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ARCHIE R. MAGARAO February 3, 2010

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Of Scholars

Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche is the most critical thinker among the

contemporary philosophers, in my own opinion. His opus Thus Spoke Zarathustra
is no other than a critique of the society in which he lived. His very
declaration, “God is dead”1 was accordingly a campaign against morality2. What
appears then is that Nietzsche is trying to deconstruct the normal mode and
common belief of his present society. On the far extent, Nietzsche criticizes
Christianity in its doctrine and in its teaching. He further motioned that
Christianity negates life, thus, he is tasked to take the part of affirming
life. In Martin Heidegger’s own reading of Zarathustra he says,

Zarathustra speaks on behalf of life, suffering, the

circle, and this is what he advocates. These three things, “life,
suffering, circle,” belong together, are the same. If we were
able to think this threefoldness correctly, as one and the same
thing, we could surmise whose advocate Zarathustra is, and who he
himself would be as that advocate. Of course, we could now break
in with a crude explanation, and assert with undeniable
correctness that in Nietzsche’s language, “life” means the will
to power as the fundamental characteristic of all beings, not
only of man. What “suffering” means Nietzsche states the
following words: “All that suffers, wills to live;” i.e.,
everything whose way is the Will to Power. This means: “The
formative powers collide.” “Circle” is the sign of the ring,
which flows back into itself and so always achieves the recurring
selfsameness.3

In this line, the section of his book Zarathustra Of Scholars delivers

the same point of reflection. It is no other than a critique of the scholars
during his time. Accordingly, the scholars are not searching the knowledge
1
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 41.
2
Samuel Enoch Stumpf and James Fieser, Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of
Philosophy 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 378.
3
Martin Heidegger, “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” in The New Nietzsche ed.
David B. Allison (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 65.
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that will shatter and compel people to think instead they seek and provide
knowledge which makes people mediocre. What is left then is a negation of
life’s exuberance than its promotion. Contrarily, Nietzsche wants to provoke
the idea that scholars should refrain from merely establishing systems of
self-evident truth. Rather they should be like Socrates who is dialectical in
approaching the issue on truth. Thus, one should be willing at times to
declare oneself against ones previous opinions.4 At this point, one could
infer that Nietzsche is asserting that truth is not something static and
stagnant but dialectical which means motion and change.

An Exposition

Primarily, the section “Of Scholars” as what was mentioned earlier is a

criticism to the scholars during the time of Nietzsche. If I have understood
it well, Nietzsche was saying that the scholars are afraid of going out of
their comfort zones that they are contented of delivering knowledge that
never shakes the people to live and affirm life. Like in Nietzsche’s famous
labeling in the section Of the Preachers of Death, the scholars are inclined
to teaching the doctrine of slow-death and nihilism. Hence, they fall under
the same contention: “‘He who goes on living is a fool, but we are such
fools! And precisely that is the most foolish thing in life...‘Life is only
suffering’ – thus others of them speak, and they do not lie: so see to it hat
you cease to live! So see to it that the life which is only suffering
ceases!”5

It is worth noticing that previous to the section Of Scholars Nietzsche

placed before it a section under the title Of Immaculate Perception. What
message might be found or deduced from the said well thought arrangement done
by Nietzsche himself is that “scholars seek only an ‘immaculate perception’
of the truth, looking to dig up knowledge without any particular goal in
mind.”6 Moreover, Nietzsche’s criticism, which is expressed through the
character of Zarathustra, conveys the notion that scholars a becoming

4
Samuel Enoch Stumpf and James Fieser, Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of
Philosophy, 380.
5
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 72.
6
Sparknotes, “Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra Commentary and Analysis,”
Sparknotes online; available from www. sparknotes.com; accessed 28 January 2010.
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uncreative and petty that they accumulate knowledge as if it were an amusing

pastime.7 Consequentially, if this behavior becomes rampant the production of
knowledge can never really soar high. Furthermore, such behavior will end up
producing no new knowledge. So much so that the field of inquiry will never
attain transcendence from culture and to whatever limits it, hence, the
Overman remains in the realms of oblivion.

As I lay asleep, a sheep ate at the ivy-wreath upon my head

– ate and said: ‘Zarathustra is no longer a scholar.’
It spoke and went away swiftly and proud. A child told me
of it.
I like to lie here where children play, beside the broken
wall, among thistles and red poppies.
To children I am still a scholar, and to thistles and to
red poppies, too. They are innocent, even in their wickedness.
But to the sheep I am no longer a scholar: thus my fate
will have it – blessed be my fate!
For this is the truth: I have left the house of scholars
and slammed the door behind me.
Too long did my soul sit hungry at their table; I have not
been schooled, as they have, to crack knowledge as one cracks
nuts.8

From the above opening speech of Zarathustra, it is implied that deep

within man is the craving and clutching spirit of rising above the human
existential condition. This is very much clear when he expressed the line:
too long did my soul sit hungry at their table. He happened to regret that he
was not schooled after all. On the other hand, the innocent symbolized by the
children, thistles and poppies still considers him a scholar. I would deduce
that the symbolism used by Nietzsche such as the children, thistles and
poppies which are quantifiably all in plural form represents the herd. It
suggests the conception that the scholar should rise above the mentality of
the herd. Being with the herd corrupts one’s power to create and the will to
power. The herd will just eat up one’s energy for creation and suppress one’s
desire towards excellence. The herd rather introduces the idea of the reading
idler or mediocrity. It gives no space for human becoming as what Martin
Heidegger would argue in his very own conception of the inauthentic existence
of the “they”. There is no doubt that this herd mentality is a very
nihilistic one in accordance to how Nietzsche views it. It also relates to
Nietzsche’s declaration: “God is dead.” Accordingly, “Nihilism is customarily

7
Ibid.
8
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 147.
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thought to be a consequence of the death of God…”9 In effect, since most of

the scholars during the time of Nietzsche were very much uncreative due to
their submersion to the herd they add up to the decline.

I love freedom and the air over fresh soil; I would sleep
on ox-skins rather than on their dignities and respectabilities.
I am too hot and scorched by my own thought: it is often
about to take my breath away. Then I have to get into the open
air and away from all dusty rooms.
But they sit cool in the cool shade: they want to be mere
spectators in everything and they take care not to sit where the
sun burns upon the steps.
Like those who stand in the street and stare at the people
passing by, so they too wait and stare at thoughts that other
thought.10

This portion is the genesis of Nietzsche critique to the scholars of

his time. Here he is contrasting Zarathustra’s freedom from the slavery of
the scholars or from their uncreativity. He even criticizes the so-called
dignity of the scholars. Further, he implies that what places Zarathustra
above and superior to the scholars is the fact that he is too hot and
scorched by his own thought. The originality and creativity of Zarathustra’s
thought is his greatest achievement against the scholars. Moreover,
Zarathustra disgusts the comfort seeking scholars who prefers to sit cool in
the cool shade. These scholars produce no other new knowledge but only the
same and paraphrased ones. Furthermore, these scholars do not tickle the mind
to think more. They simply rest in the comfort of the self-evident truth than
taking the risk and venture into the realms of dialectic. Nietzsche wishes to
make the scholars of his time like that of Plato and Socrates who instead of
relying upon the self-evident truth urges through their dialectic the
audience to think not just a mere thinking in a simple sense but to think
critically. Another, criticism Nietzsche raises is the fact the scholars
never tried going beyond of what is contemporarily thought of and even seeing
the other side. What might Nietzsche is pointing out is that as scholars one
should be able to transcend thinking. As what would Hans-Georg Gadamer imply
that to think or to understand is to transcend because the reality of human
understanding does not alone stresses the finitude of understanding but also
the possibility of seeing what is beyond. As spectators, the scholars do not
really possess the practical experience of the common people rather they
9
Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2006), 39.
10
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 147.
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merely remain in theory. Their thought and conception of reality is detached

from the dailyness of life. They made to believe that the theory they thought
of correspond directly to what is practical in life and for this I remember
David Hume saying that there is no such necessary connection. Moreover, being
a spectator in the line of argument of Pythagoras might be great because as
an spectator one can “reflect upon and analyze what is happening”11 in the
game, however, as an spectator isn’t it true, that though one sees the whole
game, in a high probability analyzes the game and can definitely see what the
players cannot see in the game, that what he perceives is still a partial
reality for surely the spectator cannot see and analyze what is at his back
while he is observing the game and the place where he is situated. It is a
fact that we only perceive singularly not totally but upon combining the
singulars we establish the whole.
The greatest crime that the scholars committed for Nietzsche is of
waiting and staring at thoughts that other thought. This is just a product of
mediocrity and complacency. By merely waiting and staring at thoughts that
other have thought makes one not a scholar in Nietzsche’s own judgment. Being
so only makes one a repeater of what has been said and it is like a tape
being replayed again and again. On the other hand, Nietzsche is challenging
the scholars to think beyond not just to think what others have thought of
before. Now, in relation to his critique to the herd mentality which is
highly Christian, scholars should transcend from such same line of thinking.
I would infer that for Nietzsche to think differently is not wrong rather it
is the venue for new horizon of knowledge. Furthermore, in not thinking
beyond and differently one can never see the error(s) and flaw(s) of the pre-
given mentality. By thinking differently one challenges the validity,
credibility and truthfulness of the said mentality. It may even be found
along the process of investigation that its claim of truth are mere
inventions and unfounded. I would say that truth as truth must be able to
remain standing against all inquiries and criticisms and through this alone
can the claimed truth be purified, justified, and proved as truthful.
When they give themselves out as wise, their little sayings
and truths make me shiver: their wisdom often smells as if it
came from the swamp: and indeed, I have heard the frog croak in
it!
They are clever, they have cunning fingers: what is my
simplicity compared with their diversity? Their fingers

11
Samuel Enoch Stumpf and James Fieser, Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History
of Philosophy, 12.
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understand all threading and knitting and weaving: thus they

weave the stockings of the spirit!
They are excellent clocks: only be careful to wind them up
properly! Then they tell the hour without error and make a modest
noise in doing so.
They work like mills and rammers: just throw seed-corn into
them! – they know how to grind corn small and make white dust of
it.
They keep sharp eye upon one another and do not trust one
another as well as they might. Inventive in small slynesses, they
lie in wait for those whose wills go upon lame feet – they lie in
wait like spiders.
I have seen how carefully they prepare their poisons; they
always put on protective gloves.
They also know how to play with loaded dice; and I found
them playing so zealously that they were sweating.
We are strangers to one another, and their virtues are even
more opposed to my taste than are their falsehoods and loaded
dice.

The scholars without hesitance profess that they are wise and possesses
wisdom. But their wisdom is very meager, actually, that to those who really
are able to think as the way thinking should be will just consider the wisdom
of the scholars as mere joke like the frog that croaks in the swamp. There is
an insightful proverb that says, “The most dangerous man in the world is the
man who read only one book.” It is so because such a man will think that what
he read is the whole truth and the only truth, no more and no less. It will
be the same as with the scholars that Nietzsche criticizes.
The scholars compared to Zarathustra are much diverse and, if I were to
add, sophisticated. What they call wisdom might just be cleverness. In the
end, as what I understood from Nietzsche’s critique, these scholars do not
really understand the difference between true wisdom and cleverness more so
that they misconstrue wisdom from cleverness. Nietzsche also labels them
clocks and not only simple clocks but excellent clocks, which for me give the
impression that they really mastered their trade. But they might be jacks of
all trades but they are master of none. In addition, as clocks the scholars
characteristically do not go outside the parameters of the structure and
there is no hope in them to deconstruct whatever is pre-given and to create
something new. They do not have any sense of wonder and they do not have the
eyes of the eagle, as symbolically used by Nietzsche, which sees beyond the
horizon. In a nut shell, one cannot find any will to create in the scholars.
Also, as clocks they only function within the standards priorly handed down
to them. Besides, their function is meaningless and paralyzed outside the
identity of being a clock, metaphorically speaking. “Thus, Nietzsche
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conjectures that we have become accustomed to interpreting the world in terms

of three basic categories: the idea that the world proceeds toward a final
aim, that its multiplicity can be subsumed under an all-encompassing unity,
and that its essential character is being instead of becoming.”12 This state
of being accustomed to the familiar way of interpreting the world is what
identifies the scholars as excellent clocks but still clocks. A clock no
matter how excellent it becomes will always be a clock and this means that it
is devoid of any possibility of becoming and transcending from what is a
clock. Due to their familiarity of what is there they really work well but
beyond the sphere of their familiar world they are numb and dead as those in
the graves.
These scholars, according to Zarathustra, do not really trust each
other more so that they prevent anyone to transcend. They do so because they
are afraid of any will to power that is why they lie in wait like poisonous
spiders waiting for some insects to trap and chain. Moreover, they do not
trust each other because by leaving the other unguarded he might discover and
expose the truth that will jeopardize the established conventional truth they
preserved for thousands of years. This is really a hindrance for the will to
create and it is even a death to whatever creative power lies therein. To
those who try to rise above they already prepared a poison of which they
themselves are putting on gloves for protection because they knew so well
that such poison knows no friend and will even kill them if they remain
reckless. With such identity and character of scholars, Zarathustra opposes
and sets himself free.
And when I lived among them I lived above them. They grew
angry with me for that.
They did not want to know that someone was walking over
their heads; and so they put wood and dirt and rubbish between
their heads and me.
Thus they muffled the sound of my steps: and from then on
the most scholarly heard me the worst.
They put all the faults and weaknesses of mankind between
themselves and me – they call this a ‘false flooring’ in their
houses.
But I walk above their heads with my thoughts in spite of
that; and even if I should walk upon my own faults, I should
still be above them and their heads.
For men are not equal: thus speaks justice. And what I
desire they may not desire!

At this point, Nietzsche did not deny the fact he lived with scholars.
The only distinction is that he thinks differently from them and this might

12
Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 49.
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be the point that qualifies Nietzsche’s assertion that he lived above them.
As a result, this deviation of Zarathustra provoked the anger of the scholars
against him. But this anger of the scholars, I believe, against Zarathustra
is no other than the product of protecting the establish truth. Because
compared to them Zarathustra goes beyond the limits of the conventionality
and even endeavors to see what is beyond it. Moreover, the danger of such
action is that by learning the truth of what is beyond it might challenge or
even replace the truth which they held so dear since time immemorial. This
unfortunately cannot be for the scholars because it yields only to their own
dethronement and the power which they enjoy might just as well disappear from
their grasp. Contrarily, Nietzsche conceives truth as “a mobile army of
metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphism. His view at this time is that
arbitrariness prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the
transformation of nerve stimuli into images, and ‘truth’ is nothing more than
the invention of fixed conventions for practical purposes, especially those
of repose, security and consistency. Viewing human existence from a great
distance, Nietzsche further notes that there was an eternity before human
beings came into existence, and believes that after humanity dies out,
nothing significant will have changed in the great scheme of things.”13
Lastly, Zarathustra boast that he possesses a far superior thought to
those of the scholars not because he has some sort of superhuman powers but
that his thought, in my own opinion, is free compared to that of the
scholars. It is free true to the fact that his thinking is not subject to the
dictate of the society or the herd and to the commonly accepted norms which
many believe as the truth. Although, the scholars promote the idea that all
men are equal but Zarathustra endorses the other way around. For what reason?
The will to power becomes an impossibility if all men are equal. The “will to
power” is “a natural expression of strength. People are differentiated into
ranks, and it is only quantity of power that determines and distinguishes
one’s rank. Thus, ideals such as political and social equality are
nonsensical. There can be no equality where there are in fact different
degrees of power. Equality can only mean the leveling downward of everyone to
the mediocrity of the herd.”14 Moreover, equality does not allow the making of
the Overman. In the state of equality, no one is permitted to rise above

13
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Friedrich Nietzsche,” Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy; available from www.plato.stanford.edu; accessed 30 January 2010.
14
Samuel Enoch Stumpf and James Fieser, Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History
of Philosophy, 386.
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anyone else and from one’s existential condition. Any deviation is a crime,
therefore.

Conclusion

Friedrich Nietzsche has a point. Any knowledge that does not tickle the
mind to think is useless because it does not make something which is new.
Nevertheless, the danger and risk of introducing new way of thinking or
knowledge may put the current authority or culture into the crucible of
inquiry and doubt. What is worst is when the introduction of the new thinking
removes and smashes the incumbent norms which the people believe to be the
truth. In this relation, Nietzsche sets the notion that truth is dialectical.
Therefore, it is not stable rather it is oriented towards becoming.
People who are really considered and recognized as the thinking group
of the society should, according to Nietzsche, liberate themselves from the
comfort confines of the herd mentality. They should refrain from thinking
what the others have already thought. Rather they must possess the will to
create. This, however, implies taking risk that upon willing to create one
might put oneself challenging the establish truth of the society. When most
people concern and identify themselves only with what is acceptable and good
according to the criteria set by the society, one should be able to think
differently and away from such ideology. Well, what is wrong with thinking
differently? Sometimes in doing so because one does no longer act to what is
expected from him or her by the society the automatic response and remedy is
to declare that one is insane and an outcast. It is like Jesus who upon
correcting the flawed and distorted teachings of the Jewish authorities was
judged worthy of crucifixion. For Nietzsche there is nothing wrong here, what
is the most important is that compared to those who think that they have the
truth and are slaves to such ideals, one, on the other hand, is free from
such concerns and slavery. This liberation then for Nietzsche opens the way
of the Overman.
Above all claims, what remains certain is the truth that there is
something we do not know. Knowing that we do not everything is much certain
than what we already and about know, for who really can ascertain that what
we know is what we really know. What we believe to be the truth might not be
the truth after all. That is why the only sure thing is that there is
something which we do not know.
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