George Santayana: World Citizen1

Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.

The Richard Stockon College of New Jersey
INTRODUCTION
No one achieves world citizenship completely. One is always rooted in place and time,
in the origin of ones life and heritage, and these grounded circumstances of life shape ones
outlook, perspective, and philosophy. Yet some few people, even philosophers, attempt to
disclose the illusions of ones place and outlook and thereby gain a perspective that while
based on ones origins escapes the partial, parochial, and illusional aspects of individual
existence. Santayana is such a philosopher. He achieved this independent perspective
through his heritage, personal history and philosophical orientation. Joseph Epstein, in a
recent review of Santayanas letters, writes:
If Santayana may be said to have an overarching philosophical message, it is to
strip oneself of all possible illusions a task that can never be entirely completed
while understanding, as best one is able, the powerful attraction of illusions to
others. The person who can do that, as Santayana consummately could, deserves to
be called philosopher.2
One may ask what does world citizenship mean? Clearly the term is not to be taken
literally, as if one person could have a passport from all nations in the world. Rather I am
using the term to suggest there is a global perspective that is sympathetic to all national and
individual perspectives, a sympathy that nevertheless does not discount or discredit the
value of ones own perspective and culture. How is this possible? For Santayana, this global
perspective, this world citizenship, is possible if one recognizes the natural basis of all life,
the multiplicity of values for all living beings, and the integrity of each individual life
including ones own.
1

Portions of this paper were previously published in Santayanas Autobiography and the Development of his
Philosophy, Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society, No. 4, Fall 1986, pp. 18-27. Some portions
were also included in addresses given at University of London, Spanish Institute, March 1990, and Spanish
Diplomatic School, Madrid, March 1990, as well as various papers presented at Texas A&M University in the
1980s and 1990s.
2
Epstein, Joseph: The permanent transient, The New Criterion (June 2009), p. 16.

Before we can explicate Santayanas outlook, it is important to ascertain his heritage

and experience.
I. LIFE
Santayanas heritage rests in Spains diplomatic history. His father and mother were
each tied to Spains diplomatic corps, and their lives were shaped by the accidental aspects
of time and international relationships, large and small. Santayana indicates there are three
ways to understanding his life and three approaches to understanding his thought.
Interestingly, Santayanas account of his life does not parallel his geographical
locations. If one focuses on Santayanas principal residences, one would divide the
geographical chronology of Santayanas life into three parts: nine years in Spain (18631872), forty years in Boston (1872-1912), and forty years in Europe (1912-1952). But
Santayanas account of his own life, also divided into three parts for his autobiography
(Persons and Places), more accurately describes the development of his person and of his
thought: (1) background (1863-1886), (2) America and Europe (1886-1912), and (3) Europe
(1912-1952). The background of his life basically spans his childhood in Spain through his
undergraduate years at Harvard. Santayanas trans-Atlantic penchant for traveling led him
to describe his years as a graduate student and professor at Harvard as on both sides of the
Atlantic, a description he suggested as a title for the second part of his autobiography.
Likewise, the third part of his life all on the other side indicates the forty years he spent
as a full-time writer in Europe after retiring from Harvard in 1912.
A. Background: Mother and Father
1. Father: Agustn Santayana
The lives of both his parents are based on the contingent patterns associated with the
lives of Spanish diplomats. His father, Agustn Santayana, was born in 1812. He studied
law, practiced for a short time, and then entered the colonial service for posting to the
Philippines. He was a remarkable man who, while studying law, served an apprenticeship to
a professional painter of the school of Goya. To his credit, he translated four Senecan
tragedies into Spanish, wrote an unpublished book about the island of Mindanao, had an
extensive library, and made three trips around the world. In 1845 he became the governor of
Batang, a small island in the Philippines. He took over the governorship from the recently
deceased Jos Borrs y Bofarull, who was the father of Josefina Borrs. Josefina was later
to become Agustns wife in 1861 and the mother of Jorge Agustn Nicols Santayana y
Borrs (George Santayana) on December 16, 1863. One might have expected Agustn and
Josefina to begin their courtship and eventual marriage on the island of Batang, but there is
considerably more adventure to this diplomatic happenstance of two people meeting.
Although it is not fully clear why Josefina left the island shortly after Agustn arrived, there
is some indication that she felt uncomfortable being the only Spanish woman on the island
with Agustn present. She left for Manila and there married a Boston businessman before
her eventual and somewhat mysterious marriage to Agustn.
In 1856 Agustn again met Josefina while traveling on board ship from Manila for
Spain. Josefina was then married to George Sturgis, a Boston merchant, and their three
surviving children were traveling with them. This particular trip took Agustn to Boston,
then to Niagara, then to New York City, and by steamer to England. His last diplomatic post

was that of Financial Secretary to the Governor-General of the Philippines, General Pava,
Marqus de Novaliches. Due to the ill effects of the tropics on his health, he retired early.
He was in his late forties, an age similar to that of George Santayanas future sons
retirement age from Harvard (age forty-eight). In 1861 he returned to Spain and there, once
again, met Josefina Borrs Sturgis, now widowed. They married that same year.
2. Mother: Josefina Borrs
George Santayanas mothers history is no less filled with contingent forces. Though
Spanish, she was born in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1826 or 1828. She spent her girlhood in
Virginia (USA) and Barcelona (Spain), and a portion of her womanhood in the Philippines
and Spain, and the last 43 years of her life in Boston, Massachusetts. Her father left Spain
for Scotland because of his political views. When they moved to the U.S., ironically he
became the American Consul for Barcelona, Spain. Later, when the fashion of the Spanish
government turned more in his direction, he was appointed to a lucrative post in the
Philippines. The voyage from Cdiz to Manila around the Cape of Good Hope lasted six
months, through one of the worst storms the captain had ever experienced. On arriving in
the Philippines, her father discovered there had been a change in the political climate back
home and that the high-paying position in the Philippines was no longer available to him,
but a smaller post, the Governor of Batang, was his.
When her father died, Josefina remained on the island, establishing a moderately
profitable export business, until Agustn Santayana arrived as the new Governor. She left
for Manila when Agustn Santayana arrived. In Manila she met George Sturgis, a Boston
aristocrat and businessman. They married, conceived five children, two of whom died in
early childhood, and then her first husband died. George Sturgis was young when he died,
his business was going badly, and his widow was once again stranded in the Philippines and
this time with several children. A brother of her husband contributed a sum of money3 to
help her, and she moved to Boston.
Remarkably, in 1861 she made a trip to Madrid, met Agustn again --he was close to
fifty years of age and she was probably thirty-five. They married and George Santayana
was born in 1863. The family moved from Madrid to vila between 1864 and 1866.
Josefina seemed determined to raise the Sturgis children in Boston, and, finally, in 1869 she
left for Boston with her two daughters, the one surviving son from the first marriage having
left earlier. From 1869 until 1872 Agustn and George lived together in vila, and then in
1872 they traveled to Boston where George was left with his mother. According to letters,
Agustn made an effort to adjust to Boston and American life, but he preferred Spain and
vila. The separation of mother and father was permanent. In 1888 Agustn wrote to
Josefina:
When we were married I felt as if it were written that I should be united with
you, yielding to the force of destiny . . . Strange marriage, this of ours! So you say,
and so it is in fact. I love you very much, and you too have cared for me, yet we do
not live together.4

3
4

$10,000. The same dollar amount Santayana would inherit when his mother died in 1912.
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 9.

B.
Portals of vila
Santayanas own life was in many ways shaped by his residence in vila, the town he
identifies as a principal residence of his childhood and also as the origin of his ties to Spain.
The uniqueness of Santayanas perspective lies, in part, in his allegiance and respect for his
heritage as well as in his vision beyond that lineage. Throughout his life, Santayana
respected his origins. He retained his Spanish citizenship to his death, never becoming a
citizen of any other country even though he spent only the first nine years of his life
residing in Spain. Just a few months before his death, he renewed his papers at the Spanish
Embassy in Rome and, tragically, fell on the Spanish Steps seriously injuring himself.
Santayanas sense of rootedness and vision may perhaps be understood as an image of his
home city, vila.
vilas history is bound within its medieval walls. The Celtic bulls and boars (symbols
of strength) from the Early Iron Age stand within the walls paying tribute to vilas early
heritage. These walls eloquently blend vilas Roman and Christian heritage by
incorporating Roman stones in the majestic medieval walls, particularly evident at Puerta
del Alczar. The strength of its heritage is formed in stone as the vila Cathedral not only
serves as a place of worship but forms a part of the city battlements enhancing its defenses.
Inside the wall all is cloistered, protected; ones heritage is secure and incorporated into
every aspect of quotidian life. But from each small portal in the wall one gains a view of the
world outside. The gates of Alczar and San Vincente provide views of churches and
commercial life, and beyond are the hills, farms, and shepherds fires at night. The southern
gates open to the mountains (Sierra de Gredos) and the more westerly portals look to the
granite outcroppings in the fields and hills, and beyond to where the wonderfully
surrealistic Castilian Plain begins. It is through these portals that citizens of vila gain their
view of the world, and it is through them that Santayana became a world citizen, never
losing the strength of his origins but gaining a perspective beyond contemporary and
parochial interests.
C. Harvard Years: On Both Sides
From 1874-1882 Santayana was a student in the Boston Latin School, and from
1882-1889 he completed his B.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard University. From 1889-1912 he
was a faculty member at Harvard University, building with William James and Josiah
Royce one of the great eras in the Department of Philosophy. Among his students were
poets (Conrad Aiken, T.S. Eliot, Robert Frost, Wallace Stevens), journalists and writers
(Walter Lippmann, Max Eastman, Van Wyck Brooks), professors (Samuel Eliot Morison,
Harry Austryn Wolfson), a Supreme Court Justice (Felix Frankfurter), numerous diplomats
(including his friend, Bronson Cutting), and a university president (James B.
Conant).Santayanas Harvard years were remarkably active as an undergraduate, graduate,
and professor. As an undergraduate he was a member of over twenty clubs, traveled to
Europe each summer following his freshman year, and clearly enjoyed the adventures and
frivolity of an undergraduate young man as is attested to by his letters to family, particularly
his father, and to friends. Two of his graduate years were spent abroad, primarily in
Germany and England, but his delight at being in academia began to dim with increasing
restriction on his intellectual license. Josiah Royce, his dissertation advisor, assigned
Santayana the philosophy of Rudolf Hermann Lotze as his dissertation topic rather than
Santayanas preference of Schopenhauer. Royce noted that Schopenhauer might be an
appropriate topic for a master of arts but not for a doctor of philosophy. This was a

misdirection that Santayana regretted even in maturity and led to what he called his dull
thesis for the Ph.D.5
Santayanas career at Harvard was productive, active, and remarkable in achievement.
In 1894 he began what he refers to as his metanoia, an awakening from somnambulism. At
about the same time he began planning for early retirement, finding the university life
unsuitable for his desire to be a full-time writer. He found faculty meetings, committees,
and governance structures largely empty and their discussions mostly partisan heat over
false issues, and the general corporate and business-like adaptation of universities not
conducive to intellectual curiosity, development, and growth. He provides a general
description of the Harvard faculty as an anonymous concourse of coral insects, each
secreting one cell, and leaving that fossil legacy to enlarge the earth.6 But, in spite of this
awakening outlook, his successes as a professor are well documented, and, indeed, these
successes made possible his early retirement. At the same time, the new expectations and
restrictions accompanying his achievements convinced Santayana that the academic
environment was not the proper place for a serious philosopher with the desire to be a fulltime writer.
After several books of poetry, Santayana, in his mid-thirties, published his first
philosophical works: The Sense of Beauty (1896) and Interpretations of Poetry and
Religion (1900). The Sense of Beauty was a natural outgrowth of his Harvard course on
aesthetics. Contrary to the prevalent doctrines of the time, the work rooted aesthetics in
natural sensibilities, not in any refined qualities of mind, and placed beauty in the natural
order of the world as a construct and response of human and animal activity. His boldness
in writing was again affirmed in his second philosophical book where religion and poetry
are viewed as imaginative by-products of the natural order, by-products that supervene on
the natural order. Santayanas mentors and colleagues at Harvard were known for their
views of muscular imagination; it was thought and imagination, according to them, that
made possible the hope of pragmatic changes in the world.
The offense was clear. Santayanas emerging view was that thought is meaningless in its
consequence but eloquent in its expression. Its value is not practical, but celebrational and
festive. This was a theme not well received in a department and university attempting to
shape and structure future generations by its documented impact on the nations governance
and business. However, Santayanas five-volume Life of Reason (1905) was well received
partly because it was misunderstood. To some it seemed that Santayana had finally crossed
the American line since it appeared to some that he now maintained the practical impact of
mental constructs. And even though he expressed this construct in classical terms, it seemed
to his American colleagues a welcome turn to practical affairs. Regardless of his reception,
favorable and unfavorable, his notice as a serious philosopher was well established by the
turn of the century.
Long before his retirement Santayana was a celebrated philosopher whose writings were
widely read and who was a frequent guest lecturer at major universities. In his last years at
Harvard there is evidence he was being courted by Columbia, Williams, Wisconsin, and
Berkeley. However, his resolve for early retirement is confirmed in letters to his sister in
5

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, 389. See also Paul G. Kuntz, ed.: George Santayana, Lotzes System of
Philosophy (Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1971).
6

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 397.

1909. When he announced his retirement in May 1911, President Lowell asked him to wait
and agreed to provide Santayana with as much free time as he wanted. Santayana initially
assented to teach only during the fall term with a full years leave for 1912-13. However, in
1912 his resolve overtook his sense of obligation to Harvard and, at the age of forty-eight,
he left Harvard and the U.S. to spend the remaining forty years of his life in Europe.
Santayanas distinctive nature at Harvard is clear. In background he was Spanish and
Catholic, and Harvard with its protestant, puritanical, New England roots was hardly his
native soil. He was the only classical American philosopher who was a classicist, and his
lineage and allegiance to Europe made him an outsider in a university he considered more
and more parochial. His numerous travels in Europe and Asia set him apart. And his interest
in art, poetry, and religion made his philosophy dubious in a department and university
where practicality and action were becoming the principal marks of philosophical inquiry.
But difference can both set one apart and also make one more interesting and more
attractive. The latter was Santayanas fate; it was one of the portals that led to his being a
world citizen, and his last years at Harvard brought trips to major universities, receptions
and parties in New York, and widespread recognitions and friendships.
The death of Santayanas mother on February 5, 1912, released him from his family
ties to America and also financially eased his planned retirement. His mother, Josefina
Sturgis de Santayana, became ill in 1909, probably a victim of Alzheimers disease. In May
1911 Santayana wrote to his half-sister, Susana (residing in Spain), that their mother was
comatose most of the time. During his last months at Harvard, Santayana visited his mother
frequently and, finally, daily. She was slowly dying. Upon her death he inherited $10,000
from her estate and made arrangements for his half-sister, Josephine, to be cared for in a
home in Spain where Susana now lived and where Santayana first thought he would reside
as a full-time writer. This inheritance plus Santayanas steady income from his publications
made retirement easier. He asked his half-brother Robert to manage his finances (something
Robert had done for their mother) with the understanding that Robert or his descendants
would inherit the full capital upon Santayanas death. Hence, in January 1912, at the age of
forty-eight, Santayana was free to write, free to travel, free to choose his residence and
country, and free from the constraints of university regimen and expectations. Santayana
welcomed the release.
D. Europe: All on One Side
Between 1912 and 1914 Santayana made twenty-odd trips between England and Europe
to find a suitable place to live and write. Settling on Paris, he found himself in London at
the outbreak of World War I and remained in England, mostly at Oxford, until 1919 when,
rejecting offers for a lifetime membership at either Corpus Christi or New College, he
returned to his chosen life as a traveling writer. Paris was no longer his settled choice of
residence, and he then was truly the vagabond scholar. Thereafter, his locales revolved
around Paris, Madrid, the Riviera, Florence, Cortina dAmpezzo, and finally by the late
1920s his established patterns began to center more and more in Rome. Harvard attempted
to bring Santayana back several times. As early as 1917 Harvard asked Santayana to return,
and as late as 1929 he was offered the Norton Chair in Poetry, one of Harvards most
respected chairs. In 1931 he turned down an invitation from Brown University, and Harvard
later tempted him to accept for only a term the William James Lecturer in Philosophy, a

newly established honorary post.7 But Santayana never returned to Harvard or America. He
appeared on the front of Time magazine February 3, 1936, in conjunction with his bestselling novel, The Last Puritan. Unsuccessful in his efforts to leave Rome before World
War II, in 1941 he entered the Clinica della Piccola Compagna di Maria, a hospital clinic
administered by a Catholic order of nuns better known as the Blue Nuns for the color of
their habit. His autobiography, Persons and Places, was smuggled out of Rome during the
war and was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection in 1944-45. He died at the clinic on
September 26, 1952, at the age of eighty-eight, having published 27 books and numerous
articles during his lifetime.
II. PHILOSOPHY
Throughout the editing of The Works of George Santayana I reflected on the
development of Santayanas philosophy and, in particular, on his own account of the
development of his philosophical thought, on the portals through which he gained his
perspective. For Santayana, philosophy is not a methodology, nor metaphysics, nor an
ideology; it is an expression of the values and beliefs inherent and discoverable in living
and acting. This perspective is derivative of Santayanas place, time, and ancestry, as well
as the result of his creativity. In Persons and Places there are some marginal comments
excluded from previous publications in which Santayana describes three important stages in
his thought. I shall use these comments as the basis for discussing the mature thought of
Santayana. They are the three principal portals through which Santayana views the world:
first, his materialism; second, his moral relativism; and third, his sense of integrity or selfdefinition.8
A. Materialism
In Chapter XI of Persons and Places, The Church of the Immaculate Conception,
Santayana describes the development of his own thought. It is a journey from the idealisms
of boyhood and from the intellectual materialism of a traveling student to the complete,
materialistic outlook of the adult Santayana. Throughout this chapter he emphasizes the
continuity of his life and beliefs, contrasting the seeming disparate tones of his developing
thought to the overall unity of his outlook. He writes, The more I change the more I am the
same person.9
In a marginal heading he records that his boyhood idealisms were never his genuine
beliefs.10 These idealisms were not expressed in philosophical form, but they were
intensely felt by me to determine the only right or beautiful order possible for the universe.
Existence could not be right or beautiful under other conditions.11
7

McCormick: George Santayana, pp. 301-302.

These three steps are described in marginal comments (headings) in the holograph of Persons and Places. These
comments were omitted from publications prior to the 1986 critical edition of the autobiography.
9

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 159mh.

10
11

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 166mh.

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 166.

But those ideal universes in my head did not produce any firm convictions or
actual duties. They had nothing to do with the wretched poverty-stricken real world
in which I was condemned to live. That the real was rotten and only the imaginary at
all interesting seemed to me axiomatic. That was too sweeping; yet allowing for the
rash generalisations of youth, it is still what I think. My philosophy has never
changed.12
Hence, he notes, in spite of my religious and other day-dreams, I was at bottom a
young realist; I knew I was dreaming, and so was awake. A sure proof of this was that I was
never anxious about what those dreams would have involved if they had been true. I never
had the least touch of superstition.13 Santayana cites poems,14 written when he was fifteen
or sixteen, as revealing this early realism, and he quotes from memory one stanza of At the
Church Door where the realistic sentiment is the same.
By the time he was a traveling student seeing the world in Germany, England, and Spain
his intellectual materialism was firmly established with little change in his religious
affections.15
From the boy dreaming awake in the church of the Immaculate Conception, to
the travelling student seeing the world in Germany, England, and Spain there had
been no great change in sentiment. I was still at the church door. Yet in belief, in
the clarification of my philosophy, I had taken an important step. I no longer
wavered between alternate views of the world, to be put on or taken off like alternate
plays at the theatre. I now saw that there was only one possible play, the actual
history of nature and of mankind, although there might well be ghosts among the
characters and soliloquies among the speeches. Religions, all religions, and idealistic
philosophies, all idealistic philosophies, were the soliloquies and the ghosts. They
might be eloquent and profound. Like Hamlets soliloquy they might be excellent
reflective criticisms of the play as a whole. Nevertheless they were only parts of it,
and their value as criticisms lay entirely in their fidelity to the facts, and to the
sentiments which those facts aroused in the critic. 16
The full statement and development of his materialism did not occur until later in his
life. It was certainly in place by the time of Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923) but not
fully so at the time of The Life of Reason (1905).
Within Santayanas fully cultivated materialism, the origins of all events in the world
are arbitrary, temporal, and contingent. Matter (by whatever name it is called) is the
principle of existence. It is often untoward, and an occasion of imperfection or conflict in
things.17 Hence, a sour moralist may consider it evil, but, according to Santayana, if one
12
13
14
15
16
17

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 167.

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 167.
Santayana, G.: To the Moon and To the Host, Persons and Places, p. 168.
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 169.
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 169.
Santayana, G.: Realm of Matter (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1930), p. v.

takes a wider view matter would seem a good . . . because it is the principle of existence: it
is all things in their potentiality and therefore the condition of all their excellence or
possible perfection.18 Matter is the non-discursive, natural foundation for all that is. In
itself, it is neither good nor evil but may be perceived as such when viewed from the vested
interest of animal life. Matters nondiscernible, neutral face is converted to a smile or frown
by latent animal interests. But moral values cannot preside over nature.19 Principled
values are the products of natural forces: The germination, definition, and prevalence of
any good must be grounded in nature herself, not in human eloquence. 20
From the point of view of origins, therefore, the realm of matter is the matrix and
the source of everything: it is nature, the sphere of genesis, the universal mother. The
truth cannot dictate to us the esteem in which we shall hold it: that is not a question
of fact but of preference. 21
Even prior to the idealisms of boyhood and the intellectual materialism of the traveling
student, the force of contingent, material events is evident in the background, birth, and
early childhood of George Santayana. The contingent factors of his background, birth, and
childhood form a backdrop for Santayanas mature materialism. Here are forces beyond
ones reach, shaping ones destiny, and at the same time providing a chance for a reasonable
and good life.
1. Non-reductive Naturalism
Although difficult to classify, Santayanas materialism is best identified as a nonreductive naturalism. This aspect of his thought bridges many philosophical borders and
provides sympathetic readings across cultures and centuries. It is the reason that much of
his work was translated in both the West and the East. Santayana focuses on the historical
content of the issues (Aristotle, Berkeley, Descartes, Euclid, Fichte, Heraclitus, Hume,
Kant, Plato, Protagoras, Schopenhauer, Socrates, and Spinoza) with little or no discussion
of positions that were contemporary in 1923 -though clearly some of these were targets of
his wit. Even so, much of his work has close parallels to contemporary issues as found in
the works of Strawson and Wittgenstein.
Santayana, Hume, Strawson, and Wittgenstein all focus on skepticism rebutting
arguments, basically claiming there are inescapable natural beliefs that stand apart from
rational discourse and argument. Wittgensteins approach is based on language users, but
Santayana carries the discussion to quite a different level, revealing that Santayana not only
marches to a different drummer but that he also marches in a different direction. Santayana
indicates the kinds of inescapable beliefs and their relationship in far greater detail than
either Hume or Wittgenstein. And he, like Hume, refers to nature as the basis for these
commitments, but he does so with an emphasis on physicobiological processes rather than
18
19
20
21

Santayana, G.: Realm of Matter, p. v.

Santayana, G.: Realm of Matter, p. 134.
Santayana, G.: Realm of Matter, p. 131.
Santayana, G.: Realm of Matter, p. xi.

sociological communities of language-users. Santayanas insight was that

neurophysiological approaches to understanding human action and behavior are moving in
the right direction. Although there are technical articles that report on neurophysiological
approaches to human actions, belief, and even understanding of self, there are few articles
and books written for the general public. If one is interested, two recent works by Dr. Todd
E. Feinberg, psychiatrist and neurologist at The Albert Einstein College of Medicine, are
available.22
Santayanas is a festive, dramatic approach to doing philosophy. He adopts the posture
of a foundationalist seeking the bedrock of certainty on which all beliefs must rest. In so
doing, however, his purpose is to show there is no bedrock of certainty and likewise that
there is no escape from skepticism through reason or experience. Skepticism-establishing
and skepticism-rebutting arguments are equally idle and empty. The only open avenue,
indeed already undertaken, is the natural belief, the animal faith in the external world, i.e.,
the belief already implicit in a smile when he announced Here is one more system of
philosophy.
Santayanas philosophical antics allow him to depict both the foundationalist and the
thorough-going skeptic in one characterization. Like Descartes, he poses as a skeptic to
purify the mind of prejudice and render it all the more apt, when the time comes, to believe
and to act wisely.23 But unlike Descartes, he also poses as a foundationalist to show the
emptiness of that approach. The search for the foundation of reason and experience finds its
culmination, for Santayana, in the solipsism of the present moment 24 where the conscious
act is absolute and indubitable but where there is no knowledge because there is nothing to
know.25 With such a position and such a conclusion, Santayanas wit as well as his unusual
perspicuity and rigor are revealed, particularly when considering that the work was
published in 1923.
2. Epistemology: Solipsism of the Present Moment and Animal Faith
Santayanas path to the solipsism of the present moment is similar to a position
discussed by Strawson in the final chapter of his book.26 Santayana draws ones attention to
what is given in an instant of awareness, and he maintains that any knowledge or
recognition found in such an instant must be characterized by a concept or abstract idea (or
essence to use Santayanas term). Concepts cannot be limited to particular instances, rather
the particular object is seen as an instance of the concept and there may be other objects
that are also instances of this concept or universal (essence). Hence, Santayana concludes
that if one is attempting to find a bedrock of certainty, one may rest his claim only after he
has, at least theoretically, recognized that knowledge is composed of instances of awareness
that in themselves do not contain the prerequisites for knowledge, i.e., concepts, universals,
22

Feinberg, Todd E.: From Axons to Identity: Neurological Explorations of the Nature of Self. W. W. Norton &
Company, Ltd., 2009 and Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self, Oxford University Press, 2002.
23
Santayana, G.: Scepticism and Animal Faith, 1923 (Dover, 1955), p. 64.
24
Santayana, G.: pp. 17,18.
25
For a fuller explication of Santayanas approach see Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.: Some Remarks on Santayanas
Scepticism in Two Centuries of Philosophy in America, ed. Peter Caw, London, Basil Blackwell, 1980.
26
Strawson, Peter F.: Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985),
pp. 81-83.

or essences. This position is both a thorough skepticism and a thorough foundationalism

that leads nowhere (in the sense that one cannot analyze experience any further). That both
skepticism and proofs against skepticism lead nowhere is precisely Santayanas point.
Santayanas approach is similar to Wittgensteins discussions of seeing as in Part II of
the Investigations. There Wittgenstein is discussing the application of a descriptive general
term or predicate to an observed object, e.g., seeing an object as green or as grass. He
writes, The flashing of an aspect on us [i.e. suddenly seeing something as such-and-such]
seems half visual experience, half thought,27 and he asks is it a case of both seeing and
thinking? or an amalgam of the two, as I should almost like to say?28 Elsewhere he speaks
of an echo of a thought in sight29 and What I perceive in the dawning of an aspect [i.e. in
coming to see something as something] . . . is an internal relation between it [the object]
and other objects.30 Strawson refers to these sections of Wittgenstein and adds his own
suggested metaphors: the visual experience is infused with or irradiated by or soaked
with the concept.31 These quotes are taken from Strawson, Imagination and Perception,
in Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen, 1974), p. 57.
Strawsons use of the above discussion is considerably different from that of Santayana.
Strawson is exploring the possibility that universals are implicit in our common and most
evident experience -Platonism demystified, he says.32 But Santayana is attempting to
show that in common experience universals or essences are required for knowledge or
belief and, yet, such universals cannot be contained in any single moment of awareness;
they are intrinsically general. So one might argue that seeing-as involves thinking-of-as
and that thinking-of-as already assumes knowledge not implicit in any moment of
awareness. What is the basis for this knowledge? For Santayana, animal faith is the
arational basis for any knowledge or any belief. It is the netherworld of biological order
operating through our physical, non-conscious being. But such belief or knowledge is
something radically incapable of proof.33 It is a vital constitutional necessity, to believe in
discourse, in experience... All these objects may conceivably be illusory. Belief in them
however, is not grounded on a prior probability, but all judgments of probability are
grounded on them. They express a rational instinct or instinctive reason, the waxing faith of
an animal living in a world which he can observe and sometimes remodel. 34
Santayana (like Hume, Wittgenstein, and Strawson) holds that there are certain
inevitable beliefs; they are inescapable given nature and the individuals physical history.
And like Wittgenstein, he maintains that these beliefs are various and variable. They are
determined by the interplay between environment and psyche, i.e., between natural
conditions and the inherited, physical organisation of the animal (the psyche). That the
inescapable belief in external objects and the general reliability of inductive reasoning, for
example, is a result of physical history and the natural conditions of the world and the self.
27

Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Philosophical Investigations, 1953 (New York, Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 197.
Wittgenstein, p. 197.
29
Wittgenstein, p. 212.
30
Wittgenstein, p. 212.
31
Strawson, p. 82.
32
Strawson, p. 83.
33
Santayana, G.: p. 35.
34
Santayana, G.: p. 308-309.
28

Since these beliefs are relative to physical histories, if history and biological order had been
different, natural beliefs also would be different.
The environment determines the occasions on which intuitions arise, the psyche -the
inherited organisation of the animal- determines their form, and ancient conditions of life
on earth no doubt determined which psyches should arise and prosper; and probably many
forms of intuition, unthinkable to man, express the facts and the rhythms of nature to other
animal minds.35
On this point, Santayanas relativizing is more thorough than Strawsons. Strawson
maintains there is no question of an alternative view in relation to commitments that are
pre-rational, natural, and quite inescapable, and sets, as it were, the natural limits within
which, and only within which, the serious operations of reason, whether by way of
questioning or of justifying beliefs, can take place.36 But Santayana maintains that even
though contingent biological history and circumstance generate an inability to act on
alternative commitments, this limitation should not prevent recognition that the surd of
physical change could give rise to animals with quite different basic creeds.
B. Moral Relativism: The Forms of the Good are Diverse
After materialism, two other significant portals remained to be opened before
Santayanas philosophy was wholly clarified and complete. Santayana describes these
gates as the two insights that the forms of the good are divergent, and that each is definite
and final. The first step enabled Santayana to overcome moral and ideal provinciality, and
to see that every form of life had its own perfection, which it was stupid and cruel to
condemn for differing from some other form, by chance ones own. 37
Santayanas moral relativism is consistent with his non-reductive naturalism. Indeed it
is one of the foundational aspects of Santayana being a world citizen. From Santayanas
perspective, every individual has personal integrity and definitive personal and cultural
outlooks rooted in the natural structures of ones physiology and of ones physical culture.
The neutral perspective of a naturalistic observer can observe the behavior of others and
value it for what it is, not because it coincides with his own interests but because the
naturalistic observer understands the basis for action and thought. 38 No doubt this insight
was influenced by the diplomatic careers and lifestyles of his parents, their distant and
respectful marriage, the experiences of the young Santayana in Miss Welchmans
Kindergarten on Chestnut Street and in the Boston Latin School, the wanderings and
deliberations of the traveling student, the personal and professional experiences of the
young Harvard professor, and the success and travels of the mature, distinguished writer. It
is clear that being Spanish, having a Catholic background, and perhaps being an
unconscious homosexual set him apart in Protestant America. He nevertheless
participated in and valued the American experience though he could never fully identify

35
36

37
38

Santayana, G.: p. 88.

Strawson, p. 51.
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 170.

This perspective is comprehensively discussed in Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), but, unfortunately, there is not a single reference to Santayana.

with it. Later, he chose Hermes the Interpreter as his god,39 paralleling his mature insight as
interpreter of views and values. Hermes is at home in the world of discourse -unraveling,
decoding, and interpreting one perspective for another. Likewise, Santayana approaches
philosophy as reflective discourse, understanding and interpreting many perspectives in his
own dialect.
Materialism provides the naturalistic basis for morality while the chaotic realm of
essence provides unlimited forms for imagination and interpretation. Santayanas
naturalism projects a neutral, objective view towards the moralities, the vested interests, of
animals. His realm of essence, likewise, is neutral to the realization or status of any possible
form.
Any special system has alternatives, and must tremble for its frontiers; whereas
the realm of essence, in its perfect catholicity, is placid and safe and the same
whatever may happen in earth or heaven. 40
Santayanas insight that the forms of the good are divergent reveals a chaotic realm of
possible goods not logically or morally ordered by animal interests or talents. However, an
absolutely neutral perspective is not possible. Perspectives derive from some living being in
a particular place and time with latent interests originating from their physiology and
physical environment. Santayanas naturalism is balanced by a polarity between the neutral,
objective understanding of behavior and activity on the one hand and the committed, vested
interest of the living being on the other hand. One may recognize that every form of the
good has its own perfection, and one may respect that perfection, but the right of alien
natures to pursue their proper aims can never abolish our right to pursue ours. 41 Hence,
Santayanas second insight: each form of the good is definite and final.
C. Integrity: Each Form of the Good is Definite and Final
Integral to Santayanas world citizenship is his respect for the multiplicity of human
(and animal) interests suited not only for survival but for living well in ones lifetime. As
Santayana notes: Survival is something impossible: but it is possible to have lived and
died well.42 Living and dying well are not abstract values that are the same for all, but
rather they are rooted in ones heritable traits, physiological development, and are
sometimes reflected in speech and written documents. However presented, they are
reflections of individual physiology rooted in diverse human and animal cultures.
Santayanas philosophy rests on his materialism and on his humane and sympathetic
appreciation for the excellence of each life. But from the perspective of autobiography,
Santayanas clear notion of self-knowledge, in the sense of the Greeks, is his most
distinguishing mark. For Santayana, integrity or self-definition is and remains first and

39

Santayana, G.: Hermes the Interpreter, Soliloquies in England (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1967), p. 259.
40
41
42

Santayana, G.: Realms of Being (one volume edition) (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1942), p. 82
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 170.
Santayana, G.: Dominations and Powers, pp. 209-210.

fundamental in morals43 Like his naturalism and his realm of essence, this insight
establishes his thought in a wide tradition, and it marks his career and his personal life with
distinction. Decided elements of his self-definition are found in his retirement from Harvard
and his life as a roving scholar. After Harvard, his daily activities and long-term
achievements were matters of his own direction. Free to choose his own environment and
habitual practices, his life was festive and fruitful. Santayana was true to his own form of
life to the end. Two days before his death Cory asked him if he was suffering: Yes, my
friend. But my anguish is entirely physical; there are no moral difficulties whatsoever. 44
EPILOGUE
Few philosophers, or writers of any sort for that matter, have captured strains of thought
that carry weight through the centuries. A central part of the gravitas of Santayanas outlook
is his account of the relative values of all life, relative to ones heritable traits, ones
physical development, and the physical structures of ones culture and the natural world.
Respecting all forms of life and all forms of good does not remove the central integrity of
ones own life and the natural drive to flourish and to live well in accord with ones natural
psyche and physical culture.
Santayana died of cancer on September 26, 1952 and is buried in the Campo Verano
cemetery in Rome. The Spanish Consulate at Rome provided the Panten de la Obra Pia
Espaola as a suitable burial ground for the lifelong Spanish subject. Wallace Stevens
memorialized Santayana in "To an Old Philosopher in Rome":
Total grandeur of a total edifice,
Chosen by an inquisitor of structures
For himself. He stops upon this threshold,
As if the design of all his words takes form
And frame from thinking and is realized.45
Somewhat like fictionalized accounts of Santayanas life, these lines (especially the last
two) miss the intent of Santayanas materialism. But there is drama in Stevens account that
focuses on the quality and strength of Santayanas chosen life, and certainly Chosen by an
inquisitor of structures / For himself does accurately and poetically depict the decidedly
clear form of Santayanas life.
Perhaps one can characterize the whole of Santayanas life in the manner he depicted his
early boyhood.
. . . a passing music of ideas, a dramatic vision, a theme for dialectical insight
and laughter; and to decipher that theme, that vision, and that music was my only
possible life.46

43
44
45

46

Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 170.

Cory, D.: The Later Years, p. 325.
American Poetry: The Twentieth Century, Volume One (The Library of America, 2000), p. 357.
Santayana, G.: Persons and Places, p. 159