AKBAR

AND
HIS AGE

Editor
Iqtidar Alam Khan

NORTHERN BOOK CENTRE

NEW DELHI
1991
 NINE • Hajj Without Spice?
Politics of Religion between
Akbar and the Portuguese

TEOTONIO R DE SOUZA

HE recent writings of M.N. Pearson

have roused historians' interest in the
Tthemes relating to the economic and
political aspects of hall under Akbar l . One looks forward to his
promised follow-up attempting more concentrated treatment of
the economic aspects of the problem, namely, the aspect of so-
called ha]] market. In this brief essay, an attempt is made to tbuch
on this economic aspect with an aim to highlight what appears to
be Akbar's counterpart to Vasco da Gama's "Christians and
Spices".
"Christians and Spices" hardly explains why the Portuguese
came to India in the late fifteenth century, yet at the least both strands
were there and were important. Nor is it entirely correct to see religion
as merely providing a sacral coating on the hard and more basic
economic motivations. Most Portuguese were God-fearing, did try to
follow their religion as they saw it, and could be swayed by appeals
from their priests. So also for most of the Muslim pilgrims trade was
not the main motive for performing kV, even though Muhammad
himself came from a trading town and had been a trader in his youth.
If many pilgrims carried some goods for sale on the way or in Mecca,
that was meant for meeting the expenses of the journey and stay. If
some merchants travelled with the hpjj caravan, that was largely to
take advantage of safety in company. In the case of Akbar, he was
not initiating the custom of Ilajj pilgrimage. It was already a reality
before his appearance on the scene. By ensuring the safety of the
pilgrims through his territory and territorial waters he could assert
his political sovereignty and win the goodwill of his Muslim sub-
jects. At least till 1581, he officially sponsored the annual hail and
 Hajj Without Spice 107
had even a mir hajj to organize and lead the pilgrimage with
imperial gift offerings for the holy cities. 2 Akbar also found hajj
useful for banishing from his presence some unwanted elements
from close imperial circles, like the two 'ulama, Makhdum-ul Mulk
and Sheikh Abdul Nabi, who had been quarreling violently at his
court. Also a noble opposed to his confidant Abu'l Fazl was
removed in the same way. Much earlier, when Akbar wanted to
take charge of the empire and do without the oppressive advice of
Bairam Khan, Akbar allowed him to go on hail." But the promotion
of hajj was also important for Akbar in the context of the expan-
sionist moves of the Ottoman empire which had taken over the
Mamaluke control of the pilgrimage centres after 1517 and was
engaged in checking the Portuguese depredations affecting the
Indian Ocean trade and the hall traffic. For a rationalist Akbar
who was bent on accomodating religions (including Islam) to his
imperial objectives, his interest in the hajj surely had its spicy
content as well. Hence the present attempt to bring out this element
from some of the contemporary or quasi-contemporary Por-
tuguese documentation and to corroborate it from some of the
available published studies, including Pearson's, whose debt has
already been acknowledged above.5
In order to clarify further the use of the term "spice" in the title,
it is suggested to be understood as a generic term covering all impor-
tant market commodities on the hajj route. The foreign trade of the
Indian Ocean was generally known as the "spice trade", a name
which in fact covered a variety of goods. The spices may have been
the dominant export item in the sixteenth century, but the textiles
were always there as the outstanding contribution of the Gujarati
trade even before the North Europeans made it a staple of theirs for
a long time. However, despite the Portuguese attempts to control the
spice exports in the Indian Ocean, the sultanate of Acheh in North
Sumatra and the Dutch from Batavia continued exporting spices,
specially cloves, via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The failure of
the Portuguese to gain control of Aden, or to hold Hormuz made it
impossible for them to enforce their exclusive control over the "spice
route".6
The monsoons made the west coast of India, and particularly the
ports of Gujarat, an indispensable stopover on the spice route. The
Gujarati businessmen had succeeded by the end of the fifteenth
century in making Gujarat the greatest economic power of the Indian
Ocean, and perhaps of the whole world? The heartland of the Indus-
Ganges plains could be tapped effectively from west coast ports in
Gujarat, especially Cambay. Tome Pires, the early sixteenth century
 108 TEOTONIO R. DE SOUZA

Portuguese visitor, wrote that "Cambay stretches out two arms, with
her right arm she reaches towards Aden and with the other towards
Malacca, as the most important places to sail to". 8 In the fifteenth
century, Gujarat was the chief beneficiary of Northern India's rise to
prosperity, becoming the heartland of the most important single trade
diaspora of the Indian Ocean, a position it held to the late seventeenth
century, inspite of European competition. 9 Surat was connected by
important land routes with the major centres of production in India.
One such road led to Baroda and Ahmedabad via Broach; other road
took the travellers through Rajasthan or Malwa to Agra and Delhi
and to Gwalior, where the Gujarati merchants had their agents.1°
Greater stability and prosperity brought by Akbar's rule to the com-
mercial hinterland of Gujarat must have added to its importance in
the trade network of the Indian Ocean, including its implications for
the hajj pilgrimage. About twenty Gujarati ships sailed every year
from Surat to Mocha and fedda carrying pilgrims for the liajj as well
as the annual trade of much of Northem and Western India. And
because of attacks made by European and other pirates on the Red
Sea fleet at the close of the seventeenth century, the Mughal govern-
ment ordered the Dutch East India Company lodge at Surat to provide
escort vessels for the Gujarati ships on the Mocha run. These included
the imperial ships, which were meant to be primarily pilgrim vessels
but were much favoured by the Surat merchants for carrying freight.
They were also considered "safer" and enjoyed certain privileges at
Mocha and jedda.11
It is important for the theme of this essay to raise the question
about the economic importance of the Ocean trade for Akbar. Some
historians have asserted that it was minimal, and that only about
five per cent of his total revenue came from the sea customs,
although some of the land-based revenues were related to sea-
trade, such as crops grown for export in the hinterland and paying
taxes, or some transit taxes on goods destined for export.' ` How-
ever, a more recent statistical study of the subject by Shireen
Moosvi reveals that urban taxation in Surat was extraordinarily
high (18.73% of jam' ), compared even with Agra (15.7%) which was
the biggest city of the empire and its largest commercial centre. Also
the overall higher jam' incidence in Gujarat is explained as possibly
due to the fact that prices in Gujarat were higher than in the
interior. Gujarat was a large importer of foodstuffs, thereby ac-
counting for higher food prices. Gujarat also had a superior crop-
. ping-pattern, and as m the case of Baroda it had very fertile tracts
utilised for extensive cotton cultivation. 13 And if khälisa under
Akbar accounted to between 24 and 33% of the jam', while aliena-
 Hajj Without Spice 109
tion by sayarghill as recorded for Gujarat is one of the lowest in the
empire, 1 it is quite obvious that Akbar had greater interest in the
revenues of Gujarat, including the opportunities of adding to his
personal hoard from the bullion entering via Surat. 15 Interest in
sea-trade and control over coastal Gujarat were also of vital inter-
est for Akbar to ensure regular and easy supplies of Turlci and
Persian horses for the imperial stables and to meet the needs of the
zaminchirs. It is estimated that nearly 1,000 Persian and 21,000 Turki
horse were brought every year to supply the needs of Akbar's
empire. 16 From all these facts, it is not difficult to conclude that
the importance of coastal Gujarat for Akbar was far more than the
5%-of its customs revenue. It would not be of interest to him to let
the powerful Ottomans extend their sway over the Indian Ocean
trade. It was strategically advantageous to let the Portuguese with
their land bases within his reach maintain an effective presence in
the Indian Ocean, without getting seriously in the way of his
imperial interests. In 1573, Akbar had performed an extraordinary
feat of covering about 600 miles in eleven days, from Fatehpur Sikri
to Ahmadabad. But that was not =mai, and the difficult terrain
of much of Gujarat, as well as its complex social composition,
simply made close control from the centre over much of the state
a physical and moral impossibility. 17 One can certainly presume
that Akbar was sufficiently well informed about the Portuguese
exploits in the Indian Ocean and their participation in the politics
of coastal India. He does not seem to have regarded the Portuguese
as a serious menace. The Portuguese too had a very effective
network of informants as one can gather from the contemporary
Portuguese documentation. Men like Khwaja Safar, the mer-
chant-governor of Surat in the 19
early sixteenth century, 15 or
Khawaja Shams-ud-din Gilani, or even the Portuguese renegades
or captives in the service of the Muslim kingdoms, including some
inside and around the Mughal court, were some of the channels of
Portuguese information. It is curious to notice how fast the Por-
tuguese were reacting to information regarding the presence of
"pirates", or to Muslim nobles or merchants seeking to brass their
cartaz system, or to developments in the native courts.
The first known direct contact between Akbar and the Portuguese
took place when Alcbar took over Gujarat and was being egged on by
some of his informants and advisers to extend his jurisdiction to the
Portuguese-controlled Daman and Bassein. He met 50 or 60 Por-
tuguese merchants residing in Cambay city. They presented themsel-
ves before Akbar impressively dressed. They were well received and
Akbar assured them that their trade would not suffer as a result of
 110 TEOTONIO R. DE SOUZA

his take-over. He even promised to grant them any other favour they
would care to ask. They quickly requested that the Portuguese mer-
chants dealing at the port be exempted from paying customs duties.
Akbar conceded their request, but no action was taken on his promise
because a noble adviser immediately intervened and explained to
him that such a concession would imply a loss of 300,000 cruzados to
his treasury every year.21
The Portuguese authorities in Goa were alarmed with the
developments in Gujarat and looked upon the Mughals as a
dangerous neighbour. One hearing that a Mughal force of ten
thousand horses was dispatched to capture Daman, and that an
envoy had been sent to the Portuguese captain of Daman asking him
to vacate the city, the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa sent quick reinfor-
cements to the North on 17 August 1572, with instructions to avoid
any provocation of the Mughal, but to keep a close watch over the
coast of Daman and to prevent secretly any provisions from reach-
ing Cambay. In the meantime, the captain of Daman was trying to
convince the Mughal envoy that he was awaiting the reply of the
Viceroy before taking any decision of handing over the city to the
Mughals as demanded. By December, the authorities in Goa tried
to gather as much force as possible and under the most ex-
perienced available captains. It turned out to be an impressive fleet
of over three thousand Portuguese soldiers, besides native com-
plement. When the force arrived in Bassein, news arrived that the
Mughal force was less than two leagues away from Daman. Follow-
ing an emergency meeting of his council, some suggested that the
Viceroy should stay behind in Bassein, and the rest of the force
should proceed to Daman. This was meant to give an impression
to the Mughals that the Vicerory was staying behind with more
back-up force. However, the Viceroy himself and most others
preferred the opinion that the arrival of the Viceroy personally at
Daman would have a better effect. This strategy seems to have had
its desired effect. After the impressive size of the fleet entering the
river at Daman with loud sounds of gunshots were heard by the
Mughal troopers and reported to the Emperor, who was at Bharoch
at the time, he moved to Surat in order to be closer to Daman. In
the meantime, the Viceroy had c,hecked the defences of the for-
tified settlement and had further protected the walls with a thick
cover of some succulent creepers (ervas leiteiras) which could not
be easily cut without preventing their juice from getting into one's
eyes and blinding the person.22
Even before seeing such a display of naval force, Akbar would
have known about the high nuisance value of the Portuguese in the
 Hajj Without Spice 111
Indian Ocean waters and about their successes against the Otton Lai Es
in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. He preferred not to proceed with
the hostilities, but on the contrary to win the Portuguese friendship
which could assist his interest in sending ships to Mecca, carrying his
mother and some women of the court for hajj, and also with much
bullion that he wanted to send. 23 The Mughal ambassador was
received by the Portuguese Viceroy with a great display of pomp
and power, so much so that the smoke created by naval guns that
were fired for almost two hours continuously did not permit the
ambassador to see where he was being taken in his vessel. The
same happened after the interview was over. The courtesy was
responded to by sending Antonio Cabral as Portuguese envoy to
Akbar in the company of his ambassador. They were accompanied
by Cristovao de Couto, a Portuguese interpreter. The Portuguese
ambassador carried instructions for concluding a peace agree-
ment, and also an order of the Viceroy allowing the Emperor to
send a ship from Surat to Mecca every year without paying any
duties to the Portuguese. 24 Akbar welcomed the embassy, but the
Portuguese do not seem to have liked the pompous style in which
Akbar drafted a farnuin (dated 18 March 1573) that he issued to
them, stating the need expressed by the Portuguese of his
friendship and their desire to serve him, and guaranteeing them
peaceful possession of Daman and lands under its jurisdiction. The
Portuguese had to swallow their pride and admit the limits
beyond which they could not push the Mughal might. 25 It would
not be very different for the other Europeans. Neither did the
Indian merchants concede superiority in trade to the Europeans
until the Mughal power declined. As the authors of the Cambridge
Economic History of India have rightly put it, "the Indian merchant
lost when the Mughal lost".26
I wish to state by way of conclusion that the politics of religion
between Akbar and the Portuguese need to be understood in the
context of haj j, just as much as in the traditional and much studied
context of Jesuit missions to Akbar's court from 1580 onwards. Both
Akbar and the Portuguese officials were circumventing the more
radical and orthodox attitudes of their respective religious leaders
in order to accorrunodate their economic and political interests. Both
Akbar and the Portuguese benefitted concretely from this approach.
The Jesuit presence in the Mughal court perhaps left behind some
artistic legacy and some records of historical value, but from their
religious teachings Akbar seems to have learnt very little, and in-
cluded nothing in his "Din-i ilähi." This great pioneer of inter-
religious dialogue and a sincere believer in universal toleration,
112 TEOTONIO R. DE SOUZA
seems to have been impressed more by Hinduism, Jainism and
Zoroastrianism than by the theological intolerance of Islam and
Christianity in defence of their "God-revealed" mysteries of faith. But
whether in the context of kijj or in the context of inter-religious
dialogue, Akbar succeeded in having his way and showing the other
parties their place in his imperial construct.47

REFERENCES
1. M.N. Pearson, "The Hail (Pilgrimage) from Mughal India: Some Preliminary
Observations", Indica, (March-September, 1986), pp. 143458; "The Estado da
India and the klajj", Indica, (March-September 1989), pp. 103418; "'Pious
passengers' motivations for the hajj from early modern India", Studies in Maritime
History, ed. KS. Mathew, (Pondicherry, 1990), pp. 112-126.
2. M.N. Pearson, '"Pious passengers' motivation for the hall from early modem
India", Studies in Maritime History, op. cit, pp. 116, 119-20. Some recent studies on
the basis of Ottoman records suggest that Akbar may have stopped sponsoring
the hall pilgrims because of deportation of the pilgrims back to India with
complaints that these Indian pilgrims were engaged in unwanted activites,
including easing in public places, bringing dogs into study, etc.
3. Ibid., pp. 121-22.
4. Salih Ozbaran, "The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf,
1534-1581", journal of Asian History, ed., Danis Sinor, Harrassowitz Verlag, VI, I,
1972, pp. 45-87.
5. M.N. Pearson, "The Estado da India and the Hajj", Indica, Vol. 26, Nos. 1 &
2 (1989), pp. 103-118, already provides much groundwork on this subject.
Also K.S. Mathew has done a good service of introducing much relevant
published Portuguese documentation on Gujarat in his Portuguese and the
Sultanate of Gujarat (Delhi, 1986), although the Documentary Appendices
do not always provide translations of the text.
6. Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurship in Asian Maritime Trade c.1400-1750. ed.
Rederich Ptak and Dietmar Rothermund (Stuttgart, 1991), p. 114.
7. India and the Indian Ocean, 1500 - 1800, ed. Ashin Dasgupta and M.N. Pearson
(Calcutta, 1987), pp. 53-63.
8. The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires (Reprint: New Delhi, 1990), Vol. I, p. 42.
9. Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, The Cambridge Economic History of India
(Delhi, 1984), Vol. I. pp. 432-3; Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat (Delhi,
1976), pp. 92-117.
10. Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean, ed. Giorgio Borsa (Delhi, 1990), pp. 6-7.
11. The Age of Partership: Europeans in Asia before Dominion, ed. Blair B. Kling and
M.N. Pearson (Honolulu, 1977), p. 124.
12. India and the Indian Ocean, p. 79.
13. Shireen Moosvi, The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c. 7595 (Delhi, 1987), pp. 112,
127-128, 141, 149, 315.
14. Shireen Moosvi, op. cit., pp. 159, 197.
Hajj Without Spice 113
15. Ibid., p. 198: Qazwini, the first official historian of Shah Jahan, while criticising
the extravagance of Jahangir, says that Akbar had left behind seven crores of
rupees (apparently besides what he had left in gold). This is regarded as a
more conservative figure, and- Moosvi puts it at ten crores of rupees of
silver-coin hoard, Cf. Ibid., pp. 375-76 for details about bullion influx. Quite a
large part of this influx went into hoards, p. 391.
16. Shireen Moosvi, op cit., p. 378.
17. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p.150; Diogo de Couto, Decadas, IX
(Lisboa, 1786), p. 65.
18. K.S. Mathew, "Khwaja Saffar, the merchant-governor of Surat and the Indo-Por-
tugeuse trade in the early sixteenth century", Vice-Almirante A. Teixeira de Mota:
In Memorian (Lisboa, 1987), pp. 319-328.
19. K.S. Mathew, "Khwaja Shams-ud-din Gilani: A Sixteenth Century Entrepreneur
in Portuguese India", Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime
Trade, pp. 363-371.
20. Chronica do Reyno de Gusarate, ed. S.C. Misra and K.S. Mathew (Baroda, 1981)
contains the account of Cambay by a Portugese named Diogo de Mesquita
Pimentel who had spent many years in Chatnpaner as a captive and took part in
the Portuguese assault that killed Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. According to
the Portuguese chronicler, Diogo de Couto Pimentel, dealt the fatal blow. Cf. Da
Asia: Decada Quinta (Parte Primeria) (Lisboa, 1779), p. 101; Pearson, Merchant and
Rulers in Gujarat, p. 57-58. •
21. Diogo De Couto, Decadas, IX, (reprint, Lisbon, 1974-75) pp. 65-67.
22. Ibid., IX, pp. 67-75.
23. Ibid., IX, p. 75. Much bullion was sent regularly for purchase of-horses, and at
times also as gift to the holy cities.
24. Ibid., IX, pp. 75-81, 86: It was calculated by the Portuguese customs authorities
at Diu that a duty-free ship would mean a loss of 18,000 pardaus to State revenue
every year. The loss was greater still because many other merchants of Cambay
who were sending 12 to 15 ships to Mecca started loading their valuable mer-
chandise on the concession ship of the Emperor. This loss was tolerated because
it was believed that double or triple that amount would be spent in defending
Daman and its jurisdiction against the Mughals. In 1583, the Portuguese inter-
cepted a ship of Akbar that was returning from Mecca. It was of 500 tonnage.
25. In 1581-85, there was pressure on Daman by the Mughal forces, but this was
caused by a challenge thrown by a favourite of Akbar, Muhammed Quill Khan, •
who boasted in the presence of Akbar, that he would send a ship to the Red Sea
without Portuguese pass.. The Portuguese blocked effectively his attempts. In
retaliation, he ordered hostilities against Daman. The Portguese resorted to an
offensive against the Mughal shipping, and in thelarocess a ship of Akbar was
also captured, but it was released for fear of irritating so powerful a ruler.
26. Tapan Raychauduri & Iran Habib, op. cit., p. 429. •
27. A.L. Srivastava, The Mughal Empire (Agra, 1966), pp. 170-176; John Correia-Afon-
so, Letters from the Mughal Court (Anand, 1980), p. 127: The author quotes another
Jesuit writer to praise the Jesuits at Akbar's court for engaging in a religious
dialogue. But were the Jesuits really dialoguing or getting impatient and even
tactless in the midst of their failure-to impose their views?