Guerring. Ideology A Definitional Analysis

FIELD ESSAY
Ideology: A Definitional Analysis

JOHN GERRING,
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
What does &dquo;ideology&dquo; mean? As a preliminary step to answering this muchasked question, I collected what seemed to be the most thoughtful and/or
influential definitions circulating within the social sciences in the postwar
decades. A quick perusal of these definitions reveals the extent to which ideology remains a highly flexible conceptual tool (see Table 1). One is struck
not only by the cumulative number of different attributes that writers find
essential, but by their more than occasional contradictions. To some, ideology
is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication;
to some it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most alienated by the status quo (e.g., revolutionary movements
and parties). To some it is based in the concrete interests of a social class,
while to others it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest.
One could continue, but the point is already apparent: not only is ideology
farflung, it also encompasses a good many definitional traits which are directly at odds with one another.
Indeed, it has become customary to begin any discussion of ideology with
some observation concerning its semantic promiscuity.2 Few concepts in the
social science lexicon have occasioned so much discussion, so much
NOTE: I would like to thank
James Schmidt, Arun
for
Taylor Dark, Marissa Golden, Chris Muste, Hanna Pitkin,

Swamy, Craig Thomas, and several anonymous reviewers
helpful comments on various versions of this manuscript.
1
Since it was not always possible to find a parsimonious statement of the writers understanding of the concept, in these cases I strung together the most important passages in
his or her discussion or paraphrased the discussion.
2
See,
e.g., Bennett (1977), Burks (1949), Converse (1964), Eagleton (1991), Goldie
(1989), Hamilton (1987), Huaco (1971), Knight (1990), Lane (1962), Larrain (1979),
Lichtheim (1967), McLellan (1986), Mullins (1972), Naess et al. (1956), Plamenatz
(1970), Putnam (1971), Roucek (1944), Sartori (1969), Seliger (1976), Shils (1967),
and Szalay and Kelly (1982).
957
Downloaded from prq.sagepub.com at East China Normal University on October 13, 2012
TABLE 1
CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS
A SAMPLING
OF
958
disagreement, and so much selfconscious discussion of the disagreement, as

&dquo;ideology.&dquo; Condemned time and again for its semantic excesses, for its bulbous unclarity, the concept of ideology remains, against all odds, a central
of social science discourse.
are we to understand this semantic confusion, and how are
we to deal with it? Five common approaches can be identified among writers
in the social sciences: operationalization, terminological reshuffling, intellectual history, etiology, and multivocality In the following section, I outline each
of these endeavors and demonstrate their limitations. I then proceed to a new
approach which comprehensively maps the meanings of ideology onto a single,
reasonably concise, semantic grid. I conclude with a brief discussion of &dquo;core&dquo;
meanings for ideology, and a plea for context-dependent methods of definition.
term
How, then,
COMMON APPROACHES
1.
Operationalization
Among those who study &dquo;behavior&dquo;
politics, discussion of
how
ideology
single empirical question:
ideological is the
mass public (compared, that is, with political elites)? There have been a good
many twists and turns in this debate since it was introduced by Campbell et
al. (1960), McClosky et al. (1960), Converse (1964), and McClosky (1964).
But the debate over the ideological proclivities of the mass public does not
seem much closer to resolution today than it did in the 1960s.3 The reason for
has centered
in American
on a
See Arian and Shamir (1983), Axelrod (1969), Bennett (1977), Cassel (1984), Conover
and Feldman (1981), Coveyou and Piereson (1977), Crewe and Searing (1988), Feldman
959
this lack of resolution has something to do with problems of data incommensurability through time and differing methods of operationalizing variables,
generally recognized.
Less often recognized are the various problems of definition inherent in the
concept of ideology. Is an &dquo;ideological&dquo; mode of thought characterized by abstraction, internal consistency, external contrast, endurance through time, rationality,
sophistication, a hierarchical ordering of idea-elements, parsimony-or some comas
bination of these characteristics? Is it separate from group affiliation and/or party

affiliation? Such questions, which merely scratch the surface of scholarly debate
among behavioralists, are &dquo;definitional&dquo; in the sense that no answer can claim a
priori precedence over another. Each definitional attribute may, of course, be
operationalized in different ways, raising a second tier of disputes.

position that definitional tasks are contained
within-and rightfully subservient to-tasks of operationalization. &dquo;It matters priIndeed,
some
writers take the
marily not what you call it, but how you measure it,&dquo; is the implicit approach of
many behavioralists. Although there is surely much to be said for a pragmatic/
empirical approach to concept definition, this has not proven an entirely successful strategy in the instant case. To the behavioral school, one must counterpose
Sartoris (1970: 1038) dictum that &dquo;concept formation stands prior to quantification.&dquo; One must, in other words, have some idea of what one is looking for before
one can find it. When concepts are defined &dquo;backwards&dquo;-by working out methods of measurement first-it may only complicate the task of social science inquiry since this encourages a rather facile approach to definition (slapping a term
onto a set of empirical findings without much consideration of the terms previous
definition, or alternative labels that might be more appropriate). In any case, there
has been little discussion of varying usages and meanings of ideology among
behavioralists, a matter this study attempts to rectify My hunch is that behavioralists
may have more to learn from a close examination of the term-including its usage
in other comers of the social science world-than from another empirical wack at
the evidence.
Terminological Reshuffling
In the face of ideologys inadequacies, some writers advocate abandoning
the term entirely, or at least severely circumscribing its use. Converse (1964),
2.
(1983; 1988), Feldman and Zaller (1992), Green (1988), Hamill et al. (1985), Inglehart
Klingemann (1979), Jacoby (1986), Klingemann (1979), Knight (1985), Kritzer
(1978), Luskin (1987, 1993), Nelson (1977), Neuman (1981), Peffley and Hurwitz
(1985), Searing (1978), Smith (1980), Sullivan et al. (1978), Szalay and Kelly (1982),
Szalay et al. (1972).
and
960
for
example, eschews ideology for &dquo;belief-system&dquo; (see also Naess et al. 1956:
171). Others have fled from ideology to worldview, attitude, symbol, myth,
value, philosophy, rhetoric, culture, and various combinations of these core
terms (often qualified by &dquo;system&dquo; or &dquo;political&dquo;). However, attempts to banish
this semantic troublemaker in favor of other, presumably more manageable,
alternatives have met with only partial success. (Witness: the continuance of
&dquo;ideology&dquo; in social science discourse.) How, then, might we explain the failure to legislate a satisfactory alternative to ideology when writers are virtually
unanimous in
declaiming its ambiguities?
First, many of these neologisms fail
to capture the political connotations

of ideology. One may, of course, rectify this problem by specifying &dquo;political
worldview&dquo; (&dquo;political belief,&dquo; &dquo;political sophistication,&dquo; and so forth) but this
results in an awkward compound noun. Second, these alternative terms tend
to miss the sense in which ideology groups together a large number of idea-
single, reasonably coherent, package. &dquo;Belief,&dquo; &dquo;myth,&dquo; &dquo;value,&dquo; &dquo;atare too small to replace ideology in most contexts in
which that term has been applied. Here one may add the qualifier &dquo;system&dquo;
(belief-system, symbol-system, et al.), but this leaves one with another rather
unwieldy verbal instrument. Ideologys endurance, one may surmise, is at
least partially derived from its admirable compactness. Third, simply replacing ideology with some neologism is not likely, by itself, to resolve the
conceptual muddle into which the concept has fallen. As Cobb (1973:
124) and Seliktar (1986: 325) ruefully observe, belief-system seems to
have accrued the same overlapping and incoherent meanings that its adopunits in
titude,&dquo; and &dquo;symbol&dquo;
avoid.
has
several centuries of established usage behind it.
Finally, ideology
Whatever one might think about the utility of the term, it is firmly entrenched
within lay and scholarly discourse. (One, rather crude, estimation of the continued significance of this concept in the social sciences can be gleaned from
the Social Sciences Citation Index. In 1992, the Index listed roughly 800 citations under the subject-headings &dquo;ideological,&dquo; &dquo;ideologies,&dquo; and &dquo;ideology&dquo;)
Concepts derive their force partly from inertia. Once established within the
tion
was
intended
to
language, it is virtually impossible to dislodge an existing term.

It may well be that ideologys meanings have been stretched too far-that
it has colonized the regions occupied by near-synonyms and has, in this sense,
muddied the semantic field. One might reasonably propose to pare down the
definitional associations of this octopoid term (as recommended below). However, it does not seem practical to propose its abolition. Whether because of its
parsimony, its long-established position in popular and academic discourse,
deemed useful-and not
sufficiently conveyed by neighboring concepts-ideology remains a fixture in
or
because of some
set
of associated traits which
are
961
the work of political scientists, social

sociologists, and historians.
psychologists, political anthropologists,
3. Intellectual
history
A third approach, which I shall label intellectual history, takes matters of
definition more seriously but does not move us closer to a usable definition of
the concept. Surprisingly, the concept of ideology has been turned up under
virtually every academic stone. Machiavelli, Bacon, Locke, Condillac, Comte,
Feuerbach, Hegel, Pareto, Sorel, Durkheim, Lukacs, Gramsci, Weber,
Mannheim, Kuhn, Freud (and later psychoanalytically oriented theorists like
Lacan), Marx, the Frankfurt School, and a whole range of neo- or
post-marxists (e.g., Castoriadis, Lefort, Habermas), structuralists (e.g., LeviStrauss, Kristeva, Barthes), and poststructuralists (e.g., Bourdieu, and the Tel
Quel crew) have been incorporated as touchstones in the ongoing debate over
what ideology means. Virtually all social theorists, linguists, and political
Ricoeur and
philosophers worth their salt now have a &dquo;concept of ideology,&dquo; which

surely
qualifies it as one of the most versatile concepts in political theory.44
Yet, it is important to note that ideology was not a key term in the work of
most of these theorists. Gramsci, his interpreters freely admit, &dquo;rarely uses the
term ideology itself, but rather a range of terms [&dquo;philosophies,&dquo; &dquo;conceptions
of the world,&dquo; &dquo;systems of thought,&dquo; &dquo;forms of consciousness&dquo;] that serve, more
or less, as equivalents&dquo; (Hall et al. 1977: 46). Weber, according to McLellan
(1986: 35), &dquo;very rarely mentioned the word ideology.&dquo; Pareto spoke of
&dquo;derivation,&dquo; Sorel of &dquo;political myth,&dquo; Lukacs of &dquo;class consciousness&dquo;
(Plamenatz 1970: 24-27), and Castoriadis of the &dquo;social imaginary&dquo;
(Thompson 1984: 17). It may be appropriate to broaden the concept of ideolinclude these near-synonyms, but it should be understood that in doing the writer is conflating the meaning of two (or more) terms. We are
well-advised to bring an attitude of suspicion toward such acts of terminoogy
to
so
logical legerdemain.
Moreover, in cases where ideology is a
employed in an equivocal
frequent referent the term is often

Ideology, one writer re-
fashion. In Marxs German
See Adams (1989), Althusser (1971), Bergmann (1951), Birnbaum (1960), Carlsnaes
(1981), Cox (1969), Cunningham (1973), Dittberner (1979), Eagleton (1991), Elster
(1982), Goldie (1989), Hall et al. (1977), Halle (1972), Hirst (1979), Huaco (1971),
Keohane (1976), Laclau (1977), Larrain (1979, 1983), Lichtheim (1967), Manning
(1980), Manning and Robinson (1985), McLellan (1986), Partridge (1961), Plamenatz
(1970), Ritsert (1990), Roucek (1944), Seliger (1976; 1977), Therborn (1980), Thompson (1984), and Williams (1988).
962
ports, Ideologie &dquo;is used about 50 times, but no normative, descriptive or real
definition is given. Most of the occurrences are such that little can be inferred
with a high degree of certainty as to which connotations were intended by the
author, if any&dquo; (Naess et al. 1956: 154; see also McLellan 1986: 10). Mannheim
(1960), for his part, used ideology in at least two, very different, ways. Thus,
although one can certainly locate &dquo;traditions&dquo; of usage-marxist, weberian,
structuralist, and so forth-the identification of intellectual traditions blurs
semantic distinctions within each tradition and within individual works. It
may be useful to explore such semantic tensions within the work of a p
lar writer or group of writers; however, such attention to detail, while admirable, is not likely to lead to a comprehensive or usably-concise definition of
the concept.
4.
Etiology
A fourth
approach to defining ideology is explanatory. How do ideologies originate, what shapes and sustains them, and what influences their
transformation? These closely related questions have provided an intriguing and enduring puzzle for social scientists. The origins of the modern
phenomenon called ideology have been located in the English Revolution
(Walzer 1969), the French Revolution (Bendix 1964; Laponce 1981;
Mullins 1972: 504; Rejai 1991), and in a long chain of interconnected
developments, including the displacement of &dquo;traditional&dquo; modes of
thought, the rise of nation-states, the invention of mass communications
media (printing presses, mass circulation newspapers), the installation of
democratic regimes and the collapse of the elite monopoly on political
power (Bendix 1964; Geertz 1964/1973: 220-21; Loewenstein 1969: 344).
Ideological thinking has been explained by basic cognitive features of the
human psyche,5 patterns of childrearing,6 a developmental model of
The gist of Laponces wideranging work is to be found in the proposition that "The
association of power and sacredness with right rather than left-first by religious then
by political thought-is rooted in the universal dominance of the right hand" (1981:
11). The more usual assumption vis-à-vis the psychological fractions of ideology is that
such constellations of ideas and values are outgrowths of a basic psychological need to
explain the world and each individuals place within it (e.g., Minar 1961: 322).
Merelman (1969: 762) argues: "the frustrations and anxieties which inadequate child
rearing methods produce may inhibit the identification process and prevent the growth
of cognitive and evaluational skills sufficient for the development of political ideology.
Furthermore, the imposition of excessive physical punishment and frustration on normally ideological people may induce a regression to less ideological conceptual frameworks."
963
political cognition, social strain, cultural strain (Bluhm
1974:
14), personality
al. 1950; Tetlock 1983), irrational features of the cultural

situations
of
crisis (Shils 1967: 69), premodern cleavages (Lipset and
landscape,9
Rokkan 1967), the absence of economic development, particular organizational
structures (Bames 1966), types of electoral systems, levels of political mobilization and communications technologies (Loewenstein 1969: 343; Nettl 1967), group
interests, constituencies (the rank-and-file of an ideological grouping), an intelligentsia, critical historical events, and ideologies themselves.o
Each of these causal arguments offers a slightly different perspective on
how the concept of ideology should be defined. (Indeed, so varied are the
answers to this question that any attempt to survey the field is, at best,
only
suggestive.) Thus, none lead to a satisfactory general definition of the concept-one serviceable, that is, beyond the confines of a single theory. Consequently, theories of ideology are probably best considered as fodder for
empirical investigation, not as a method of definition.
structures
5.
(Adomo
et
Multivocality
If each attempt at defining ideology seems problematic, why not simply withdraw from the Sisyphean task of legislating a &dquo;good&dquo; definition and instead accept
the multivalent and mutually contradictory senses which now inhabit the term?
Unfortunately, taking a laissez-faire attitude toward this definitional problem neither resolves the conceptual muddle nor relieves us of the task of definition. What
it says, in effect, is that the practitioner is on his/her own.
Moreover, those writers who advocate letting a thousand definitions bloom
generally end up distinguishing adequate from inadequate definitional properties of this charged term. Eagleton (1991: 1), for example, defines his task
as one of assessing &dquo;what is valuable or can be discarded&dquo; in the etymological
history of the concept. One wonders what differentiates this strategy from
7
Rosenberg (1988) views ideology as the product of one of three successive forms of
political thinking—"sequential," "linear," and "systematic"-each of which conditions
how the political realm is understood by the individual.
8
See Geertz (1964/1973) for
review of this genre, which is rooted in the work of

See also Johnson (1968) and White (1961).
Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons.

9
Loewenstein (1969: 335) declares: "the main well-spring of ideologies is the irrational,
supplied by religious beliefs; superstitions; the impact of the supernatural, mythologies ; legends, folklore; and, in general, symbolizations and manifestations of national
traditions and environmental conditions."
10
The basic values (e.g., equality, individualism) or systems of thought (e.g., liberalism,
communism) of an ideology are often endowed with causal significance. An ideology
appears, and endures in large part because of its own persuasiveness.
964
that which might normally be pursued. Eagleton apparently intends to leave

with several acceptable usages (which he admits are often mutually contradictory), rather than one &dquo;Grand Global Theory,&dquo; as he puts it (1991: 7). But
this more relaxed definitional standard leaves Eagleton facing the same essential problem facing every writer on the subject: which properties of ideology
are to be considered invaluable, which dispensable, and why?
It may not be possible, even were one so inclined, to avoid meddling with
the definitional properties of ideology. Studies on this subject, as on any subject, must participate in the ongoing interpretive Da<dc over what the key
terms mean. Any work on ideology, if successful, alters our understandings of
ideology. (This might be called the Heisenberg principle of concept formation.) Thus, it is fatuous for a writer to insist that he or she has no definitional
preferences, even if those preferences are understood to apply only for a single
purpose or within a single context.
us
6. A New Approach to
an
Old
Topic
foregoing arguments can be briefly restated. First, recurring disputes

ideology stem not merely from disagreement over method and measurement
but also from disagreement over what ideology is, which is to say, over matters of
definition. Problems of definition have not been resolved by resort to new terminology, to &dquo;history,&dquo; or to the causes of ideology; nor can such problems be avoided
simply by embracing the plenitude of definitional traits now inhabiting the term.
If we must, therefore, define ideology, how might we best carry out this
difficult task? As it is, some writers spend a good deal of time and effort canvassing the-now lengthy-list of works dealing with ideology in order to find
that definition which is most appropriate to the work at hand. Doing a thorough job of this would be a Herculean effort. Most writers, one imagines, read
Converse (1964), Geertz (1964/1973), or Lichtheim (1967)-depending on
their methodological and ideological proclivities-and a few additional pieces,
leaving the matter go at that. Definitions are commonly lifted from one of
these works, or constructed de novo, presumably without much knowledge of
the concepts various employments. Surely, this is not a healthy state of affairs.
It is neither time-efficient nor productive of scholarly exchange (since people
are often talking of very different things when they invoke the term &dquo;ideology&dquo;).
What I propose is not another best-definition. This ploy has been tried
many times&dquo; and with very little success, as the continued proliferation of
meanings attests. Rather, I shall set forth two general arguments that should
The
over
11
See, e.g., Converse (1964), Hamilton (1987), Huaco (1971), Mannheim (1960), Sartori
(1969), Seliger (1976).
965
delimit the process of concept formation with respect to this critical

following section I shall set out, in a reasonably comprehensive
fashion, all definitional attributes commonly associated with &dquo;ideology&dquo; within
contemporary social science work. In this way, writers can quickly and easily
survey the field of semantic possibilities, choosing those attributes which best
suit their individual purposes. Second, I shall argue that all definitions must
contain-though they need not be limited to-a set of &dquo;core&dquo; attributes (attributes common to all but the most idiosyncratic work on ideology).
With a core definition to stand upon, and a range of options to choose
from (large, but not unlimited), writers should be able arrive at a definition
that will advance their theoretical and empirical claims without digging through
a mass of published work &dquo;on ideology&dquo; and without unnecessarily muddying
the semantic field. To be sure, writers will still be talking about somewhat
different things when they employ the I-word. However, this multivocality
would be limited to a range of established options (discouraging completely
idiosyncratic uses of the term), and rooted in the core attributes of the concept. This extensive survey of the field, if successful, will not only provide a
conceptual toolkit for those in need of &dquo;a definition of ideology&dquo; but also a
way of understanding, and adjudicating between, that immense and diverse
set of studies which now rely on this travel-weary term.
serve to
term.
In the
A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK
The following framework contains all attributes regularly associated with

&dquo;ideology&dquo; in contemporary social science discourse, arranged in logically related parts (see Table 2). Idiosyncratic usages are ignored.l2 Since there has
been so much work devoted explicitly to the meaning of this concept, I draw
primarily upon these more selfconscious endeavors, rather than upon works
which merely employ the term (defining it summarily, if at all).
l. Location
Where is ideology located-in the mind, in behavior, and or in language?

(a) Thought. The traditional, common sense, approach is to look at ideol12
Feuer, for example, insists that "Every ideology in some fashion repeats the Mosaic
myth,-the dramatic story of the liberation of the Hebrew tribes by Moses" (1975: 1).
To include claims of this sort would produce a typology which is unhelpfully long and
attributes are clearly
notes that a political
actor may be said to be ideological when he is "extremist." What he means here, I think,
is that many of the definitional traits assigned to ideologues are drawn from the example of extremist groups. It would be quite unusual, however, for an author to define,
a priori, only groups with extreme views as ideologues.
not
indicative of academic
or
interpretations of definitions.
ordinary
Putnam
usage. Some
suggested
(1971: 655), for example,
966
= TABLE 2
A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK
meant originally a &dquo;science of ideas&dquo;) as a set of beliefs, values,

principles, attitudes, and/or ideals-in short, as a type of political thinking.
(b) Behavior. Ideologies, however, unlike political philosophies, are not
isolated from real-world political dilemmas. Rather, ideologies direct, or at
least influence, political behavior. It is impossible, therefore, to study ideological phenomena as purely ideational. Secondly, behavioral patterns are of
more political and social relevance than patterns of thought (or, for that matter, of expression). We are more concerned with what political actors do than
what they say or believe. For these related reasons, writers have often resolved
to treat ideology primarily as a set of practices (e.g., Thompson 1984: 195).
(c) Language. A third basic approach to the definition of ideology attempts
to transcend the belief/behavior divide by defining the concept by reference
to a set of linguistic symbols, or discourse. The rules, regularities, and principles of any ideology, according to this contemporary line of argument, derive not so much from the intentions of the ideologists (their values and beliefs),
but rather from the linguistic norms in which they are embedded. It is impossible, therefore, to evaluate values, beliefs, attitudes, and principles independently of the speech, or speech-acts, in which they are manifested. &dquo;Ideological
thinking&dquo; is inseparable from-and perhaps even secondary to-&dquo;ideological
language.&dquo; Conservatives, therefore, might be defined as those who evaluate
the political world with a particular set of linguistic symbols, rather than those
who believe in God, family, and country. Ideology, Eagleton (1991: 11) writes,
is &dquo;the medium in which men and women fight out their social and political
battles at the level of signs, meanings and representations.&dquo; Downs (1957: 96)
ogy (which
967
ideology as &dquo;a verbal image of the good society.&dquo; Thompson (1984:

89-90), although wishing to view linguistic practice as inseparable from other
(nonlinguistic) practices, nonetheless explores the possibility that &dquo;the language of everyday life is the very locus of ideology and the very site of the
meaning which sustains relations of domination.&dquo; Ellul (quoted in Loewenstein
1953: 68) concurs that ideology exists in and through linguistic practices-in
this case, official state and party propaganda. This is also the general approach
of the &dquo;Cambridge school&dquo; of historians (although not always under the rubric
refers
to
of &dquo;ideology&dquo;).13
important to recognize that the debate over &dquo;location&dquo; is not simply a

debate over how to measure ideology. For some, certainly, the investigation of
behavior and/or language is simply a convenient, and perhaps more reliable,
method of testing what an individual believes. Thought, in this sense, reIt is
mains the central desideratum.
However, there are many others who argue

that behavior (verbal and nonverbal) cannot be separated from thought oreven more radically- that behavior should be granted priority in defining an
individuals ideology. To observe, for example, that someone addresses a superior by a particular title may be more meaningful, in certain contexts,
than to ask why he does so. The more deeply ingrained a social practice, the
more it has a tendency to lose its quality as an intentional activity Ideology, in
this sense, refers to the &dquo;un-thought&dquo; (discussed below).
Subject Matter
What is ideology about? Here we can differentiate between three basic
positions, according to which ideology pertains to politics, power, or the world
at-large.
(a) Politics. Politics is the &dquo;home turf&dquo; of ideology, and remains its most
common referent. Seliger (1976: 120) builds a spirited defense of the proposition that &dquo;politics is inseparable from ideology.&dquo; To move beyond &dquo;the political&dquo;- even as broadly defined- Seliger and others argue, is to move beyond
the generally understood meaning of the term and beyond the sphere to which
many of its common attributes properly apply.
(b) Power. Yet, even those who would prefer (one supposes) a narrower interpretation of this peripatetic term find its territory difficult to demarcate. Campbell
et al. (1960) note that &dquo;by origin and usage its connotations are primarily political,
[but] the scope of the structure is such that we expect an ideology to encompass
content outside the political order as narrowly defined - social and economic relationships, and even matters of religion, education, and the like.&dquo; Consequently,
2.
13
See
Pagden (1987),
Pocock (1975; 1985), Skinner (1978), and
Tully (1988).
968
ideology is often defined as pertaining more broadly to relationships based on

power, coercion, or domination. &dquo;Ideologies,&dquo; writes Birnbaum, &dquo;appear wherever
systematic factual assertions about society contain ... evaluations of the distribution of power,&dquo; including &dquo;aesthetic and moral statements about the human situation&dquo; (1960: 91). One currently popular definition of ideology is &dquo;discourse plus
power&dquo;-more generally, &dquo;the ways in which meaning (or signification) serve to
sustain relations of domination&dquo; (Thompson 1984: 4).
(c) The world at-large. A final, and even broader, view of ideology is also
possible (and, indeed, quite common). Marx and Engels, for example, sometimes use &dquo;ideology&dquo; as a vast receptacle for all conscious and relatively organized ideational phenomena.14 &dquo;The distinction should always be made,&dquo; they
write, &dquo;between the material transformation of the economic conditions of
production ... and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic-in
short, ideological-forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and
fight it out.&dquo;15 Aron, in even more sweeping terms, refers to ideology as &dquo;all
ideas or patterns of ideas accepted by individuals or groups as true or valid,
irrespective of either their origin or their quality&dquo; (quoted in Loewenstein 1953:
52). The same sense is brought forth in a much-quoted passage from Walsby
(1947: 145), defining the topic as &dquo;the complete system of cognitive assumptions and affective identifications which manifest themselves in, or underlie,
the thought, speech, aims, interests, ideals, ethical standards, actions-in short,
the behaviour-of an individual human being.&dquo; This also replicates the sense
of one of Mannheims (1960; quoted in Hamilton 1987: 21) basic definitions
of ideology-as &dquo;the total structure of the mind of an epoch or class.&dquo; Wuthnow
(1981) also defines ideology as a subset of culture, the only difference being
that the term ideology represents shared meanings. Geertz (1964/1973: 21819), in one of the most influential discussions of the subject, describes ideologies as &dquo;maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of
collective conscience.&dquo; In this sense of the word, ideology is virtually indistinguishable from worldview, cultural system, symbol-system, or belief-system. 16 There
are, certainly, political implications to such concepts, but there need be no
explicit political content.

14
shall see, this is not the only meaning of ideology implied by Marx and Engelsspecific connotations will be discussed below.
Contribution to the Critique of Political Philosophy (quoted in Williams 1983: 156). In the
German Ideology they refer, along similar lines, to "Morality, religion, metaphysics, all
the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness..." (Marx and Engels
As
we
more
15
1970: 47).
16
See also Adorno et al. (1950: 2), Ashford (1972: 27), Cobb (1973), Harris
Roucek (1944: 479), and examples discussed in Naess et al. (1956: 162-63).
969
(1968),
3.
Subject
Who has ideologies? Who are the &dquo;ideologists&dquo;? Three basic responses
have been given to this question.
(a) Social class. From the Marxist perspective ideology refers primarily to
the views of a particular social class (Marx and Engels 1970). Particular ideologies, Althusser (1971: 159) affirms, in a nod to Marxist convention, &dquo;always express class positions.&dquo;
(b) Any group. However, the sense of ideology being tied to a particular
economic station has eroded in recent years. Duverger (1951/59) writes:
&dquo;To a certain extent political ideologies themselves correspond to class
attitudes, but the correspondence is neither general nor absolute. Ideologies are never simple epiphenomena in relation to the socioeconomic structure, and some are related to class in ways that are indirect and of minor
importance.&dquo; Most writers now refer broadly, to &dquo;a specific, socially significant group or class&dquo; (Eagleton 1991: 29). The OED says that ideologies
relate &dquo;to politics or society, or to the conduct of a class or group&dquo; (622).
Lane (1962: 15) is most emphatic: Ideologies &dquo;are group beliefs that individuals borrow; most people acquire an ideology by identifying (or
disidentifying) with a social group.&dquo;
(c) Any group or individual. Finally, many writers have applied the word
ideology as a property that might be possessed by a single individual. While it
has usually been considered a central aspect of ideologies that they be &dquo;shared,&dquo;
this does not reflect upon other presumably ideological characteristics (e.g.,
coherence, political orientation, action orientation ...). There may be no reason to exclude an individual from the category &dquo;ideological&dquo; just because others cannot be found who share his or her views; and, in fact, we commonly
speak of &dquo;Xs ideology,&dquo; as if it were distinguishable from all others.
&dquo;
4. Position
Ideology has often been identified as the hallmark of a group in a particular strategic position within society. Here, as in so many other respects, there
has been little agreement over which status is more ideological-an &dquo;in-group&dquo;
ideology legitimates a relationship of domination, or an &dquo;out-group&dquo;

ideology is a protest against an exclusionary or discriminatory social
hierarchy
(a) Dominant. The classical reference-point for ideology as domination is
Marx and Engels (1970: 64), who write: &dquo;The ideas of the ruling class are in
every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force in
society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.&dquo; Many contemporary
writers have moved from this class-specific understanding of domination to a
whose
whose
970
general notion of &dquo;structures of domination. 1117 Ideology, in this sense,

&dquo;bolsters stable institutional arrangements by explaining, justifying, and
prompting support for a particular stratification system whose failure or demise will lead to the disintegration of a particular pattern of control&dquo; (Wilson
1992: 19). This understanding of ideology is not limited to writers of a Marxist or leftist extraction. Apter (1964: 18), who could scarcely be accused of
either, writes &dquo;ideology helps to support an elite and to justify the exercise of
power&dquo; (see also Thompson 1984: 89-90).
Co) Subordinate. Yet, at the same time, ideology is commonly associated
with movements of the extreme left or right. Indeed, the most coherent, abstract, stable, and sharply differentiated sets of beliefs, these writers have noted,
often emanate from those groups or individuals protesting the existing
sociopolitical order (e.g., Feuer 1975). Ideologists, Putnam (1971: 655) writes,
are commonly described as &dquo;Alienated&dquo; and &dquo;Extremist.&dquo; Shils (1967: 66), in
the same vein, writes: &dquo;Ideologies...entail an aggressive alienation from the
existing society&dquo; These sorts of definitional attributes are more likely to describe those groups protesting the status quo than those benefiting from it.
Raymond Williams (1983: 154) reports that the terms ideologist and revolutionary were often equated in the nineteenth century-an equation, one might
add, that persists into the twentieth century.
more
5. Function
(a) Explaining. Ideology, Geertz (1964/1973: 218-19) writes, &dquo;is...the

attempt...to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful,
to so construe
them
as to
make it
possible to act purposefully within them.&dquo;
(b) Repressing. Propaganda, however, is the selfconscious manipulation of

symbols to achieve a given effect. Thompson (1984: 86-86) acknowledges
that
&dquo;ideology allows only certain things to be communicated and discussed.

only expresses but also represses.&dquo; Most writers would agree that
in studying ideology one is paying attention not merely to that portion of the
belief-system which has been selfconsciously projected, but also to that which
remains submerged.
(c) Integrated. Perhaps the foremost exponent of ideologies as mechanisms
...
It not
of social integration was Talcott Parsons. In The Social System (1951: 349-50),
Parsons wrote of ideology as &dquo;a system of beliefs, held in common by the
members of a collectivity ... which is oriented to the evaluative integration of
the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and
17
See Abercrombie et al. (1980), Althusser (1971: 158), Foucault (1979), Lasswell (quoted
58), Mannheim (1960: 85).
in Loewenstein 1953:
971
of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed

to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented, and
their relation to the future course of events.&dquo; Here, ideology functions to bind
individuals to a community by establishing an authoritative set of norms and
values (Apter 1964: 18-21; Parsons 1951: 349; Plamenatz 1970: 31). Ideologies &dquo;provide the individual with a sense of identity and belonging&dquo; serving to
achieve &dquo;social solidarity and cohesion&dquo; (Rejai 1991: 17).
(d) Motivating. Both scholarly usage and ordinary understandings of the
term ideology suggest that ideologies are action-oriented. They seek not merely
to describe the world but also to mold it.1S Where publicly declared, ideologies are aimed at an audience (not formed &dquo;in the abstract&dquo;) with the intent of
influencing opinion. Even where an ideology is not officially or openly articulated, its intent is still prescriptive (or, if you prefer, &dquo;programmatic&dquo;) in that
the holder of the ideology is enjoined by his or her ideology to act. Ideologies
&dquo;furnish guides for action&dquo; (McClosky 1964: 362). By organizing and interpreting the world an ideology helps the subject to act within that world. Ideologists do not passively accept the prevailing winds of historical change; they
embrace, reject, or seek to regulate the course of history, presenting an implicit or explicit vision of the good life, the ideal world. Ideology, it is argued,
forms the nexus between ideas and actions.
That ideology is action-oriented should not, however, be confused with
the idea that ideologies are acted upon all the time, or that political action is
primarily the product of ideologies. &dquo;The significance of ideology,&dquo; Mullins
(1972: 509) states succinctly, &dquo;is not that it causes one to do but that it gives one
cause for doing.&dquo; The OED, similarly, cites ideologys function in &dquo;justifying
actions&dquo; (622). Ideologies, in this sense, offer a way of overcoming the difficulties inherent in collective action without (or supplementary to) a coercive
apparatus and material incentives.
(e) Legitimating. Ideology also legitimates. Usually, by this it is meant that
ideologies distort, and that they do so in defense of dominant social groups
(e.g., Eagleton 1991: 6). One might note with irony that the legitimation function of ideology is understood to be illegitimate. However, one can also find
the concept of legitimation (though not, perhaps, the term) used in a more
value-neutral manner. In this sense, ideology &dquo;legitimates&dquo;-i.e., make legitimate-actions, whether or not those actions are in support of or in revolt
against the established order.
18
See, e.g., Bell (1960: 400), Connolly (1967: 2), Geertz (1964/1973), Gouldner (1976:
85), Lane (1962: 14-15), La Palombara (1966: 5-16), Mullins (1972: 506, 509), Naess
et al. (1956: 164-65), Roucek (1944: 249), Seliger (1976: 19-20), Walsby (1947: 142).
972
6. Motivation
Many writers have considered motivation to be in some way determinative of ideology. Three equally influential positions can be discerned. According to the first, ideologies are rooted in interests; according to the second, it is
the absence of material interest in a set of ideas which defines an ideology;
according to the third it is the absence of short-term interests (or &dquo;expediency&dquo;) which must be present in order for a set of attitudes to claim the status
of an ideology.
(a) Interest-based. The notion of ideologies as interest-based can be traced
back at least as far as Marx and Engels (1970: 64; see also 47, 57), who write:
&dquo;The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby,
generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships.&dquo; Just as the notion of power was
gradually extended from its original Marxian roots in social class, the notion
of &dquo;interest&dquo; has undergone a like permutation. The interests of an ideologue
may refer not simply to the material interests of his or her class but, more
broadly, to group interests and even to self-interest, and to a set of tangible
and intangible interests which include position, status, power, and perquisite.19 &dquo;An ideology,&dquo; Elster writes, &dquo;is a set of beliefs of values that can be
explained through the (non-cognitive) interest or position of some social group&dquo;
(1982: 123). Whether the ideology actually serves the interests of the group
in question, or is dysfunctional in this respect, the origin of the system of
values is thought to be traceable to the social position of the group in question
(on this point, see Geertz 1964/1973).
(b) Non-interest based. Yet, we are also quite familiar in contemporary works
of social science with the notion that matters of ideology are removed from
matters of &dquo;self-interest,&dquo; and particularly from material self-interest (e.g. Crewe
and Searing 1988: 362-63; Kritzer 1978: 486). This sense of the term can be
found as far back as Napoleon. An early biographer of the Emperor, writing
shortly after his death, testifies that his subject used ideology to refer to &dquo;every
species of theory ... resting in no respect upon the basis of self-interest&dquo; (Scott,
Napoleon, 1827, quoted in Williams 1983: 154).
(c) Non-expedient. A third position in the motivation debate is held by
those who argue that while interest in the broad sense may be ideological,
interest in the narrow sense of expediency is not. &dquo;[I]t matters,&dquo; write Campbell
19
See Althusser (1971: 134), Corbett (1965:

(1971: 376), Mannheim (1960: 50).
138), Goldman (1969: 102-03),
973
Gramsci
al. (1960: 203-204) &dquo;whether self-interest proceeds in a simple and naked

or has indeed become imbedded in some broader ideological structure.&dquo; What the writers wish to distinguish is &dquo;self-interest in a primitive and
short-sighted sense, and the operation of self-interest within a structure of
attitudes that might reasonably be labeled an ideology&dquo; In both the second
and third senses (above), ideology may be employed as a residual categorystanding for those actions, statements, or beliefs for which no self-interested
basis can be discovered. 21
et
sense,
Cognitive/Affective Structure
Sixteen types of cognitive/affective
plied to ideology (or ideologists).
7.
structure
have
commonly
been ap-
(a) Coherence (internal). There is little question among analysts of ideology that the internal
structure
of a
set
of values and beliefs
must
be coherent
in order for it to be considered &dquo;ideological.&dquo; However, exactly how coherent,

or what exactly constitutes coherence, remains a subject of great debate. The
fuzziness of this central ideological characteristic is abetted by its number of
near-synonyms-including consistency, integrated, structure, system, organization, logical interrelationship, and the ever-popular constraint. Each refers, with
a slightly different emphasis, to the degree of likeness, agreement, or &dquo;fit&dquo;
characterizing the various elements or manifestations of an ideology
(b) Contrast (external). The idea of internal coherence implies a degree of
contrast between the ideology in question and surrounding ideologies (or the
general political culture). A value, belief, or attitude is ideological only with
reference to something else which is not, or which is differently ideological. If
there is little to distinguish the beliefs and values of a party or movement from
its competitors in a political system then it has failed a crucial test. If all political parties within a country are equally &dquo;conservative&dquo; then it would appear
that the ideology of &dquo;conservativism&dquo; applies to the country at-large rather
any individual party Contrast is a matter which, under various rua great quantity of study; it is the driving question, for
behind
example,
spatial models of electoral behavior 21 and behind the eternal
over
whether
American politics is &dquo;consensual&dquo; or &dquo;conflictual&dquo; (see
argument
et
al.
1960; McClosky 1964; Stemsher 1975).
McClosky
Abstraction.
(c)
Ideology is also commonly viewed as an abstract endeavor.
&dquo;Ideal or abstract speculation,&dquo; specifies the OED (622). Campbell et al.(1960:
than
to
brics, has inspired
20
21
On the difficulties of
(1993).
Strom (1990) offers
defining an "interest," see
an
excellent
Citrin and Green
(1990) and Kingdon
synthesis of this literature.

974
of the word, referring to ideology as a cognitive structure &dquo;capped by concepts of a high order of abstraction.&dquo;22
(d) Specificity. Along with endorsements of ideologys abstraction, one also
finds frequent endorsements of its concreteness-its specificity Ideologies, in
contrast to political philosophies, writes Keohane (1976: 97), &dquo;must be simple
and concrete if they are to be effective.&dquo; For many writers, a set of values
becomes ideological only insofar as it specifies a concrete program, a set of
issue-positions. It is this, arguably, that differentiates ideologies from beliefsystems, philosophical systems, and cultural systems.
(e) Hierarchy. Campbell et al. (1960: 190) expected idea-units to be organized in a hierarchical fashion, &dquo;in which more specific attitudes interact with
attitudes towards the more general class of objects in which the specific object
is seen to belong.&dquo; Working from this vision, Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) create a hierarchical model of ideological reasoning, in which specific issue-attitudes are related to more general attitudes and, finally, to notions of liberalism
and conservatism. The authors assume that, generally speaking, values drive
issue-positions, rather than the reverse.
Q) Stability. Although stability does not appear in many formal definitions, most writers would probably agree that a set of values and beliefs must
endure for some length of time in order to warrant the appellation &dquo;ideology&dquo;
(see Achen 1975; Converse 1964: 238; Erikson 1979; Sniderman and Tetlock
1986: 64). &dquo;Parties of the left and right do not trade positions from election
to election,&dquo; Campbell et al. (1960: 189) note. &dquo;Assuming stability in parallel
values in individuals, it would follow that partisan preferences would be pursued for long periods of time.&dquo; More recently, Klingemann et al. (1994: 36)
describe an &dquo;ideology model&dquo; of party behavior, in which &dquo;parties in power
follow more closely a policy reflecting longstanding ideology than one reflecting current programmatic emphases.&dquo; Frequent and repeated changes of political perspective, in other words, are usually considered good evidence of a
lack of ideological commitment. Under such circumstances it can be assumed
that a group or individual is responding to nonideological demands (interests, expediency, coercion) or simply has no developed beliefs and values about
politics at all.
(g) Knowledge. Another cognitive characteristic commonly associated with
ideological modes of thought is summarizable in the term political knowledge. Political knowledge, one might note, may be operationalized so as to
account not simply for the gross number of factual observations or responses
193) echo this traditional
22
sense
See also Smith (1980: 686, 694), Converse (1964), Coveyou and Piereson
Putnam (1971: 655), and Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586).
975
(1977: 78),
individual is able to make, but also for the range over which these observations/responses fall (see Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964, 1990; Smith
an
1989).
(h) Sophistication. A related-but rather different-cognitive
trait
commonly
associated with ideologues is that of sophistication.23 While political knowledge,

coherence, and abstractness refer to various particular aspects of cognitive processing, political sophistication refers to the general character of the reasoning
process- including, therefore, some or all of the foregoing attributes. This is not
an easy concept to nail down; indeed, political scientists laboring under this rubric have encountered many of the same definitional problems currently roiling
work on ideology (Luskin 1987: 1993). Writers have been unable to agree, for
example, whether sophistication is indicated by a greater or lesser number of
dimensions within a given ideology (Luskin 1987: 863). Ideology, in any case, in
much of the political science literature refers to the highest-i.e., most sophisticated-level of political reasoning found among the general public.
(i) Facticity. Ideology, according to one view, is defined by its &dquo;facticity&dquo;
Unlike other types of communication, ideology makes statements with truthclaims- ideas which &dquo;purport to be factual, and also carry a more or less explicit evaluation of the &dquo;facts&dquo; (Ashford 1972: 26; see also Birnbaum 1960: 91;
Hamilton 1987).
(i) Simplicity. Sutton et al. ( 1956: 4-5; quoted in Geertz 1964/1973: 209)
claim that &dquo;Ideology tends to be simple and clear-cut, even where its simplicity and clarity do less than justice.&dquo; Gould and Kolb (1964: 315) write of
ideology as the explanation of &dquo;complex social phenomena with a view to
directing and simplifying sociopolitical choices facing individuals and groups&dquo;
(see also McClosky 1958; Oakeshott 1962: 114-27; Tetlock 1983).
(k) Distortion. One of the most common and longest-standing elements
associated with ideology is that of distortion. &dquo;[Each new class which puts
itself in the place of one ruling before it,&dquo; write Marx and Engels (1970: 6566), &dquo;is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its
interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed
in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent
them as the only rational, universally valid ones.&dquo; In Marxs writings, and particularly in the German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1970: 119), a &dquo;realm of real
history&dquo; is counterposed to a &dquo;realm of ideology.&dquo; This sense of distortion is
likewise the gist of Mannheims &dquo;particular&dquo; definition of ideology, which denotes a &dquo;more or less conscious disguise ... of the real nature of a situation
23
See Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964). Smith (1989: 226) defines sophistication as including knowledge, but acknowledges the ambiguity of this point.
976
the
true
recognition of which would not be
in accord with
[the ideologists]
interests&dquo; (quoted in Naess et al. 1956: 166). Althusser offers a modern variation on the &dquo;distortion&dquo; theme. &dquo;Ideology,&dquo; he writes (1971: 162), &dquo;represents
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.&dquo;
&dquo;
poststructuralist circles ideology is apt to be used as a synonym for &dquo;closure&dquo; -that circumstance in which naturally free-floating processes of signification are blocked or prematurely ended (e.g., Thompson 1984: 196). Eagleton
(1991: 6) writes of ideologies &dquo;denigrating ideas which might challenge it;
excluding
V rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic
logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself... [e.g.] masking
or suppressing social conflicts,&dquo; papering them over with &dquo;an imaginary resolution of real contradictions&dquo; (see also Putnam 1971: 655).
Distortion is thus the end-product of many operations traditionally viewed
as ideological: legitimation, naturalization (the depiction of fabricated circumstances as &dquo;natural&dquo;), popularization, &dquo;the illicit union of fact and value&dquo; (Adams
In
u
-
1989: 137; Minar 1961: 323), &dquo;systematically distorted communication&dquo;

(Habermas 1984), the (unsubstantiated) claim to &dquo;moral certainty&dquo; (Adams
1989: 139; Naess 1956: 166), the use of unverifiable truth-claims (Sartori
1969: 403). In all such cases, the description of ideology as distortion rests on
an implicit epistemological contrast between &dquo;ideological&dquo; and scientific, or
truthful, forms of analysis. 14
(1) Conviction. Most writers would probably agree (even if they do not
formal definitional premise) that ideological beliefs are strongly heldthat there is an element of conviction to any ideology. Ideology is often equated
with a deep, passionate, or emotional sort of commitment (Bell 1960: 370-71;
Neuman 1981: 1239; Rejai 1971; Sartori 1969). In an attempt to reorient the
discussion of ideology among mass publics, Sniderman and Tetlock (1986:
63) claim that ideology &dquo;is better understood as a set of root likes and dislikes
rather than an assemblage of abstractions.&dquo; It is, therefore, an affective rather
than cognitive aspect of thought that may determine how people understand
and relate to political issues.
(m) Insincerity. By the same token, ideology has often been used to indicate
the speakers lack of commitment, her insincerity One hears, for example, that
politicians reiterate &dquo;ideologies&dquo; which they do not believe and which they do not
implement once ensconced in public office. This is ideology in this sense of &dquo;mere
ideology,&dquo; and carries the same connotations as &dquo;mere rhetoric.&dquo;
state as a
&dquo;
24
(1976), Connolly (1967), Feuer (1975: 254), Goldman (1969: 103),

Gouldner (1976: 38), Huaco (1971: 253-55), Lichtheim (1967: 3), Loewenstein (1953:
60), McCarney (1981: 30), McClosky (1958), Rejai (1991: 4), Roucek (1944: 482).
See also Barth
977
(n) Dogmatism. &dquo;It is to the doctrine of the ideologues,&dquo; said Napoleon, &dquo;to
metaphysics, which in a contrived manner seeks to find the pri-
this diffuse
mary causes and on this foundation would erect the legislation of peoples,
instead of adapting the laws to a knowledge of the human heart and of the
lessons of history-to which one must attribute all the misfortunes which
have befallen our beautiful France&dquo; (quoted in Williams 1983: 154). Marx
and Engels (1970: 68) also refer repeatedly to societys ideologists as &dquo;dogmatic.&dquo; To many writers of the postwar generation, ideologies were &dquo;secular
religions,&dquo; characterized by their obstinacy in face of facts, counterarguments,
and opposition of any sort .21 A good summation of this view is provided by
Loewenstein (1969: 335), who writes: &dquo;It is characteristic of the religious that
it does not admit degrees of acceptance. Being absolute by nature it must
either be accepted or rejected; there are only believers and heretics. Most
modern political ideologies have become religion-affected in the sense that a
particular thought and belief pattern embodies values that are considered absolute by its adherents. To the masses the ideological belief is a substitute for
eroded religious values. Even liberal ideologies whose specific value-content
is tolerance and relativism, assume, when exposed to the competitive antithesis of totalitarianism, the absolutist coloration of the either-or.&dquo; The sense of
ideology as dogmatism is enshrined in the OED (&dquo;held implicitly or adopted
as a whole and maintained regardless of the course of events&dquo;-622) and repeated in countless evaluations of the subject. Ideologists are &dquo;guided by a
belief system which is closed, rigid, resistant to new information,&dquo; writes
Putnam (1971: 655) in his compendium of definitions. One of the strongest
statements of this perspective is to be found in Sartoris (1969: 402) controversial claim that &dquo;the ideological mentality represents a typically dogmatic,
i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics.&dquo;26
(o) Consciousness. One common view has it that the ideologist should &dquo;be
able to explicate those principles&dquo; of the ideology to which he or she is thought
to belong (Kritzer 1978: 485-86). Ideology is &dquo;an explicit, consciously held
belief system&dquo; (Putnam 1971: 655). &dquo;Ideology,&dquo; another writer asserts, &dquo;pertains to that part of consciousness which can be said; it has a public objectivity
which enables the projects it promotes to be discussed among strangers&dquo;
(Thompson 1984: 85). An even stronger sense of explicitness is the achievement of written form. According to Thompson (1984: 85-86), &dquo;writing was
and still is its principal medium.&dquo; This moves us into what is undoubtedly the
25
26
See Aron
(1962: 265-94), Bell (1960), Halle (1972: 116),
Loewenstein
Rokeach (1960), Sartori (1969), Shils (1967: 66).

For commentary, see Mullins (1974).
978
(1969: 335),
explicit form any ideology can achieve-and the form which many would
say is the most quintessentially &dquo;ideological&dquo;-propaganda.
(p) Unconsciousness. While, as noted, many writers consider consciousness to be the hallmark of ideological thinking, many more consider unconsciousness to be its distinguishing characteristic (see Bames 1966: 514). Engels
is emphatic on this point: &dquo;The real driving force which moves [ideology]
remains unconscious, otherwise it would not be an ideological process&dquo; (quoted
in Roucek 1944: 482). Ideologists are persons making history, yet blindlywithout a complete awareness of their actual roles (Lichtheim 1967: 31).
Others have described the unconsciousness of ideology in a more Freudian
sense. Feuer, for example, claims that ideologies typically &dquo;project wish-fulfillments&dquo; (1975). For Kardiner et al. ideologies are, likewise, &dquo;compounds of
projective systems&dquo; (quoted in Lane 1962: 14; see also Adomo et al. 1950;
Erikson 1968; Nelson 1977: 580). Some political scientists have decided that,
although the mass public is relatively devoid of articulable ideology, it is not
devoid of ideology (e.g., Levitin and Miller 1979: 752). Ideology, in this sense,
must be considered a proto-conscious phenomenon. Nelson (1977: 580) takes
a psychoanalytic approach to this question. &dquo;An individual may evince a pattern of behavior from which an observer can reasonably infer beliefs informing the acts of the individual. And yet those beliefs need not inform the acts
consciously Repression of awareness of these beliefs can, according to psychoanalytic theory, serve important psychic needs of the individual.&dquo;
most
CONCLUSIONS
I have
argued that the troubles social scientists encounter with the conof
cept ideology are largely &dquo;definitional&dquo; in character-rather than empirical,
theoretical (explanatory), or operational. Of course, this proposition might be
applied to many social science terms. However, the problem of defining ideology seems particularly severe. Arguably, the term has become so overladen
with meaning that it is no longer stable enough to be of much use. Having
been appropriated for all manner of academic and political purposes over the
past several centuries, ideology has become a victim of its own popularity It
now means too much.
What, then, are we to do with this over-supply of meanings? I shall suggest the following set of procedures: (1) the construction of a minimal (or
&dquo;core&dquo; definition; (2) the achievement of the greatest possible differentiation
vis-A-vis neighboring terms; and (3) context specificity
l. A Core Definition
A
strategy when attempting to cope with semantic plenitude in a

identify a core (or &dquo;minimal&dquo;) definition-a single attribute or small
common
concept is
to
979
of related attributes that is universally agreed-upon and which might therefore

lend some coherence to other, less central, definitional attributes.&dquo; In order to
arrive at a core definition one must jettison conceptual attributes that conflict with
other, well-established attributes, as well as those which exclude important ideational phenomena from consideration (ones, that is, for which we have no alterset
nate
label).
senses of the term ideology are attended to, I would argue that only
trait meets this criterion. The importance of coherence (7a)-aka &dquo;consistency&dquo;
or &dquo;constraint&dquo;- is virtually unchallenged in the social science literature. Ideology,
If all the
one
the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that
belong to one another in a non-random fashion. On what principles they intercorrelate, and to what degree, remain matters of dispute (as discussed), but the
notion of coherence is difficult to gainsay One might add, as corollaries, contrast
(7b) and stability (7f)-the one implying coherence vis-A-vis competing ideologies
and the other implying coherence through time.
All other possible core attributes are simply not universal in usage (even within
the restricted parameter of social science), or involve arbitrary classificatory decisions about what constitutes &dquo;ideological&dquo; behavior .21 For example, many writers
propose that all ideologies imply a sense of conviction on the part of the holders of
that set of beliefs (71). But we have also observed the sense in which ideologies
may be &dquo;mere ideologies,&dquo; hollow ideational shells in which few truly believe. The
ideology of communism in Eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Soviet Union
seems to have approximated this sense of ideology as insincerity (7m). Similarly,
the attribute dominant (4a) conflicts with subordinate (4b). Consciousness (70), evidently, contradicts unconsciousness (7p).
To those who would define ideology as referring to explicitly political subject matter (2a), it is important to point out that this would exclude many
uses of the term in non-political contexts-e.g., as pertaining to relationships
mediated by power (2b), or relationships within the world at-large (2c).
To those who would claim that ideology is an example of abstract (7c),
hierarchically ordered (7e), knowledgeable (7g), and/or sophisticated (7h) cogniat
27
28
See Sartori (1976: 61). Hamilton purports to follow this strategy; but is evidently influenced by other principles of definition as well. "Idiosyncratic criteria should normally
be rejected unless it can be demonstrated that despite their idiosyncrasy there are good reasons for including them. By this procedure, the core features of the majority of definitions
will be retained. The selection of other elements on the basis of reasoned argument will
then fix the limits or boundaries of the concept" (Hamilton 1987: 19; emphasis added).
I should note that not all terms contain core properties; some may be defined by "family
characteristics," none of which are invariably present (Colher and Mahon 1993).
By "arbitrary" I refer to a classificatory decision that would be appropriate only within
the purview of a single study or subfield.
980
tion, one must observe that ideological thought has also been defined by its
simplicity (7j) and distortion (7k). More importantly, perhaps, defining the concept of ideology as sophisticated political cognition may deprive us of a way
to talk about the political beliefs and values of many members of the public.
Let us assume, for a moment, that most people have thoughts about political
objects, that these thoughts motivate them to action (perhaps not continually,
but at least every once in a while), and that these actions have political consequences. Assume, moreover, that these thoughts are not entirely randomi.e., contain some elements of internal coherence. If all these observations are
evidently need a term referring to such cognitive behavior. (One may, of course, resort to mentalite or culture, but these terms lose
the explicitly political connotation of ideology.) It would be hard, George Rude
(1980/1995) points out, to make sense of popular movements, like the Levellers and Diggers of the English Revolution, the Sons of Liberty during the
American Revolution, and the sans-culottes during the French Revolution without resort to the concept of ideology The same argument, of course, can be
applied to the &dquo;mass public&dquo; in contemporary America.19
The most troubling internal definitional conflict besetting ideology is to
be found on the motivation dimension. Here, interest-based (6a) and non-interest based (6b) definitions collide. Indeed, this would seem to be the source of
a good deal of ideologys semantic strife; for some evidently wish to define
ideological activity as instrumental and others as noninstrumental. I think
Campbell et al. (1960: 203-204) offer the most sensible way out of this dilemma in proposing that ideology be understood as nonexpedient ideas and
behavior. To repeat: &dquo;[I]t matters whether self-interest proceeds in a simple
and naked sense, or has indeed become imbedded in some broader ideological structure.&dquo; What the writers wish to distinguish is &dquo;self-interest in a primitive and short-sighted sense, and the operation of self-interest within a structure
of attitudes that might reasonably be labeled an ideology.&dquo;
correct, social scientists
Differentiation
In his brilliant, though tortuous, work on concept formation Sartori (1984:
63) advises that &dquo;no word should be used as a synonym for another word. ,30
This line of inquiry is quite useful in narrowing the range of possible attributes
connected with ideology. On grounds of achieving maximum clarity, one ought
29
See, e.g., Fine and Sandstrom (1993).
30
Ironically, he appears to violate this tenet in his earlier definition of ideology as dogmatism (Sartori 1969). Why define ideology as dogma when we already have a term for
this semantic purpose, one might well inquire. For further commentary on Sartori (1969),
see
Diggins (1970).
981
to
seek
out
attributes that
effectively differentiate ideology from neighboring
perspective it is indeed useful to limit the purview of ideology

explicitly political subject matter (2a), for only in this way can its definition be distinguished from worldview, belief-system, cultural system,
value-system, and other like terms.
By the same logic, we ought to avoid adding attributes to the core defining attribute (coherence) if they repeat attributes already defining neighboring
terms. We have little use for a concept of ideology defined largely in terms of
cognitive sophistication (7h), when we already possess the perfectly serviceterms.
From this
to
able term, sophistication. This is the laudable trend of current research (Cassel
1984; Luskin 1987, 1993; Smith 1980, 1989).
Perhaps the toughest borderline case is posed by the concept of political
culture. Even here, however, conceptual differentiation can be achieved, and
scholars are well-advised to consider carefully their choice of terms. Political
culture is generally considered to be less programmatic, less action-oriented,
referring as much to political procedures as to the substance of politics, and is
much more likely to be defined as a set of (unconscious) practices. One can
point to a good many cases of writers who chose &dquo;ideology&dquo; when they might
have been more precise and accurate in choosing political culture.31
Many, generally on the left of the political spectrum, protest that to &dquo;sanitize&dquo; ideology of any hint of its sense as domination (4a), as suggested above, is
to deprive the concept of its capacity for social critique (e.g., Lichtheim 1967).
This may be true, although one may reasonably counter that social critique is
more effective insofar as it is clear. In any case, the dual status of the term-as
a structure of domination and an ideational form structuring opposition to
the status quo-means that any pejorative use of ideology ends up calling into
question the very &dquo;ideologies of liberation&dquo; that those on the left would champion. A more sensible rhetorical strategy, I suggest, would use terms that refer
more directly and clearly to the phenomena now referred to (by these authors) as &dquo;ideological.&dquo; What is lost, one wonders, in calling domination domination, repression repression, and hegemony hegemony? What is the special
status of ideology that it must be imported to serve as the universal signifier of
injustice?
My general argument, lest it be misconstrued,
is that the richness of this

detriment. In trespassing on the
meanings of other related words, many previous definitions of ideology have
weakened the clarity-and hence the utility-of this concept (as well as of
semantic field need not be looked upon
31
as a
See, e.g., Merelman (1969), Mullins (1972), and Wilson (1992). For
nitional analysis of "political culture," see Patrick (1984).
982
an
excellent defi-
those
terms
whose
meanings are appropriated). We do not need to stretch the
ideology to perform so many semantic functions precisely bealready possess other terms which cover adjacent areas. In respectthe
ing
differentness of these related terms we can carve out clearer definitions
meaning of
cause we
of this concept. This also

smaller definitions.
means
that
we
may have
to
reconcile ourselves
to
Context-Specificity
Beyond these, relatively general, strategies-minimal definition, jettisoning contradictory attributes, and differentiation-we cannot avoid context-specific definitions. In other words, it is not reasonable to try to construct a single,
all-purpose definition of ideology, usable for all times, places, and purposes.
Doing so would deprive the concept of its utility precisely because its utility is
(usually) context-specific. It may be that ideology is more context-dependent
3.
other social science terms-that it travels with less ease across geoand
theoretical boundaries. But all terms face this difficulty, and must
graphic
generally accept a restricted ambit of applicability in exchange for a wide
range of attributes (Sartori 1970).
The task of definition we must leave to the writer, situated in a particular
problem, region, time-period, and methodology. It is important to state the
obvious: different definitions of ideology will be useful for different purposes.
It is hoped that the task of definition will be made easier by this seven-part
framework of the concept of ideology, which establishes a uniform grid upon
which one can identify, and hence compare, definitional choices. This will not
resolve the question of what constitutes a &dquo;best definition&dquo; in the specific case,
but it will at least give us grounds upon which to arbitrate disputes. Only by
accounting for all possible definitional choices, in a reasonably concise fashion, can we move forward the practical task of term definition.
To this might be appended one final note. It is essential that contextspecific definitions-all definitions, that is, that move beyond mere &dquo;coherence&dquo; (the core attribute) -recognize their situatedness in a more selfconscious
manner than has hitherto been the fashion. Those studying political behavior
at the individual level may have need of a slightly different concept than those
studying political organizations. Political parties may call forth a different set
of accompanying attributes than revolutionary cells. Ideology may be a fundamentally different phenomenon in modern and pre-modern societies, western and non-western societies, religious and secular societies, at mass and
elite levels, and so forth. These are necessarily matters of empirical investigation, but they are not merely of empirical import. If it is determined that the
mass publics experience and process political phenomena differently in different contexts it is entirely appropriate to define the concept differently in
than
most
983
these contexts-and, in doing so,

the concept (so defined) applies.
to
acknowledge the limited terrain to which
Employing Strategies of Redefinition: Ideology in the Field of Political &dquo;Behavior&dquo;

As a way of summarizing the points made in the foregoing discussion, and as
an example of how these strategies of definition might be employed in a specific
context, it may be useful to take a brief look at one particular area of endeavor. I
choose the field of &dquo;political behavior&dquo; because it is probably of greatest interest to
the readers of this journal, but I assume that the general strategies of definition
outlined in this study would work with equal facility in other social science domains (even, I think, within the domain of political theory).
The good news for behavioralists is that the thrust of most empirical
investigation-into matters of coherence (or &dquo;constraint,&dquo; &dquo;consistency&dquo;)-coincides with the core meaning of the concept of ideology. It is, therefore, perfectly justifiable to call an individual with highly coherent views on political
matters an &dquo;ideologue.&dquo; Indeed, there does not seem to be any other available
term for such an individual (or group). This does not, of course, resolve the
problem of how to judge coherence, or measure it. Here lies the source of a
good deal of the debate: namely, what things are to be compared and how
coherent must they be in order to qualify that group or individual as ideological ? Coherence may refer to the degree of fit among different issue-positions,
between issue-positions and core values, or between either of the foregoing
and larger ideological rubrics (e.g., &dquo;liberalism,&dquo; &dquo;conservatism&dquo;). One may
gauge the degree of coherence of these items along a single dimension (e.g.,
the left-right spectrum) or along several dimensions, and according to logical
relationships (often referred to as &dquo;deductive consistency&dquo;), self-defined relationships (aka &dquo;psychological consistency&dquo;), or empirical regularities (among
a group of individuals under study).&dquo;
Of relevance for present purposes are the following general points. First,
these arguments all revolve around the single attribute of coherence. Second,
arguments between these various ways of operationalizing coherence are endemic for the simple reason that none can claim any semantic (or &dquo;definitional&dquo;) priority. A writer finding coherence using one set of operationalizations
has just as much definitional ground to stand upon as a writer armed with
another set of operationalizations. It would be healthy for the field to
4.
32
The distinction between "deductive" and "psychological" consistency is explored in

Nelson (1977). The best recent reviews of the debate over how to measure coherence
(or "constraint") are Knight (1985), Luskin (1987) and Smith (1989). The dimensionality debate is discussed in Green (1988), Knight (1984; 1990), and Wilcox and Clausen
(1991).
984
acknowledge that the tit-for-tat nature of the debate is, in this sense, rooted in
the ambiguities of &dquo;coherence.&dquo; Needless to say, I do not think that replacing
coherence with, &dquo;consistency,&dquo; &dquo;constraint,&dquo; or &dquo;hierarchy&dquo; is likely to solve
this problem because, again, one is simply asserting-by definitional fiat, as it
were-that one particular understanding of togetherness should be privileged
above others.
empirical and conceptual dilemma lies in finding

reference
appropriate comparative
points. One may never resolve whether
members
of
the
the
general public are, or are not, ideological. The question,
phrased in such dichotomous term, hardly admits of a sensible answer. Surely,
as Nelson (1977: 576) suggests, ideological-ness is more usefully thought of
as a matter of degrees-which brings us to the question of comparative reference points. The standard reference for studies of the mass public has been
the political elite, and this seems an eminently useful, and answerable, question. If we cannot determine whether members of the American public qualify
as ideologues (since such a conclusion would be dependent upon arbitrary
choices about how to define ideology), we should at least be able to compare
their ideological-ness with the ideological-ness of national party delegates,
activists, politicians, and so forth. (It may even be that mass publics and elites
are not more or less, but instead, differently ideological.) Crossnational comparisons (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann 1990) would also seem eminently useful, allowing one to judge the ideological-ness of mass publics vis-A-vis each
other.
Other disputes within the behavioral field involve definitional attributes
that are more ambiguously situated in the concept of ideology Neither abstraction (7c) nor hierarchy (7e), for example, are always mentioned in work
on ideology. Even within behavioral work there is considerable disagreement
on the extent to which ideologues must be organized around concepts &dquo;of a
high order of abstraction&dquo; (Campbell et al. 1960: 193) or whether ideological
idea-elements must be hierarchically ordered (from most specific to most abstract) (ibid: 190; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). Not only are these definitional
attributes less often found in the literature, they are also contradicted by those
who view ideology as a largely unconscious, or preconscious affair (7p). The
use of high-order concepts like liberalism and conservatism presume a selfawareness that, many would argue, is not inherently ideological. One can be
ideological, from this perspective, without being able to explain ones ideology-at least not in so many words. The question &dquo;Why are you doing that?&dquo;
may have little meaning to ideologues.
It may seem that I am arguing at cross-purposes with myself here, since I
attempted to distinguish between ideology and political culture according to
ideologys more selfconscious expression. However, I am not arguing against
One way
out
of this
985
the use of either abstraction or hierarchy in definitions of ideology; I am merely

pointing out that they rest on shakier semantic ground than the core attribute
(coherence) and that they are likely, for this reason, to remain shaky. Definitions of ideology which impute sophistication (7h), as I have suggested, are on
even more tenuous ground, for this attribute runs headlong into well-established notions of ideology as simplicity (7j), distortion (7k), and dogmatism (7n)not to mention unconsciousness (7p). The movement underway to disentangle
sophistication from ideology (noted above) is auspicious.

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FIELD ESSAY

Ideology: A Definitional Analysis

Taylor Dark, Marissa Golden, Chris Muste, Hanna Pitkin,

helpful comments on various versions of this manuscript.

disagreement, and so much selfconscious discussion of the disagreement, as

bination of these characteristics? Is it separate from group affiliation and/or party

operationalized in different ways, raising a second tier of disputes.

writers take the

declaiming its ambiguities?

First, many of these neologisms fail

to capture the political connotations

titude,&dquo; and &dquo;symbol&dquo;

language, it is virtually impossible to dislodge an existing term.

of associated traits which

the work of political scientists, social

psychologists, political anthropologists,

philosophers worth their salt now have a &dquo;concept of ideology,&dquo; which

frequent referent the term is often

fashion. In Marxs German

political cognition, social strain, cultural strain (Bluhm

al. 1950; Tetlock 1983), irrational features of the cultural

review of this genre, which is rooted in the work of

Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons.

that which might normally be pursued. Eagleton apparently intends to leave

foregoing arguments can be briefly restated. First, recurring disputes

delimit the process of concept formation with respect to this critical

The following framework contains all attributes regularly associated with

Where is ideology located-in the mind, in behavior, and or in language?

(1971: 655), for example,

meant originally a &dquo;science of ideas&dquo;) as a set of beliefs, values,

ideology as &dquo;a verbal image of the good society.&dquo; Thompson (1984:

important to recognize that the debate over &dquo;location&dquo; is not simply a

mains the central desideratum.

However, there are many others who argue

Pocock (1975; 1985), Skinner (1978), and

ideology is often defined as pertaining more broadly to relationships based on

explicit political content.

ideology legitimates a relationship of domination, or an &dquo;out-group&dquo;

general notion of &dquo;structures of domination. 1117 Ideology, in this sense,

(a) Explaining. Ideology, Geertz (1964/1973: 218-19) writes, &dquo;is...the

possible to act purposefully within them.&dquo;

(b) Repressing. Propaganda, however, is the selfconscious manipulation of

&dquo;ideology allows only certain things to be communicated and discussed.

of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed

See Althusser (1971: 134), Corbett (1965:

138), Goldman (1969: 102-03),

al. (1960: 203-204) &dquo;whether self-interest proceeds in a simple and naked

of values and beliefs

in order for it to be considered &dquo;ideological.&dquo; However, exactly how coherent,

brics, has inspired

defining an "interest," see

Citrin and Green

(1990) and Kingdon

synthesis of this literature.

193) echo this traditional

associated with ideologues is that of sophistication.23 While political knowledge,

recognition of which would not be

1989: 137; Minar 1961: 323), &dquo;systematically distorted communication&dquo;

(1976), Connolly (1967), Feuer (1975: 254), Goldman (1969: 103),

See also Barth

(1962: 265-94), Bell (1960), Halle (1972: 116),

Rokeach (1960), Sartori (1969), Shils (1967: 66).

strategy when attempting to cope with semantic plenitude in a