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Dialectics of Citizenship
Author(s): Ruth Lister
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 12, No. 4, Citizenship in Feminism: Identity, Action, and Locale (Autumn,
1997), pp. 6-26
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810731
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Dialecticsof Citizenship
RUTH LISTER
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Ruth Lister
CITIZENSHIP
AS STATUSAND PRACTICE
My startingpoint is to reformulateand bringtogether the two greathistorical traditionsof citizenship,those of liberalismand civic republicanism,in a
critical synthesis. In these traditions, citizenship is understoodas involving
respectivelyrightsand political obligation, the formerprioritizingthe individual, the latterthe interestsof the widercommunity.These elements have been
conceptualizedas citizenshipas a statusversuscitizenshipas a practice(Oldfield
1990). The broadercontemporary"dutiesdiscourse,"which emphasizesobligation more generallyand in particularpaid workobligations,is not my focus
here; but its relevance for feminist politics should be noted, particularlyin
relationto the vexing questionof the value to be placedon careas a citizenship
obligation.
Today,most rights-basedaccounts of citizenshiptake as their startingpoint
T. H. Marshall'scelebratedexposition of its three elements, which extended
the liberalformulationof civil and political rights to embracealso the social
(Marshall1950). Despite earlierskepticismtowardtraditionalformulationsof
citizenshiprightsamong some feminists and other radicals,the case has been
made for extending those formulationsto embracenew categoriesdemanded
by social movements.Two sets of rights, in particular,can be identifiedin this
context. Firstare reproductiverights,which can be seen both as an extension
of the civil-political-social rights triad and as inseparable from it. Their
importanceto women'sautonomyand democraticparticipationhas been a key
tenet of modem feminism and has now been given official recognition by
bodies such as the United Nations. Second is the right to participate in
decisionmaking in a range of spheres, reflected, in the context of welfare
institutions, in demands for user-involvement and greater democratic
accountability.
Here, a rights-basedconception of citizenship as status shades into an
emphasison citizenship as practice, closer to the civic republicantradition.
The renaissance today of this tradition, particularlyin the United States,
representsa reaction against the individualismof the previously dominant
liberalcitizenshipparadigm.The reclaimingof active, collective politics as the
essence of citizenship is pivotal to contemporarycivic republicanismand in
particularto its appropriation,suitably modified, by some feminists, most
notably MaryDietz (1987). Others,while attractedby the portrayalof citizenship as active political participation, remain critical of some of civic
republicanism'sother key tenets (Young 1989, 1990; Phillips 1991, 1993).
Potentially problematic for feminists are its demanding nature, which has
particularimplicationsfor women, disadvantagedby the gendereddivision of
time; its narrowconception of the "political"built on a generallyrigidseparation of public and private spheres; and its uncritical appeal to notions of
universality,impartiality,and the common good. Without pursuingthe arguThis content downloaded from 163.178.101.228 on Sat, 05 Sep 2015 18:38:53 UTC
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The subversionof the public-privatedivide, as it is conventionally understood, exemplifies the approachtaken in this article. From the meaning of
citizenship itself through our understandingof inclusion-exclusion and the
relationshipbetween universalismand difference to some of the theoretical
dilemmasthat have faced feminism,I have attemptedto challenge the binary
thinking that all too often forcesourconceptualand political choices into rigid
and separatecompartments.Deconstructingthe dichotomyto revealhow each
side of a binary division implies and reflects the other is one of poststructuralism's
key tools. The binarythinking that it challenges has been one
of the linchpins of Westernthought since Aristotle and Plato-in contrastto
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NOTES
1. My conceptualizationof human agency is influencedby Gould and her articulation of the actions and choices of autonomousactorsas a processof self-development:
"of concretely becoming the person one chooses to be through carryingout those
actions that expressone's purposesand needs" (1988, 47). Her conception of human
agency locates it both in a dialectical relationshipwith social structuresand as embedded in social relations.
2. The question of those whose capacity to exercise citizenship obligations and
rightsis impairedis raisedby Bulmerand Rees (1996) and Meekoshaand Dowse (1997).
3. The commission,which reportedin 1995, was chairedby the prime ministerof
Sweden and the formersecretarygeneralof the BritishCommonwealth.Itsmembership
includeda formerpresidentof the WorldBank.
4. Relevant too are attempts to reconcile the insights of post-modernismwith a
clear anti-oppressivemoralstandpointthroughthe vehicle of a theory of social justice.
See Flax (1992); Squires(1993); and Fraser(1995).
5. The Opsahl Commission, of which I was a member, was an independent
commissionon the futureof Norther Ireland.Itsreport,basedon evidence fromabout
three thousandpeople, was publishedas Pollak (1993).
6. The notion of transculturalismwas suggestedby Philomena Essedat a seminar
on citizenshipand peace, held in Cork, the Republicof Ireland,November 1995.
REFERENCES
Bacchi, Carol. 1990. Samedifference.Sydney:Allen & Unwin.
and rightsin international
Baubock,Ranier. 1994. Transnational
citizenship:Membership
Edward
Aldershot:
Elgar.
migration.
Benhabib,Seylah. 1992. Situatingtheself.Cambridge:Polity Press.
Bock, Gisela and Susan James, eds. 1992. Beyond equalityand difference.London:
Routledge.
Bulmer,Martin and Anthony M. Rees. 1996. Conclusion: Citizenship in the twentyfirst century.In Citizenshiptoday,eds. M. Bulmerand A. M. Rees. London:UCL
Press.
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