Angeles vs.

Gaite
7.
8.

DOCTRINE:

ART. VII, Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

Facts
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes

Vistan, to take care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner
became attached to such child and took care of her as her own.
Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of the
grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support
ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece,
Michael Vistan, failed to do an important task, the petitioner and
the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was
given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to
different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to
mislead the petitioner and the police.
The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a
dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five
counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610,
otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of
Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint
for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and
Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with
the filing of the case. This was however denied by the provincial
prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but
was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC
Perez and was also denied
She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was
dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum Circular No.
58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except

Issue

those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or

death
Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
Petitioner
contends
that
such
Memo
Circular
was
unconstitutional since t diminishes the power of control of the
President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it

diminishes the power of the President?

Ruling
NO, it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice
by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the
doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to
have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance
on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as
it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President
on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the
guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4
November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President
of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of
Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal
cases are reiterated and clarified.

No
appeal
from
or
petition
for
review
of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not
clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, as set forth in the immediately preceding
paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits
of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument
that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of
Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify
whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his
discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot secondguess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate
whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and
speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a
cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear
that
There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must
be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or
ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers
by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
(par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the
benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in
our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out
of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension
of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The

declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision
of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases
cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which
cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power
of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to
impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly
hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize
each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latters expertise in said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the
very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which
the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government.