Aidala (1985)

Sodologiad Analyiis 1985.
46:3 287-314
Social Change, Gender Roles, and

New Religious iVIovements*
Angela A. Aidala
Rutgers University
The relationship between gender role ambiguities and new religious movements is explored by
an analysis of religious and nonreligious communes utilizing both survey and ethnographic data.
The existence of a single, morally absolute set of definitions and specific rules concerning sexuality
and gender roles distinguishes religious from secular communal movements. Participants in religious
groups are characterized by uncertainty about rather than outright rejection of traditional gender
roles, and low tolerance for ambiguity. Findings are discussed within a broader explanatory framework which emphasizes the significance oflifestage and gender roles for understanding the interrelationships among structural change, cultural fragmentation and social movement participation.
A recurrent phenomenon on the historical landscape is the periodic upsurge of niovements sweeping in their condemnation of the society that surrounds them and offering
alternative communities of moral regeneration and social fellowship. Such times of
countercultural protest are characterized by relatively sudden economic, social, and
demographic changes that have eroded the taken-for-granted legitimacy of prevailing institutions (Yinger, 1982). Where and when traditional understandings and values no
longer fit emerging realities, large cracks appear in the consensus underlying existing social arrangements and prophets and visionaries can command the attention of more
than a few passersby. Religious movements flourish as competing visions of a New Moral
Order receive enthusiastic support. In periods of major social and cultural disjuncture,
religious as well as many secular movements have a communitarian focus oriented to
the establishment of actual communities of co-enthusiasts. Within small, well-bounded
communities of likeminded others, "new" values, goals, and role behaviors can be socially defined and consensually affirmed (cf. Bennett, 1975; Bestor, 1950; Cohn, 1970;
Darin-Drabkin, 1962; Zablocki, 1980).
Many sociologists of religion interpret the spiritual ferment of recent decades as a response to such a structurally induced "culture crisis." The appearance of exotic new religions led by Asian prophets, the upsurge of pentecostal sects, and the development
of quasi-religious psychotherapies in the late 1960s are all seen as responses to the fragmentation of cultural symbol systems that before that time had served to integrate institutions and give meaning to personal experience. Despite glaring differences in belief
and practice, each movement provided some hope for cultural coherence, at least within
pockets of sectarian withdrawal (see e.g., Bellah, 1975, 1976; Bird, 1979; Eister, 1972,
1974; d o c k , 1976; McLoughlin, 1978; Robbins and Anthony, 1981; Tipton, 1982).
*TTie Research reported here was supported by grants from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH
25525-OlMP), the National Science Foundation (SOC7711262, SES-82-08581), Sigma XI Scientific Research
Association of North America, and Rutgers University Research Council. Thanks to Alice Rossi, Anne
Foner, Judy Gerson, Debbi Schaubman, Jean Schmidt, Michael Kimmel for helpful criticism and assistance.
Revision of a paper presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association. Detroit, Michigan,
September 1983.
287
288
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
This paper will argue that we must consider the significance of age and sex/gender
in attempting to understand the interrelations among structural change, cultural fragmentation, and participation in social movements. Because of the forced confrontation
with the accumulated cultural material that inevitably accompanies the transition to
adulthood, a disjuncture between old norms and new realities will be experienced most
directly by youth. Gender roles are important links between culture and personality,
as well as forces shaping the social division of labor; thus "culture crisis" and the institutional change that surrounds it is experienced as gender confusions and uncertainties.
In a context of rapid social change and shifting cultural frames, regardless of other goals
and programs, many different social movements share a concern with issues of sexuality
and gender roles. Religious movements typically differ from their secular counterparts
in offering a morally absolute set of definitions and rules to follow concerning women,
men, and their relations. This I suggest is an important part of their appeal to potential
converts.*
We will attempt to explore this thesis by an examination of sexuality and gender roles
in communal groups inspired by the range of social movements of the 1960s era. The
analysis of secular as well as spiritually focused groups and their members will help us
understand the extent to which the new religions may serve needs not met by participation in other types of youth subcultures.
Life Stage, Gender Roles, and Rapid Social Ghange
As Robert Merton long ago pointed out, gender is a "master status" visible and consequential in all institutional realms. Gender identities and roles are among the most
basic orienting constructs by which we guide self and communicate with others; the attributes, traits of temperament, expectations, rights, and obligations which we consider
appropriate to ourselves in any situation, we consider appropriate to ourselves as
women or men (Laws, 1979; Weitzman, 1979). Gender roles have a basis in (as well as
contribute to) the structure of economic and political relations in a society. Thus relatively sudden changes in social and economic conditions inevitably give rise to gender
role "crisis"finding oneself without adequate guides to ascribe meaning, articulate and
order values, designate goals, and carve paths of action as a (male or female) human
being.
'My general thesis is similar to analyses developed by Anthony and Robbins (Anthony and Robbins, 1982)
and Frederick Bird (1979) in that both consider the reduction of moral ambiguity within new religious movements an important part of the appeal of such groups to young persons. My argument however emphasizes
cognitive as well as normative consequences of cultural fragmentation. "Culture crisis" produces not only
moral confusion concerning which behaviors are good and which are to be condemned, but also a lack of
certainty about what is real, what is possible, and what are standards for evidence (Aidala, 1982). In addition,
both emphasize that the ideologies of some groups espouse moral relativism and disavow fixed rules or standards which appears to contradict my argument that all religious movements in the era under study provide
adherents with explicit rules for behavior. We differ in that both Bird and Anthony and Robbins base their
analyses on formal theologies and their philosophical underpinnings. My focus is on actual communities of
adherents and therein individuals experience clearly defined and consistently enforced norms which govern
most aspects of everyday life, even if they are presented as only "interpretations" or "suggestions" from guru,
pastor, enlightened teacher, or other authority. The data base for the present analysis includes representatives
of all the different types of new religions encompassed by the typologies of Anthony and Robbins (monisticrelativistic and dualistic-absolutistic) and Bird (devotee, disciple, and apprentice).
SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
289
Analysts have pointed to changes such as technological advance, shifting occupational strata, upgrading of educational requirements before employment, growth in the
reach of mass communications, etc. as contributing to normative breakdown and culture crisis in the late 1960s (see eg. discussions in Bellah, 1976; d o c k , 1976; Wuthnow,
1976; Yinger, 1982). However the actual human beings caught up in them do not directly experience shifts in the occupational structure or any other macro-level dislocations. They experience a whirlwind of personal opportunity, threat, and anomic uncertainty. This is especially the case for youth, those making the transition to adulthood.
As Mannheim (1952) has shown, each successive generation experiences a "fresh contact" with the social and cultural world. In times of major structural change, the young
are directly confronted with the lack of fit between institutionalized guides for thought,
feeling, and behavior, and changed conditions and events. As horizons expand beyond
the family unit, traditional gender roles into which they have been socialized, which
under stable conditions provide a base for identity formation and making one's way in
the adult world, fail to resonate with emerging social-cultural realities. If not by economic independence (since father helps pay for graduate school), when does manhood
begin? How shall I be a man and how will others know me? Given the range of career
possibilities, shall I be a mother? If wife-and-mother is in the future, if at all, what are
the rules for sexual feelings and behavior in the here and now?
It is not the case that age-related sex and gender ambiguities are in themselves sufficient
to account for the emergence of social movements and their appeal to adherents. However, age and gender roles are important interlinkages between social actors and larger
social and cultural structures (Riley, et al., 1972). As mechanisms for the social shaping
of personal identity as well as mechanisms for the allocation of economic and other social functions, gender roles become the locus of many structural and cultural influences
as they impact upon individuals (cf. Lueptow, 1984).
Historical study supports the claim that times of social and cultural disjuncture are
indeed periods of crisis and major change in age and gender roles. They are also times
of spiritual ferment, political activism, and communal experimentation (see e.g. Bestor,
1950; Cohn, 1970; Darin-Drabkin, 1962). The definition and implementation of a particular vision of male/female, masculine/feminine, has been central to communitarian
efforts. The early decades of the 19th century, an era that shows many parallels to the
1960s and 1970s, are a case in point. The early stage of industrialism was a period of
major technological advance and change in economic organization, placing special
strains on relations between the sexes (Ehrenreich and English, 1978; Rothman, 1978;
Smith-Rosenberg, 1972; Welter, 1966). It was also a time of religious enthusiasm and
communitarian crusade. Western New York and Ohio (the "California" of the era) were
dotted with small communities attempting to implement their version of a new social
and cultural synthesis (Bestor, 1950; Cross, 1950; Nordhoff, 1965; Tyler, 1944). Each
Utopia defined and defended "proper" roles for women and men (Foster, 1981; Harsin,
1984; Kern, 1981; Muncy, 1973; Taylor, 1983). Religious communalists were especially
preoccupied with issues of sexuality and gender roles. Groups as diverse as Shakers,
Mormons, and Oneida Perfectionists offered detailed solutions to gender problematics
and each considered their redefinitions the key to an improved social and spiritual
order.
290
Young persons were overrepresented in both secular and religious antiinstitutional

movements in the early nineteenth century; religious movements, however, recruited
particularly heavily from among youth (Cross, 1950; Dolan, 1978; Cillis, 1981; Kett,
1977). Biographies show conversions often took place during times of crisis about life
plans as young men and women attempted to find their way to adulthood within a rapidly changing social and economic structure that had undermined traditional understandings of marriage and work (Kett, 1977: 70fO.
This paper will explore the relationship between gender role ambiguities and contemporary communitarian movements. If my general line of argument is correct we should
expect the following relationships: All communal groups will be ideologically concerned
with sexuality and gender roles. Like their nineteenth century predecessors, religious
groups are expected to give more attention to sex and gender questions than their secular counterparts and are more likely to offer firm answers to questions posed. On the
individual level, young persons are expected to be overrepresented among the membership of communal movements. Commune members in general will show estrangement
from traditional gender understandings, ideals, and behaviors. However, the ideological
rigidity of religious groups is hypothesized to appeal to individuals characterized by low
tolerance of ambiguity, and confusion regarding gender roles rather than outright rejection of traditional patterns.'
Ideological Solutions to Problematic Sex and Gender Roles
Data for the present analysis were generated by a nationwide, longitudinal study of
communal living groups which has utilized both survey and ethnographic techniques.
Ten groups in each of six major U.S. metropolitan areas (Boston, New York, Atlanta,
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Houston and Los Angeles) were studied intensively in a panel
format from 1974 to 1976. A follow-up phase of research began in 1982.
The sample was chosen from a comprehensive census of communal living groups
within each metropolitan area. Groups were selected to reflect ideological type and
other key characteristics as indicated by the census. While not a probability sample, the
present data base is more representative of the universe of contemporary communitarian groups and the ideologies which inspired them than any other which is known
to exist.^
Forty-five percent of the groups in the sample had religious ideologies. The largest
number of spiritually focused communes derived their beliefs from Eastern religions.
Communes inspired by Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh traditions accounted for 25% of the
entire sample. "New Christian" communes (15%) included charismatic pentecostal,
evangelical youth or Jesus people, and groups whose Christianity has a liberal, social
gospel focus. Three communes (5%) were classified as "Psycho-Spiritual" indicating their
ideological amalgamation of Eastern spiritual philosophies and humanistic psychology.
Nonreligious groups represented the spectrum of secular movements which emerged in
the late 1960s youth culture (See Table 1). The typical commune had been in existence
for two years at first contact. Membership varied from 5 to 101 with a median population of 11. Religious communes were more likely to have had larger populations; nonfull discussion of sampling and methodology of this research see Zablocki (1980) and Aidala (1979).
291
TABLE 1
RELIGIOUS TYPE OE COMMUNAL HOUSEHOLD
Eastern Religious
Hir^du
Sikh
Buddhist
New Christian
Charismatic Renewal
Social Gospel
Evangelical Youth
15
12 (20%)
2 ( 3%)
1 ( 2%)
( 15%)
4 ( 7%)
3 ( 5%)
2 ( 3%)
( 5%)
Psycho-Spiritual
Mystical
Gestalt
2 ( 3%)
1 ( 2%)
Non-Religious
Hippie/Counter Cultural
Household Cooperative
New Left Political
Alternative Eamily
Rehabilitational
Personal Growth
Total
( 25%)
33
( 55%)
60
(100%)
9 (15%)
8 (13%)
7 (12%)
4 ( 7%)
3 ( 5%)
2 ( 3%)
religious groups were more likely to have been together for a longer time than spiritual
communities in the sample.
Sexual lôrms in Communal Groups
Norms and expectations regarding sexual behavior and erotic relationships are an important aspect of gender roles. Not all young people during the 1960s were "adrift in
a sea of permissiveness" as popular magazines warned. Yet in a relatively short period
of time, what had been fairly stable mores could no longer be taken for granted as generally understood rules. The wide availability of reliable birth control and an atmosphere of sexual openness provided more opportunity and greater pressures to engage
in sex at an earlier age and in circumstances unconnected with expectations for lasting
relationships. The number of persons cohabitating increased over 700% in the decade
between 1960 and 1970 (Macklin, 1978). Opinion polls have shown that general acceptance of premarital sex increased considerably between the years 1969 and 1973 after
rates of disapproval had remained constantly high for the prior 30 years {Current Opinion, 1973). Understanding sexual feelings and learning to deal with them is anxiety producing for all young persons; all the more so for a generation confronted with competing
rhetorics and shifting standards of appropriate behavior.
All communal groups were ideologically concerned with sexuality; there were fewer
differences in the questions asked about forms of sexual expression than in the firmness
of answers given. Communes inspired by hippie, personal growth and, to some extent,
new left ideologies, encouraged openness and experimentation with sexuality. None of
the secular groups studied, however, had arrived at a single, agreed-upon alternative to
292
conventional sexual scripts. In contrast, communes founded by religious movements

typically offered precise and detailed definitions, justifications, and rules. Adopting the
religious ideology promised easy resolution of uncertainties regarding sexuality and patterns of sexual relating.
Despite great diversity in specific norms, there were three general approaches to sexuality within religiously inspired communes: compulsory celibacy, group controlled
marriage, and "free-love." In many ways the simplest solution to confused and unanchored sexual feelings is total abstinence. Seventy percent of contemporary religious
communes had celibacy norms. Five groups required total celibacy of all members. A
more common pattern was "voluntary" celibacy celibacy was preferred, but marriage
as defined and controlled by the group was permitted.
Where sex was not prohibited entirely, strict and very specific norms regulated sexual
expression. The guru, pastor, elders, or other spiritual leaders provided both general
rules and personalized direction regarding the who, what, when, where, and how of sexual behavior. In some cases potential spouses are suggested to each other and marriage
with little intimate knowledge of one's mate was not uncommon (see also: Bromley and
Shupe, 1979; judah, 1974; Richardson, et al, 1979).
It is important to note that not all religious ideologies prescribed sharp restrictions
on sexual expression. The liberal Christian groups rejected the rigidity of fundamentalist understandings and rules. Psycho-spiritual groups tended to encourage free sexuality.
In Spectra commune,^ for example, norms of sexuality reflected the general philosophy
of "hedonism-in-the-service-of-egolessness." Spectran teachings held that the shortest
path to transcendence is often release through immoderate indulgence:
Sex is considered a door, a door of compensation. . . . When your psyche gets really pushed
you go out of a door. That can be like overeating, could be like excessive work over-working,
or getting into drugs. . . . And sex is considered the safest door to go out. [This] allows you
to approach sex for just sex its not love it's just sex.
The justifications for sexuality (pleasure, procreation, higher consciousness, etc.), as

well as the restrictiveness of sexual expression varied within spiritually focused communal living groups. However, with few exceptions, all religious and quasi-religious
groups had a coherent sexual ideology anchored by cosmic justifications which provided
a specific set of rules to follow. Whether asceticism or hedonism was encouraged, sexuality was typically scripted down to details such as the positions and prerogatives of males
and females, the appropriateness of kissing with the mouth open, the sequence of precoital prayers/massages designed to ensure a "successful" (however defined) experience.
Ideological redefinitions of sexuality in both religious and psychospiritual movements
were such as to eliminate or minimize individual decision-making and interpersonal negotiation regarding both sexual relationships and sexual behavior.
In addition, sexual norms in religious groups had wide consensual support. There
were, not surprisingly, violations of sexual restrictions. Nonetheless the degree of personal acceptance of norms was consistently high-whether ideological injuctions sharply
restricted sexuality or encouraged unbridled hedonism. In celibate groups, for example,
^Pseudonyms will be used for all names of communal groups and individual commune members.
293
only 12% of the membership indicated even slight dissatisfaction or doubt about abstinence rules. Similarly, in groups where dyadic relations and marriage were strictly
controlled, 100% of those surveyed strongly agreed that they and fellow commune members should submit to the authority of guru/pastor/elders in these matters. Charismatic
authority transforms what seem to the outsider as severe restrictions on individuality
into potentialities for full and complete personhood:
Sometimes Yogi will assign people [to marry each other]. He'll just tell two certain people to
get married. Because he's so tuned in he can read people's auras, he can see people's destinies,
he can figure out what two people need to go through to get their scene together . . . and
sure! People will do it.
In many religious groups, the acceptance of sexual norms was higher than acceptance
of other rules such as norms of income sharing or chore allocation.
In contrast, the typical sexual pattern within nonreligious communal groups could
only be characterized as "emergent norm"no commonly accepted, well-articulated
ideological specifications existed; definitions and behavior were in flux. Most secular
communes rejected conventional standards as "repressive" and the source of a variety
of personal and social ills. Several groups had a self-conscious goal of collectively working out new rules for sexual behavior; one commune, for example, launched a program
of reading, debate, and essay writing about the evils of sexual exclusivity. Yet, regardless
of attention paid to the matter, arriving at shared definitions and stable norms for sexual relating proved elusive.
Value commitments which emphasized personal freedom and individual choice
worked against establishing sexual norms that were acceptable to all members. Most secular groups also highly valued emotional intimacy among members (Aidala, 1983; Zablocki and Aidala, 1980). Wanting to throw out old rules regarding sexuality left the
precise relationship between sexual and other intimacies highly ambiguous, as a exhippie describes:"*
One night a few weeks after I was living there he came into my room at night and crawled
into bed with me, you know, wanted to make love. It completely freaked me out because I
really didn't know. . . . Now if anyone ever did that to me. . . . I would say get the hell out
of here. But then, still being new in the house and not knowing my position trying to be nice
to everybody I didn't know what to say.
Even when members could agree on standards for sexual behavior, ideals were often
difficult to put into practice. Communal households attempting to experiment with
"sexual sharing," for example, had difficulties when members differed regarding their
sexual interest in one another. Sexual sharing was not easily translated into shared responsibility and care for offspring.
Table 2 presents the dominant norms for sexual behavior in religious and nonreligious
communal groups. In almost half (48%) of the secular communes, there was no commonly accepted set of meanings, values and expected behaviors. Vague support for nontraditional sexuality with no accepted guide for what might be a viable alternative was
"Berger (1981:151) suggests that the sexual exploitation of vulnerable young women within the hippie movement was partially responsible for the appeal of sexually restrictive religious communes.
294
TABLE 2
DOMINANT NORMS REGARDING SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN RELIGIOUS
AND NON-RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
Religious'^
Communes
1^ on-Religious
Communes
Total and Compulsory Celibacy
19%
0%
Celibacy or Licensed Monogamy^

Group approval required for marriage
Group approval recommended but not required
11%
41%
3%
0
Licensed or Unlicensed
Monogamous Relationships with Commitment
7%
33%
Licensed or Unlicensed
Non-sexually Exclusive Commitments
6%
11%
3%
Partial Group Marriage
6%
Shifting Sexual Norms
11%
48%
[27]
[33]
Sexual Norms
Non-committed Non-con\entional Sexual Relations

(multiple partners, homosexuality, etc. encouraged)
N =
Încludes Psycho-Spiritual Communes.
"Celibacy for non-married members.
a source of tension and conflict within secular groups which did not afflict members of
religious communities (cf. Berger, 1981).
Gender Role Ideologies
As Jessie Bernard (1975) has summarized, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the "tilt"
of many institutional structures, a tipping point for many processes of change that
created a situation of true normlessness regarding gender role ideals and behaviors.
Neither traditional patterns nor alternative images, understandings, expectations were
able to impress themselves with self-evident authority. The absence of any broader
normative consensus facilitated the proliferation of competing ideologies, each defending its particular understanding of men, women, and relations between them.
Three general approaches to gender roles were found among communes inspired by
the new religions: biblically-based understandings of patriarchy, bio-mystical specification of complementarity, and subjectivist denial of gender differences. Communal
households with fundamentalist Christian ideologies embraced biblically-based images
of woman as temptress and/or helpmate to man. An important task within such groups
was the undoing of the influence of secular culture which blurs "Cod-ordained" distinctions between the sexes. The wife of the leader of Joy of God commune explains, "So
that's the basic thing we work on is the woman being in a more submissive role. . . ."
Social gospel communes accepted in principle notions of male authority and separate
spheres for women and men. However, a less literal understanding of biblical guidance
left more room for defining new norms as they attempted to "bring Christian principles
to bear" on the issues of man and woman, husband and wife.
295
Gender role ideology in Eastern religious communes reflected the Asian cultures from
which they drew their inspiration. In some Eastern religious movements roles were
sharply differentiated, based upon understandings of biological/spiritual complementarity. A member of Third Eye Fellowship hints at a much more elaborate conceptual system and set of explicit rules which structured gender roles in her commune:
Men and women are two polarities in this universe men and women are very different and
they're totally complementary. A man is controlled by the sun and the woman is controlled
by the moon. . . . The women's role is a pretty heavy duty role on this planet, I mean, bringing
up a soul.
Some groups with Eastern religious ideologies, as well as all the psycho-spiritual communes in the sample, dismissed gender role issues as manifestations of the illusionary
nature of ego concerns. No differences were seen in the abilities of men and women to
attain self-perfection or "higher consciousness" which was held to be the only relevance
in life. A self-described "ex-feminist" explains: "Now I see my equality is how I feel
about myself... I can do whatever I want." Concern for such mundane matters as the
tendency of male members of the commune to avoid household chores was scorned as
evidence of wrong or limited consciousness. The quest for personal transcendence in
such groups most often resulted in the reproduction of traditional patterns of gender
relations, however refurbished with spiritual explanations.
Not all religious communes had gender role expectations worked out in such detail
that different hourly schedules could be provided for women and men (although some
had such schedules). All religious ideologies, however, did provide systematic explanations which defined the "true" nature of women and men and provided spiritual and
practical guidance for male/female relations. Although a few women members privately
expressed dissatisfaction with their role within their communes, open conflicts over gender-based roles were rare within religious communal groups. Malcontents tended to
leave the community.
In contrast to the ideological deliberateness found in religious movements, the modal
approach to gender roles in secular communal groups was "laissez faire": while traditional roles were ideologically scorned, scant energy was devoted to challenging prevailing gender expectations and behaviors. Hippie communes were notorious for male dominance in the name of anarchistic "freedom" (see: Berger, 1981; Wagner, 1982). Feminism was clearly not a concern among many new left activists (Evans, 1979; Thorne,
1975). Over half (55%) of the nonreligious communal groups in the present sample considered gender role issues a matter of individual or perhaps dyadic experimentation
but not a focus for concerted group effort.
A few new left communes were self-consciously committed to achieving equality between the sexes as part of the general goal of restructuring American society to eliminate
exploitation and oppression. Several alternative family communes had a psychologistic
ideology which emphasized the limitations to emotional fulfillment and self-actualization imposed by rigid role divisions. But few of these groups had arrived at a coherent
set of concepts, images, goals, and norms as a positive alternative to traditional roles
for women and men.
Lack of agreement about the status, duties, and "proper" attributes of women and men
was a source of conflict and schism within secular communes. In spite of a collective
296
neglect of gender role issues, individual women among the membership often challenged
ideological drift into conventional patterns.* Groups which had an ideological vision
of improved gender relations argued about how to get there. If men must cook, should
women be required to learn auto mechanics? Should communal energy be taken up
with getting males to express their emotions more openly or does this distract from
building a workers' party? As might be expected, the presence of children within the
communal household exacerbated confusions and disagreements (cf. Berger, 1981; Berger et al., 1971; Vesey, 1973; Zablocki and Aidala, 1980).
Table 3 classifies communal groups according to their normative specifications regarding gender roles. Ideologies which emphasize distinct spheres of existence for men and
women and the principle that women's lives should be home and family-centered are
considered "traditional," regardless of differences in the broader philosophical underpinnings of such beliefs. Only ten groups in the sample were deliberate about redefining
gender role understandings and attempting to put new ideals into practice. Several
other groups are classified as "anti-traditional casual." These groups publicly supported
changed roles and greater equality between women and men, but devoted little attention to the matter beyond requiring males to take an occasional turn at preparing meals
or cleaning the communal toilet bowl.
In sum, the new religious movements show great diversity in sexual and gender role
ideology. There were ashrams dedicated to celibacy across the street from households
experimenting with meditative hedonism. Some emphatically prescribed separate
spheres for women and men; others denied such distinctions existed. Nevertheless, the
different religious and psycho-spiritual communal groups studied were similar in the fol-
TABLE 3
NORMATIVE ORIENTATION TO TRADITIONAL GENDER ROLES
IN RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
Religious
Communes
Non-Religious
Communes
Traditional Gender Roles

Deliberate
26%
Traditional Gender Roles

Casual
37%
Laissez faire Orientation to

Gender Roles
30%
55%
Anti-traditional Gender Roles

Casual
7%
15%
Anti-traditional Gender Roles

Deliberate
^0%
[271
(33)
Gender Role Norms
N =
' A phenomenon familiar to researchers of counter cultural and political communes is the collective revolt
of women members over issues related to the sexual division of labor and power within the group. Sec Zablocki and Aidala (1980:236) and Berger (1981:150ff).
297
lowing ways: First, groups with a religious ideology offered a pre-defined, relatively coherent set of rules for thinking, feeling, and behaving with regard to sexuality and gender roles. Second, normative specifications in religious communes were given elaborate,
transcendental justifications. Beliefs and values concerning sexuality and gender roles
were considered absolute, non-negotiable, not a matter of individual introspection and
choice. Third, norms concerning sexuality and gender roles received wide support, were
consensually validated within a community of co-believers where definitions and behavior were enforced and reaffirmed through daily interaction. Fourth, in none of the
religious communes did ideological formulation or practice pose a direct challenge to
the traditional allocation of greater social and economic power to men. Many groups
actively promoted traditional inequalities. Those that did not denied the reality of inequalities, which allowed traditional patterns to continue.
In contrast, communes inspired by secular movements of the sixties youth culture offered shared rejection of traditional sexual and gender roles, a haven for experimentation with alternatives, and the possibility of eliciting the support of commune mates for
one's version of new ideals and behaviors. However, value commitments emphasizing
personal freedom and individual choice worked against arriving at a set of beliefs, expectations, and rules that could be affirmed by all group members. The practical problems
of household management and parenting were not resolved by commitments to vague
ideological principles of equality and androgyny. Life in communal households affiliated
with hippie, new left, and other secular movements of the 1960s period, more often than
not, included continued discussion, negotiation, and conflict about changing sexuality
and gender roles.
Sex and Cender Orientations Among Commune Members
Religious and nonreligious communitarian movements offered different solutions to
problematic sex and gender roles, differing not only in substantive ideological content
but perhaps more importantly, in the systematization and comprehensiveness of sex/
gender ideology and the specificity of group enforced norms for behaviors. The next
task is to analyze the audiences to which these movements appealed. My general thesis
links cultural fragmentation, stage in the life course, and estrangement from traditional
gender roles with participation in communitarian social movements. In addition, the
ideological rigidity of specifically religious groups is hypothesized to appeal to individuals most in need of certainty regarding problematic sex and gender issues.
Following Mannheim, one expects communal movements to appeal to the young, to
those most directly confronted with the necessity of finding new identities and frameworks in response to collapse of cultural hegemony in major institutional spheres. But
there is within-cohort variance in movement participation. Individuals differ both in
their experience of cultural estrangement and in their capacity for enduring it. I suggest
these differences may help account for the differential attraction of sectarian religious
movements among the available pool of alienated youth.
The normative specificity of religious movements, and roles within such groups that
do not challenge traditional male-female relations, would seem likely to appeal to young
persons who could not accept without question prevailing understandings of sex and
gender, but who nonetheless found it difficult to choose among the competing packages
of tradition and counter-cultural reversal (free sexuality, androgyny, etc.) being posed.
298
Religious communalists are expected to score relatively low on measures of tolerance of

ambiguity. Aversion to conflicting meanings and values is related to the desire to hang
onto tradition, even if it no longer comfortably guides one in the face of changed circumstance, and/or the tendency to resolve ambiguity by the adamant assertion of some
other authority perceived as permanent and absolute (Rokeach, 1960; see also Berger,
1979:61fO. Joining a religious group offered resolution of anomic drift by immersion in
a community of caring others who embraced a single system of belief and practice which
promised answers to troublesome questions about self and society.*
On the other hand, nonreligious communal movements are expected to appeal to
those who have more completely rejected traditional cultural values and norms of conduct. For these individuals, the commune represented a shared opposition to established society and a supportive environment for experimentation with alternatives.
Communalists in secular groups are hypothesized to have higher tolerance for the ambiguity necessarily involved in the attempt to forge new values and identities chosen
from among the cacophony of competing options socially available. This includes attempting to personally define satisfying forms of spirituality. The relationships posited
between gender role ambiguities and the new religions is not an attempt to account for
personal religiosity or spiritual seeking but rather the appeal of doctrinaire religious
groups.^
It is not possible to directly test the complex set of relationships posited. The available
data are limited and mainly cross-sectional.* Factors predisposing an individual to join
a communal group cannot always be untangled from post-communal resocialization influences.' We can, however, draw upon our respondents' retrospective reports as well
'This is not to say that young persons in the late 1960s were uncertain only about gender roles and relations.
Because of the "baseline" nature of gender identities and roles, confusion at this level will have many complications for understanding and responding to many social issues. For example, unquestioningly embracing the
traditional male role emphasis on toughness and daring-do provides some direction to a young man encouraged to experiment with potentially dangerous drugs. Not being sure that men have to be tough makes responding to the offer more complicated.
Ît is important to note that members of secular communes were not irreligious. Two-thirds (68%) of the
individuals in nonreligious groups said they had religious or spiritual beliefs that were important to them. In
many nonreligious groups, including those with a specifically political focus, a greater proportion of the membership described religion or spirituality as "highly important" than answered correspondingly with regard to
politics. However, individuals in households affiliated with hippie, new left, and other secular movements of
the late 60s era were not prone to affiliation with churches or organized religious movements (Aidala, 1979,
1983).
*A total of 950 individuals participated in the research during 1974-76 as members or ex-members of 60
communal groups. However not all individuals took part in all aspects of data collection. Personal background
data was obtained from 78% (N = 737) of possible respondents and approximately half of these have participated in detailed autobiographical interviews. Attitude data were obtained from 65% and self-perception data
from 70%. The personal values instrument was administered to the membership of 25 communes; response
rate was 77% of those surveyed (N = 174). Because of the use of multiple instruments with differing response
rates, data tables represent slightly different case bases. The number of cases with data sufficiently complete
for multivariate analyses is unfortunately limited. However for the analyses presented here, there are no significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents on basic demographic characteristics nor do
they differ by ideological type of commune.
'Several possible predisposing factors can be dismissed as alternative explanations for patterns observed in
the data. Personal interest in religion or spirituality is insufficient explanation for joining a sectarian religious
group. As stated above, individuals in communes affiliated with religious movements were not the only mem-
299
as the findings of other researchers to corroborate tentative conclusions drawn from

cross-commune comparisons. If the hypothesized relationship holds between gender role
"crisis" and joining a doctrinaire religious movement, we would expect members of religious communes to evince greater ambivalence and uncertainty regarding changing sex
and gender roles than their secular counterparts. Life stage indicators, diversity of sexual experience, personal gender ideals, and attitudes toward work and family roles will
be examined for evidence of conflicts and confusions experienced by those who joined
religious and nonreligious groups. Standardized scales will measure tolerance of ambiguity and other intrapersonal attributes.
Social Demographics
The social demographics of commune members supports the thesis that stage in the
life course and uncertainty concerning gender roles influences participation in communitarian movements. While not exclusively a phenomenon of youth, communal groups
had greatest appeal to those making the transition to adulthood (Zablocki, 1980).
Eighty-three percent of commune members were between the ages of 20 and 29; over
90% had joined their group before their thirtieth birthday. Family and employment
characteristics give some indication that traditional role choices were not automatic for
movement participants. The great majority of commune members (80%) had never been
married compared to 49% of others in their cohort. Male commune members were
much less likely to be working full-time (61%) than other young men their age (34%).
Participants in religious groups were more likely to be under 30 years of age and less
likely to be employed fulltime or to ever have been married than their secular counterparts.
Diversity of Sexual Experience
Patterns of pre-communal experimentation with diverse sexual behaviors can be taken

as an indicator of estrangement from institutionalized patterns. Individuals who joined
religious communal groups are hypothesized to have experienced greater uncertainty regarding traditional sexual mores than their secular counterparts; members of nonreligious groups are expected to have more completely rejected conventional patterns. Thus
low rates of precommunal involvement in nonconventional sexual behaviors which represent a self-conscious alternative to conventional monogamous sexual commitment (eg.
open marriage) are expected among those who joined sexually restrictive religious
groups. On the other hand, members of psycho-spiritual groups are expected to manifest
bers of the sample who were personally religious. Further, personal interest in religion in many instances developed after joining a commune with a religious ideology. One may dismiss primary socialization into similiar
religious group. For the great majority of cases, joining a spiritually focused communal group represented a
sharp change from prior affiliation. Only 10% of the sample remained identified with the religion of their upbringing. (Those who switched among mainline protestant denominations are not counted as changing religion.) One might expect that most young persons raised in conservative religious traditions are confused and
uncertain about sexuality and gender roles. However, less than 10% of the sample came were raised in religiously conservative families and these individuals were distributed among the different types of communal
households. Conservative family religious tradition is not associated with joining a sexually restrictive communal group. The final possible confounding factor is loneliness or the desire for close interpersonal relationships.
Affiliative needs were present among those embracing secular as well as religious ideologies; secular as well
as religious groups offered friendship and community to participants.
300
TABLE 4
AGE, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNE MEMBERS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION AGE 2O-2Q
Commune Members
20-2') years
Marital Status
Single, Never Married:
U.S.
20-29ycan
80%[(,i2]^
Parental Status
Has Not Had Children
84%[6i2)
Employment Statt<5
Not Working Full-Time

Males Only
^1%[322]
Females Only
70%[280]
1974 General Social Survey

Kumbers in brackets are case bases for percentages shown
relatively high rates of precommunal sexual experience. The ideological center-piece for
most psycho-spiritual groups was an elaborate set of explanations and justifications for
refusing "taboo-ridden," middleclass sexuality. Thus, rather than providing a haven for
those uncomfortable under pressures for freer sexuality, psycho-spiritual groups might
appeal to those attracted to sexual exploration but lacking a secure rationale for explaining "deviant" behaviors to self and others (cf. Stone, 1976).
Table 5 presents the proportions of men and women in different types of communal
movements who engaged in a variety of sexual experiences before joining their communal household. There are some interesting differences both between those who join
religious versus nonreligious groups, and among the three types of religious communes.
The lowest rate of involvement with nonconventional sexuality was among those who
joined Christian communes; more members of secular communes had precommunal experience with nonconventional sexual behaviors than members of Christian communes.
However, for many behaviors, the differences between secular communalists and those
who joined Eastern religious groups were slight. Members of psycho-spiritual communes
had, as predicted, relatively high rates of pre-communal sexual experimentation. Psychospiritualists had the highest rates of involvement with all types of sexual activity and
arrangement, including voluntary celibacy and monogamous marriage.
Comparison of the numbers of persons who have ever had different sexual experiences does not show sharp differences along the religious/nonreligious dimension; these
rates, however, do not reveal the intentionality nor the emotional significance of sexual
experimentation. The major change with regard to sexuality during the 1960s was not
a sharp increase in the prevalence of those experiencing sex outside of marriage, but
rather changes in the perceived legitimacy and comfortableness with a greater variety
of sexual involvements (Reiss, 1966). Biographical interviews show individuals in religious communes were more likely to have experienced a period of uncertainty and confusion about sexuality preceding commune membership than participants in secular
movements. Many descriptions of the year prior to joining a religious group refer to
problems coming to terms with sexuality:
301
TABLE 5
PRE-COMMUNAL SEXUAL EXPERIENCE BY SEX
BY TYPE OF COMMUNE JOINED
Type of Commune
Neif Christian
Eastern Religious
males
females
Psycho-Spiritual
males
females
hlon-Religious
females
males
males
females
Public or Group Nudity
25%
11%
44%
25%
74%
73%
51%
46%
Sexual Relations With

More Than One Person
At The Same Time
6%
6%
24%
17%
32%
42%
23%
27%
Homosexual Relations
9%
4%
13%
4%
39%
15%
18%
14%
Open Marriage^
15%
21%
13%
27%
20%
17%
Group Marriage
3%
2%
8o
4%
1%
Celibacy^
22%
17%
26%
25%
50%
54%
21%
24%
Monogamous Marriage
31%
19%
<1%
13%
37%
40%
30%
2M%
[32]
[47]
[SO]
[48]
[38]
[20]
[102)
[93]
Proportion of commune
members u/ho engaged in
behavior before joining
communal group:
N=
p marriage refers to a marriage agreement with no vows of sexual exclusivity.

^Celibacy refers to a deliberate commitment to abstain from sexual relations.
1 had a girlfriend. I pretty much always had a girlfriend who was like my best friend since I
first went steady in my sophomore year in high school. But the relationships weren't sexual.
. . . No I didn't have a great deal of anxieties about sexual stuff. It got to be a problem though
that I was still a virgin at 21. It was Columbia and the sixties and everything.
I just went out and did it. I met a boy at a party and he seemed really nice and I thought
it would be nice to have a boyfriend. . . . We had sex together. I felt really terrible and didn't
want to see him again. He kept calling me up but I knew that that just wasn't how 1 was.
Individuals in nonreligious groups were much less likely to report precommunal sexual
confusions and more likely to have firmly rejected traditional norms regarding sexual
behaviors and relationships. Many looked to communal life as a means of facilitating
expanded sexual horizons.'
The reason [my husband] wanted to start the commune was he and I had talked a long time
about finding another person to live with us somebody we could have an intense relationship
with. I can see where a straight heterosexual relationship could really get to the down side,
at least with me.
Other researchers have found a similar pattern of ambivalence and uncertainty about
changing sexual mores among young persons who became involved in religious and
'"Despite a variety of ideological commitments to the contrary, actual sexual behavior in communal groups
was for the most part very conventional (Zablocki and Aidala, 1980; d. Berger, 1982). The rates of experimentation with nonconventional sexuality tended to go down upon joining a communal group, regardless of collective interest in sexual exploration (Zablocki, 1980:114fO-
302
psycho-spiritual communal groups (see e.g.: Daner, 1976; Downton, 1979; Mintz, 1973;
Simmonds, et al., 1976).
For aspects of gender roles other than sexual behavior, members of the various types
of religious commune show more similarities than differences among them. Thus participants in psycho-spiritual, Christian and Eastern religious groups will be considered together in the analyses that follow.
Personal Values and Self-Perception
Society defines masculine and feminine characterological ideals. Males are supposed
to be ambitious, capable, independent, logical, etc. while women are expected to be loving and nurturing. The extent to which commune members personally attach importance to these value preferences, and the extent to which they choose "male" or "female"
attributes to describe themselves, can be used as measures of estrangement from traditional gender identities and roles.
This topic was approached with the Rokeach (1973) value ranking instrument in
which respondents were instructed to rank a list of eighteen value phrases in order of
the importance they attached to each as "ideal principles of conduct." Ambitious, capable, and independent were selected to represent traditionally masculine ideals; loving, forgiving and helpful represented standard feminine virtues. Table 6 presents the rankings
of these values by men and women in religious and nonreligious communes. The rankings of a general sample of American youth (NORC, 1971) are presented for comparison.
TABLE 6
PERSONAL VALUES OF U.S. YOUTH AND COMMUNE MEMBERS
BY SEX AND TYPE OF COMMUNE^
Men in Communal Groups'^
Women in Communal Groups
U.S. Men
Religious Non-Religious U.S. Women
Religious Non-Religious
Age 20-29^ Communes
Communes
Age 20-29
Communes
Communes
Traditional Masadine
Ideals
ambitious
independent
capable
6.6 ( 3)
8.0 ( 6)
9.1 ( 8)
16.8 (18)
11.8 (12)
9.4 ( 9)
15.3 (15)
8.3 ( 7)***
5.1 ( 3)**
8.4 ( 7)
10.1 (11)
11.3(13)
16.7 (18)
13.2 (13)
9.8 (10)
13.4 (13)*
6.5 ( 7)***
6.0 ( 4)***
Traditional Feminine
Ideals
loving
forgiving
helpful
N=
Q.5 (10)
9.0 ( 7)
10.1 (11)
[135]
3.2 ( 1)
7.5 ( 0)
6.4 ( 4)
[53]
4.3 ( 1)
9.1 ( 9)
8.7 ( 8)
[49]
5.3 ( 2)
6.3 ( 3)
7.9 ( 6)
[177]
1.9 ( 1)
5.7 ( 3)
7.0 ( 5)
[33]
2.7 ( 2)
10.9 (12)***
8.0 ( 9)
[35]
Êighteen values were rank-ordered by each respondent; 1 indicated the most important personal ideal and
18 the least important. Numbers shown are median rankings and composite rank order for each subpopulation.
DNORC 1971 General Social Survey
'^Statistical significance for commune-type differences determined by Kruskal-Wallis analysis:
.05
.01
**
.001
***
303
I had expected greatest support for traditional gender role ideals among participants
in religious groups. This was the case for women only. Women in religious communes
gave high rankings to being loving, forgiving and helpful, and low ranks to achievement-related values. Men in religious movements had the same pattern o{ value preferences which makes them very nontraditional considering the heavy cultural emphasis on
independence and achievement as desired attributes for males. The value choices of men
and women in secular communal groups show rejection of at least some aspects of traditional polarized gender roles. Both men and women in nonreligious communes placed
being loving at the top of their value lists; women as well as men endorsed being independent and capable as important personal ideals.
One of course cannot be certain of the extent to which personal values of commune
members indicate predispositional factors. Adoption of a collective ideology and group
participation influences individual value preferences (Aidala, 1979). However analysis
of synthetic cohorts, comparing just-joined members with those who had participated
in the group for two years or more, found no significant differences in the ranking of
the six values chosen for analysis. Thus it seems unlikely that differences shown in Table
6 are solely the result of resocialization influences.
Further, the same general pattern appeared in self-perception data. Commune members were asked to select which if any of a list of attributes best described them and
which least described them. Men as well as women in religious groups chose traditionally feminine virtures (loving, supportive, intuitive, etc.) to characterized themselves.
Men and especially women in secular communal households showed a blurring of gender-based distinctions in self-descriptions which included traits and interests traditionally associated with the opposite sex. (Table 7)
Gender role crisis refers to anomic floundering without adequate guides for ordering
experience as a male or female member of society. Estrangement from dominant cultural
patterns does not necessarily indicate a lack of direction for self-identity and social action, for it is clearly possible to be governed by norms other than those upheld by the
broader society in which one lives. Likewise, an individual may embrace conventional
values yet still experience "normlessness" as a result of conflicting role demands or other
structurally induced contradictions (Merton, 1976). It is important to determine not
only whether respondents accepted or rejected traditional role concepts but also the extent to which personal insecurities and ambiguities accompanied the traditional or nontraditional orientation. A central issue is whether values and self-perceptions were
translated into clear choices regarding family and work roles the institutional arenas
defined by the dominant culture as the special provinces of adult women and men.
Attitudes Toward Work and the Family
The analysis of attitudes of commune members toward work and family life supports
the hypothesis that the new religions exert a special appeal to those uncertain about
traditional gender identities and roles rather than rejecting them outright. Zablocki and
Aidala (1980:192) found that attitudes of commune members were characterized by a
high proportion of "no opinion" and "don't know" responses. This lack of choice specificity was not evenly distributed across all questions, but was most associated with the
304
TABLE 7
SELF PERCEPTION OF WOMEN AND MEN IN
RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
Traits chosen by 30% or more of each sub-population 05 "Most Applies to Me" or "Least Applies to Me"
Wen m Religious Croups
Men in Non-Religious Groups
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Supportive
Loving
Intuitive
Influential
Interested in Fixing up the House
42%
41%
39%
38%
35%
Women m Religious Croups
1.
2.
3.
4.
Loving
Supportive
Interested in Children
Good at Helping to Resolve
Emotional Problems
5. Interested in Fixing up the House
6. Intuiti\c
7. Not Dominant
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Sexy
Decisive
Influential
Not Dependent
Supportive
Strong
Not Passive
Loving
53%
45%
44%
43%
41%
39%
39%
37%
37%
33%
Vômen in Non-Religious Croups
57%
55%
48%
40%
44%
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
30%
36%
7.
8.
'^.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Supportive
Loving
Strong
Not Passive
Good at Helping Resolve
Emotional Problems
Intuitive
Sexy
Not Dependent
Not Dominant
Not Narcissistic
Decisive
62%
61%
59%
54%
53%
53%
4^%
47%
45%
45%
34%
34%
33%
Note: Respondents are considered perceiving themselves not to possess an attribute if they circled "least
applies to me."
social spheres of adult role involvement.** Religious communalists manifest this tendency in the extreme. For example, 44% of males and 40% of females in groups with
religious ideologies would not or could not choose between marriage and singlehood as
a preferred lifestyle. Almost 40% of male participants in religious movements and onequarter of their female commune mates indicated a lack of conviction about parenthood. Uncertainty about work and career achievement was equally striking. One-third
of the males in religious groups expressed no opinion concerning their ability to control
" 1 here are of course difficulties in interpreting "non-choice" responses in questionnaires. However, in contrast to the 3-5% no opinion/don't know answers typical for many of the standardized items used, the rates
for commune members were remarkable. In addition, non-choice responses among the communal sample were
patterned in meaningful ways. This is not to say that commune members were the only individuals among
their generational cohort who were uncertain about traditional work and family roles. What is distinctive
about attitudes of participants in communitarian movements is the comprehensiveness of both disaffection
from institutional patterns and lack of conviction concerning alternarives. For example, the attitude instrument was administered to a small control group of college students; the proportion who gave non-choice responses to the questions about work and family life presented in Table 8 reanged from 0 to 8%. See discussion
in Zablocki and Aidala (1980:191).
305
their economic fate, the advisability of commitment to a life-long occupation, and their
ability to feel proud of their work. Forty percent indicated they did not know or were
uncertain whether people who work hard reap society's benefits.
Males in secular communal groups were more likely to firmly reject the traditional
work ethic and the notion that one should commit oneself to a single occupation.
Women in nonreligious communal groups were more likely to take a definite stand for
or against marriage, parenthood, and working hard than their religious sisters. Table
8 presents items selected from a longer number of questions about family and work
roles. For each question in this series, religious communalists were two to three times
more likely than other respondents to answer "no opinion," or "don't know" or give
some other response that did not indicate a clear preference or conviction.
Again, we cannot be certain of the extent to which attitudes of commune members
indicate precommunal predispositional factors. However I have limited analysis to recent recruits, individuals who were members of their groups for six months or less. FurTABLE 8
ATTITUDES TOWARD FAMILY AND WORK ROLES^
BY SEX AND TYPE OF COMMUNE
Males
Religious
Communes
Non-Religious
Communes
Religious
Communes
Females
Non-Religious
Communes
Percent Who:
21
54
28
54
44
21***b
40
27*
B. Would rather not

have children
21
21
24
16
Has no opinion
38
14*
24
25
51
16
41
18
16*
42
57
24
16
42
57
A. Would rather be single

than married
Has no opinion
C. Feels marriage results

in giving up direction
over one's life
23
Has no opinion
D. Rejects commitment to
a single life-long
occupation
44
65
34
Has no opinion
E. Disagrees that people
who work hard reap
society's benefits
Has no opinion
N=
48
81
S*
39
9***
22
16
[61]
[43]
[50]
[37]
Ânalysis limited to those who have been members of their communal household for 6 months or less.
"Statistical significance for commune-type differences, Chi-square test:
*p = .05
**p = .01
***p = .001
306
ther, for almost every question asked, the formal ideology of religious communes offered
a specific answer. Thus responses shown are more likely something individuals brought
with them to the commune rather than the result of resocialization processes.
We can also again turn to our qualitative data sources and the findings of other researchers to corroborate inferences drawn from questionnaire responses. Biographical
interviews of participants in religious communal movements describe periods of anomic
confusion to the point of psychological crisis as they attempted to thread their way
through conflicting definitions and options regarding marriage, parenthood, work and
career achievement. Respondents who were members of religious groups typically supported marriage in principle yet often expressed uncertainty regarding their personal
commitment to married life as traditionally defined:
I'm not a woman's libber, by any means . . . even though I'm very independent I'm still a
woman and 1 desire a relationship with a man. But I have to lay that down because God's will
is best and ultimate happiness is going to come from doing His will. I'm happier now than I
ever was in my marriage.
If I marry it will be understanding that marriage is for keeps regardless of what happens. Death
is the only way to break marriage. But I don't feel obligated to marry.
I'm married to the Guru. I don't need any other kind of marriage.
Women in secular communes who speak of their pre-communal involvement with the
women's movement do so in definite and positive terms (cf. Berger, 1981; Connover,
1975; Kanter, Jaffe and Weinberger, 1975. See also Orcott, 1975).
It's hard to remember back to really pre-raised consciousness and pre-women's group. But it
really was a mind boggling experience. I mean, opening your eyes to these things that you had
never noticed about roles and who did what. . . . And seeing the world through different eyes,
you know. You start to see the exploitation of women in the media and all those things you
had never noticed before. 1 remember that as a major break in my life.
Young women who joined religious communal groups were exposed to women's rights
activism, but for many, their involvement appears to have been hesitating and qualified
(cf. Judah, 1974; Nordquist, 1978; Richardson, et. al., 1979):

There were some things about the women's movement that were not part of my ideas but I
was a little bitI was kind of headed towards being involved but there were things still that
I saw that were happeningit was like an extreme. There were some things that I thought were
very positive but then things were real extreme also that I couldn't agree with so I was kind
of on the edge.
To me when I first heard what Yogi had to say about women . . . To me it struck a bell somewhere. Just because I realized like in all the flirting little relationships that 1 had with men that
I really was looking for that security. You know I was coming from the liberationist's consciousness too not as heavy as some people maybe.
The current research as well as other studies have found that males in hippie, new
left, and other secular communes tended to reject the masculine work ethic that emphasizes competition, delayed gratification, and materialistic consumption as indicators of
success. Yet career goals, albeit often unrealistic plans for artistic production, craft manufacture, or public service employment, might be pursued with enthusiasm (cf. Berger,
307
et al. 1971; Conover, 1975; Wieder and Zimmerman, 1974).'' On the other hand, the
lives of young men who joined religiously inspired communes were more often characterized by a pattern of drift and ambiguity regarding work and career rather than rejection of traditional definitions in favor of counter cultural alternatives. The experience
of a member of Love from Above spiritual commune is representative:
I don't have a usual occupation in the sense of employment. . . . It has never occurred to me.
Of course from it seems like age one almost, people were asking me: Well what are you going
to be when you grow up?. . . Like these questions. You almost have to have an answer to them
or you don't get past that question on to other things. So you have to fill in the blanks . . .
But at some point I stopped filling in the blank even to the point of pretending that I ought
to be thinking. What do you want to do?
The same assessment has been reached by other researchers. Religious groups were
havens for young men personally unattached to the traditional male role emphasis on
occupational achievement, yet experiencing strong social pressures to achieve. Confusion and anxiety regarding work and career plans is a recurrent theme in descriptions
of life prior to group membership (Daner, 1976; Downton, 1979; Judah, 1974; Nordquist, 1978; Richardson et. al., 1979; Simmonds, 1976; Tipton, 1982).
Tolerance for Ambiguity
I have hypothesized that the absolutism of religious communal groups would be attractive to those with low tolerance for the shifting interpretations of masculinefeminine which confronted youth in the late 1960s. This was indeed the case. Using the
Budner (1962) scale of tolerance for ambiguity, the mean score for males in religious
communes was 9.68; their secular counterparts had a significantly higher score of 12.06
(F = 35.310, p < .000). Women in communal groups show the same pattern. Those in
religiously inspired households had a score of 10.63; the mean score for participants in
secular movements was 12.35 (F = 14.410, p < .000). Women in communal groups show
the same pattern. Those in religiously inspired households had a score of 10.63; the
mean score for participants in secular movements was 12.35 (F = 14.410, p < .000).
Thus it would seem that a common experience for women and especially men in religious groups was confusion and uncertainty about changing gender roles, uncertainty
made more difficult to bear due to relatively low cognitive capacity for ambiguity and
contradiction (see also Richardson, et al., 179:191).
Discriminant Analysis
In the final exploration of the thesis that sexual and gender role ambiguities and low
tolerance for such ambiguities were predisposing factors influencing participation in religious movements, these variables were entered into a discriminant analysis. Estrangement from traditional gender ideals was measured by an index which compared personal value rankings of commune members to those of a general sample of American
men and women (NORC 1971). Uncertainty about gender-based adult roles was indi'^Males in secular communal groups were more likely than their peers in religious movements to ha\ e completed college training. Over half of male members of non-religious communal groups who were employed
had professional occupations.
308
cated by a simple summary of the number of questions about the family and about work
and achievement which were answered "no opinion," "don't know," or given some other
response that did not indicate a clear conviction. Several other variables which have
been shown to influence religious participation were also added to the analysis: family
religious tradition, occupational prestige and geographical mobility; respondent's selfesteem, age, educational level, and alienation from political institutions (Argyle and
Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Roof, 1978). Table 9 presents attempts to discriminate between
males who joined communes with religious ideologies and those who became involved
in nonreligious groups; Table 10 compares female members of religious and secular
groups. Because of the relatively few cases for which we have complete data, these analyses can be considered only suggestive. Nonetheless, the high proportion of cases correctly classified by the discriminant functions would suggest the variables chosen are not
without merit in predicting involvement with the new religions.
In confirmation of my general thesis, uncertainty about gender-based adult roles successfully discriminated between participants in religious and nonreligious communal
groups. Estrangement from cultural ideals of masculinity and femininity was a predictor.
However, as the bivariate analysis showed, rejection of traditional gender role ideals was
TABLE 9
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: MALES IN RELIGIOUS GROUPS
vs. MALES IN NON-RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
X'ariable
Standardized
Discriminant
Coefficient
Mean Score Higher in:

}^ on-Religious
Religious
Communes
Communes
(N=21)
S=20)
X
1. Self-esteem
.73
2. Jewish Family Religion
.73
3. Protestant Family
Religion
.63
4. Uncertainty About
Work and Career
.56
5. Difference in Values
Compared to American
Males
.45
6. Father's Occupational
Prestige
.44
7. Tolerance of Ambiguity
.39
Canonical Correlation: .779

Cases Correctly Classified: 94%
.\'on-Discrimmating Variables:
Catholic Family Religion
Times Moved During Childhood
Respondent's Age
Respondent's Education
Political Alienation Score
Uncertainty about Marriage &L Family
X
X
SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES. AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
309
TABLE 10
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: FEMALES IN RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
vs. FEMALES IN NON-RELIGIOUS COMMUNAL GROUPS
Variable
Standardized
Discriminant
Coefficient
Mean Score Higher in

Religious
hJ on-Religious
Communes
Communes
(N=J8)
(N = 20)
I. Difference in Values
Compared to American
Females
1.03
2. Tolerance of Ambiguity
.68
3. Self-esteem
.46
4. Uncertainty About
Marriage 6t the Family
.35
Canonical Correlation: .722

Cases Correctly Classified: 86%
1ôn-Discriminating Variables:
Father's Occupational Prestige

Protestant Family Religion
Catholic Family Religion
Jewish Family Religion
Times Moved During Childhood
Respondent's Age
Respondent's Education
Political Alienation Score
Uncertainty About Work &. Career
greatest for women who joined secular communes; among male participants in communal movements, the least traditional were found in religious households. Uncertainty
about marriage and family roles distinguished women in religiously inspired households
from female adherents to nonreligious ideologies; lack of clear opinions and choices
about the nature of work and career achievement distinguished religious males from
their secular counterparts. Young men in religious communes were more likely to have
come from Jewish families*^ and their fathers' occupational prestige was lower than their
peers in nonreligious groups. One might speculate that part of the explanation for association between Jewish family background and participation in the new religions may
be that within such families, special pressures are exerted for male career performance
(McClelland, et al., 1955; McClelland, 1970). None of the family background variables
distinguished women who joined religious groups from their sisters in hippie, new left,
personal growth, and other secular communes. As predicted, controlling for other factors, participants in religious groups have lower tolerance for ambiguity than youth who
joined communes inspired by the nonreligious movements of the 1960s era. The findings on self-esteem deserve special notice. Other studies have found that members of
'^Young persons from Jewish families were underrepresented in fundamentalist Christian communes. However they were present in more liberal Christian groups and highly over-represented in Eastern Religious and
Psychospiritual households.
310
religious movements score relatively low on measures of self-esteem (Nordquist, 1978;

Richardson, et al., 1979). In the data at hand, low self-esteem appears to be associated
with religious participation for males only.'''
Summary and Conclusions
The most common theoretical explanation of the upsurge of cults and sects in recent
decades considers movement activity a response to "culture crisis." When traditional
frameworks of meaning, value, and role behavior are no longer effective for anchoring
social arrangements and providing meaning to personal experience, subcultures and social movements emerge oriented toward articulating "new" values and putting beliefs
into practice (Anthony and Robbins, 1982; Bellah, 1975, 1976; Bird, 1979; Eister, 1972,
1974; d o c k , 1976; McLoughlin, 1978; Robbins and Anthony, 1981; Tipton, 1982).
This paper has argued that we must consider age and sex/gender in our attempts to understand the impact of culture crisis in the lives of individuals, and how this might lead
to participation in religious groups. The disjuncture between old norms and new realities will be experienced most directly by youth. Because gender roles are important links
between culture and personality, as well as mechanisms for the allocation of social functions, rapid social change and cultural fragmentation will be manifest as gender role
confusion and uncertainty. Developing new scripts for masculine/feminine will be important to both religious and secular social movement efforts. Differences in ideology
and practice regarding sex and gender issues are important factors in the differential appeal o{ movements to various audiences.
Data we have examined, as well as findings from other research, are consonant with
this line of argument. Study of a sample of communal groups inspired by the range of
social movements of the late 1960s era has shown that, regardless of other (political, social, interpersonal, etc.) goals and programs, issues of sexuality and gender roles were
a matter of ideological concern. Comparing religious and nonreligious communal movements, there were less differences in substantive ideological content than might have
been expected regarding sex/gender. Libertarian sexual norms were found in spiritual
as well as secular groups. Many nonreligious communes were as unconcerned as their
religious neighbors with implementing equality for women. The most striking and consistent differences were in the systematization and comprehensiveness of gender role
ideology, and the specificity of group enforced norms for behavior, found in religious
communities. Like their nineteenth century counterparts, contemporary religious movements have offered absolute definitions, ideals, and rules regarding men, women, and
'^The self-esteem findings may be explained by the disjuncture between self-concept and social confirmation
within communal groups in the sample. As the personal values and self-perception data showed, women in
nonreligious groups tended to reject the traditional helping-serving role and saw themselves as strong, independent, decisive, etc. However, as pointed out in the discussion of gender role ideologies, relatively few secular communes had any degree of commitment to equality between the sexes and even those with nominal
interest in changing roles for women and men had individual members who disagreed with this goal. Furthermore, sociometric analysis of informal power structures and comparison of the sexual division of labor within
communes shows relatively little difference in the subordinate role of women in religious and nonreligious
groups. Similarly, males in religious communes scored low on commitment to traditionally male achievement
ideals. Nonetheless group ideology in most instance held that males should be strong, capable, responsible
for protecting and providing-consistent with traditional conceptions of male identity and role performance.
311
their relations. This it would seem is an important part of the appeal of such movements
to potential converts.
It was hypothesized that the ideological rigidity of religious groups would appeal to
those most adrift in a shifting social world neither embracing nor rejecting dominant
patterns yet having low tolerance for the ambiguity incumbent upon being caught between. There were less consistent differences than expected in the percentages of individuals in religious and nonreligious groups who had ever had nonconventional sexual
experiences. Women but not men in religious communes were more traditional than
their secular counterparts on measures of personal gender role orientation. However,
biographical interviews as well as measures of uncertainty regarding work and family
life indicate those who joined religious groups were more confused and indecisive about
traditional gender identities and norms rather than rejecting them outright. As expected, women and men in religious communal groups were characterized by low tolerance for ambiguity.
Adopting a comprehensive, externally defined worldview, being told in very specific
terms how to behave as a woman or a man, experiencing a "moratorium" from adult
responsibilities as conventionally understood, offers release from the anxiety and effort
necessarily involved in attempting to cope with the wantonness of rapid social change
(cf. Gillis, 1981; Zablocki, 1980:95fO. It seems reasonable to conclude an "elective affinity" exists between doctrine and practice regarding sex and gender found in religious
groups and the desire or need of many young persons for clear guidance in resolving
gender related ambiguities and strain.
No attempt has been made to provide a complete explanation for the existence of the
new religions; the origins of many precede the late 1960s which saw the influx of youthful converts (Ellwood, 1979). Nor is my intention to explain away spiritual needs and
longing. Religious interest in and of itself is not sufficient motive for participation in a
sectarian religious group. Religious conversion is one of a range of possible responses
to culture crisis and the need to discover or create new frameworks and identities. Those
who embrace the new religions are those who most resolutely answer "no" to the question of whether "a world which limps along on partial and shifting truths is to be preferred to one of perfect harmony" (Horowitz, 1981:167). Among the most useful truths
offered by contemporary religious movements are sex and gender certainties.
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Sodologiad Analyiis 1985.

Social Change, Gender Roles, and

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Young persons were overrepresented in both secular and religious antiinstitutional

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

conventional sexual scripts. In contrast, communes founded by religious movements

The justifications for sexuality (pleasure, procreation, higher consciousness, etc.), as

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Total and Compulsory Celibacy

Celibacy or Licensed Monogamy^

Partial Group Marriage

Shifting Sexual Norms

Non-committed Non-con\entional Sexual Relations

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Traditional Gender Roles

Traditional Gender Roles

Laissez faire Orientation to

Anti-traditional Gender Roles

Anti-traditional Gender Roles

Gender Role Norms

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Religious communalists are expected to score relatively low on measures of tolerance of

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

as the findings of other researchers to corroborate tentative conclusions drawn from

Patterns of pre-communal experimentation with diverse sexual behaviors can be taken

Has Not Had Children

Not Working Full-Time

1974 General Social Survey

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Public or Group Nudity

Sexual Relations With

p marriage refers to a marriage agreement with no vows of sexual exclusivity.

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Women m Religious Croups

V^omen in Non-Religious Croups

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

B. Would rather not

A. Would rather be single

C. Feels marriage results

(cf. Judah, 1974; Nordquist, 1978; Richardson, et. al., 1979):

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Mean Score Higher in:

2. Jewish Family Religion

Canonical Correlation: .779

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES. AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

Mean Score Higher in

Canonical Correlation: .722

Father's Occupational Prestige

religious movements score relatively low on measures of self-esteem (Nordquist, 1978;

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

SOCIAL CHANGE, GENDER ROLES, AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

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