Are Russia and America ^Converging"?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON:

Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, Viking Press, 1964.

Reviewed by Max Beloff
SPONSORED jointly by the
Russian Institute and the Institute of War and Peace Studies
of Columbia University, and
written jointly by two eminent
specialists on the Soviet Union
and the United States respectively, this ambitious and scholarly study should command a
wide audience despite the fact
thatby reason, perhaps, of the
dual authorshipits style tends
towards the ponderous. The
authors have set themselves two
tasks, neither of them easy.
They have tried to find a conceptual language that would allow meaningful comparisons between political systems as
different from each other as
those of the United States and
the Soviet Union. They have
also tried to answer the question
that has become so topical in
Mr. Beloff is Gladstone Professor of
Government and Public Administration at All Souls College, Oxford
University, and author of, among
others, The Foreign Policy of Soviet
Eussia, 1929-51, published in several volumes by Oxford University
Press, London and New York (19%71953).

recent yearsnamely, whether

something in the nature of a
"convergence" between the Soviet and American systems is
taking place; whether, that is,
the impact of increasing industrialization and its effect upon
the social order and habits of
daily life may not bring about
similar responses from the
peoples concerned, with a consequential development of nearsimilar institutions and political
styles.
Professors Brzezinski and
Huntington pursue these two
themes, with the former perhaps uppermost, first through a
series of general chapters concerned with such matters as the
role of ideas in the politics of
the two countries, the relationship in each between the individual and the political system,
the nature and development of
political elites, and the question
of the extent to which political
leaders are subject to pressures
from social groupings within
the two societies. Later chapters
examine the same range of problems through specific examples:
policy-making in the field of
agriculture; civil-military rela-

tions as exemplified in the Khrushchev-Zhukov and TrumanMacArthur affairs; dilemmas

about intervention abroad
Hungary, 1956, and the Bay of
Pigs; and finally, alliance management or mismanagement as
illustrated by the Soviet-Chinese
and American-French imbroglios.
THROUGHOUT the book the
level of discussion is high, and
there are no overt concessions to
the mentality of the Cold War.
That there should be some unconscious assumption of the
normality of American development and of the abnormality of
the Soviet experience was perhaps inevitable, and an imaginary observer from Mars
someone wholly outside the Soviet-American conflictmight
raise certain queries. Some of
the questions asked about the
two systems are such as would
come naturally only to students
basically committed to a Western democraticor even a
purely Americanapproach to
politics. Which system, the authors ask, "has a more effective

40

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

method of recruiting political dissimilarities between the two

leaders and of regularly chang- systems. On the one hand, a
ing the wielders of power?" But country in which the social has
why should regular change be priority, and in which political
regarded as a normal feature of institutions are merely the ina healthy polity? Indeed, when struments of social pressures;
we come to the discussion of the a country whose ideology is
first Cuban crisis, we find the limited to the constitutional
authors pointing out how ama- sphere, to the world of means
teur and inexperienced, as com- rather than of ends; a" country
pared with their Soviet opposite with a rather high degree of
numbers, were the group of men ideological homogeneity, but of
around President Kennedy who a spontaneous rather than a
were responsible for the ulti- forced variety. On the other
hand, a country dominated by
mate fiasco.
an ideology looking to the complete transformation of society
by the use of political power,
OR AGAIN they ask: "In for- where the political has complete
mulating policy in each system, priority over the social, a counwhat are the roles of profes- try prepared to use every kind
sional politicians, civilian bu- of coercion necessary to preserve
reaucrats, military leaders, in- ideological homogeneity, whatdustrial managers, intellectuals, ever the internal pressures.
public opinion?" Now this
In the light of this perfectly
would certainly be a perfectly
good way of beginning a com- valid analysis, the authors are
parative study of, say, the Amer- certainly right to repudiate
ican and British systems. All the either of the two crude versions
classes of persons mentioned are of the "convergence" theory:
to be found in each of the two the straightforward Marxism
systems, and in each of them of Khrushchev's "We shall bury
"public opinion" plays a recog- you!"that is to say, convernizable role through its various gence through the eventual unichannels of expression. But, in versal triumph of communism
a society so heavily politicized or the equally Marxist overas that of the Soviet Union, it is simplification which proclaims
not clear that public opinion is that the single fact of indusa meaningful concept. How trialization will bring everywould one define, analyze or thing else in its train. The aumeasure it? How are profes- thors have no difficulty in
sional politicians and civilian showing, first,, that the political
bureaucrats to be distinguished system in the Soviet Union is
from each other in a country much more than a "superstrucwhere state and party form a ture" ; and, second, that even if
single interlocking hierarchy ? greater affluence resulted from
In what useful sense can indus- increased industrialization, it
trial managers be distinguished would be "collective" affluence,
from either group? When we not the private affluence of Westcome to the actual analysis of ern consumer-oriented econothe two systems, however, the mies. But it is possible that by
authors' performance is much their choice of topics for inbetter than their promise, and vestigation they may have
only rarely do they strain to- omitted another aspect of "conwards an artificial comparison vergence"i.e., the special pressures that might bring Ameriof the basically incomparable.
can society closer to the Soviet
The authors rightly stress system without
necessarily
what is too often forgotten by transforming it entirely in that
the preachers of "convergence" direction.
namely, the basic ideological

The United States, for instance, may be becoming more

ideological; the South has produced its share of ideologists already. The authors relate that
many schools in the United
States teach courses "devoted
primarily to exposing the evils
of communism" and that "at
times this is done with a crudeness fully matching that of Soviet descriptions of the United
States." It is true that the Soviet educational system is still
far more directly political in its
aims than that of the United
States; but cnce political indoctrination begins, it is difficult to
limit its ravages. In other
words, the Cold War tends to
impose on the adversaries of
communism some of communism's own features.

FURTHERMORE, although it
is no doubt of some importance
that the United States has a
basically privately-owned economy while in the USSR the
state is the sole owner of property, some importance should
be attached to the fact that
under Cold War conditions the
US Government remains the
principal customer of an important section of industry, and
that the security of employment
in important areas depends
upon the maintenance of demand for weapons of war unless
adequate substitutes can be
found. In such circumstances,
the "military-industrial complex" which worried President
Eisenhower cannot simply be
dismissed as a figment of leftwing imagination, however farfetched the conclusions that
left-wing writers may draw
from it.
It is harder today than it was
a quarter of a century ago to see
the state as something external
to the economy and to society at
large. The authors take the conventional view of American liberal thinkers that the administration and the American
41

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Establishment" represent liberal and internationalist forces,

while Congress h more likely to
be responsive to mass movements of a less enlightened and
more fundamentalist kind. They
point out, for instance, that the
latter dissents from the "Establishment" on "key issues of Cold
War strategy, foreign aid, nuclear testing and disarmament,
civil rights, and civil liberties";
and they are at the moment obviously right to hold these
views. But not all members of
the "Establishment," and not
even all those connected with the
present administration, respond
to the external and internal
pressures of the day with equal
liberality or an equal degree of
internationalism. The contemporary challenge to traditional
American values in politics and
to traditional American political
methods would seem to a nonAmerican observer to be rather
greater than the authors allow.
IN THE concluding chapter,
Brzezinski and
Huntington
point out that the appeal of the
"convergence" theory in the
West largely springs from the
view that it is the only hope for
peace, that a greater similarity
between the two systems would
make armed conflict between
them less likely. The authors
are right to point out the hollowness of this argument; great
wars in the past have most often
been waged between countries
with very similar social and
political patterns. On the other
hand, the inhibitions against
large-scale war that have been
effective in the post-World War
II period have owed nothing to
any similarity of structure or
basic aims between Russia and
America. Each has been guided
by enlightened self-interest, and
if this continues to operate, no
more is needed.
To rely on "convergence" to
bring peace is to be more pessimistic than one need be. Inter-

national tensions and internal

political developments are indeed connected, as the authors
show in studying Khrushchev's
chequered course in the perennial competition between heavy
industry and consumer interests
for scarce resources. But in the
case of the Soviet Union, where
external goals are codetermined
by ideology, foreign policy will
not be shifted simply because
Soviet citizens demand a more
relaxed existence at home.

matter of relations with allies,

the lack of a rigid ideological
framework can help to keep dissension within bounds. France
has some grievances against the
United States which are similar
to those that China nourishes
against the Soviet Union
though there is not of course
the element of direct territorial
rivalry. But the United States
has been able to put up with
French obstruction to its policies
and with French criticism without attempting to have France
excluded from the Western
camp because no basic challenge
THE CHAPTERS devoted to to America's self-confidence or
foreign affairs are worth study- ways of thought is involved.
ing for the light they throw on De Gaulle is not trying to reinthe two countries, rather than terpret the Founding Fathers,
as signposts to a problematical and there is no Gaullist party in
future. The authors are struck Washington. The Soviet Union
by the extent to which solidity and China have allowed tactical
of doctrine as well as the con- differences of approach to spill
centration of highly-placed and over into an ideological dispute
experienced
decision-makers with immense ramifications in
upon important issues of prin- the entire Communist world.
ciple may give the Soviet Union
an advantage in some aspects
of foreign affairs, particularly
in view of its freedom from any HOW FAR this striving for idemoral inhibitions about the use ological conformity is inherent
of force.
in the Communist system itself,
The relations between the So- and how far it is reinforced by
viet Union and Eastern Europe the social background of the
do have a good deal in common Soviet ruling elite, is difficult to
with the relations between the say. The authors are influenced
United States and Latin Amer- by American sociological theory
ica. In both cases the prepond- which tends to equate doctrinal
erant power is feared, disliked, absolutism with a low position
and regarded as culturally in- on the social and educational
ferior by the lesser ones. But scale, and they find a parallel in
the Soviet Union can decide ex- Soviet experience:
actly what degree of dissidence
it will tolerate, and can move The peasant-worker origin of
rapidly, as in Hungary, if the the Soviet elite has left an immark is overstepped. In rela- print on its behavior and mores.
tion to Cuba, the United States . . . It also stimulates a marked
has never been able to establish tendency, common among the
a satisfactory criterion for in- less educated masses, to simplify
tervention-except in relation issues and reduce them to black
to nuclear missilesand its pol- and ivhite categories. To the
icy of limited harassment, itself extent that this facilitates mass
conditioned by the impact of indoctrination, it may be done
equal uncertainties about rela- consciously, but there is also
tions with other Latin American ample evidence that Stalin,
countries, has proved much less Khrushchev and others reason
in fairly simple dichotomic cateeffective, if more humane.
On the other hand, in the gories.

42

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To some extent this fact the country's lack of food and

may be relevant to another of its basic cause, the law prothe book's main conclusions. ductivity of agriculture, could
Whereas in the United States only be remedied by abandoning
the struggle for power is insti- certain "socialist" principles of
tutionalized in a form which organization and by providing
divides it from the policy-mak- peasants with incentives at ining processparty platforms dustry's expense. But this would
have little binding force and run against the regime's dearest
make little difference as to who convictions. The Americans,
winsin the Soviet Union "pol- on the other hand, face a conicy-making . . . is not nearly stant threat of glut encouraged
as distinct and identifiable as it by the subsidies given to agriis in the United States. Instead, culture; and these in turn are
it is one aspect of the struggle justified by the Jeffersonian
for power and is absorbed in it." agrarian myth which makes
Because of this fact and because special treatment of the farmer
of the importance of ideology, a paradoxical exception to the
"competition for power in the country's general commitment
Soviet Union tends to magnify to laissez-faire. By a final twist,
policy differences between the each country is helping by its
contestants; in the US it tends own policies to maintain the
status quo in the other: "The
to moderate them."
Midwestern politician or grain
exporter who wishes to sell to
BUT ONE should not overlook the Soviet Union is helping to
the fact that in both countries maintain the collective system
the grip of dogma may inhibit in Soviet agriculture. The Soviet
rationalityor if one prefers it, apparatchik urging grain pureconomic rationality may be chases from the United States is
subordinated to social prefer- helping to alleviate the dilemma
ences. In the Soviet Union, in- of American overabundance and
dustry has been consistently to perpetuate its basic causes."
The fundamental question refavored as against agriculture;

mains the position of the individual. The Soviet system has

many strong pointsthis book
will give no comfort to those
who still look for signs of its
speedy downfall; but the
strengths of the system are incompatible with any real respect
for individual rights. Even in
non-political matters the degree
of deviant misbehavior that can
be tolerated is very limited; each
departure from the norm is
viewed as a symptom of political alienation and treated accordingly. "For this reason attempts to discuss with the Soviets the common problems of
industrialized society, such as
juvenile delinquency, are unfruitful." The insulation of so
much of the Soviet public
against knowledge of the external world and its prevailing
currents of thought keeps the
mental gap from diminishing.
It is because of this mental gap
that in the end all attempts at
making comparisons except
within the narrowest limitations come up against insuperable obstacles. In these circumstances "convergence" seems as
far off as ever.

43

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bringing up the Communist Man

EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI :

An African Student in China, New York,

F. A. Praeger, 1963.
EDMUND A. KING (ED.) : Communist Education, New York,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.

Reviewed by Allen Kassof

tinental winter and the supersensitivity understandably harbored by many non-Europeans
about color, it is no wonder that
there are frequent eruptions of
discontent. One Soviet attempt
at a solution is Moscow's Lumumba (formerly Friendship)
University, established as a
separate institution for foreign
students. But the educational
benefits of attending a thirdrate institution are questionable, and the enforced separation from regular Soviet
students has led to charges by
some that Lumumba U. is really
"Apartheid U." Moreover, the
most serious sources of discontentunwelcome ideological indoctrination, suppression of voluntary student organizations,
restrictions on freedom of
speech, travel, and association
cannot be eradicated until the
Mr. Kassof is Assistant Professor Soviets are ready to drop the
of Sociology at Princeton Univer- political price-tag from what
sity (Princeton, N.J.) and author they advertise as free education.
of The Soviet Youth Program, to be
Now we have a very similar
published shortly by Harvard Uni- story from Communist China,
versity Press. His last contribution where the Soviet errors have
to these pages was "Moscow Discovers Public Opinion Polls" (May- been repeated on a grander
scale. Emmanuel John Hevi, a
June 1961).
AS THE Russians have discovered to their sorrow, wooing
students from the new nations
with a free ride at Soviet universities isn't nearly as easy as
it sounds. The angry westward
exodus of individuals and
groups charging mistreatment
at Soviet hands, and such propaganda disasters as the demonstrations by young Africans in
Red Square some months ago alleging foul play in the death of
one of their fellows, are only
the most dramatic signs of friction between the Communist
hosts and their student guests.
It is only fair to say that
foreign students anywhere are
likely to be set on edge by language problems and homesickness. If one also considers the
unaccustomed rigors of the con-

young Ghanaian, went to Peking in 1960 to study medicine.

Less than two years later, after
an unsuccessful struggle to reconcile his vision of socialism
with the miseries and humiliations that he and his fellows
suffered in Communist China,
he left (along with almost all
the other Africans) in despair
and disillusionment. An ardent
nationalist with no special
sympathy towards the West,
Hevi came away filled with profound fears about the consequences of importing the Chinese variety of socialism to his
native continent.
WHILE appreciating the need
for austere living in a developing economy, the African students found it almost impossible
to make ends meet on their
meager allowances and were
dismayed at discovering that
Chinese students were forced to
live on far less, even to the point
where many suffered from malnutrition. Chinese cant in denying the existence of the problem
was even more disturbing.

44

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED