Cases not in digest list

RP v PNB
1. WORDS AND PHRASES; "CREDIT." The term "credit" in its usual meaning is a sum credited on the
books of a company to a person who appears to be entitled to it. It presupposes a creditor-debtor
relationship, and may be said to imply ability, by reason of property or estates to make a promised payment
(In Re Ford, 14 F. 2nd 848, 849). It is the correlative debt or indebtedness, and that which is due to any
person as distinguished from that which he asks.
2. ID.; "A DEMAND DRAFT." A demand draft is a bill of exchange payable on demand (Arnd v. Aylesworth,
145 Iowa 185; Ward v. City Trust Company, 102 N.Y.S. 50; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank, 42 S.W.
2nd, 27). Considered as a bill of exchange, a draft is said to be, like the former, an open letter of request
from, and an order by, one person on another to pay a sum of money therein mentioned to a third person,
on demand or at a future time therein specified (13 Words and Phrases, 371.) As a matter of fact, the term
"draft" is often used, and is the common term, for all bills of exchange. And the words "draft" and "bill of
exchange" are used indiscriminately (Ennis v. Coshoctan National Bank, 108 S. R., 811; Hinneman v.
Rosenback, 39 N.C. 98: 100, 101; Wilson v. Buchenau, 43 Supp. 272, 275.
3. ID.; "A BILL OF EXCHANGE" A bill of exchange within the meaning of our Negotiable Instrument Law
(Act No. 2031) does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee who is not liable in
the instrument until he accepts it.
4. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT; BILL OF EXCHANGE; PRESENTMENT ESSENTIAL. With regard to drafts of
bills of exchange there is need that they be presented either for acceptance or for payment within a
reasonable time after their issuance or after their last negotiation thereof as the case may be (section 71 Act
2031). Failure to make such presentment will discharge the drawer from liability or to the extent of the loss
caused by the delay (section 186, Act 2031).
5 WORDS AND PHRASES; "CASHIERS OR MANAGERS CHECK." A bank which issued it and constitutes its
written promise to pay upon demand.
6. ID.; TELEGRAPHIC PAYMENT ORDER, NATURE OF. Being a transaction for the establishment of a
telegraphic or cable transfer the agreement to remit creates a contractual obligation and has been termed a
purchase and sale transactions (9 CJS. 368). The purchaser of a telegraphic transfer upon making payment
completes the transaction insofar as he is concerned though insofar as the remitting bank is concerned the
contract is executory until the credit is established.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines filed on September 25, 1957 before the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint for escheat of certain unclaimed bank deposits balances under the provisions of Act No. 3936
against several banks, among them the First National City Bank of New York. It is alleged that pursuant to
Section 2 of said Act defendant banks forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines a statement under oath
of their respective managing officials of all the credits and deposits held by them in favor of persons known
to be dead or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the period of 10 years or more.
Wherefore, it is prayed that said credits and deposits be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines by
ordering defendant banks to deposit them to its credit with the Treasurer of the Philippines.
In its answer the First National City Bank of New York claims that, while it admits that various savings
deposits, pre-war inactive accounts, and sundry accounts contained in its report submitted to the Treasurer
of the Philippines pursuant to Act No. 3936, totalling more than P100,000.00, which remained dormant for
10 years or more, are subject to escheat, however it has inadvertently included in said report certain items
amounting to P18,589.89 which, properly speaking, are not credits or deposits within the contemplation of
Act No. 3936. Hence, it prayed that said items be not included in the claim of plaintiff.

After hearing the court a quo rendered judgment holding that cashiers or managers checks and demand
drafts as those which defendant wants excluded from the complaint come within the purview of Act No.
3936, but not the telegraphic transfer payment orders which are of different category. Consequently, the
complaint was dismissed with regard to the latter. But, after a motion to reconsider was filed by defendant,
the court a quo changed its view and held that even said demand drafts do not come within the purview of
said Act and so amended its decision accordingly. Plaintiff has appealed.
Section 1, Act No. 3936, provides:

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"SECTION 1.Unclaimed balances within the meaning of this Act shall include credits or deposits of money,
bullion, security or other evidence of indebtedness of any kind, and interest thereon with banks, as
hereinafter defined, in favor of any person unheard from for a period of ten years or more. Such unclaimed
balances, together with the increase and proceeds thereof, shall be deposited with the Insular Treasurer to
the credit of the Government of the Philippine Islands to be used as the Philippine Legislature may direct."

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It would appear that the terms "unclaimed balances" that are subject to escheat include credits or deposits
of money, or other evidence of indebtedness of any kind, with banks, in favor of any person unheard from
for a period of 10 years or more. And as correctly stated by the trial court, the term "credit" in its usual
meaning is a sum credited on the books of a company to a person who appears to be entitled to it. It
presupposes a creditor-debtor relationship, and may be said to imply ability, by reason of property or
estates, to make a promised payment (In Re Ford, 14 F. 2d 848, 849). It is the correlative to debt or
indebtedness, and that which is due to any person, as distinguished from that which he owes (Mountain
Motor Car Co. v. Solof, 124 S.E., 824, 825; Eric v. Walsh, 61 Atl. 2d 1, 4, See also Libby v. Hopkins, 104 U.S.
303, 309; Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F. 2d, 441, 443; Barnes v. Treat, 7 Mass. 271,
274). The same is true with the term "deposits" in banks where the relationship created between the
depositor and the bank is that of creditor and debtor (Article 1980, Civil Code; Gullas v. National Bank, 62
Phil. 519; Gopoco Grocery, Et. Al. v. Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., Et Al., 65 Phil. 443).
The question that now arise are: Do demand drafts and telegraphic orders come within the meaning of the
term "credits" or "deposits" employed in the law? Can their import be considered as a sum credited on the
books of the bank to a person who appears to be entitled to it? Do they create a creditor-debtor relationship
between the drawee and the payee?
The answer to these questions require a digression on the legal meaning of said banking terminologies.
To begin with, we may say that a demand draft is a bill of exchange payable on demand (Arnd v. Aylesworth,
145 Iowa 185; Ward v. City Trust Company, 102 N.Y.S. 50; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank, 42 S.
W. 2d, 27). Considered as a bill of exchange, a draft is said to be, like the former, an open letter of request
from, and an order by, one person on another to pay a sum of money therein mentioned to a third person,
on demand or at a future time therein specified (13 Words and Phrases, 371). As a matter of fact, the term
"draft" is often used, and is the common term, for all bills of exchange. And the words "draft" and "bill of
exchange" are used indiscriminately (Ennis v. Coshoctan Nat. Bank, 108 S.E., 811, Hinnemann v.
Rosenback, 39 N.Y. 98, 100, 101; Wilson v. Buchenau, 43 Supp. 272, 275).
On the other hand, a bill of exchange within the meaning of our Negotiable Instrument Law (Act No. 2031)
does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee who is not liable on the instrument
until he accepts it. This is the clear import of Section 127. It says: "A bill of exchange of itself does not
operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereon and the
drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the same." In other words, in order that a drawee
may be liable on the draft and then become obligated to the payee it is necessary that he first accepts the
same. In fact, our law requires that with regard to drafts or bills of exchange there is need that they be
presented either for acceptance or for payment within a reasonable time after their issuance or after their
last negotiation thereof as the case may be (Section 71, Act 2031). Failure to make such presentment will
discharge the drawer from liability or to the extent of the loss caused by the delay (Section 186, Ibid.)
Since it is admitted that the demand drafts herein involved have not been presented either for acceptance or
for payment, the inevitable consequence is that the appellee bank never had any chance of accepting or
rejecting them. Verily, appellee bank never became a debtor of the payee concerned and as such the
aforesaid drafts cannot be considered as credits subject to escheat within the meaning of the law.
But a demand draft is very different from a cashiers or managers check, contrary to appellants pretense,
for it has been held that the latter is a primary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes its

written promise to pay upon demand. Thus, a cashiers check has been clearly characterized In Re Bank of
the United States, 277 N.Y.S. 96, 100, as follows:
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"A cashiers check issued by a bank, however, is not an ordinary draft. The latter is a bill of exchange
payable on demand. It is an order upon a third party purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds.
Drinkall v. Movious State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724, 57 L.R.A. 341, 95 Am. St. Rep. 693; State v. Tyler
County State Bank (Tex. Com. App.) 277 S.W. 625, 42 A.L.R. 1347. A cashiers check is of a very different
character. It is the primary obligation of the bank which issues it (Nissenbaum v. State, 38 Ga. App. 253,
143 S.E. 776) and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand (Steinmetz v. Schultz, 59 S.D. 603,
241 N.W. 734) . . ."
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The following definitions cited by appellant also confirm this view:

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"A cashiers check is a check of the banks cashier on his or another bank. It is in effect a bill of exchange
drawn by a bank on itself and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance" (10 C. J. S. 409).
"A cashiers check issued on request of a depositor is the substantial equivalent of a certified check and the
deposit represented by the checks passes to the credit of the checkholder, who is thereafter a depositor to
that amount" (Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker 70 So. 754, 756, 195 Ala. 552).
"A cashiers check, being merely a bill of exchange drawn by a bank on itself, and accepted in advance by
the act of its issuance, is not subject to countermand by the payee after indorsement, and has the same
legal effects as a certificate of deposit or a certified check" (Walker v. Sellers, 77 So. 715, 201 Ala. 189).
A demand draft is not therefore of the same category as a cashiers check which should come within the
purview of the law.
The case, however, is different with regard to a telegraphic payment order. It is said that as the transaction
is for the establishment of a telegraphic or cable transfer, the agreement to remit creates a contractual
obligation and has been termed a purchase and sale transaction (9 C.J.S. 368). The purchaser of a
telegraphic transfer upon making payment completes the transaction insofar as he is concerned, though
insofar as the remitting bank is concerned the contract is executory until the credit is established (Ibid.) .
We agree with the following comment of the Solicitor General: "This is so because the drawer bank was
already paid the value of the telegraphic transfer payment order. In the particular cases under consideration
it appears in the books of the defendant bank that the amounts represented by the telegraphic payment
orders appear in the names of the respective payees. If the latter choose to demand payment of their
telegraphic transfers at the time the same was (were) received by the defendant bank, there could be no
question that this bank would have to pay them. Now, the question is, if the payees decide to have their
money remain for sometime in the defendant bank, can the latter maintain that the ownership of said
telegraphic payment orders is now with the drawer bank? The latter was already paid the value of the
telegraphic payment orders otherwise it would not have transmitted the same to the defendant bank. Hence,
it is absurd to say that the drawer banks are still the owners of said telegraphic payment orders."
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WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby modified in the sense that the items specifically
referred to and listed under paragraph 3 of appellee banks answer representing telegraphic transfer
payment orders should be escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. No costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., took no part.

Catholic Vicar v CA
Facts: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an
application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the
Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school
dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio

Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting

ownership and title thereto since their predecessors house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar
after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land
registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots
1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then
Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.
Issue: Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes
an adverse possession on the part of the owner
Decision: No. The bailees failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor
did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the
property subject matter of commodatum.
Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.

Catholic Vicar v CA
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not a decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated a
long time ago can properly be considered res judicata by respondent Court of Appeals in the present
two cases between petitioner and two private respondents.
Petitioner questions as allegedly erroneous the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Ninth Division
of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 05148 [Civil Case No. 3607 (419)] and CA-G.R. No.
05149 [Civil Case No. 3655 (429)], both for Recovery of Possession, which affirmed the Decision of the
Honorable Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet in Civil Case No.
3607 (419) and Civil Case No. 3655 (429), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant, Catholic Vicar
Apostolic of the Mountain Province to return and surrender Lot 2 of Plan Psu-194357
to the plaintiffs. Heirs of Juan Valdez, and Lot 3 of the same Plan to the other set of
plaintiffs, the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano (Leonardo Valdez, et al.). For lack or
insufficiency of evidence, the plaintiffs' claim or damages is hereby denied. Said
defendant is ordered to pay costs. (p. 36, Rollo)
Respondent Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision, sustained the trial court's
conclusions that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, in
the two cases affirmed by the Supreme Court, touched on the ownership of lots 2 and 3 in question;

that the two lots were possessed by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents under claim
of ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951; that petitioner had been in possession of the same lots
as bailee in commodatum up to 1951, when petitioner repudiated the trust and when it applied for
registration in 1962; that petitioner had just been in possession as owner for eleven years, hence
there is no possibility of acquisitive prescription which requires 10 years possession with just title
and 30 years of possession without; that the principle of res judicata on these findings by the Court
of Appeals will bar a reopening of these questions of facts; and that those facts may no longer be
altered.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideation of the respondent appellate court's Decision in the two
aforementioned cases (CA G.R. No. CV-05418 and 05419) was denied.
The facts and background of these cases as narrated by the trail court are as follows
... The documents and records presented reveal that the whole
controversy started when the defendant Catholic Vicar Apostolic of
the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio Benguet on September 5, 1962 an application for
registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Psu-194357, situated at
Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as LRC N-91, said
Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high
school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall,
stonewalls, etc. On March 22, 1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and the
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots
Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto. After
trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its
Decision, dated November 17, 1965, confirming the registrable title of
VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez (plaintiffs in the herein Civil Case No. 3655)
and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano (plaintiffs in the herein Civil Case
No. 3607) appealed the decision of the land registration court to the
then Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 38830-R. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision, dated May 9, 1977, reversing the
decision of the land registration court and dismissing the VICAR's
application as to Lots 2 and 3, the lots claimed by the two sets of
oppositors in the land registration case (and two sets of plaintiffs in
the two cases now at bar), the first lot being presently occupied by
the convent and the second by the women's dormitory and the
sister's convent.
On May 9, 1977, the Heirs of Octaviano filed a motion for
reconsideration praying the Court of Appeals to order the registration
of Lot 3 in the names of the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano, and on May
17, 1977, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez filed their
motion for reconsideration praying that both Lots 2 and 3 be ordered
registered in the names of the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita
Valdez. On August 12,1977, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Juan Valdez on the ground

that there was "no sufficient merit to justify reconsideration one way
or the other ...," and likewise denied that of the Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano.
Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
his (its) application for registration of Lots 2 and 3, docketed as G.R.
No. L-46832, entitled 'Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain
Province vs. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano.'
From the denial by the Court of Appeals of their motion for
reconsideration the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez, on
September 8, 1977, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review, docketed as G.R. No. L-46872, entitled, Heirs of Juan Valdez
and Pacita Valdez vs. Court of Appeals, Vicar, Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano and Annable O. Valdez.
On January 13, 1978, the Supreme Court denied in a minute
resolution both petitions (of VICAR on the one hand and the Heirs of
Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez on the other) for lack of merit. Upon
the finality of both Supreme Court resolutions in G.R. No. L-46832
and G.R. No. L- 46872, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, a Motion For Execution of
Judgment praying that the Heirs of Octaviano be placed in
possession of Lot 3. The Court, presided over by Hon. Salvador J.
Valdez, on December 7, 1978, denied the motion on the ground that
the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. 38870 did not grant the
Heirs of Octaviano any affirmative relief.
On February 7, 1979, the Heirs of Octaviano filed with the Court of
Appeals a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as CAG.R. No. 08890-R, entitled Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano vs. Hon.
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Vicar. In its decision dated May 16, 1979,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the instant cases were filed. The Heirs of
Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil Case No. 3607 (419) on July 24, 1979,
for recovery of possession of Lot 3; and the Heirs of Juan Valdez filed
Civil Case No. 3655 (429) on September 24, 1979, likewise for
recovery of possession of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199-201, Orig. Rec.).
In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano
presented one (1) witness, Fructuoso Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership
of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano
(Exh. C ); his written demand (Exh. BB-4 ) to defendant Vicar for the return of the
land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000.00 per
month. On the other hand, defendant Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Benguet, Atty. Nicanor Sison, who testified that the land in question is not
covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the plaintiffs (Exh.

8). The defendant dispensed with the testimony of Mons.William Brasseur when the
plaintiffs admitted that the witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that
defendant Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for seventy-five (75) years
continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.
In Civil Case No. 3655, the parties admitting that the material facts are not in dispute,
submitted the case on the sole issue of whether or not the decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court touching on the ownership of Lot 2, which in effect
declared the plaintiffs the owners of the land constitute res judicata.
In these two cases , the plaintiffs arque that the defendant Vicar is barred from
setting up the defense of ownership and/or long and continuous possession of the
two lots in question since this is barred by prior judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 038830-R under the principle of res judicata. Plaintiffs contend that the
question of possession and ownership have already been determined by the Court of
Appeals (Exh. C, Decision, CA-G.R. No. 038830-R) and affirmed by the Supreme
Court (Exh. 1, Minute Resolution of the Supreme Court). On his part, defendant Vicar
maintains that the principle ofres judicata would not prevent them from litigating the
issues of long possession and ownership because the dispositive portion of the prior
judgment in CA-G.R. No. 038830-R merely dismissed their application for registration
and titling of lots 2 and 3. Defendant Vicar contends that only the dispositive portion
of the decision, and not its body, is the controlling pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals. 2
The alleged errors committed by respondent Court of Appeals according to petitioner are as follows:
1. ERROR IN APPLYING LAW OF THE CASE AND RES JUDICATA;
2. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT LOTS 2 AND 3 WERE ACQUIRED
BY PURCHASE BUT WITHOUT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED;
3. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS' CLAIM IT PURCHASED LOTS 2 AND 3 FROM
VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO WAS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION THAT THE FORMER OWNERS WERE
VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO;
4. ERROR IN FINDING THAT IT WAS PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO
WERE IN POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AT LEAST FROM 1906, AND NOT PETITIONER;
5. ERROR IN FINDING THAT VALDEZ AND OCTAVIANO HAD FREE PATENT APPLICATIONS
AND THE PREDECESSORS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALREADY HAD FREE PATENT
APPLICATIONS SINCE 1906;
6. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER DECLARED LOTS 2 AND 3 ONLY IN 1951 AND JUST
TITLE IS A PRIME NECESSITY UNDER ARTICLE 1134 IN RELATION TO ART. 1129 OF THE CIVIL
CODE FOR ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF 10 YEARS;
7. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R. NO.
038830 WAS AFFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT;

8. ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830 TOUCHED ON

OWNERSHIP OF LOTS 2 AND 3 AND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS WERE IN POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3 UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP
IN GOOD FAITH FROM 1906 TO 1951;
9. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF LOTS 2 AND 3
MERELY AS BAILEE BOR ROWER) IN COMMODATUM, A GRATUITOUS LOAN FOR USE;
10. ERROR IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS A POSSESSOR AND BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
WITHOUT RIGHTS OF RETENTION AND REIMBURSEMENT AND IS BARRED BY THE FINALITY
AND CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DECISION IN CA G.R. NO. 038830. 3
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner questions the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149,
when it clearly held that it was in agreement with the findings of the trial court that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 4,1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, on the question of ownership of Lots 2
and 3, declared that the said Court of Appeals Decision CA-G.R. No. 38830-R) did not positively
declare private respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared that they were not owners
of the land, but it held that the predecessors of private respondents were possessors of Lots 2 and
3, with claim of ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951. Petitioner was in possession as borrower
in commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for
taxation purposes. When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had been in
possession in concept of owner only for eleven years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession for ten years, but always with just title. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30
years. 4
On the above findings of facts supported by evidence and evaluated by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 38830-R, affirmed by this Court, We see no error in respondent appellate court's ruling that
said findings are res judicatabetween the parties. They can no longer be altered by presentation of
evidence because those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle
of res judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous determination of issues
without end.
An examination of the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 4, 1977, First Division 5 in CA-G.R. No.
38830-R, shows that it reversed the trial court's Decision 6 finding petitioner to be entitled to register the
lands in question under its ownership, on its evaluation of evidence and conclusion of facts.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for
acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years
possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. The appellate
court did not believe the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by
purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar
because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged
purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.
By the very admission of petitioner Vicar, Lots 2 and 3 were owned by Valdez and Octaviano. Both
Valdez and Octaviano had Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906. The predecessors of
private respondents, not petitioner Vicar, were in possession of the questioned lots since 1906.

There is evidence that petitioner Vicar occupied Lots 1 and 4, which are not in question, but not Lots
2 and 3, because the buildings standing thereon were only constructed after liberation in 1945.
Petitioner Vicar only declared Lots 2 and 3 for taxation purposes in 1951. The improvements oil Lots
1, 2, 3, 4 were paid for by the Bishop but said Bishop was appointed only in 1947, the church was
constructed only in 1951 and the new convent only 2 years before the trial in 1963.
When petitioner Vicar was notified of the oppositor's claims, the parish priest offered to buy the lot
from Fructuoso Valdez. Lots 2 and 3 were surveyed by request of petitioner Vicar only in 1962.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner
Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house,
but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the
bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean
adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter
of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for
taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by
way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
The Court of Appeals found that the predecessors-in-interest and private respondents were
possessors under claim of ownership in good faith from 1906; that petitioner Vicar was only a bailee
in commodatum; and that the adverse claim and repudiation of trust came only in 1951.
We find no reason to disregard or reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830R. Its findings of fact have become incontestible. This Court declined to review said decision, thereby
in effect, affirming it. It has become final and executory a long time ago.
Respondent appellate court did not commit any reversible error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, when it held that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R is
governing, under the principle of res judicata, hence the rule, in the present cases CA-G.R. No.
05148 and CA-G.R. No. 05149. The facts as supported by evidence established in that decision may
no longer be altered.
WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

People v. Puig and poras

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with
petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, praying for the reversal of the Orders dated 30 January 2006 and 9

June 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the 6th Judicial Region, Branch
68, Dumangas, Iloilo, dismissing the 112 cases of Qualified Theft filed against
respondents Teresita Puig and Romeo Porras, and denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration, in Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165.
The following are the factual antecedents:
On 7 November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office filed before
Branch 68 of the RTC in Dumangas, Iloilo, 112 cases of Qualified Theft
against respondents Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who
were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of private complainant Rural
Bank of Pototan, Inc. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 053054 to 05-3165.
The allegations in the Informations1 filed before the RTC were uniform and
pro-forma, except for the amounts, date and time of commission, to wit:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 1st day of August, 2002, in the Municipality of
Pototan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named [respondents], conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of
confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of
Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of
the management of the Bank and with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the sum of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the said bank in the aforesaid amount.
After perusing the Informations in these cases, the trial court did not find the
existence of probable cause that would have necessitated the issuance of a
warrant of arrest based on the following grounds:
(1) the element of taking without the consent of the owners was
missing on the ground that it is the depositors-clients, and not the Bank,
which filed the complaint in these cases, who are the owners of the
money allegedly taken by respondents and hence, are the real partiesin-interest; and

(2) the Informations are bereft of the phrase alleging "dependence,

guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the
offended party that would have created a high degree of
confidence between them which the respondents could have
abused."
It added that allowing the 112 cases for Qualified Theft filed against the
respondents to push through would be violative of the right of the respondents
under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Following Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the RTC dismissed the cases
on 30 January 2006 and refused to issue a warrant of arrest against Puig and
Porras.
A Motion for Reconsideration2 was filed on 17 April 2006, by the petitioner.
On 9 June 2006, an Order3 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was issued by the RTC, finding as follows:
Accordingly, the prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration should be, as
it hereby, DENIED. The Order dated January 30, 2006 STANDS in all
respects.
Petitioner went directly to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45, raising the sole legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE 112 INFORMATIONS FOR QUALIFIED
THEFT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE ELEMENT OF TAKING
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER, AND THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE.
Petitioner prays that judgment be rendered annulling and setting aside the
Orders dated 30 January 2006 and 9 June 2006 issued by the trial court, and
that it be directed to proceed with Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165.
Petitioner explains that under Article 1980 of the New Civil Code, "fixed,
savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall
be governed by the provisions concerning simple loans." Corollary thereto,
Article 1953 of the same Code provides that "a person who receives a loan of

money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is
bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality."
Thus, it posits that the depositors who place their money with the bank are
considered creditors of the bank. The bank acquires ownership of the money
deposited by its clients, making the money taken by respondents as belonging
to the bank.
Petitioner also insists that the Informations sufficiently allege all the elements
of the crime of qualified theft, citing that a perusal of the Informations will show
that they specifically allege that the respondents were the Cashier and
Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., respectively, and that they took
various amounts of money with grave abuse of confidence, and without the
knowledge and consent of the bank, to the damage and prejudice of the bank.
Parenthetically, respondents raise procedural issues. They challenge the
petition on the ground that a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 is
the wrong mode of appeal because a finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest presupposes evaluation of facts and
circumstances, which is not proper under said Rule.
Respondents further claim that the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the
Secretary of Justice, is the principal party to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, considering that the incident was indorsed by the DOJ.
We find merit in the petition.
The dismissal by the RTC of the criminal cases was allegedly due to
insufficiency of the Informations and, therefore, because of this defect, there is
no basis for the existence of probable cause which will justify the issuance of
the warrant of arrest. Petitioner assails the dismissal contending that the
Informations for Qualified Theft sufficiently state facts which constitute (a) the
qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element of
taking, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, which is the
Bank.
In determining the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest,
the RTC judge found the allegations in the Information inadequate. He ruled
that the Information failed to state facts constituting the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence and the element of taking without
the consent of the owner, since the owner of the money is not the Bank, but

the depositors therein. He also cites People v. Koc Song,4 in which this Court
held:
There must be allegation in the information and proof of a relation, by
reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance, between the
respondents and the offended party that has created a high degree of
confidence between them, which the respondents abused.
At this point, it needs stressing that the RTC Judge based his conclusion that
there was no probable cause simply on the insufficiency of the allegations in
the Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the
offense charged. This, therefore, makes the issue of sufficiency of the
allegations in the Informations the focal point of discussion.
Qualified Theft, as defined and punished under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed as follows, viz:
ART. 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Theft, as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the
physical taking of anothers property without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things. The elements of the crime under this Article are:
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful taking;
3. Personal property belonging to another;
4. Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things.

To fall under the crime of Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
On the sufficiency of the Information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions
complained of as constitutive of the offense.
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the
statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.5
The portion of the Information relevant to this discussion reads:
A]bove-named [respondents], conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being
the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the
management of the Bank x x x.

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of

a Bank who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the
confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand,
where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very
clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established
jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors has been held
to be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil
Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:
Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks
and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning
loan.
In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly
established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits
therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of
the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has consistently
considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with
grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without
particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to
make out a case of Qualified Theft. For a graphic illustration, we cite Roque v.
People,6 where the accused teller was convicted for Qualified Theft based on
this Information:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1989, in the municipality of
Floridablanca, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ASUNCION GALANG ROQUE, being then employed as teller of the
Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) with office
address at Basa Air Base, Floridablanca, Pampanga, and as such was
authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect
capital contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation,
and having collected and received in her capacity as teller of the
BABSLA the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), said
accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and

without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
the amount of P10,000.00, Philippine currency, by making it appear that
a certain depositor by the name of Antonio Salazar withdrew from his
Savings Account No. 1359, when in truth and in fact said Antonio
Salazar did not withdr[a]w the said amount of P10,000.00 to the
damage and prejudice of BABSLA in the total amount of P10,000.00,
Philippine currency.
In convicting the therein appellant, the Court held that:
[S]ince the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places
money in the tellers possession due to the confidence reposed on the
teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.7
Also in People v. Sison,8 the Branch Operations Officer was convicted of the
crime of Qualified Theft based on the Information as herein cited:
That in or about and during the period compressed between January
24, 1992 and February 13, 1992, both dates inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the
following, to wit:
Cash money amounting to P6,000,000.00 in different denominations
belonging to the PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK
(PCIBank for brevity), Luneta Branch, Manila represented by its Branch
Manager, HELEN U. FARGAS, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount of P6,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, herein accused acted with
grave abuse of confidence and unfaithfulness, he being the Branch
Operation Officer of the said complainant and as such he had free
access to the place where the said amount of money was kept.
The judgment of conviction elaborated thus:
The crime perpetuated by appellant against his employer, the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), is Qualified Theft. Appellant

could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the
position of Luneta Branch Operation Officer which gave him not only
sole access to the bank vault xxx. The management of the PCIB
reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch
Operation Officer, and it was this trust and confidence which he
exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of PCIB x x x.9
From another end, People v. Locson,10 in addition to People v. Sison,
described the nature of possession by the Bank. The money in this case was
in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the
possession of the defendant was the possession of the Bank. The Court held
therein that when the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the
money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the Bank,
there was taking as contemplated in the crime of Qualified Theft.11
Conspicuously, in all of the foregoing cases, where the Informations merely
alleged the positions of the respondents; that the crime was committed with
grave abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the Bank, without necessarily stating the phrase being assiduously
insisted upon by respondents, "of a relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship or vigilance, between the respondents and the offended
party that has created a high degree of confidence between them, which
respondents abused,"12 and without employing the word "owner" in lieu of
the "Bank" were considered to have satisfied the test of sufficiency of
allegations.
As regards the respondents who were employed as Cashier and Bookkeeper
of the Bank in this case, there is even no reason to quibble on the allegation in
the Informations that they acted with grave abuse of confidence. In fact, the
Information which alleged grave abuse of confidence by accused herein is
even more precise, as this is exactly the requirement of the law in qualifying
the crime of Theft.
In summary, the Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its
clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are entrusted with the
possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in them,
occupy positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege
all the essential elements constituting the crime of Qualified Theft.

On the theory of the defense that the DOJ is the principal party who may file
the instant petition, the ruling in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa13 is
instructive. The Court thus enunciated:
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of
dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible,
insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made
only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State
only, through the OSG. x x x.
On the alleged wrong mode of appeal by petitioner, suffice it to state that the
rule is well-settled that in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only errors of law may be raised,14 and herein petitioner certainly raised
a question of law.
As an aside, even if we go beyond the allegations of the Informations in these
cases, a closer look at the records of the preliminary investigation conducted
will show that, indeed, probable cause exists for the indictment of herein
respondents. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
shall issue a warrant of arrest only upon a finding of probable cause after
personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. Soliven v. Makasiar,15 as reiterated inAllado v.
Driokno,16 explained that probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.17 The records reasonably
indicate that the respondents may have, indeed, committed the offense
charged.
Before closing, let it be stated that while it is truly imperative upon the fiscal or
the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the respondents from the pain of
going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the respondents, conversely, it is also
equally imperative upon the judge to proceed with the case upon a showing
that there is a prima facie case against the respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated 30 January 2006 and 9 June 2006 of
the RTC dismissing Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 053165 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the corresponding Warrants of
Arrest issue against herein respondents TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO
PORRAS. The RTC Judge of Branch 68, in Dumangas, Iloilo, is directed to
proceed with the trial of Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165, inclusive,
with reasonable dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.