or" under the Rules, signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated, 30 to
mean that a party must choose between self-representation or being represented by a
member of the bar. During the course of the proceedings, a party should not be allowed to
shift from one form of representation to another. Otherwise, this would lead to confusion, not
only for the other party, but for the court as well. If a party, originally represented by counsel,
would later decide to represent himself, the prudent course of action is to dispense with the
services of counsel and prosecute or defend the case personally. 31
For the orderly administration of justice, respondent judge should not have allowed Santos to
litigate personally because Santos was already represented by counsel. Respondent judge
should have required Santos to choose between self-representation or being represented by
counsel.

Moreover, respondent judge should not have recognized Santos as lead counsel. The "lead
counsel" is the lawyer on either side of a litigated action who is charged with the principal
management and direction of the partys case, as distinguished from his collaborating
counsels or subordinates.32 In recognizing Santos as "lead counsel", respondent judge made
it appear that Santos was a counsel or lawyer when he is not. To repeat, when a party
represents himself in his own case, he does so not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party
exercising his right of self-representation.

determination of the cases of Santos.42 This may erode the trust of the litigants in respondent
judges impartiality and eventually, undermine the peoples faith in the administration of
justice.43 Judges must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. 44
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Judge

The Court agrees with the OCAs finding that respondent judges inhibition from the cases was
discretionary. The three cases do not fall under the instances covered by the rule on the
mandatory disqualification of judges33 and the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter
of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. 34

Respondent judges actuations constitute simple misconduct, a less serious charge

punishable with (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for a period of not
less than one month but not more than three months; or (b) fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.45 However, considering that respondent judge had retired compulsorily on
16 May 2003 after twenty-eight years of service in the government and that this is respondent
judges first offense, the P10,000 withheld from his retirement benefits46 should be forfeited as
sufficient penalty for his administrative offense.47

Besides, complainant did not follow the proper procedure for the disqualification of judges.
In Constante v. Pimentel,35 the Court ruled that the procedure for disqualification of judges in
Section 2, Rule 13736 must be substantially followed.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom GUILTY of simple
misconduct andORDERS the FORFEITURE of the P10,000 withheld from his retirement
benefits.

On Respondent Judges Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

[G.R. No. 126625. September 23, 1997]

On respondent judges admission that Dr. Lacurom received a favor from the officers of
Faberns Inc., respondent judge violated Rule 5.04 37 of the Code. Faberns Inc. is the
petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF, which was then pending before respondent judges
sala. Respondent judge should have advised Dr. Lacurom not to accept any favor from
Faberns Inc. or from any of its officers 38 or principal stockholders. Judges, as occupants of
exalted positions in the administration of justice, must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
on them.39 Their private, as well as their official conduct, must always be free from the
appearance of impropriety.40

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR.,
EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR
BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR,
ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO
LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO
EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA,
DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ,
JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI
SURILA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO
BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO,
PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.

On Respondent Judges Inhibition

On respondent judges close friendship with Santos, such fact did not render respondent
judge guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Santos did not influence his official conduct as a judge in the cases where Santos was a
party.41 Complainant failed to present any convincing proof that respondent judge gave any
undue privileges in his court to Santos, or that Santos benefited from his personal relations
with respondent judge, or that respondent judge used his influence, if any, to favor Santos.
However, it would have been more prudent if respondent judge avoided hearing the cases
where Santos was a party because their close friendship could reasonably tend to raise
suspicion that respondent judges social relationship with Santos would be an element in his

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks
to annul the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and
remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.

Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The
Supreme Court ruled: 'Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties.' (Lao Sok v.
Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide

with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner
was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant
employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner
as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and
Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating
the services of private respondents and its other employees.

"Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that 'a court cannot decide a case without
facts either admitted or agreed upon by the parties or proved by evidence.' (Yu Chin Piao v.
Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160),

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before SubRegional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that
petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary
differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named corespondents.

"The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute the individual
claims of the herein complainants.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual
claims of the above-named complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Order.

"SO ORDERED." [3]

On June 29, 1990, ArbiterPalangan issued a similar order, thus:

Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while the others
were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of
preliminary conference were issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner through
Engineer Estacio. The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990
before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability to private respondents and
agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result
of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position
paper. [1] Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position
papers and were adopting their complaints as their position paper. [2]
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week to settle
the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an
order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay private respondents'
claims. Arbiter Siao held:
"x

x.

"Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed, and what the
complainants might think as to how this branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as
they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to order the
respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the

"When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m.
respondent thru their representative manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the
complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
"However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise of the
respondent, the latter failed to appear without any valid reason.
"Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the
complainants, we believe that the issues raised herein have become moot and academic.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed
and Terminated, however, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their
differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof based
on the employment record on file with the respondent.
"SO ORDERED." [4]
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that
it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to
represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.

In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the orders of the
Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent Commission
was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that:
"I
"THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A
NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
"PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND EVIDENCE BUT
ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law when it was
adjudged by the NLRC liable without trial on the merits and without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC
and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that petitioner is already in estoppel
to disclaim the authority of its alleged representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private respondents
unsubstantiated complaints to hold petitioner liable for damages." [5]
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and respondent
Commission are void for the following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of
summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear
and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent
Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on
unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right
to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 4
and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. They provide:

"Section 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions.-- (a) Notices or summons and copies of
orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; provided
further that in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both the
parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the parties are so numerous,
service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be
practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor
Code, as amended.
"x

x.

"Section 5. Proof and completeness of service.-- The return is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his
agent. x xx."
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally
or by registered mail on the party himself. If the party is represented by counsel or any other
authorized representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal
address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and
summonses therefore served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether
Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or "agent" of
parties on whom summons may be served, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may
be resorted to. [6]
Under the Revised Rules of Court, [7] service upon a private domestic corporation or
partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the
corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them. [8]
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and
supervised the construction project. [9] According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work
of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to

realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the
president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore
validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the
claims of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and
respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:
"Section 6. Appearances.-- x

x.

"A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
"(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
"(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present
written proof that he is properly authorized; or
"(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department
of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. x
x
x." [10]
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he
represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization or its members,
with written authorization from them; or (c) he is a duly accredited member of any legal aid
office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred to by the latter. [11]
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited
members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as
parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their
appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent
upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named corespondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and
declarations Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to respondent
Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first

place, had no authority to appear before the respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he
filed was verified by him, not by petitioner. [12] Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve
into the merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine whether Engineer Estacio was duly
authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the ground that notices were
served on petitioner and that the latter was estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were
authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in
procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose
from Engineer Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to
compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of
petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly
established by evidence. [13] This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure, viz:
"Section 7. Authority to bind party.-- Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have
authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special
power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing
party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim."
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the preliminary
conference and constituted an offer to settle the case amicably. The promise to pay could not
be presumed to be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General. [14] A
defendant's promise to pay and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal
obligation from the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and discharge the defendant from
liability. [15] In effect, the offer to pay was an offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror. [16] If this rule were otherwise, no attempt to settle
litigation could safely be made. [17] Settlement of disputes by way of compromise is an
accepted and desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals. [18] In fact, the
Labor Code mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable the parties to arrive at an
amicable settlement of the dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. [19]
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decisions
of the labor arbiters which were not only based on unauthorized representations, but were
also made in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

"Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum.-- Should the parties fail to agree

upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter
shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the
conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position
papers.
"x

x."

After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as promised,
Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position
papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring
private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived
their right to file position papers but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the
premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the
scheduled conference. Since petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle
the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to file their
position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and
respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the
Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure should not be
interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process. [20] And
this right is satisfied, at the very least, ' when the parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers. [21] Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in dispensing with this
requirement.

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO vs. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415
of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle,
Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the standoff between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to
BonifacioAlcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the
barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent,
on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter,
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance
elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as
complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is
merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as

Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be
the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to
assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. [22]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is
remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.

counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to

prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong
Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what
complainant said in her complaint: [2]

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the

subject matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because

LorencitoInos said that [complainants brother] MelencioMagno, Jr. made

alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to
the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter....
attached as Annex A

panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the
prohibition

against

lawyer

appearing

to

assist

client

in katarunganpambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her
appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the

hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the
proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial
in favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for
which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent]
wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes .

In her report dated October 6, 2003, [5] Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of
complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis,
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period
of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner,

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong

Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as
Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as
Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket added.)

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer
to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default. [3]

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of
July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4]

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the
Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the LupongTagapamayapa, and heard
by Punong Barangay BonifacioAlcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation

recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED

and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in
violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and
representation by lawyers in the KatarunganPambarangay, Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba is herebyADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subject KatarungangPambarangay, provides:
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all
katarungangpambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be
assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the

parties in katarunganpambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or
representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable
the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, [8] the
exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no
quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose
presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. [9] Worse still, the participation of
lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong
instead of expedite settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings
was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the
LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of
Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this
regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing
herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the LupongTagapamayapa.[10]

Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan

barangay proceedings. Section 412(a)[11] the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process
either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case,
the punong barangay, as chairman of the LuponTagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation
proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its
determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the
LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified.
Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of
the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when respondent
repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the
barangay conciliation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.