THIRD DIVISION

OFELIA C. CAUNAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents.
X----------------------------X
JOEY P. MARQUEZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 182020-24

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
September 2, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

At bar are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assail the
Decision[1] dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954, finding petitioners Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan)
guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government officials of Paraaque City[3] and private individual
Antonio Razo (Razo), were charged under five (5) Informations, to wit:
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27944 states:
That on January 11, 1996 or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official,
being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with the members

of the aforesaid Committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City
Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City
Budget Officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN
ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in
relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and with the accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner
and proprietor of ZARO Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and
Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable
negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with said ZARO Trading, for the purchase of
5,998 pieces of walis ting-ting at P25 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-12-8629 in the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P149,950.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and
other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly
overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was only P11.00 as found by the Commission
on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, of P14.00
per piece or a total overpriced amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY
TWO PESOS (P83,972.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27946 states:
That on June 30, 1997 or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the
City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the
aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU
TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG
26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head
Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official
duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O]
Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions,
through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 23,334 pieces of walis ting-ting
atP15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-447 in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND TEN PESOS (P350,010.00), without complying with the Commission
on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and
which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was
only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13,
2003 with a difference, therefore, of P4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of NINETY THREE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS (P93,336.00), thus causing damage and
prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27952 states:
That [in] September 1997, or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Public Officers JOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the
City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the
aforesaid committee, namely: SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU
TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG
26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head
Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official
duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and with accused private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O]
Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions,
through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of walis ting-ting
at P15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-561 in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P120,000.00), without complying with the Commission on
Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and
which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was
only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13,
2003 with a difference, therefore, of P4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the
aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27953 states:
That during the period from February 11, 1997 to February 20, 1997, or thereabout, in Paraaque City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P.
MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman,
Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE
LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG
26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC
General Services office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26),
acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advance of their
official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private
individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered
with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the
very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O]
Trading for the purchase of 10,100 pieces of walis ting-ting on several occasions at P25.00 per piece
without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements
on procurement and Public Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:
Date of Transaction

Voucher No.

Amount

Quantity

February 20, 1997

101-97-04-1755

P 3,000.00

120 pcs.

February 12, 1997

101-97-04-1756

P100,000.00

4,000 pcs.

February 11, 1997

101-97-04-1759

P149,500.00

5,980 pcs.

in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P252,000.00), and which
transactions were clearly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was only P11.00 as
found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a
difference, therefore, of P14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P141,400.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the
government in the aforesaid sum.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 27954 states:
That during the period from October 15, 1996 to October 18, 1996 or thereabout, in Paraaque
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P.
MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman,
Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE
LEON, being then the City Treasurer, MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG
26), FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26), OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC
General Services Office (SG 26) and AILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26),

acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their
official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private
individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered
with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the
very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O]
Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of walis ting-ting on several occasions at P25.00 per piece
without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements
on procurement and Public Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:
Date of Transaction
October 15, 1996
October 18, 1996

Voucher Number
101-96-11-7604
101-96-11-7605

Amount
P 100,000.00
P 100,000.00

Quantity
4,000 pcs.
4,000 pcs.

in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), and which transactions
were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was onlyP11.00 as found
by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference,
therefore, of P14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P112,000.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum. [4]

The five (5) Informations were filed based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that
there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions ofParaaque City. In March 1999, a Special Audit Team composed of
Fatima Bermudez (Bermudez), Carolina Supsup, Gerry Estrada, and Yolando Atienza, by virtue of Local Government
Audit Office Assignment Order No. 99-002, audited selected transactions of Paraaque City for the calendar years 1996 to
1998, including the walis tingtingpurchases.
In connection with the walis tingting purchases audit, the audit team gathered the following evidence:
1. Documents furnished by the Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City upon request of the audit team;
2. Sample walis tingting with handle likewise submitted by the Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City;
3. Samples of walis tingting without handle actually utilized by the street sweepers upon ocular inspection of the audit
team;
4. Survey forms accomplished by the street sweepers containing questions on the walis tingting;
5. Evaluation by the Technical Services Department [5] of the reasonableness of the walis tingting procurement compared to
current prices thereof;

6. A separate canvass by the audit team on the prices of the walis tingting, including purchases thereof at various
merchandising stores;[6] and
7. Documents on the conduct and process of procurement of walis tingting by the neighboring city of Las Pias.
Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team made a
canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Paraaque City. All, however, were reluctant to
provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis tingting. In addition, the audit team attempted to
purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of Paraaque City. Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed
addresses of the suppliers, these were occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and
purchased from, a lone supplier that sold walis tingting.
As previously adverted to, the audit team made a report which contained the following findings:
1. The purchase of walis tingting was undertaken without public bidding;
2. The purchase of walis tingting was divided into several purchase orders and requests to evade the requirement
of public bidding and instead avail of personal canvass as a mode of procurement;
3. The purchase of walis tingting through personal canvass was attended with irregularities; and
4. There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions.
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Disallowance Nos. 01-001-101 (96) to 01-006-101 (96), 01-001-101 (97) to 01011-101 (97), and 01-001-101 (98) to 01-004-101 (98) covering the overpriced amount of P1,302,878.00 for the purchases
of 142,612 walis tingting, with or without handle, by Paraaque City in the years 1996-1998. [7]
Objecting to the disallowances, petitioners Marquez and Caunan, along with the other concerned local government
officials of Paraaque City, filed a request for reconsideration with the audit team which the latter subsequently denied in a
letter to petitioner Marquez.
Aggrieved, petitioners and the other accused appealed to the COA which eventually denied the appeal. Surprisingly, on
motion for reconsideration, the COA excluded petitioner Marquez from liability for the disallowances based on our
rulings in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[8] and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan.[9]
On the other litigation front, the criminal aspect subject of this appeal, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioners and the other local government officials ofParaaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Consequently, the five (5) Informations against petitioners, et al. were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
After trial and a flurry of pleadings, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along
with Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. As for accused Flocerfida
Babida, Ailyn Romea and private individual Razo, the Sandiganbayan acquitted them for lack of sufficient evidence to
hold them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:

1. The prosecution evidence, specifically the testimony of Bermudez and the Special Audit Teams report, did not
constitute hearsay evidence, considering that all the prosecution witnesses testified on matters within their personal
knowledge;
2. The defense failed to question, and timely object to, the admissibility of documentary evidence, such as the Las Pias
City documents and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) price listing downloaded from the Internet,
which were certified true copies and not the originals of the respective documents;
3. The Bids and Awards Committee was not properly constituted; the accused did not abide by the prohibition against
splitting of orders; and Paraaque City had not been afforded the best possible advantage for the most objective price in the
purchase of walis tingting for failure to observe the required public bidding;
4. The contracts for procurement of walis tingting in Paraaque City for the years 1996-1998 were awarded to pre-selected
suppliers; and
5. On the whole, the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Expectedly, the remaining accused, Caunan, Marquez and Tanael, moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan
decision. Caunan and Tanael, represented by the same counsel, collectively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with
Written Notice of Death of Accused Silvestre S. de Leon). Marquez filed several motions, [10] including a separate Motion
for Reconsideration.
All the motions filed by Marquez, as well as Caunans motion, were denied by the Sandiganbayan. However, with respect
to Tanael, the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction.
Hence, these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan.
Petitioner Caunan posits the following issues:
1. [WHETHER] THE PROSECUTIONS PROOF OF OVERPRICING [IS] HEARSAY.
2. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN [ERRED] IN ADMITTING WITNESS
FATIMA V. BERMUDEZ TESTIMONY DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS SOURCES ARE
THEMSELVES ADMITTEDLY AND PATENTLY HEARSAY.
3. [WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY [ERRED] IN APPLYING AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE[.] UNDER THIS EXCEPTION, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
CONSISTING OF ENTRIES IN PUBLIC RECORDS, ETC., x x x ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.
4. CONSEQUENTLY, [WHETHER] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING [CAUNAN].[11]

For his part, petitioner Marquez raises the following:

1. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES
BASED ON THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN THE ARIAS AND MAGSUCI CASES EARLIER
DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE AND OTHER EXISTING REGULATIONS[;]

2. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES

SINCE HE WAS ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM LIABILITY BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT[;]
3. WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF CO-ACCUSED 1) SUPPLIER ANTONIO RAZO WHO WAS
THE OTHER PARTY TO, AND RECEIVED THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF, THE QUESTIONED
CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS, 2) CITY ACCOUNTANT MARILOU TANAEL WHO PREAUDITED THE CLAIMS AND SIGNED THE VOUCHERS, 3) CITY BUDGET OFFICER
FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, AND 4) HEAD OF STAFF AILYN ROMEA CASTS A BIG CLOUD OF
DOUBT ON THE FINDING OF [MARQUEZS] GUILT BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH
DIVISION[;]
4. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] CAN BE CONVICTED ON PLAIN HEARSAY, IF NOT DUBIOUS
EVIDENCE OF OVERPRICING OR ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT DO NOT
AMOUNT TO PROOF OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES[;]
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED OVERPRICING WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR CLAIMING THAT
THE CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY [MARQUEZ] IN BEHALF OF
PARAAQUE CITY WERE MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT WAS ASCERTAINED OR DETERMINED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OR PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED UNDER COA
MEMORANDUM NO. 97-012 DATED MARCH 31, 1997[;]
6. WHETHER THE QUANTUM OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS OVERCOME THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WHICH [MARQUEZ] ENJOYS IN THE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES[;]
7. WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE
CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE GREGORY ONG) OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION
REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST[;]
8. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE REOPENING OF THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES[;]
9. WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED WHEN INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE OFFENSE,
SEVERAL INFORMATION HAD BEEN FILED IN THE TRIAL COURT ON THE THEORY OF
OVERPRICING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF BROOMSTICKS (WALIS TINGTING) BY WAY OF
SPLITTING CONTRACTS OR PURCHASE ORDERS[; and]
10. WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL SINCE HIS RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL TRIAL WAS VIOLATED IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES WHEN THE
CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE GREGORY ONG) REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST RAISED BY THE FORMER BEFORE THE JUDGMENT
BECAME FINAL.[12]

In a Resolution dated February 23, 2009, we directed the consolidation of these cases. Thus, we impale petitioners issues
for our resolution:
1. First and foremost, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019.

2. Whether the testimony of Bermudez and the report of the Special Audit Team constitute hearsay and are,
therefore, inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
3. Whether petitioner Marquez should be excluded from liability based on our rulings in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan[13] and Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan.[14]
Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing, upon which the charge against them of graft and corruption is
based, had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[15] Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing, consisting of the report of the Special Audit Team and the
testimony thereon of Bermudez, constitutes hearsay and, as such, is inadmissible against them. In addition, petitioner
Marquez points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required by COA
Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997. [16] In all, petitioners asseverate that, as the overpricing was not
sufficiently established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 a contract or transaction
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government was not proven.
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officersIn addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. [17]
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question we should resolve is
whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the
government.
We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A.
No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the
government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also
adequately proven. Thus, we grant the petitions.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.[18] The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable
presumption of innocence.[19] The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and

circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accuseds guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[20] Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The
audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and
object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on
the walis tingtingaccomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team
purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis
tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners
and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a
signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the
audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by theParaaque City
street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis
tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous
to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest
and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the issue of hearsay, the Sandiganbayan hastily shot down petitioners arguments thereon, in this wise:
We find no application of the hearsay rule here. In fact, all the witnesses in this case testified on matters
within their personal knowledge. The prosecutions principal witness, Ms. Bermudez, was a State Auditor
and the Assistant Division Chief of the Local Government Audit Office who was tasked to head a special
audit team to audit selected transactions of Paraaque City. The report which she identified and testified on
[was] made by [the] Special Audit Team she herself headed. The disbursement vouchers, purchase orders,
purchase requests and other documents constituting the supporting papers of the teams report were public
documents requested from the City Auditor of Paraaque and from the accused Mayor Marquez. Such
documents were submitted to the Special Audit Team for the specific purpose of reviewing them. The
documents were not executed by Ms. Bermudez or by any member of the Special Audit Team for the
obvious reason that, as auditors, they are only reviewing acts of others. The Special Audit Teams official
task was to review the documents of the walis tingting transactions. In the process of [the] review, they
found many irregularities in the documentations violations of the Local Government Code and pertinent
COA rules and regulations. They found that the transactions were grossly overpriced. The findings of the
team were consolidated in a report. The same report was the basis of Ms. Bermudezs testimony. x x x. [21]

The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing
based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present market price of walis tingting of a different
specification, purchased from a non-supplier of Paraaque City, and the price of walis tingting purchases in LasPias City.
Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt,
in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.

As pointed out by petitioner Caunan, not all of the contents of the audit teams report constituted hearsay. Indeed, as
declared by the Sandiganbayan, Bermudez could very well testify thereon since the conclusions reached therein were
made by her and her team. However, these conclusions were based on incompetent evidence. Most obvious would be the
market price of walis tingting in Las Pias City which was used as proof of overpricing in Paraaque City. The prosecution
should have presented evidence of the actual price of the particular walis tingting purchased by petitioners and the other
accused at the time of the audited transaction or, at the least, an approximation thereof. Failing in these, there is no basis to
declare that there was a glaring overprice resulting in gross and manifest disadvantage to the government.
We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioners failed to conduct the requisite public bidding for the questioned
procurements. However, the lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross
disadvantage to the government. As we had occasion to declare in Nava v. Sandiganbayan,[22] the absence of a public
bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to
graft and corruption. However, this does not satisfy the third element of the offense charged, because the law requires that
the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. After all, penal laws are strictly construed against the government.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to rule on the applicability of our rulings in Arias and Magsuci to
petitioner Marquez. Nonetheless, we wish to reiterate herein the doctrines laid down in those cases. We call specific
attention to the sweeping conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that a conspiracy existed among petitioners and the
other accused, most of whom were acquitted, particularly private individual Razo, the proprietor of Zaro Trading.
Our ruling in Magsuci, citing our holding in Arias, should be instructive, viz.:
The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of [Magsuci] on its finding of conspiracy among Magsuci,
Ancla and now deceased Enriquez.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime
itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence therefore must reasonably be
strong enough to show a community of criminal design.
xxxx
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had
to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had
foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might
have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports
submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there
must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality on the part of cohorts.
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, aware of the dire consequences that a different rule could bring,
has aptly concluded:

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common
problemsdishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or
positions, or plain incompetenceis suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply
because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step
from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction
before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
xxxx
x x x. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on
the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. x
x x. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest
to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters,
memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or department is even more appalling. [23]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution dated March 10, 2008 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Joey P. Marquez in G.R. Nos. 182020-24 and Ofelia C. Caunan in G.R. Nos. 181999 and 182001-04
areACQUITTED of the charges against them. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
JOSE R. CATACUTAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 175991

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 31, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is well within the Courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to
the proceeding on hand.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan seeking to set aside and reverse the
Decision[1] dated December 7, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 30, Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Factual Antecedents
The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.
Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia
was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).[3]
On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private
complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4] These promotional appointments were duly
approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-In-Charge of

SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997, [6] copy furnished the concerned
appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to assume their new position since
petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them despite written orders
from CHED[7] and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.[8] Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint
against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.[9]
In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 as amended, committed in the following manner, to wit:
That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades
(SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his official duties, thus committing
the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did then and there, with grave abuse of authority
and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A.
Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing
authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil
Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a
higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better
services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Instruction Supervisors [III].
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants because of
some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. According to him, the appointment papers
were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the
CHED Regional Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire plantilla[11] (1996
Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He
likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original
appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the
CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he contended, were formally brought to
the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12] who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were
regular and valid and directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession of CHED Chairman
Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13] but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to
implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of
the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of appointment papers.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[14] holding that the act of the petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the
CSC to implement the subject promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his palpable and patent

fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The trial court
ruled that petitioners refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held
petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month and perpetual disqualification from public office.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, this Court hereby
imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, and to pay the costs.
The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and Magdalena
Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated
October 13, 2005.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The appellate court ruled that the Decision of the
trial court, being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to show
that the trial court committed any reversible error in judgment.
Hence, this petition.
In the Courts Resolution[19] dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file its Comment. The
OSG filed its Comment[20] on June 5, 2007 while the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment [21] for respondent People of
the Philippines on February 22, 2008.
Issue
The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:
Whether the [petitioners] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the] law
x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of Appeals]
Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled Jose R. Catacutan, petitioner, versus Office
of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents.[22]

Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,[23] petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is
grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the

trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the
administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private
complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks of merit.
Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.

Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.[24] Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.[25] Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[26]
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due
process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously,
and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due
process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant
and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as
in this case, concerns an administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the Ombudsman). The
findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal
proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter. The dismissal of
a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all
respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal
proceeding with the same subject matter. x x x[27]

This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without legal precedent. In Paredes v. Court of
Appeals,[28] this Court ruled:
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal
actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative
prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the
same act.
xxxx

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily
be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. x x x
In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:
This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in
one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x x

On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that the courts below correctly
disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although
admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it.[30]
At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner
is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the
court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CAs Decision for whatever it may
be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.
As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence
that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected
and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary
value to evidence which was not formally offered.
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:
1.

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2.

He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3.

His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[31]

All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to this case were it not for his
being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and
functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management
and finances, as well as implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers.[32]
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants. As
the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:
The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no longer
anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED Regional Director
addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latters protest letter. x x x In light of the undisputed
evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutans reason for not implementing the appointments was a personal
dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court believes that Catacutans refusal was impelled by an ill motive or
dishonest purpose characteristic of bad faith. x x x
xxxx
In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once again
directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully acted upon by
competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even challenged the private
complainants to file a case against him. Such arrogance is indicative of the bad faith of the accused-appellant.
Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying with
finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject promotions. This
stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent authorities established the evident bad
faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary.[33]
While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants valid appointments,
the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of
the subject appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. It is well to remember that good intentions do not
win cases, evidence does.[34]

Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here, the private
complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the
issuance of their valid appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19,
1997. So in the interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary
corresponding to their newly appointed positions.Likewise established is that as a result of petitioners unjustified and inordinate
refusal to implement their valid appointments notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private
complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article 2217 of
the New Civil Code.
At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out and decided upon by
the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by theSandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings of the lower courts, this
Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7,
2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

SECOND DIVISION
VICTOR R. REYES, G.R. No. 152243
Assistant City Assessor,
Department of Assessment, Present:
City of Manila,
Petitioner, PUNO,
Chairman
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA,
Mayor, City of Manila,
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON,
Secretary to the City Mayor, Promulgated:
and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. September 23, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The petitioner in this case, Victor R. Reyes (Reyes), identifies himself as the Assistant City Assessor of the City of
Manila. The very appropriateness of the nomenclature is crucial to the present petition. Petitioner ultimately hinges the
favorable action on his cause on the recognition that he still is the Assistant City Assessor of Manila, a post to which he
was appointed in 1989, but which function he has not effectively held since 1994.

The case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman against
respondents Jose L. Atienza, the Mayor of the City of Manila, and Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, Secretary to the City Mayor.
The respondents were charged with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
[1]

The particular act complained of was the appointment by Mayor Atienza of Hernando B. Garcia as Assistant City

Assessor on 1 July 1998. According to Reyes, such appointment was illegal, for as of even date, he remained the
incumbent Assistant City Assessor of Manila, by virtue of his appointment to the office, on a permanent status, on 3
August 1989.
Reyes had originally been designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Assessor on 16 January 1987
by then acting Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.[2] Upon the recommendation of Mayor Lopez, Reyes was appointed on a
permanent status as Assistant City Assessor effective 3 August 1989 by then Acting Secretary of Finance Victor C.
Macalincag.[3] He remained in office upon assumption of office by then Manila Mayor Alfredo C. Lim [4] in 1992.

In a letter dated 1 October 1993, Reyes requested Mayor Lim for a transfer in Quezon City Hall. [5] In the said
letter, Reyes further stated [i]f I ever could not transfer until December 31, 1993, then eventually, I would be applying for
a retirement effective January 1, 1994.[6] He also requested therein for the approval of sick leave for the months of August
and September of 1993, and such request was duly approved. [7]
It appears from the record that since then, Reyes has never been able to actually reassume the functions of
Assistant City Assessor. By his own admission, Reyes was prevented from reporting back to work [8] due to the pendency
of three complaints[9] filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. Notably, an administrative complaint was
also pending with the Office of the City Legal Officer against Reyes. [10] The complaints against Reyes filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman were all dismissed by March of 1994.
There is no certainty as to the status of Reyess appointment as Assistant City Assessor after 1994. However, the
following facts from the record are telling.
In a letter dated 8 April 1994 addressed to Carlos C. Antonio, City Assessor of Manila, Reyes stated as follows:
I would like to request for Clearances needed for my Retirement, be [sic] informed that last October
1993 upon my request to his Honor Mayor ALFREDO S. LIM approved my retirement effective
January 1, 1994 including my clearances [sic], but to my surprise the Legal Department of Manila file [sic] a
case which was dismissed by the Ombudsman.
Hoping for your kind consideration on this matter.[11]

Moreover, it is also undisputed that Mayor Lim made two subsequent appointments to the post of Assistant City
Assessor. Angel R. Purisima was appointed to the position on 26 July 1995, and his appointment was approved by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 18 September 1995. Purisima resigned on 31 October 1996, and in his stead,
Mayor Lim appointed Senen D. Tomada on 26 March 1998. However, the CSC disapproved the appointment of
Tomada, it having been made in violation of the Commission on Elections ban on appointments during the election
period.[12] Interestingly, the CSC disapproval was made only on 27 July 1998, or 26 days after the appointment of
Garcia to the same post by the newly elected Mayor Atienza.
In the meantime, it appears that Reyess application for retirement could not be cleared due to the pending
administrative complaint filed with the Office of the City Legal Officer. In April of 1994, Reyes filed a demurrer to the
evidence in the said administrative proceeding. Despite repeated urgings, the demurrer remained unresolved by October of
1995, thus causing Reyes to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that the
demurrer be acted upon by the Office of the City Legal Officer. Pertinently, Reyes alleged the following under oath in his
petition:

13. Meanwhile petitioner [Reyes], who retired from the service as City Assessor of Manila,
cannot get his retirement pay because he cannot submit a clearance from the office of the public respondent. [13]

The petition for mandamus was dismissed in an Order dated 29 October 1996.[14]
It was only on 28 August 1998 when the administrative complaint against Reyes was dismissed in a decision penned by
Mayor Atienza. Still, Reyes alleged that he was never furnished a copy of the decision and that he learned of the dismissal
of the complaint only on 5 May 1999. He likewise claimed that his requests for a certified copy of the decision from
Manila City Hall have been ignored.[15]
Then, on 20 March 2000, Reyes filed the aforementioned criminal complaint against Mayor Atienza and Sison before the
Ombudsman. In the complaint, Reyes characterized as illegal the appointment of Garcia as Assistant City Assessor, noting
that he was then and still is actually occupying the said position on the premise that his retirement was never approved or
cleared due to the pending administrative case. Reyes also alleged that the appointment smacked of nepotism, as Garcia
was the brother-in-law of Sison, the Secretary to Mayor Atienza.
From the record, the allegation also appears that Reyes had filed charges against Atienza and Sison before the CSC,
[16]

although there is no indication as to the actual nature of the complaint, or its present status.

In a Resolution[17] dated 10 October 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman concluded that the inferences made by Reyes did not suffice to establish
clearly and convincingly that there was a deliberate action on the part of respondents to violate existing rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in the conduct of their official duties by reason of the
inducement, persuasion or influence by another or allowing themselves to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit
such offense or violation, in contravention of Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. [18]
The Ombudsman likewise ruled that the requisites for liability under Section 3(e) of the same law had not been
established. It was noted that the element of causing undue injury in the discharge of respondents official and/or
administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence was not
sufficiently established. This conclusion was derived from the fact that there were two prior appointments made by Mayor
Lim to the position of Assistant City Assessor, which fact refutes the claim of Reyes that he had not yet vacated the post.
[19]

Finally, the Ombudsman concluded that the allegation of nepotism was without merit. [20]
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Reyes was denied for lack of merit by the Ombudsman in

a Resolution dated 23 November 2000, which also noted that the motion was not timely filed. [21]

The rulings of the Ombudsman were assailed by Reyes in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division dismissed the petition in
a Decision[22] rendered on 21 August 2001. The appellate court again reiterated the finding that Mayor Lim had made two
appointments to the position of Assistant City Assessor prior to the designation of Garcia to the same post by Mayor
Atienza in 1998. Thus, it was concluded that Reyes had been terminated or separated from his position as of 26 July 1995,
or when Mayor Lim appointed Purisima to the position, as the CSC would not have approved the said appointment had
there actually been no vacancy.

The Court of Appeals further noted that Garcias appointment was approved by the CSC on 31 August 1998, and
that nothing in the record indicated that said appointment was recalled or subsequently declared void and set aside.
A few days prior to the promulgation of the Court of Appeals Decision, Reyes filed a Supplement to Reply with
two documents attached thereto. The first was a letter from former Mayor Alfredo Lim, wherein Lim averred that he had
not approved any formal retirement application of Reyes. The second document was a certification from the Integrated
Records Management Office of the CSC, which noted that there was no record with that office of any notice of separation
of service for Reyes. The conclusiveness of these documents was espoused by Reyes in hisMotion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, but for naught. In its Resolution[23] denying Reyes motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court reiterated its finding that the position of Assistant City Assessor was vacant as of 26
July 1995, when Purisima was appointed to the position.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals in denying Reyess petition and motion for reconsideration. The Court notes that the resort to the special
civil action is patently erroneous, the plain speedy and adequate remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 being
clearly available to Reyes. On this score alone, the present petition is dismissible. Nonetheless, the Court resolves to
examine the petition on the merits, with due regard to the precedental value a full-length decision would provide.
Before this Court, Reyes reiterates that his complaint filed with the Ombudsman sufficiently establishes the
liability of respondents under Section 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The violation of Section
3(a) was established by the appointment of Garcia as Assistant City Assessor, despite the fact that there was no vacancy
by reason of Reyess continuous holding of the position. Reyes also claims that his repeated attempts to follow up the
status of his administrative cases were ignored. Even though he was subsequently exonerated of the administrative
charges, his requests for a copy of the decision have been ignored. Reyes argues that the acts/omissions and nonfeasance
committed by the respondents directly violate Section 5(a) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.

Reyes also claims that the elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act have likewise been established. In that regard, he claims that he had not known of the appointment of Purisima in
1995, and had he known, he would have filed the appropriate case for usurpation. Reyes imputes that the real reason
behind Purisimas resignation in 1996 was the knowledge that his appointment was irregular and illegal. Reyes also claims
that Garcias appointment by Atienza was made on 1 July 1998, or twenty-six (26) days before the CSC had disapproved
Tomadas appointment to the same post.
The precise issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the Ombudsman was correct in concluding there was no
probable cause to charge respondents with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of
probable cause.[24] As the Court is not a trier of facts, it reposes immense respect to the factual determination and
appreciation made by the Ombudsman. In this case, the Ombudsman characterized Reyess claims as mostly inferential.
Many of the allegations now before us are unsubstantiated by evidence and cannot be accorded merit by this
Court. These would include the imputations of malice on the part of respondents in impeding Reyes attempts in following
up his clearance for retirement, in refusing to release a certified copy of the decision exonerating him from administrative
charges, that nepotism attended the appointment of Garcia to the post of Assistant City Assessor, or that Garcias
appointment under re-employment status violated the Rules on Appointment of the Civil Service Commission since he
was previously a contractual and not a permanent employee. Even assuming that there is truth to any of these charges,
they have not been substantiated to the extent of convincing the Ombudsman that there is probable cause to file criminal
cases against respondents. Owing to this paucity in substantiation, we have no reason to disturb the Ombudsmans refusal
to lodge a criminal case arising from these premises.
Any possible culpability on the part of respondents hinges on a finding of probable cause that Garcia was
appointed with the knowledge that such appointment was illegal, given that there was no vacancy in the post of
Assistant City Assessor. Both the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals upheld respondents argument that the post was
indeed vacant at the time of Garcias appointment, and supreme reliance was placed on the fact that Atienzas predecessor
had made two appointments to the post after Reyess presumed retirement.
There is wrinkle, however, to the unhesitating dismissal of this case. There is no definitive proof or smoking gun
which decisively establishes when Reyes vacated his position, as concluded by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.
Assuming that Reyes had resigned his position, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative
and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office. [25] The Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions promulgated by the CSC requires that in case of resignation, the voluntary

written notice of resignation by the employee and the acceptance of resignation in writing by the appointing authority be
submitted to the CSC.[26]
If, on the other hand, Reyes had retired from his position as he had previously claimed, such retirement must be
understood as in concordance with the GSIS Law, which provides for either compulsory retirement at the age of sixty-five
(65)[27] or optional retirement for employees over sixty (60) years of age and with more than fifteen (15) years of
government service.[28] In such a case, there is no general demand that retirement meet the approval of the appointing
authority, although retirement may be precluded under other circumstances provided by law. [29] However, the applicable
Civil Service rules require that a notice stating the date of such retirement be submitted to the Commission.
It is uncertain from the record whether Reyes is entitled under the law to apply for retirement, which would
generally not require any approval from the appointing authority in order to become effective. Respondents do not make
any allegations that Reyes has reached the age of compulsory retirement.
The record is similarly bereft of any proof that Reyes had equivocally resigned his position, or that said
resignation was accepted by the appointing authority. Before this Court, respondents rely, as proof of Reyes separation
from service, on the letter dated 1 October 1993, wherein Reyes informed Mayor Lim that [i]f I ever could not transfer [to
Quezon City Hall] until December 31, 1993, then eventually, I would be applying for a retirement effective January 1,
1994.[30] Respondents narrate in their Comment, [E]ffective January 1, 1994, the petitioner has finally retired from the
service because the then Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved his retirement on October 1993. [31] Yet it is clear from the letter
that the option of retirement was not actually exercised then, but merely mentioned as a possibility, requiring further
action on the part of Reyes. What Reyes had sought approval in the said letter was his application for sick leave and it was
only such sick leave, and not retirement, which was approved by then Mayor Lim in October of 1993.
In essence, if indeed Reyes had applied for retirement or submitted his resignation following the normal
processes, it would have been easy for respondents to present the countervailing documents which would have
conclusively refuted Reyess claims that he still was the incumbent Assistant City Assessor. The fact that no such
documents were presented makes us refrain from concluding that the legal processes pertaining to resignation or
retirement were observed in this case.

Still, the vitality of Reyess claim of incumbency, crucial to the cause of action in his complaint, is severely
undercut by his prior statements, which are not disputed and even at times averred under oath, that indicate that starting
1994, he had considered himself as having been separated from service as Assistant City Assessor. To recapitulate, Reyes
had informed the City Assessor of Manila as early as 8 April 1994 that Mayor Lim approved my retirement effective
January 1, 1994.[32] Reyes also averred under oath in his petition for mandamus filed in 1995 that he retired from the

service as City Assessor of Manila. [33] Reyes had even spent considerable energy since 1994 following up on his
clearances for retirement. There is no showing that he has attempted to perform the functions of Assistant City Assessor
since 1994. It is extremely disingenuous on the part of Reyes to suddenly claim that all this time, he actually still was the
Assistant City Assessor, a position whose functions has since been assumed by three other persons, the appointments of
the first two never having been challenged by him. [34]

Still, it must be kept in mind that the central issue in this case is not the viability of Reyess claim to continued
incumbency, but the existence of probable cause for respondents criminal culpability by reason of the appointment of
Garcia. On that point, we certainly are unable to attribute any malice aforethought or criminal intent of respondents on
account of the appointment of Garcia. As the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals noted, Atienzas predecessor, Mayor
Lim, had issued two appointments to the position of the CSC. The first was approved by the CSC, and while the second
was disapproved, it was due to the violation of the COMELEC ban on appointments, and not because of any finding that
Reyes had not been validly separated from the office. [35] The fact that the appointment of Purisima in 1995 was approved
by the CSC gives rise to a presumption that the body was aware that the position was vacant and that the appointment was
valid. We are unable to share the absolute belief of the Court of Appeals that this approval of Purisimas appointment
is ipso facto conclusive that the position had already been vacated by Reyes. However, given that nobody appears to have
challenged the validity of that appointment or of the subsequent appointment of Tomada on the grounds now alleged by
Reyes, we can conclude that Mayor Atienza had every right to assume in good faith that Reyes no longer held the post of
Assistant City Assessor.
Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act requires a deliberate intent on the part of the public
official concerned to violate those rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority, or to commit an offense
in connection with official duties. On the other hand, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence before liability can be had on that paragraph. Manifest partiality has been
characterized as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other." [36] Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. [37] Gross
inexcusable negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference
to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. [38] Clearly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is quite high, and in this case, insufficiently quantified by the evidence presented
by Reyes. Moreover, the conduct of respondents in this case hardly meets these standards, guided as it was, in
presumptive good faith by the two previous unchallenged appointments made by Mayor Lim to the same post.

There are troubling circumstances that attend the facts of this case, and nothing in this decision should preclude
Reyes from pursuing through the proper legal avenues, whatever rights and claims he may have under law, emanating
from his permanent appointment as Assistant City Assessor of Manila and his possible separation from the service.
Nonetheless, what the Court is called upon to adjudge is probable cause for criminal culpability of respondents, and under
the circumstances, we cannot find such probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, the assailed Decision not being tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D.
MANONGSONG, CRISPIN M. EGARQUE,
and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION),
Respondents.

G.R. No. 171671

Present:
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
BERSAMIN,**
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*** and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 18, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution[1] dated February 28, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents Aristeo E. Atienza and Rodrigo
D. Manongsong, which effectively dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information[2] filed on June 19, 2001, respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then Municipal
Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then Municipal Engineer
of Puerto Galera and Crispin M. Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto Galera, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act in Criminal Case No. 26678. The Information alleged:
That on or about 04 July 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Puerto Galera, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental

Mindoro, conspiring and confederating with co-accused RODRIGO MANONGSONG, Municipal

Engineer, and CRISPIN EGARQUE, PNP Officer, while in the performance of their official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their offices, and taking advantage of their official positions, acting
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally destroy,
demolish, and dismantle the riprap/fence of the new HONDURA BEACH RESORT owned by
complainant EDMUNDO A. EVORA located at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing
undue injury to complainant in the amount of P8,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Duly arraigned, respondents entered their respective pleas of not guilty to the crime charged against them. [4] After
pre-trial,[5] trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita), Alexander
Singson (Alexander), Edmundo Evora (Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman Concepcion Escanillas (Escanillas).

Mercedita testified that she was the caretaker of Hondura Beach Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro. She narrated that on July 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a fence made of coco
lumber and G.I. sheets worth P5,000.00 on his resort. On July 4, 2000, she found out that the fence that was just recently
built was destroyed. Upon the instruction of Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay authorities. On July 5,
2000, Edmundo again caused the construction of a second fence on the same property worth P3,000.00. However, on the
day following, the fence was again destroyed. Mercedita stated that she was informed by some people who were there that
a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the ones who destroyed the fence. [6]

Mercedita further testified that Edmundo instructed her to report the matter to the police. When she inquired at the
police station, Egarque admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of Mayor Atienza. When she asked Mayor
Atienza about the incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a
tourist destination and that the land was intended for the fishermen association. Mercedita added that Engr. Manongsong
admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit and that the land was
intended for the fishermen. Mercedita also stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas that it was
Engr. Manongsong and Egarque who destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor.[7]

Alexander testified that he and a certain Reynaldo Gumba constructed the fence twice on the subject property. On
the morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the fence being destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque. He said that he
informed Mercedita about the incident and he accompanied the latter to the police station and the offices of Mayor
Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. They eventually reported the incident to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas. [8]

Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the testimony of Mercedita and further stated that due to the incident,
he requested the barangay chairman for a meeting. OnJuly 24, 2000, acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas, the barangay
secretary, Engr. Manongsong, Mercedita, Alexander, and a certain Aguado attended the meeting at the barangay
hall. Edmundo stated that when Engr. Manongsong was asked why Edmundo was not notified of the destruction of the
fence, Engr. Manongsong replied, Sino ka para padalhan ng Abiso? Edmundo said that they eventually failed to settle the
case amicably.[9]

Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified that Mercedita and Alexander went to her on July 4, 2000 and July
6, 2000 to report that the fence constructed on the property of Edmundo was destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque
upon the order of Mayor Atienza. She added that upon the request of Mercedita, she wrote Engr. Manongsong for a
meeting with Edmundo, but the parties failed to settle the dispute on the scheduled meeting.

All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were marked in evidence and were admitted on September 21, 2005,
which consisted of, among others, machine copies of transfer certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay blotters. [10]

Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,[11] which was
opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. OnAugust 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Mayor
Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [12] which petitioner opposed.

Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Motion to Acquit by Way of Demurrer to Evidence,[13]which petitioner opposed. On December 6, 2005, the court a
quo issued a Resolution[14] which granted the motion. In the same resolution, the court a quo also held in abeyance the
resolution of Mayor Atienzas motion for reconsideration of the resolution granting his suspension from office.

On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit),
[15]

which was anchored on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondents maintain that the evidence

presented were not sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged. On January 19, 2006, petitioner filed its
Comment/Opposition.[16]

On January 23, 2006, albeit belatedly, Egarque filed a Manifestation [17] that he was adopting the Demurrer to
Evidence filed by his co-accused.

On February 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) issued the assailed Resolution which, among other
things, granted the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case. The decretal potion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of all the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
The bail bonds posted by all accused is hereby ordered CANCELLED and RETURNED to them,
subject to the usual accounting rules and regulations.
The Hold Departure Order issued by this Court against all of the accused in this case are hereby
LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Let the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation be
notified accordingly.
Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration, dated August 31, 2005, filed by accused Atienza
regarding his suspension from office pendent lite, is hereby rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[18]

In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements of the crime
charged were established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part of respondents. The
Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not show that the respondents favored other persons who were
similarly situated with the private complainant.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PROSECUTION AN OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD THEREON.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
CONSIDERED MATTERS OF DEFENSE.[19]

Petitioner contends that the prosecution was not afforded due process when the Sandiganbayan granted the
Demurrer to Evidence based on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish bad faith on the part of the
respondents. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan should have resolved the Demurrer to Evidence based on the
argument of the respondent questioning the credibility of petitioners witnesses and the admissibility of their testimonies in
evidence, not upon an issue which petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard, thus, effectively denying the
prosecution due process of law.

Petitioner maintains that contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo there was evident bad faith on the part of
the respondents. Petitioner insists that the act itself of demolishing a fence erected upon private property without giving
notice of the intended demolition, and without giving the owner of the same the opportunity to be heard or to rectify
matters, is evident bad faith.

Petitioner also contends that the element of manifest partiality was sufficiently established when the fence was
destroyed on the rationale that they do not have a permit to erect the fence; the place was intended for the benefit of
fishermen; and it was a tourist spot. Moreover, the demolition was allegedly done in the guise of official business when
the fence was demolished on the basis of the above-stated purpose.

Finally, petitioner argues that the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy does not apply in the present
case.
On their part, respondents argue that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Demurrer to Evidence and
dismissing the case. Respondents allege that the prosecution was not denied due process of law. Respondents maintain
that the prosecution was given every opportunity to be heard. In fact, the assailed resolution was issued after the
prosecution has rested its case. Moreover, respondents insist their right against double jeopardy must be upheld.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

This crime has the following essential elements:

1.
functions;

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

2.
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and

3.
His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. [20]

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed
to establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. [21] In Uriarte v. People,[22] this Court explained that Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality,
or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a
clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. Evident bad faith
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable
negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. [23]

As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as charged
was not sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:
I.
The presence of the first element of this offense was not disputed. The prosecution established that
accused-movants were public officers, being then the Mayor, Municipal Engineer, and member of the
PNP, at the time alleged in the information.
II.
Anent the second element, did the act of destroying the subject fences on July 4, 2000 and on July 6,
2000 allegedly by accused Manongsong and Egarque, without giving any notice to the private
complainant, amount to manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith as indicated in the information?
Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each other so that
the existence of any of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second element. x x x
xxxx
Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence adduced did not show that accused-movants
favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant.
Eyewitness Alexander Singson categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as the persons
who destroyed/removed the second fence. Private complainant lamented that he was not even given
notice of their intent to destroy the fence. However, the same could not be considered evident bad faith as

the prosecution evidence failed to show that the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self
interest. In fact, the following testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution itself showed that:
1.

Mercedita Atienza revealed that when she confronted Manongsong why he

destroyed the subject fences, the latter replied that You dont have permit and the
land is for the fishermen;

2.

Alexander Singson corroborated that Manongsong told them that they destroyed
the fence because it is a tourist spot and it is also a port for the fishermen; and

3.

Mercedita Atienza also testified that when she asked accused Atienza about the
incident, the latter told her Masama and pinabakod mo. Alam mo namang tourist
spot ang Puerto Galera at para sa fishermens association yan.

III.
Considering that the second element was not present, the Court deemed it proper not to discuss the third
element.[24]

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, the prosecution was not denied due process. It is to be noted that the
prosecution participated in all the proceedings before the court a quo and has filed numerous pleadings and oppositions to
the motions filed by respondent. In fact, the prosecution has already rested its case and submitted its evidence when the
demurrer was filed. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the
party can present its side or defend its interests in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process. [25] What is
repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard, [26] which is not present here.

Clearly, double jeopardy has set in. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. [27]

The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 26678 against respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and entered their
respective pleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence
on the ground that not all the elements of the offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from
which no appeal can be had.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,[28] this Court elucidated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by

the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal
of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by
the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. [29]

Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer [30] is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be
appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it
is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court
must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed
judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [31] In the present case, no such circumstances exist to
warrant a departure from the general rule and reverse the findings of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 28, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case No. 26678, isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172602

April 13, 2007

HENRY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Henry T. Go seeking to nullify
the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, which denied his motion to quash. Likewise sought to be nullified
is the Sandiganbayan Resolution of March 24, 2006 denying petitioner Gos motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On May 5, 2003, this Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
(PIATCO),1 declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement (ARCA), and the Supplemental Contracts entered into between the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.
By the aforementioned contracts (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts), the Government awarded in favor of
PIATCO the project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT
Law).2
The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCOs predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it failed to
meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and
void for being contrary to public policy. The penultimate paragraph of the Courts Decision states thus:
CONCLUSION
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium,
predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains
material and substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement
into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null and
void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the
1997 Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct
government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void. 3
Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia L.
Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in connection
with the NAIA IPT III project. The AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to PIATCO when it
failed to match the latters bid price.

After conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan the
Information dated January 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman
and President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g)4 of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and
Henry T. Go. The Information reads:
I N F O R M AT I O N
The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses
VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with Violation of Sec. 3 (g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows:
On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the
same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals,
Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the
draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by
Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the
latters default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is
more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On February 11, 2005, petitioner Go posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty.
On February 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order against Rivera and petitioner Go.
On March 28, 2005, petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."
On May 26, 2005, Rivera filed a Motion for Judicial Determination (or Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion
to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner Go a period of ten (10) days within which to file a comment thereon.
On June 20, 2005, petitioner Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash. Adopting the view advanced by Rivera,
petitioner Go harped on the alleged "missing documents," including Pesaycos amended affidavit-complaint and those
others that were mentioned in the resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman finding probable cause against
Rivera and petitioner Go, but which were not allegedly in the records. Petitioner Go maintained that apart from the bare
allegations contained in Pesaycos affidavit-complaint, there was no supporting evidence for the finding of the existence
of probable cause against him and Rivera. Petitioner Go further alleged that he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government. At least one of the important elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly
present in his case.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner Go filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute the Comment with Motion to Quash,
which the prosecution, through the Office of the Ombudsman, opposed.
On December 6, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying Riveras Motion for Judicial
Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Gos Motion to Quash.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that, contrary to the prosecutions submission, it could still entertain petitioner Gos Motion to
Quash even after his arraignment considering that it was based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Gos Motion to Quash holding that, contrary to his claim, the
allegations in the Information actually make out the offense charged. More particularly, the allegations that accused

Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which
agreement was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, are constitutive of the elements of the offense
charged as defined under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
The Sandiganbayan explained that petitioner Gos contentions that he is not a public officer, he did not conspire with
Rivera in the execution of the ARCA and, in any case, the said agreement cannot be said to be manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, could not be properly considered for the purpose of quashing the Information on the
ground relied upon by him. According to the Sandiganbayan, these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved
during trial.
The decretal portion of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the "Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and
Motion to Dismiss" and the "Motion to Quash," filed by accused Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, respectively, are
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner Go filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in the Resolution dated
March 24, 2006.
Petitioner Go now seeks recourse to the Court and, in support of his petitioner, alleges that:
A.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not
ruling that Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person within its proviso.
B.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not
ruling that there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial. 7
Petitioner Go contends that Section 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged by implication or
intendment to bring within its limited scope private persons. The said provision of law allegedly punishes only public
officers as it penalizes the act of "entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby." As a private person,
he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the government," there being no showing of any agency relations
or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
Citing several cases,8 petitioner Go enumerates the following elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
He also cites Marcos v. Sandiganbayan9 where the Court acquitted then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos of the charge of
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as it found that she did not sign the subject Lease Agreement, entered into between
the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) and Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), as a public
officer, but in her capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private entity. As such, the Court held that the first element of the
offense charged, i.e., that the accused is a public officer, was wanting.

Petitioner Go claims that, in the same manner, the first element of the offense charged against him is absent because he is
not a public officer who is authorized by law to bind the government through the act of "entering into a contract." He also
points out that, similar to his case, in Marcos, the Information also alleged that the former First Lady conspired with a
public officer, then Minister Jose P. Dans of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, in entering into a
contract. Nonetheless, the Court therein dismissed the allegation of conspiracy.
Petitioner Go maintains that by any of its definition, 10 he cannot be considered a "public officer." Further, only a public
officer can enter into a
contract in representation of the government. He stresses that the first element of the offense, i.e., that the accused is a
public officer, is an essential ingredient of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. He likens it to the crime of parricide
where the essential element is the relationship of the offender to the victim and, citing a criminal law book author, a
stranger who cooperates in the execution of the offense is not allegedly guilty of this crime. The stranger is allegedly
either liable for homicide or murder but never by "conspiracy to commit parricide." 11
By parity of reasoning, according to petitioner Go, the first essential element of the crime penalized under Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 is that the offender must be a public officer. Since he is not a public officer, one of the essential elements of the
offense is lacking; hence, there is no other recourse but to quash the Information.
Section 9 of RA 3019 was also cited which reads:
SEC. 9. Penalties for violation.
(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5,
and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month or fifteen years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest
and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
xxx
Petitioner Go posits that had it been the intention of the lawmakers to penalize private persons who supposedly
"conspired" with public officers in violation of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of RA 3019, it could have easily used the
conjunctive "and," not "or," between the terms "public officer" and "private person" in Section 9 thereof.
Petitioner Go takes exception to the Sandiganbayans pronouncement that even as a private individual he is not excluded
from the coverage of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not being accused singly but as someone who conspired with
a public officer in violating the said law. According to petitioner Go, this proposition applies only to Section 3(e) 12 of RA
3019, the elements of which include that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them."13 He stresses that, unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019, Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the
operative phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the government."
Petitioner Go vigorously asserts that there is no basis for the finding of probable cause against him for violation of Section
3(g) of RA 3019. In particular, he insists that the allegation of conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by
any evidence. He makes an issue out of those documents that were mentioned in the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman
finding probable cause against him but were not in the records of the Sandiganbayan. His mere signing of the ARCA does
not allegedly establish culpability for violation of RA 3019. Further, he faults the Sandiganbayan for invoking the doctrine
of non-interference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause. It is
petitioner Gos view that the Sandiganbayan should have ordered the quashal of the Information for palpable want of
probable cause coupled with the absence of material documents.
The petition is bereft of merit.
For clarity, Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is quoted below anew:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 14
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public officer does not necessarily take him
out of the ambit of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Petitioner Gos simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he
cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA
3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office
is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.
As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, 15 the Court had ascertained the scope
of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons:
x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the
commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision
has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act
3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. 16
Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private persons with violation of
Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft laws application extends to both public officers and
private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections
3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than
fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of
any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
xxx
The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily
preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers
in the commission of the offense thereunder.
The case of Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan17 is instructive. In the said case, Gregorio Singian, Jr., a private person who was
then Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), together with some officers of the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), was charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with the loan accommodations that
the said bank extended to ISI which were characterized as behest loans.

A total of eighteen Informations were filed against Singian and his co-accused by the Office of the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan corresponding to the nine loan accommodations granted to ISI. Each loan was subject of two Informations
alleging violations of both Section 3(e) and (g), respectively. In other words, nine Informations charged Singian and his
co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and the other nine charged them with violation of paragraph (g) of
the same provision.
Singian filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for re-determination of existence of probable cause but the same was
dismissed. He then filed with the Court a petition for certiorari but it was likewise dismissed as the Court held that the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan had not committed grave abuse of discretion when they respectively found probable
cause against Singian for violations of both paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA 3019.
Singian thus illustrates that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and,
if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Another case, Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 18 may
likewise be applied to this case by analogy.
In the said case, Diosdado Garcia, proprietor of D.T. Garcia Construction Supply, together with Jaime Domingo, then
municipal mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, was charged with Section 3(h) of RA 3019 as it appeared that he was used by
Domingo as a dummy to cover up his business transaction with the municipality. Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law reads:
SEC.3. Corrupt practices of public officers. x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law
from having an interest.
The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) he has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction; (3) he either: (a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with such interest, or (b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.19
Despite the first element mentioned above, the Court affirmed the conviction of Garcia, a private individual, as well as
that of Domingo, who was then a municipal mayor, for violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019. In so holding, the Court
established that Domingo and Garcia acted in conspiracy with one another in the commission of the offense. Domingo
thus also serves to debunk petitioner Gos theory that where an offense has as one of its elements that the accused is a
public officer, it necessarily excludes private persons from the scope of such offense.
The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is applicable to the present case, is that
private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.
Reliance by petitioner Go on Marcos v. Sandiganbayan20 is not quite appropriate. To recall, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the Court therein acquitted former First Lady Imelda Marcos of the charge of violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 in its Resolution dated October 6, 1998. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease
agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element, i.e., that the accused is a public officer
was wanting.
Petitioner Go, however, failed to put the Courts ruling in Marcos in its proper factual backdrop. The acquittal of the
former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Courts Decision dated January 29, 1998, in Dans, Jr. v.
People,21 which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion, gave rise to the Courts
Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of
Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, alleged that they were both public officers
and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a
private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Ladys conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 but
acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First Ladys motion for
reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former First Ladys conviction was
based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer.
However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the public officer with whom she had
supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words, the element that the accused is a
public officer, was totally wanting in the former First Ladys case because Dans, the public officer with whom she had
allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady
could not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case because he is not being
charged alone but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary.
The case against both of them is still pending before the Sandiganbayan. The facts attendant in petitioner Gos case are,
therefore, not exactly on all fours as those of the former First Ladys case as to warrant the application of the Marcos
ruling in his case.
Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information is infirm as far as petitioner
Go is concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his participation in the planning and preparation of the
alleged conspiracy. It opines that "aside from the sweeping allegation of conspiracy, the Information failed to mention any
act as to how petitioner had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged conspiracy. Mere allegation of
conspiracy in the Information does not necessarily mean that the criminal acts recited therein also pertain to petitioner."
While it concedes that the Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over private individuals, it submits that it may do so
only "upon Information alleging with specificity the precise violations of the private individual." By way of conclusion,
the dissenting opinion cites Sistoza v. Desierto22 where the Court stated that a signature appearing on a document is not
enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among officials and employees charged with defrauding the government.
These asseverations, however, are unpersuasive. It is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. 23 In
the same manner, the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. 24
Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera in violating Section 3(g)
of RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged
conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to be shown and
proved during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of
the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.
Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of
each of them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all." 25
In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court are complied with:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 on the grounds
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of
the material averments of an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
Information are not to be considered.26

As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted hypothetically,
establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis--vis petitioner Go:
ELEMENTS ALLEGATIONS
1a\^/phi1.net
1. The offender is a public officer
[T]he accused
VICENTE C.
RIVERA, JR.,
Secretary of
Department of
Transportation and
Communications
(DOTC),
committing the
offense in relation to
his office and taking
advantage of the
same, in conspiracy
with accused
HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and
President of
Philippine
International Air
Terminals, Co., xxx"
2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government
"[T]he accused
VICENTE C.
RIVERA, JR.,
xxx in conspiracy
with accused
HENRY T. GO xxx
did then and there,
willfully &
unlawfully and
feloniously entered
into an Amended
and Restated
Concession
Agreement (ARCA),
after the project for
the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport
International
Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III)
was awarded to
Paircargo
Consortium/PIATC

Oxxx
3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government

"xxx which ARCA

substantially
amended the draft
Concession
Agreement covering
the construction of
the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act
6957, as amended by
Republic Act 7718
(BOT Law)
providing that the
government shall
assume the liabilities
of PIATCO in the
event of the latters
default specifically
Article IV, Section
4.04 (c) in relation
to Article I, Section
1.06 of the ARCA
which terms are
more beneficial to
PIATCO and in
violation of the BOT
Law and manifestly
grossly
disadvantageous to
the government of
the Republic of the
Philippines."27

Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated thus:
The rule is that the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the
public prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case. Such official is vested with authority to determine whether
or not a criminal case must be filed in court and the concomitant function of determining as well the persons to be
prosecuted. Also, it must not be lost sight of that the correctness of the exercise of such function is a matter that the trial
court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon, consistent with the policy of non-interference by the courts
in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions relating to the finding of
probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman should be addressed to the said office itself, then to the Court of Appeals
and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that the same exists in this case, the
said finding we arrived at upon a personal determination thereof which we did for the purpose of and before the issuance
of the warrant of arrest.1awphi1.nt While it may indeed be true that the documents mentioned by accused-movant as
being absent in the records are missing, we nevertheless had for our perusal other documents assiduously listed down by

accused Rivera in his motion, including the information, which we found to constitute sufficient basis for our
determination of the existence of probable cause. It must be emphasized that such determination is separate and distinct
from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman and which we did independently therefrom. 28
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the government prosecutor, which
in this case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons. 29 Mindful of this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made
its own determination on the basis of the records that were before it. It concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the
records for the finding of the existence of probable cause against petitioner Go.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on the Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists probable cause against
petitioner Go.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated December 6, 2005 and
March 24, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxx

THIRD DIVISION
LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168544

Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TINGA,*
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 31, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

For review is the Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan dated January 28, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27434, finding
Victor S. Venturanza (Venturanza) and petitioner Linda Cadiao-Palacios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(b), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.[2]
Petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique from July 1998 to June 2001.
[3]

During her administration, there were infrastructure projects that were initiated during the incumbency of her

predecessor, then Mayor Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid. These included the Janlagasi Diversion Dam, San
Luis Diversion Dam, Caridad-Bagacay Road, and San Juan-Tumao Road which were contracted by L.S. Gamotin
Construction (L.S. Gamotin) with a total project cost of P2 million. For the said projects, the municipality owed the
contractor P791,047.00.[4]

Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with Venturanza, then the Municipal Security Officer, was
indicted in an Information for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about the month of January, 1999, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, LINDA CADIAO PALACIOS and VIC VENTURANZA, public officers,
being the Municipal Mayor and Security Officer to the Mayor, respectively, of the Municipality of Culasi,
Antique, and as such, accused Mayor is the approving authority of contracts involving the Municipality,
in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of (sic) gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand money from Grace Superficial of L.S. Gamotin
Construction, which undertook the construction of the following government projects, for the
Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique, to wit:
a)
b)
c)

Rehabilitation of Tumao-San Juan Road;

Rehabilitation of Centro Norte-Buenavista Road; and
Rehabilitation of Bagacay-Buenavista Road

which projects amounted to TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, which was
sourced from the National Disaster Coordinating Council and channeled to the Municipality of Culasi,
under condition that the final payments for said projects would not be released, if said amounts would not
be given, and consequently received the amounts of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) in cash
and ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P162,400.00) in LBP
Check No. 3395274, thus accused Mayor Linda Cadiao Palacios, directly or indirectly through her coaccused Vic Venturanza, demanded or received money from a person, in connection with contracts or
transactions between the government, wherein the public officer in her official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

On April 16, 2002, both accused voluntarily surrendered and, upon motion, posted a reduced bail bond
of P15,000.00 each.[6] They were subsequently arraigned wherein they both pleaded Not Guilty.[7] Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witnessthe private complainant herself, Grace M. Superficial
(Superficial). Her testimony may be summarized as follows:
For and on behalf of L.S. Gamotin, she (Superficial) took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings of the
municipality.[8] Prior to the full payment of the municipalitys obligation, petitioner demanded money from her, under
threat that the final payment would not be released unless she complied. Acceding to petitioners demand, she gave the
formers husband P15,000.00.[9] Sometime in January 1999, petitioner demanded from Superficial the full payment of her
total kickback which should be 10% of the project cost. Superficial thus proposed that she would deliver a check in lieu of
cash, to which petitioner agreed.[10]
On January 25, 1999, petitioner gave to Neil Superficial, then an incumbent councilor and the husband of private
complainant, three checks[11] representing the final payment for the construction projects. The following day, Venturanza
picked up the check promised by Superficial as payment for the 10% kickback. In accordance with petitioners instruction,
the check was made payable to Venturanza in the amount of P162,400.00. The check was encashed by Venturanza at the

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), San Jose, Antique Branch, which is about 90-100 kilometers away from Culasi; and
the amount was received by Venturanza. [12] It was Venturanza also who deposited the three checks, representing the full
payment of the project, to the account of Superficial. [13]
The prosecution likewise offered the following documentary evidence: 1) Minutes of the Meeting of PreQualification, [Bid] and Award Committee (PBAC) held at the Municipality of Antique; [14] 2) Land Bank Check No.
3395274P dated January 26, 1999 in the amount of P162,400.00;[15] 3) Complainants Consolidated Sur-Reply; [16] and 4)
Deposit Slip of the three LBP Checks representing full payment of the project. [17]
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: 1) petitioner herself, 2) Venturanza, 3) Engr.
Armand Cadigal, 4) petitioners husband Emmanuel Palacios, 5) petitioners Executive Assistant Eugene de Los Reyes, and
6) Atty. Rex Suiza Castillon. Their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Petitioner denied Superficials allegations. She insisted that she only dealt with the owner of L.S. Gamotin, Engr.
Leobardo S. Gamotin (Engr. Gamotin), relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she could have made the demand
directly from him and not from Superficial. Contrary to Superficials contention, it was Engr. Gamotin himself who
claimed payment through a demand letter addressed to petitioner.[18] She added that she only met Superficial when the
latter received the checks representing the final payment.She further testified that she never entrusted any highly sensitive
matter to Venturanza since her trusted employee was her chief of staff. She also averred that she was not the only person
responsible for the release of the checks since the vouchers also required the signatures of the municipal treasurer, the
municipal budget officer, and the municipal accountant. [19] As far as Venturanza was concerned, she denied knowledge of
such transaction as he did not ask permission from her when he used the vehicle of the municipality to go to San Jose.
[20]

Lastly, she claimed that the filing of the case against her was politically motivated. [21]
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied having received P15,000.00 from Superficial. He claimed that he was

financially stable, being a Forester; the manager of a 200-hectare agricultural land and of a medium piggery
establishment; and the owner of a residential house valued at no less than P6 million, a parcel of land and other properties.
[22]

He also claimed that the institution of the criminal case was ill-motivated as Neil Superficial, in fact, initiated a

complaint against him for frustrated murder.[23]

Venturanza, for his part, admitted that he indeed received the check from Superficial but denied that it was grease
money. He claimed that the said amount (P162,400.00) was received by him in the form of a loan. He explained that he
borrowed from Superficial P150,000.00 to finance his trip to Australia so that he could attend the wedding of his nephew;
and asked for an additional amount for his expenses in processing his visa. [24] Venturanza, however, failed to leave
for Australia. Of the total amount of his loan, he allegedly spent P15,000.00 in processing his visa. Venturanza stated that
he was able to repay the entire amount immediately because he obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Aklan, Pandan
Branch, to pay the amount he used in applying for his visa. He further testified that he was persuaded by the Superficials
to campaign against petitioner.[25]
On January 28, 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting both accused of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS and

VICTOR S. VENTURANZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, in view of the
attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of both accused, each of them are hereby
sentenced to (i) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to nine (9) years, as maximum; (ii) suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto;
and (iii) pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]

The Sandiganbayan concluded that the following circumstances established the guilt of both petitioner and
Venturanza: 1) that the municipality had outstanding obligations with L.S. Gamotin for the construction of several public
works that were completed in 1998; 2) that petitioner was the person authorized to effect the payment of said obligations
which, in fact, she did; 3) that Venturanza was a trusted employee of petitioner as he was in charge of the security of the
municipal buildings and personnel as well as the adjoining offices; 4) that Venturanza received the three LBP checks
representing the full payment to L.S. Gamotin and the LBP check bearing the amount of P162,400.00; 5) that Venturanza
went to San Jose, Antique on January 26, 1999 to deposit the three checks and encashed the P162,400.00 check; 6) that
Venturanza did not receive the above amount by virtue of a loan agreement with Superficial because there was no
evidence to prove it; 7) that Venturanza used the vehicle of the municipality to encash the check in San Jose, Antique; and
8) that the amount of P15,000.00 initially given to Emmanuel Palacios and the P162,400.00 appearing on the check
corresponded to the 10% of the total project cost after deducting the 10% VAT and P10,000.00 Engineering Supervision
Fee.[27]
In arriving at this conclusion, the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimony of the lone witness for the
prosecution. It added that contrary to the claim of the defense, no ill motive could be attributed to her in testifying against
petitioner and Venturanza. This is especially true in the case of the latter, as she was related to him. In finding both
accused guilty, the Sandiganbayan concluded that, together, they conspired in committing the offense charged.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Venturanza separately appealed their conviction. The latter petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 168548 which was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated September 26, 2005. The former, on the other
hand, is now before us, mainly challenging the legal and factual bases of the Sandiganbayan decision.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 3 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
following elements: 1) the offender is a public officer; 2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage,
or benefit; 3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; 4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government; 5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene. [28]
At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Antique. As mayor, her
signature, both in the vouchers and in the checks issued by the municipality, was necessary to effect payment to
contractors (for government projects). [29] Since the case involved the collection by L.S. Gamotin of the municipalitys
outstanding obligation to the former, the right of petitioner to intervene in her official capacity is undisputed. Therefore,
elements 1, 4 and 5 of the offense are present. [30]
Petitioners refutation of her conviction focuses on the evidence appreciated by the Sandiganbayan establishing
that she demanded and received grease money in connection with the transaction/contract.
Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts 1) demanding or requesting; 2) receiving; or 3) demanding, requesting
and receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to
intervene under the law. Each of these modes of committing the offense is distinct and different from one another. Proof of
existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. [31]
The Sandiganbayan viewed the case as one, the resolution of which hinged primarily on the matter of
credibility. It found Superficial and her testimony worthy of credence, that petitioner demanded grease money as a
condition for the release of the final payment to L.S. Gamotin. Aside from the demand made by petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that, indeed, she received the grease money through Venturanza. Therefore, petitioner
was convicted both for demanding and receiving grease money.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the aforesaid conclusions.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court [32] save in the
following cases: 1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2) the inference
made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on
record;[33] and 6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. [34] The
instant case does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.

The assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial court, which had the benefit of
observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness. [35] It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to
weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it
considers perjurious or fabricated. [36] Between the Sandiganbayan and this Court, the former was concededly in a better
position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth. [37]
Petitioner contends that it was improbable for her to have demanded the grease money from Superficial, when she
could have talked directly to the contractor himself. She insists that Superficial was never a party to the transaction and
that Engr. Gamotin was the one who personally facilitated the full payment of the municipalitys unpaid obligation.
This contention does not persuade. As held in Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan,[38] it is irrelevant from whom petitioner
demanded her percentage share of the project cost whether from the contractor himself or from the latters
representative. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, and this
element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Superficial. [39]
Notwithstanding her claim that the prosecution failed to present a special power of attorney to show Superficials
authority to represent L.S. Gamotin, petitioner admitted that it was Superficial (or her husband) who received the three
checks representing full payment of the municipalitys obligation. Moreover, although the checks were issued to L.S.
Gamotin, the deposit slip showed that they were deposited by Venturanza to the account of Superficial. Thus, contrary to
petitioners contention, the evidence clearly shows that Superficial was not a stranger to the transaction between the
municipality and L.S. Gamotin, for she, in fact, played an important role in the receipt of the final payment of the
governments obligation. It was not, therefore, impossible for petitioner to have demanded the grease money from
Superficial, for after all, it was the latter who received the proceeds of the final payment. This was bolstered by the fact
that the P162,400.00 check in the name of Venturanza was encashed by him on the same day that he deposited the three
checks. If indeed the amount given to Venturanza was in the form of a loan to finance his trip to Australia, why was the
grant of the loan dependent on the receipt of the final payment to L.S. Gamotin? [40] We cannot fathom how Superficial
could lend money out of the proceeds of the checks which admittedly were received by her not in her own capacity but for
and on behalf of another person (L.S. Gamotin). The only plausible explanation is that the amount given to Venturanza
was grease money taken from the proceeds of the checks issued by the municipality.
In holding that petitioner and Venturanza conspired in committing the offense, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the
circumstances enumerated above point to the culpability of the accused. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence showing
that petitioner demanded and received the money but the testimony of Superficial, corroborated by the documentary
evidence and the admissions of the witnesses for the defense, sufficiently establishes that Venturanza received the money
upon orders of petitioner.
The sad reality in cases of this nature is that no witness can be called to testify since no third party is ordinarily
involved to witness the same. Normally, the only persons present are the ones who made the demand and on whom the
demand was made.[41] In short, like bribery, the giver or briber is usually the only one who can provide direct evidence of
the commission of this crime. [42] While it is true that entrapment has been a tried and tested method of trapping and

capturing felons in the act of committing clandestine crimes [43] like the instant case, we cannot fault Superficial in not
resorting to this method because of the position occupied by petitioner during that time, as well as the power attached to
her office. This is especially true in the instant case as the person who made the demand assigned another person to
receive the grease money; and ordered that the check be issued in the name of another person.
One final note. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean evidence that which produces absolute certainty;
only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [44] We find
that such requirement has been met in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated January 28, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27434 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202243

August 7, 2013

ROMULO L. NERI, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Assailed and sought to be nullified in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, with
application for preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order, are the Resolution 1 dated February 3, 2012 of the
Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in SB-10-CRM-0099 entitled People of the Philippines v. Romulo L. Neri, as well as
its Resolution2 of April 26, 2012 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE 3 National Broadband Network (NBN) Project,
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB ), on May 28, 2010, filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) criminal Informations, the
first against Benjamin Abalos, for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), and eventually raffled to
the Fourth Division of that court. The second Information against Neri, also for violation of Sec. 3(h), RA 3019, in
relation to Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, was docketed as SB-10-CRM-0099 (People v. Neri) and raffled to
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. Vis--vis the same project, the Ombudsman would also later file an information
against Macapagal-Arroyo and another information against her and several others docketed as SB-11-CRM-0467 and SB11-CRM-0468 to 0469, respectively, all of which ended up, like SB-10-CRM-0098, in the anti-graft courts 4th Division.

The accusatory portion of the Information against Neri reads as follows:

That during the period from September 2006 to April 2007, or thereabout in Metro Manila x x x and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused x x x being the then Director General of the NEDA, a
Cabinet position and as such, is prohibited by Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution from being financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government but in spite of said
provision, petitioner, while acting as such, x x x directly or indirectly have financial or pecuniary interest in the business
transaction between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Zhing Xing Telecommunications
Equipment, Inc., a Chinese corporation x x x for the implementation of the Philippine x x x (NBN) Project, which requires
the review, consideration and approval of the NEDA, x x x by then and there, meeting, having lunch and playing golf with
representatives and/or officials of the ZTE and meeting with the COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos and sending his
emissary/representative in the person of Engineer Rodolfo Noel Lozada to meet Chairman Abalos and Jose De Venecia
III, President/General Manager of Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) another proponent to implement the NBN Project and
discuss matters with them. (Rollo, pp. 48-50.)
In the ensuing trial in the Neri case following the arraignment and pre-trial proceedings, six (6) individuals took the
witness stand on separate dates5 to testify for the prosecution. Thereafter, the prosecution twice moved for and secured
continuance for the initial stated reason that the prosecution is still verifying the exact address of its next intended witness
and then that such witness cannot be located at his given address. 6
In the meantime, a pre-trial conference was conducted in the Abalos case following which the Fourth Division issued on
September 17, 2010 a Pre-Trial Order7 containing, among other things, a list of witnesses and documents the prosecution
intended to present. On October 27, 2010, Neri, whose name appeared high on the list, took the witness stand against
Abalos in the Abalos case.8
On January 3, 2012, in SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), OMB, citing Sec. 22, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules, moved for its consolidation with SB10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), SB-11-CRM-0467 (People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to 469 (People v. Arroyo).
The stated reason proffered: to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases
involving the same business transaction. And in this regard, the prosecution would later manifest that it would be
presenting Yu Yong and Fan Yang, then president and finance officer, respectively, of ZTE, as witnesses all in said cases
which would entail a substantive expense on the part of government if their testimonies are given separately. 9
Neri opposed and argued against consolidation, and, as he would later reiterate, contended, among other things that: (a)
SB-10-CRM-0099, on one hand, and the other cases, on the other, involve different issues and facts; (b) the desired
consolidation is oppressive and violates his rights as an accused; (c) consolidation would unduly put him at risk as he does
not actually belong to the Abalos group which had been negotiating with the ZTE officials about the NBN Project; (d) he
is the principal witness and, in fact, already finished testifying, in the Abalos case; (e) the trial in the Neri and Abalos
cases are both in the advanced stages already; and (f) the motion is but a ploy to further delay the prosecution of SB-10CRM-0099, considering the prosecutions failure to present any more witnesses during the last two (2) scheduled
hearings.
To the opposition, the prosecution interposed a reply basically advancing the same practical and economic reasons why a
consolidation order should issue.
By Resolution dated February 3, 2012, the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with the position thus taken by the
OSP, granted the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecutions Motion to Consolidate is hereby GRANTED. The instant case (SB-10-CRM-0099) is
now ordered consolidated with SB-10-CRM-0098, the case with the lower court docket number pending before the Fourth
Division of this Court, subject to the conformity of the said Division. 10 (Emphasis added.)
According to the Fifth Division, citing Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, 11 consolidation is proper inasmuch as the subject
matter of the charges in both the Abalos and Neri cases revolved around the same ZTE-NBN Project. And following the
movants line, the anti-graft court stated that consolidation would allow the government to save unnecessary expenses,
avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court without
violating the parties rights.
Neri sought a reconsideration, but the Fifth Division denied it in its equally assailed April 26, 2012 Resolution.
The Issues
Petitioner Neri is now before the Court on the submission that the assailed consolidation order is void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Specifically, petitioners allege that respondent court gravely erred:
[A] x x x in ordering a consolidation of the subject criminal cases when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
allow a consolidation of criminal cases, only a consolidation of trials or joint trials in appropriate instances.
[B] x x x in ordering the consolidation because petitioner will now be tried for a crime not charged in the information in x
x x SB-10-CRM-0099 and this is violative of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Worse, conspiracy was not even charged or alleged in that
criminal information.
[C] x x x in ordering the consolidation for it would surely prejudice the rights of petitioner as an accused in x x x SB-10CRM-0099 because he does not actually belong to the Abalos Group which had been negotiating with the ZTE Officials
about the NBN Project.
[D] x x x in ordering the consolidation for it would just delay the trial of the case against the petitioner, as well as that
against Abalos, because these cases are already in the advanced stages of the trial. Worse, in the Abalos case, the
prosecution has listed 50 witnesses and it has still to present 33 more witnesses while in the case against the petitioner the
prosecution (after presenting six witnesses) has no more witnesses to present and is now about to terminate its evidence in
chief. Clearly, a consolidation of trial of these two (2) cases would unreasonably and unduly delay the trial of the case
against the petitioner in violation of his right to a speedy trial.
[E] x x x in not finding that the proposed consolidation was just a ploy by the prosecution to further delay the prosecution
of x x x SB-10-CRM-0099 because during the last two (2) hearings it has failed to present any more prosecution witnesses
and there appears to be no more willing witnesses to testify against the petitioner. x x x
[F] x x x in not finding that it would be incongruous or absurd to allow consolidation because petitioner was the principal
witness (as he already finished testifying there) against Abalos in x x x SB-10-CRM-0098. 12
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious, owing for one on the occurrence of a supervening event in the Sandiganbayan itself. As may
be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division ordering the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099
(the Neri case) with SB-10-CRM-0098 (the Abalos case) pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the "conformity
of the said (4th) Division." On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the premise that consolidation is addressed to

the sound discretion of both the transferring and receiving courts, but more importantly the latter as the same transferred
case would be an added workload, issued a Resolution13 refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division RESPECTFULLY DECLINES to accept SB-10CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation with SB-10-CRM-00998 (Abalos case) pending before it.
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wrote to justify, in part, its action:
The Fourth Division already heard accused Neri testify against the accused in the Abalos case, and in the course of the
presentation of his testimony (on direct examination, on cross-examination and based on his reply to the questions from
the Court), the individual members of the Fourth Division, based on accused Neris answers as well as his demeanor on
the dock, had already formed their respective individual opinions on the matter of his credibility. Fundamental is the rule x
x x that an accused is entitled to nothing less that the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. This Court would not want
accused Neri to entertain any doubt in his mind that such formed opinions might impact on the proper disposition of the
Neri case where he stands accused himself. 14
While it could very well write finis to this case on the ground of mootness, the actual justiciable controversy requirement
for judicial review having ceased to exist with the supervening action of the Fourth Division, the Court has nonetheless
opted to address the issue with its constitutional law component tendered in this recourse.
The unyielding rule is that courts generally decline jurisdiction over cases on the ground of mootness. But as exceptions to
this general norm, courts will resolve an issue, otherwise moot and academic, when, inter alia, a compelling legal or
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public 15 or
when, as here, the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.16Demetria v. Alba added the following related
reason:
But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance
of and as a restraint upon the future.17
The interrelated assignment of errors converged on the propriety, under the premises, of the consolidation of SB-10-CRM0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098.
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so
that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. 18Toward this end,
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the courts docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are
permitted by the rules.
As held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), citing American jurisprudence, the term "consolidation" is used
in three (3) different senses or concepts, thus:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in one trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one
action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial) 19 (citations and emphasis omitted; italicization in the original.)
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled
"Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. - Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a
series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added.)
as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is
raffled.
Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in criminal or civil cases, the rule allowing
consolidationin whatsoever sense it is taken, be it as a merger of several causes of actions/cases, in the sense of actual
consolidation, or merely joint trialis designed, among other reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants. 20
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there is nothing in the
records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation for
trial or joint trial. This conclusion may be deduced from the underscored portion of the following excerpts of the
resolution in question, thus:
In its reply, the prosecution asserted that the rationale behind consolidation of cases is to promote expeditious and less
expensive resolution of a controversy than if they were heard independently and separately. It is claimed that the OMB
and DOJ have already requested the participation in the hearing of these cases of the ZTE executives, which will entail
huge expenses if they will be presented separately for each case. x x x
We agree with the prosecution.21 (Emphasis added.)
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec.
22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.
Given the above perspective, petitioner should now disabuse himself of the unfounded notion that what the Fifth Division
intended was a fusion into one criminal proceedings of the Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable from the
other, or worse, where he will be tried as co-accused in the Abalos case.
This thus brings us to the question of whether a consolidation of trial, under the factual and legal milieu it was ordered, is
proper.

Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caos v. Peralta, 22 joint trial is permissible
"where the actions arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a
joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties." More
elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or similar
character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of
events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or
are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance
in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their
prosecution, and if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required
on each trial.23
In terms of its effects on the prompt disposition of cases, consolidation could cut both ways.1wphi1 It may expedite trial
or it could cause delays. Cognizant of this dichotomy, the Court, in Dacanay v. People, stated the dictum that "the
resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government cannot not be given preference over the right to a
speedy trial and the protection of a persons life, liberty or property." Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases can
also be affected by consolidation. As we intoned in People v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the denial by the anti-graft
court of the prosecutions motion to consolidate a criminal case for indirect bribery with another case for plunder,
consolidation should be refused if it will unduly expose a party, private respondent in that instance, to totally unrelated
testimonies, delay the resolution of the indirect bribery case, muddle the issues, and expose him to the inconveniences of a
lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation, the Court added, has also been rendered
inadvisable by supervening eventsin particular, if the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already
been heard in the earlier case.25
So it must be here.
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the
crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 26
Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts constituting, or the elements, of
the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in the information are crucial to the success or failure of a
criminal prosecution. It is for this reason that the information is considered the battle ground in criminal prosecutions. As
stressed in Matrido v. People:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit the crime given in the law in some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
The overt acts ascribed to the two accused which formed the basis of their indictments under the separate criminal charge
sheets can be summarized as follows:
People v. Neri (For Violation of Section 3[h] RA 3019)28

1. Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in the business transaction between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, which requires the
review, consideration and approval by the accused, as then NEDA Director General;
2. Meeting, having lunch and playing golf with representatives and/or officials of the ZTE;
3. Meeting with then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos; and
4. Sending his emissary/representative, Engr. Rodolfo Noel Lozada, to meet Abalos and Jose de Venecia III,
President/General Manager of Amsterdam Holdings Inc. (AHI), another proponent to implement the NBN Project
and discuss matters with them.
People v. Abalos (For Violation of Section 3[h], RA 3019)
1. Having financial or pecuniary interest in the business transaction between the GRP and the ZTE for the
implementation of the Philippines NBN;
2. Attending conferences, lunch meetings and golf games with said ZTE officials in China, all expenses paid by
them and socializing with them in China and whenever they were here in the Philippines;
3. Offering bribes to petitioner in the amount of PhP 200,000,000 and to Jose de Venecia III President and General
Manager of AHI in the amount of USD 10,000,000, being also another proponent to implement said NBN Project
of the Government; and
4. Arranging meetings with Secretary Leandro Mendoza of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).29
As can be gleaned from the above summary of charges, the inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and
specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the
negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the
pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to testify in the Abalos
case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders. This can be easily seen by a simple comparison of the list of
witnesses to be presented in the cases consolidated. The witnesses common to both cases are underscored. Thus:
In People v. Neri, the following are named as witnesses, 30 viz:
1. Benjamin Abalos
2. Jose de Venecia Jr.
3. Jose de Venecia III
4. Rodolfo Noel "Jun" Lozada
5. Dante Madriaga
6. Jarius Bondoc
7. Leo San Miguel

8. Sec. Margarito Teves

9. Representative of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation;
10. Employees of the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club
11. Airline Representatives (2)
12. Raquel Desiderio DOTC, Asec. Administrative and Legal Affairs
13. Atty. Frederick Fern Belandres, DOTC
14. Atty. Geronimo Quintos
15. Nilo Colinares
16. Elmer Soneja
17. Lorenzo Formoso
18. Records Custodian, DOTC
19. Senate Secretary or any of her duly authorized representative
20. Director General of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee or any of his duly authorized representative
21. Representative of NEDA;
22. ZTE Officials
23. Ramon Sales
24. Hon. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
25. Atty. Jose Miguel Arroyo
26. Others.
In People v. Abalos, the following are the listed witnesses, 31 to wit:
1. Atty. Oliver Lozano
2. Mr. Jose De Venecia III
3. Engr. Rodolfo Noel Lozada
4. Engr. Dante Madriaga
5. Secretary Romulo L. Neri

6. Mr. Jarius Bondoc

7. Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr.
8. Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco
9. Congresswoman Ana Theresa H. Baraquel
10. TESDA Chairman Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
11. Mr. Leo San Miguel
12. Secretary Margarito Teves
13. Atty. Raquel T. Desiderio
14. Atty. Frederick Fern M. Belandres
15. Atty. Geronimo V. Quintos
16. Mr. Nilo Colinares
17. Mr. Elmer A. Soneja
18. Asst. Secretary Lorenzo Formoso
19. Atty. Harry L. Roque
20. Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
21. Dr. Ma. Dominga B. Padilla
22. Fr. Jose P. Dizon
23. Mr. Roel Garcia
24. Mr. Bebu Bulchand
25. Mr. Renato Constantino, Jr.
26. Mr. Ferdinand R. Gaite
27. Mr. Guillermo Cunanan
28. Mr. Amado Gat Inciong
29. Mr. Rafael V. Mariano
30. Ms. Consuelo J. Paz

31. Atty. Roberto Rafael J. Pulido

32. Antonia P. Barrios, Director III, Senate Legislative Records & Archives Services
33. The Personnel Officer, Human Resource Management Office, Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
34. Representative/s from the Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Mandaluyong City
35. Representative/s from the Philippine Airlines (PAL)
36. Representative/s from Cathay Pacific Airways
37. Representative/s from the Cebu Pacific Airlines
38. Representative/s from the COMELEC
39. Representative/s from the National Economic & Development Authority (NEDA)
40. Representative/s from the Board of Investments
41. Representative/s from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
42. Representative/s from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
43. Representative/s from the Bureau of Immigration
44. Representative/s from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
45. Representative/s from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
46. Representative/s from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
47. Representative/s from the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China to the Philippines
48. Representative/s from the Central Records Division, Office of the Ombudsman
49. Representative/s from the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
50. Representative/s from the Philippine Senate
The names thus listed in the pre-trial order in the Abalos case do not yet include, as aptly observed by the Fourth Division
in its adverted October 19, 2012 Resolution,32 additional names allowed under a subsequent resolution. In all, a total of at
least 66 warm bodies were lined up to testify for the prosecution.
It can thus be easily seen that veritably the very situation, the same mischief sought to be avoided in People v.
Sandiganbayan33 which justified the non-consolidation of the cases involved therein, would virtually be present should the
assailed consolidation be upheld. Applying the lessons of People v. Sandiganbayan to the instant case, a consolidation of
the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case
against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case. And as in People v.
Sandiganbayan, consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however

irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be resolveda needless, hence, oppressive
delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two cases. In fact, the
number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos. Awaiting the completion in due course of
the presentation of the witnesses in Abalos would doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as there are
more or less thirty-five (35) prosecution witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri. In the
concrete, this means, in the minimum, awaiting the completion of the testimonies of thirty-five (35) additional witnesses,
whose testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before the case against petitioner may finally be disposed of,
one way or another. Also, petitioner will be exposed to an extra thirty-five (35) irrelevant testimonies which even exceed
those relating to his case, since the prosecution only has roughly about twenty-six (26) witnesses for his case. Further still,
any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses in People v. Abalos would certainly affect the speedy disposition of
the case against petitioner. At the end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of contributing to the swift
dispensation of justice and affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases, would achieve
the exact opposite.
Before the Sandigabayan and this Court, petitioner has harped and rued on the possible infringement of his right to speedy
trial should consolidation push through, noting in this regard that the Neri case is on its advanced stage but with the
prosecution unable to continue further with its case after presenting six witnesses.
Petitioner's point is well-taken. In Dacanay, a case involving a request for separate trial instead of a joint trial, the Court
upheld an accused's right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by Sec. 14 (2), Art. III of the Constitution, over the claim of the
prosecution that a joint trial would make the resolution of the case less expensive. 34 In Dacanay, Dacanay moved for
immediate and separate trial, which the People opposed on the ground that a separate trial, if approved, would entail a
repetitive presentation of the same evidence instead of having to present evidence against Dacanay and his co-accused
only once at the joint trial. According to the respondent therein, this will result in inconvenience and expense on the part
of the Government,35 the very same reasons given by the prosecution in the case at hand. There. as later in People v.
Sandiganbayan,36 We held that the rights of an accused take precedence over minimizing the cost incidental to the
resolution of the controversies in question.
Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the element of commonality of the lineage
of the offenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22 of Rule 119, should be ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes
underlying the rule on consolidation, foremost of which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties. It should, however, be denied if it subverts any of the aims of consolidation. And
Dacanay and People v. Sandiganbayan are one in saying, albeit implicitly, that ordering consolidation-likely to delay the
resolution of one of the cases, expose a party to the rigors of a lengthy litigation and in the process undermine the
accused's right to speedy disposition of cases-constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Not lost on the Court of course and
certainly not on the Sandiganbayan 's Fourth Division is the resulting absurdity arising from the consolidation of trial
where the accused (Neri) in one case would be the prosecution's main witness in the other case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division dated February 3, 2012
in Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0099 and its Resolution dated April 26, 2012 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0098 and Criminal Case No. SB-1 0-CRM-0099 proceed independently and be
resolved with dispatch by the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan to which each was originally raffled.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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