Arriola vs. Arriola

666
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Arriola vs. Arriola
*
G.R.No.177703.January28,2008.
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.

ARRIOLA, petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA,
respondent.
Civil Procedure; Contempt; Requirements for Initiating an
Indirect Contempt Proceeding; Filing of a verified petition that has
complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading,
is mandatory.UndertheaforecitedsecondparagraphoftheRules,
therequirementsforinitiatinganindirectcontemptproceedingare
a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it
should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadingsforcivilactions.InRegalado v. Go,514SCRA616(2007),
weheld:AsexplainedbyJusticeFlorenzRegalado,the filing of a
verified petition that has complied with the requirements for
the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatoryxxx.
Civil Law; Family Code; Family Home; One significant
innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic
constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a
family residence without need anymore for the judicial or
extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to
251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court.One
significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the
automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
occupationasafamilyresidence,without
_______________
* THIRDDIVISION.
667
VOL.542,JANUARY28,2008
667
Arriola vs. Arriola

need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided
under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule
106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153
specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
dwellingstructureinwhichthefamilyresidesbutalsototheloton
whichitstands.Thus,applyingtheseconcepts,thesubjecthouseas
wellasthespecificportionofthesubjectlandonwhichitstandsare
deemedconstitutedasafamilyhomebythedeceasedandpetitioner
Vilmafromthemomenttheybeganoccupyingthesameasafamily
residence20yearsback.
Same; Same; Same; It being settled that the subject house (and
the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased
and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under
Article 159 of The Family Code.It being settled that the subject
house(andthesubjectlotonwhichitstands)isthefamilyhomeof
the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz.: Article 159.
The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spousesoroftheunmarriedheadofthefamilyfor a period of ten
yearsorforaslongasthereisaminorbeneficiary,andthe heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor.This rule shall apply regardless of whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis
supplied.)ThepurposeofArticle159istoavertthedisintegrationof
the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it
preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love,
security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its
partition:first,thattheheirscannotextrajudiciallypartitionitfor
aperiodof10yearsfromthedeathofoneorbothspousesorofthe
unmarriedheadofthefamily,orforalongerperiod,ifthereisstill
a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs
cannotjudiciallypartitionitduringtheaforesaidperiodsunlessthe
court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has
beenallegedbytheparties;norhastheRTCfoundanycompelling
reasontoorderthepartitionofthefamilyhome,eitherbyphysical
segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction
saleassuggestedbytheparties.
Same; Same; Same; Article 159 imposes the proscription against
the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its
668
668
Arriola vs. Arriola
ownership.Article 159 imposes the proscription against the

immediatepartitionofthefamilyhomeregardlessofitsownership.
Thissignifiesthatevenifthefamilyhomehaspassedbysuccession
to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an
ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by
the law. The rights of the individual coowner or owner of the
familyhomecannotsubjugatetherightsgrantedunderArticle159
tothebeneficiariesofthefamilyhome.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionand
resolutionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Oliver O. Lozanoforpetitioners.
Nelson A. Clementeforrespondent.
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
underRule45oftheRulesofCourt,assailingtheNovember
1
2
30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.93570.
Therelevantfactsareculledfromtherecords.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil
ActionNo.030010withtheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch
254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial
partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the
decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel
with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner
Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife,
petitionerVilma.
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mariflor P.

PunzalanCastillo;Rollo,p.96.
2Id.,atp.115.
669
669
Arriola vs. Arriola

On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the
dispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John
NaborC.Arriola,VilmaG.ArriolaandAnthonyRonaldG.
Arriola in equal shares of onethird (1/3) each without
prejudicetotherightsofcreditorsormortgageesthereon,if
any;
2. Attorneys fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00)PESOSisherebyawardedtobereimbursedby
thedefendantstotheplaintiff;
3. Costsagainstthedefendants.
3
SOORDERED.
ThedecisionbecamefinalonMarch15,2004.
Asthepartiesfailedtoagreeonhowtopartitionamong
them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land),
respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and
5
petitionersaccededtoit. Accordingly,theRTCorderedthe
6
publicauctionofthesubjectland. Thepublicauctionsale
wasscheduledonMay31,2003butithadtoberesetwhen
petitioners refused to include in the auction
the house
7
(subjecthouse)standingonthesubjectland. Thisprompted
respondent to file with the RTC an
Urgent Manifestation
8
andMotionforContemptofCourt, prayingthatpetitioners
bedeclaredincontempt.
_______________
3Rollo,p.28.
4CADecision,id.,atp.98.
5SeeRTCOrderdatedAugust30,2005,id.,atp.33.
6Id.
7Id.
8Rollo,p.20.
670
670
Arriola vs. Arriola
9
TheRTCdeniedthemotioninanOrder datedAugust30,
2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in
refusingtohavethesubjecthouseincludedintheauction,
thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house
or improvement erected on the property should not be included in
theauctionsale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the
evidence adduced during the exparte hearing clearly show that
nothingwasmentionedaboutthehouseexistingonthelandsubject
matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiffs [respondents] initiatory
Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house.
Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its
adjudicationofthesubjectlandbecauseitwasplaintiffhimselfwho
failedtoallegethesame.Itisawellsettledrulethatthecourtcan
not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered
accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to
plaintiffs[a]rightwhichhasneverbeenconsideredorpassedupon
duringthetrialonthemerits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise,
only the land should be partitioned in accordance to [sic] the
aforementionedDecisionasthehousecannotbesaidtohavebeen
necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared
asacoownerofthesamehousewithoutevidencethereofanddue
hearingthereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as
correctly pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it
mightbeerroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
10
SOORDERED.
The RTC, in its Order dated January

3, 2006, denied
11
respondentsMotionforReconsideration.
_______________
9Supranote5.
10Rollo,pp.3435.
11
Id., atp.49.
671
671
Arriola vs. Arriola

12
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari

where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and
prayedthathebeallowedtoproceedwiththeauctionofthe
subjectlandincludingthesubjecthouse.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the
PetitionforCertiorari,towit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders
datedAugust30,2005andJanuary3,2006issuedbytheRTC,in
CivilCaseNo.SCA030010,areREVERSEDandSETASIDE,and
the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale
of the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the
house constructed thereon.
13
SOORDERED. (Emphasissupplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

but the CA
14
deniedthesameinitsResolution ofApril30,2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the
CAerredinholdingthattheRTCcommittedgraveabuseof
discretionindenyingthemotionforcontemptofcourt.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be
modified for reasons other than those advanced by
petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was
oneforindirectcontempt.Section4,Rule71oftheRulesof
Court prescribes the procedure for the institution of
proceedingsforindirectcontempt,viz.:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced.Proceedings for indirect
contemptmaybeinitiatedmotu propriobythecourtagainstwhich
thecontemptwascommittedbyanorderoranyotherformalcharge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punishedforcontempt.
_______________
12Rollo,p.51.
13Id.,atp.105.
14Id.,atp.115.
672
672
Arriola vs. Arriola
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be

commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned.Ifthecontemptchargesaroseoutoforarerelatedtoa
principalactionpendinginthecourt,thepetitionforcontemptshall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
jointhearinganddecision.(Emphasessupplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the

requirementsforinitiatinganindirectcontemptproceeding
area)thatitbeinitiatedbywayofaverifiedpetitionandb)
thatitshouldfullycomplywiththerequirementsforfiling
15
initiatorypleadingsforcivilactions.InRegalado v. Go, we
held:
AsexplainedbyJusticeFlorenzRegalado,the filing of a verified
petition that has complied with the requirements for the
filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatoryxxx:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper
procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such
proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former
Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for
any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees
therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this
amendedsection.
xxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu
propriobyorderoforaformalchargebytheoffendedcourt,allcharges
shallbecommencedbyaverifiedpetitionwithfullcompliancewiththe
requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the
secondparagraphofthissection.
_______________
15G.R.No.167988,February6,2007,514SCRA616.
673
673
Arriola vs. Arriola

xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case
over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules
direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of
the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites
for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a
verified petition, attachment of a certification on nonforum
shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be
faithfully observed.
xxxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and
categoricallanguage.Incasewheretheindirectcontemptchargeis
not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which
fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite.
Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified
petitionininitiatinganindirectcontemptproceeding.Truly,priorto
the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion
without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings

wastoleratedbythecourts.Attheonsetofthe1997RevisedRules
of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
16
countenanced. (Emphasisours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect

contemptproceedinginitiatedbyrespondent.Thelatterdid
not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of
Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation
and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified
petition.Helikewisedidnotconformwiththerequirements
forthefilingofinitiatorypleadingssuchasthesubmission
ofacertificationagainstforumshoppingandthepaymentof
docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been
dismissedoutrightbytheRTC.
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 632634, 636; see also Land
Bank of the Philippines v.
Listana, Sr.,455Phil.750,758759;408SCRA328,334335(2003).
674
674
Arriola vs. Arriola
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked

the infirmities in respondents unverified motion for
contempt, in the end, it dismissed the motion, albeit on
substantivegrounds.Thetroubleisthat,intheCAdecision
assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same
oversight by delving into the merits of respondents
unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein.
Thus,strictlyspeaking,theproperdispositionofthepresent
petitionoughttobethereversaloftheCAdecisionandthe
dismissal of respondents unverified motion for contempt
filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4,
Rule71.
However,suchsimplisticdispositionwillnotputanend
tothedisputebetweentheparties.Aseedoflitigationhas
alreadybeensownthatwilllikelysproutintoanothercase
between them at a later time. We refer to the question of
whetherthesubjecthouseshouldbeincludedinthepublic
auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally
resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the
parties. We must therefore deal with it squarely, here and
now.
TheRTCandtheCAdifferedintheirviewsonwhether
the public auction should include the subject house. The
RTCexcludedthesubjecthousebecauserespondentnever
alleged its existence in his complaint
for partition or
17
established his coownership
thereof.
On the other hand,
18
19
20
citingArticles440, 445 and446 oftheCivilCode,theCA
held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also
ownedthesubject
_______________
17Supranote5.
18Article440.Theownershipofpropertygivestherightbyaccession
to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or

attachedthereto,eithernaturallyorartificially.
19
Article 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the

owneroftheland,subjecttotheprovisionsofthefollowingarticles.
20Article446.Allworks,sowingandplantingarepresumedmadeby
theownerandathisexpense,unlessthecontraryisproved.
675
675
Arriola vs. Arriola

housewhichisamereaccessorytotheland.Bothproperties
form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in
coownershipbyhisheirs,thepartiesherein.Hence,theCA
concludesthatanydecisionintheactionforpartitionofsaid
estate should21cover not just the subject land but also the
subjecthouse. TheCAfurtherpointedoutthatpetitioners
themselvesimplicitlyrecognizedtheinclusionofthesubject
house in the partition of the subject land when they
proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the following
swappingarrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only
poorandsimplepeople.Weareverymuchpleasedwiththedecision
of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las
Pias, on the sharing of onethird (1/3) each of a land covered by
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.383714(84191)inLasPiasCity.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our
residenceformorethantwenty(20)years,wewishtorequestthat
the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants
dependingonthechoiceoftheplaintiffbetweenitem(1)oritem(2),
detailedasfollows:
(1)Swapwitha500squaremeters[sic]lotlocatedatBarasRizal
xxx.
(2)CashofP205,700.00xxx.
22
xxxx.
Weagreethatthesubjecthouseiscoveredbythejudgment
of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify,
however,thatthisrulingdoesnotnecessarilycountenance
theimmediateandactualpartitionofthesubjecthouseby
wayofpublicauctioninviewofthesuspensiveproscription
imposedunderArticle159ofTheFamilyCodewhichwillbe
discussedforthwith.
_______________
21CADecision,Rollo,p.100.
22Rollo,pp.102103.
676
676
Arriola vs. Arriola

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not
specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such
omissionnotwithstanding,thesubjecthouseisdeemedpart
ofthejudgmentofpartitionfortwocompellingreasons.
First,ascorrectlyheldbytheCA,undertheprovisionsof
the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the
subjectland.TheCourtquoteswithapprovaltherulingof
theCA,towit:
TheRTC,intheassailedOrderdatedAugust30,2005ratiocinated
that since the house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged
inthecomplaintanditsownershipwasnotpasseduponduringthe
trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its
adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it
cannot give a relief to [sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in
thecomplaint.
Wearenotpersuaded.
TofollowtheforegoingreasoningoftheRTCwillineffectrender
meaninglessthepertinentruleonaccession.Ingeneral,the right
to accession is automatic (ipso jure),requiring no prior act
on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the
improvements including the house were not alleged in the
complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot
on which they stand, following the principle of accession.
Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this
case includes the house which is permanently attached
thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the
principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is
23
permanently attached thereto. (Emphasissupplied)
Second,respondenthasrepeatedlyclaimedthatthesubject
24
house was built by the deceased. Petitioners never
controvertedsuchclaim.Thereisthennodisputethatthe
subjecthouseispartoftheestateofthedeceased;assuch,it
isowned
_______________
23CADecision,Rollo,p.104.
24 Motion for Reconsideration, id.,
at p. 36; Petition for Certiorari,
id.,atp.51.
677
677
Arriola vs. Arriola

25
incommonbythelattersheirs,thepartiesherein,
anyone
26
ofwhom,underArticle494 oftheCivilCode,may,atany
27
time,demandthepartitionofthesubjecthouse. Therefore,
respondents recourse to the partition of the subject house
cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical
omission of said common property from the complaint for
partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize
that, while we treat the subject house as part of the
coownership of the parties, we stop short of

authorizing its actual partition by public auction at
this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition
involvestwophases:first,thedeclarationoftheexistenceof
astateofcoownership;andsecond,theactualterminationof
that state of coownership
through the segregation of the
28
commonproperty. Whatissettledthusfarisonlythefact
that the subject house is under the coownership of the
parties,andthereforesusceptibleofpartitionamongthem.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public
auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different
matter,dependingontheexactnatureofthesubjecthouse.
Respondent claims that the subject house
was built by
29
decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add
30
that said house has been their residence for 20 years.
Taken together, these averments on record establish that
thesubject
_______________
25Generosa
v. PanganValera,G.R.No.166521, August 31, 2006, 500
SCRA620,628.
26
Article 494. No coowner shall be obliged to remain in the co
ownership.Eachcoownermaydemandatanytimethepartitionofthe
thingownedincommon,insofarashisshareisconcerned.
27
BravoGuerrero v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152658, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 244, 266; De Guia v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447, 464; 413
SCRA114(2003).
28
MaglucotAw v. Maglucot, 385 Phil. 720, 730; 329 SCRA 78, 89
(2000).
29Supranote24.
30Petition,Rollo,p.6.
678
678
Arriola vs. Arriola
house is a family home within the contemplation of the

provisionsofTheFamilyCode,particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
housewheretheyandtheirfamilyreside,andthelandonwhichit
issituated.
Article153.Thefamilyhomeisdeemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to
be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowedbylaw.(Emphasissupplied.)
OnesignificantinnovationintroducedbyTheFamilyCode
is the automatic constitution of the family home from the
time of its occupation as a family residence, without need
anymoreforthejudicialorextrajudicialprocessesprovided
underthedefunctArticles224to251oftheCivilCodeand
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152
and153specificallyextendthescopeofthefamilyhomenot
just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides
butalsotothelotonwhichitstands.Thus,applyingthese
concepts,thesubjecthouseaswellasthespecificportionof
thesubjectlandonwhichitstandsaredeemedconstituted
asafamilyhomebythedeceasedandpetitionerVilmafrom
the moment they began
occupying the same as a family
31
residence20yearsback.
Itbeingsettledthatthesubjecthouse(andthesubjectlot
onwhichitstands)isthefamilyhomeofthedeceasedand
his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition
underArticle159ofTheFamilyCode,viz.:
_______________
31 Spouses
Versola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164740, July 31,
2006,497SCRA385,392.
679
679
Arriola vs. Arriola

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.(Emphasissupplied.)
ThepurposeofArticle159istoavertthedisintegrationof
thefamilyunitfollowingthedeathofitshead.Tothisend,
it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of
family love, security and unity by imposing the following
restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
extrajudiciallypartitionitforaperiodof10yearsfromthe
deathofoneorbothspousesoroftheunmarriedheadofthe
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs
cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No
compellingreasonhasbeenallegedbytheparties;norhas
theRTCfoundanycompellingreasontoorderthepartition
of the family home, either by physical segregation or
assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggestedbytheparties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription
against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the
familyhomehaspassedbysuccessiontothecoownershipof
the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property,muchlessdispeltheprotectioncastuponitbythe
law. The rights of the individual coowner or owner of the
family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under
Article159tothebeneficiariesofthefamilyhome.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home
consistingofthesubjecthouseandlotonwhichitstands
cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to
the coownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent
Fidel
680
680
Arriola vs. Arriola
32
diedonMarch10,2003. Thus,for10yearsfromsaiddate
or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is
still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home
he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no
compellingreasonexistsforthecourttootherwisesetaside
therestrictionandorderthepartitionoftheproperty.
33
TheCourtruledinHonrado v. Court of Appeals thata
claim for exception from execution or forced sale under
Article153shouldbesetupandprovedtotheSheriffbefore
thesaleofthepropertyatpublicauction.Hereinpetitioners
timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house
althoughforadifferentreason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA
ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of
coownership and partition. The same evidence also
establishes that the subject house and the portion of the
subjectlandonwhichitisstandinghavebeenconstituted
as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs.
Consequently,itsactualandimmediatepartitioncannotbe
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the
deathofFidelArriola,oruntilMarch10,2013.
Itbearsemphasis,however,thatinthemeantime,there
isnoobstacletotheimmediatepublicauctionoftheportion
ofthesubjectlandcoveredbyTCTNo.383714,whichfalls
outsidethespecificareaofthefamilyhome.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisPARTLYGRANTEDand
the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007
ResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsareMODIFIEDinthat
the house standing on the land covered by Transfer
CertificateofTitleNo.383714isDECLAREDpartoftheco
ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED
frompartitionbypublicauction
_______________
32RTCDecision,Rollo,p.26.
33G.R.No.166333,November25,2005,476SCRA280.
681
681
Arriola vs. Arriola

withintheperiodprovidedforinArticle159oftheFamily
Code.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago (Chairperson), Corona,** Nachura
andReyes, JJ.,concur.
Petition
modified.
partly
granted,
judgment
and
resolution
Note.Respondents are liable for indirect contempt

whentheyopenlydisobeyedtheCourtsdecision.(Province
of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon, 367 SCRA 91
[2001])
o0o
_______________
** In lieu of Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario, per Special Order No.
484datedJanuary11,2008.
682
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Arriola vs. Arriola

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VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.