G.R.No.166562.March31,2009.

*
BENJAMING.TING,petitioner,vs.CARMENM.VELEZTING,respondent.
Judgments; Stare Decisis; Legal Research; The doctrine of adherence to
precedentsorstaredecisiswasappliedbytheEnglishcourtsandwaslateradoptedby
theUnitedStates.Theprincipleofstaredecisisenjoinsadherencebylowercourtsto
doctrinalrulesestablishedbythisCourtinitsfinaldecisions.Itisbasedontheprinciple
thatonceaquestionoflawhasbeenexaminedanddecided,itshouldbedeemedsettled
andclosedtofurtherargument.Basically,itisabartoanyattempttorelitigatethesame
issues,necessaryfortwosimplereasons:economyandstability.Inourjurisdiction,the
principleisentrenchedinArticle8oftheCivilCode.Thisdoctrineofadherenceto
precedentsorstaredecisiswasappliedbytheEnglishcourtsandwaslateradoptedby
theUnitedStates.AssociateJustice(nowChiefJustice)ReynatoS.Punosdiscussion
on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in
Lambinov.CommissiononElections,505SCRA160(2006)isenlightening:xxx
Same;Same;StatutoryConstruction;Theinterpretationorconstructionofalaw
bycourtsconstitutesapartofthelawasofthedatethestatuteisenacteditisonly
whenapriorrulingofthisCourtisoverruled,andadifferentviewisadopted,thatthe
newdoctrinemayhavetobeappliedprospectivelyinfavorofpartieswhohaverelied
ontheolddoctrineandhaveactedingoodfaith.Respondentsargumentthat the
doctrinalguidelinesprescribedinSantosandMolinashouldnotbeappliedretroactively
forbeingcontrarytotheprincipleofstaredecisisisnolongernew.Thesameargument
wasalsoraisedbutwasstruckdownin Pescav.Pesca,356SCRA588(2001)and
againinAntoniov.Reyes,484SCRA353(2006).Inthesecases,weexplainedthatthe
interpretationorconstructionofalawbycourtsconstitutesapartofthelawasofthe
datethestatuteisenacted.ItisonlywhenapriorrulingofthisCourtisoverruled,anda
differentviewisadopted,thatthenewdoctrinemayhavetobeappliedprospectivelyin
favorofpartieswhohavereliedontheolddoctrineandhaveactedingoodfaith,in
accordancetherewithunderthefamiliarruleoflexprospicit,nonrespicit.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity; Psychological
Incapacity;LegalResearch;CourtsshouldinterpretArticle36oftheFamilyCodeona
casetocasebasis,guidedbyexperience,thefindingsofexpertsandresearchersin
psychologicaldisciplines,andbydecisionsofchurchtribunals;Farfromabandoning
Republicv.CourtofAppealsandMolina,268SCRA198(1997),theCourtinNgoTev.
YuTe, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193, simply suggested the
relaxationofthestringentrequirementssetforththerein,cognizantoftheexplanation
givenbytheCommitteeontheRevisionoftheRulesontherationaleoftheRuleon
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages(A.M.No.021110SC).Itwasforthisreasonthatwefounditnecessary
toemphasizeinNgoTethateachcaseinvolvingtheapplicationofArticle36mustbe
treateddistinctlyandjudgednotonthebasisofaprioriassumptions,predilectionsor
generalizationsbut according toitsownattendant facts.Courtsshouldinterpret the
provisiononacasetocasebasis,guidedbyexperience,thefindingsofexpertsand
researchersinpsychologicaldisciplines,andbydecisionsofchurchtribunals.Farfrom

abandoning Molina,wesimplysuggestedtherelaxationofthestringentrequirements
setforththerein,cognizantoftheexplanationgivenbytheCommitteeontheRevision
oftheRulesontherationaleoftheRuleonDeclarationofAbsoluteNullityofVoid
MarriagesandAnnulmentofVoidableMarriages(A.M.No.021110SC), viz.:To
require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accreditedpsychologistorpsychiatristhaveprovedtobetooexpensivefortheparties.
Theyadverselyaffectaccesstojusticeofpoorlitigants.Itisalsoafactthatthereare
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it
necessarytorelaxthisstringentrequirementenunciatedintheMolinaCase.Theneed
fortheexaminationofapartyorpartiesbyapsychiatristorclinicalpsychologistand
thepresentationofpsychiatricexpertsshallnowbedeterminedbythecourtduringthe
pretrialconference.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Theintendmentofthelawhasbeentoconfinethe
application of Article 36 tothe most serious cases of personality disordersclearly
demonstrativeofanutterinsensitivityorinabilitytogivemeaningandsignificanceto
themarriage.Comingnowtothemainissue,wefindthetotalityofevidenceadduced
byrespondentinsufficienttoprovethatpetitionerispsychologicallyunfittodischarge
thedutiesexpectedofhimasahusband,andmoreparticularly,thathesufferedfrom
suchpsychologicalincapacityasofthedateofthemarriageeighteen(18)yearsago.
Accordingly,wereversethetrialcourtsandtheappellatecourtsrulingsdeclaringthe
marriagebetweenpetitionerandrespondentnullandvoidabinitio.Theintendmentof
thelawhasbeentoconfinetheapplicationofArticle36tothemostseriouscasesof
personalitydisordersclearlydemonstrativeofanutterinsensitivityorinabilitytogive
meaningandsignificancetothemarriage.Thepsychological illnessthat must have
afflicteda partyat the inceptionofthe marriageshouldbea maladysograveand
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonialbondheorsheisabouttoassume.
Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; It should be remembered that the
presumptionisalwaysinfavorofthevalidityofmarriagesemperpraesumiturpro
matrimonio.Wearenotcondoningpetitionersdrinkingandgamblingproblems,or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a
behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouseasmuchasthelatterowesthesametohim.Unfortunately,thiscourt finds
respondentstestimony,aswellasthetotalityofevidencepresentedbytherespondent,
tobetooinadequatetodeclarehimpsychologicallyunfit pursuant toArticle36.It
should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semperpraesumiturpromatrimonio.Inthiscase,thepresumptionhasnot
beenamplyrebuttedandmust,perforce,prevail.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorarioftheamendeddecisionandresolutionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Gica, Del Socorro, Espinosa, Teleron, Villaramia, Limkakeng and Tan and
Palma,Ybaez&Teleronforpetitioner.
Dindo Antonio Q. Perez and Lawrence L. Fernandez and Associates for
respondent.
NACHURA,J.:
BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariseekingtosetasidetheNovember17,
2003AmendedDecision1 oftheCourtofAppeals(CA),anditsDecember13,2004
Resolution2inCAG.R.CVNo.59903.Theappellatecourt,initsassaileddecisionand
resolution,affirmedtheJanuary9,1998Decision 3oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),
Branch23,CebuCity,declaringthemarriagebetweenpetitionerandrespondentnull
andvoidabinitiopursuanttoArticle36oftheFamilyCode.4
Thefactsfollow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen VelezTing (Carmen)
firstmetin1972whiletheywereclassmatesinmedicalschool. 5Theyfellinlove,and
theywerewedonJuly26,1975inCebuCitywhenrespondentwasalreadypregnant
withtheirfirstchild.
Atfirst,theyresidedatBenjaminsfamilyhomeinMaguikay,MandaueCity. 6 When
theirsecondchildwasborn,thecoupledecidedtomovetoCarmensfamilyhomein
CebuCity.7InSeptember1975,Benjaminpassedthemedicalboardexaminations 8and
thereafterproceededtotakearesidencyprogramtobecomeasurgeonbutshiftedto
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship
programforthesaidfield9and,in1980,hebeganworkingforVelezHospital,owned
by Carmens family, as member of its active staff, 10 while Carmen worked as the
hospitalsTreasurer.11
Thecouplebegotsix(6)children,namelyDennis,bornonDecember9,1975;James
Louis,bornonAugust25,1977;AgnesIrene,bornonApril5,1981;CharlesLaurence,
bornonJuly21,1986;MylesVincent,bornonJuly19,1988;andMarieCorinne,born
onJune16,1991.12
OnOctober21,1993,afterbeingmarriedformorethan18yearstopetitionerandwhile
theiryoungestchildwasonlytwoyearsold,Carmenfiledaverifiedpetitionbeforethe
RTCofCebuCityprayingforthedeclarationofnullityoftheirmarriagebasedon
Article36oftheFamilyCode.SheclaimedthatBenjaminsufferedfrompsychological
incapacityevenatthetimeofthecelebrationoftheirmarriage,which,however,only
becamemanifestthereafter.13
Inhercomplaint,Carmenstatedthatpriortotheirmarriage,shewasalreadyawarethat
Benjaminusedtodrinkandgambleoccasionallywithhisfriends. 14Butaftertheywere
married,petitionercontinuedtodrinkregularlyandwouldgohomeataboutmidnight
orsometimesintheweehoursofthemorningdrunkandviolent.Hewouldconfront
andinsultrespondent,physicallyassaultherandforcehertohavesexwithhim.There
werealsoinstanceswhenBenjaminusedhisgunandshotthegateoftheirhouse. 15
Becauseofhisdrinkinghabit,Benjaminsjobasanesthesiologistwasaffectedtothe
pointthatheoftenhadtorefusetoanswerthecallofhisfellowdoctorsandtopassthe
tasktootheranesthesiologists.Somesurgeonsevenstoppedcallinghimforhisservices

because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her

husbandaboutthelattersdrinkingproblem,butBenjaminrefusedtoacknowledgethe
same.16
Carmenalsocomplainedthatpetitionerdeliberatelyrefusedtogivefinancialsupportto
theirfamilyandwouldevengetangryatherwheneversheaskedformoneyfortheir
children.Insteadofprovidingsupport,Benjaminwouldspendhismoneyondrinking
and gamblingand would even buyexpensive equipment for hishobby. 17 He rarely
stayedhome18andevenneglectedhisobligationtohischildren.19
Asidefromthis,Benjaminalsoengagedincompulsivegambling. 20 Hewouldgamble
twoorthreetimesaweekandwouldborrowfromhisfriends,brothers,orfromloan
sharkswheneverhehadnomoney.Sometimes,Benjaminwouldpawnhiswifesown
jewelrytofinancehisgambling.21Therewasalsoaninstancewhenthespouseshadto
selltheirfamilycarandevenaportionofthelotBenjamininheritedfromhisfatherjust
tobeabletopayoffhisgamblingdebts. 22Benjaminonlystoppedgoingtothecasinos
in1986afterhewasbannedtherefromforhavingcausedtrouble,anactwhichhesaid
he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.23
Insum,CarmensallegationsofBenjaminspsychologicalincapacityconsistedofthe
followingmanifestations:
1.Benjaminsalcoholism,whichadverselyaffectedhisfamilyrelationshipandhis
profession;
2.Benjaminsviolentnaturebroughtaboutbyhisexcessiveandregulardrinking;
3.Hiscompulsivegamblinghabit,asaresultofwhichBenjaminfounditnecessaryto
sellthefamilycartwiceandthepropertyheinheritedfromhisfatherinordertopayoff
hisdebts,becausehenolongerhadmoneytopaythesame;and
4.Benjaminsirresponsibilityandimmaturityasshownbyhisfailureandrefusalto
giveregularfinancialsupporttohisfamily.24
Inhisanswer,Benjamindeniedbeingpsychologicallyincapacitated.Hemaintainedthat
heisarespectableperson,ashispeerswouldconfirm.Hesaidthatheisanactive
memberofsocialandathleticclubsandwoulddrinkandgambleonlyforsocialreasons
and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.25 Asforhisallegedfailuretosupporthisfamilyfinancially,Benjamin
claimedthatitwasCarmenherselfwhowouldcollecthisprofessionalfeesfromVelez
Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. 26 In his
testimony,Benjaminalsoinsistedthathegavehisfamilyfinancialsupportwithinhis
meanswheneverhecouldandwouldonlygetangryatrespondentforlavishlyspending
hishardearnedmoneyonunnecessarythings.27Healsopointedoutthatitwashewho
oftencomfortedandtookcareoftheirchildren,whileCarmenplayedmahjongwithher
friendstwiceaweek.28
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling
habitsandviolentbehaviorwascorroboratedbySusanaWasawas,whoservedasnanny
to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992. 29 Wasawas stated that she personally
witnessedinstanceswhenBenjaminmaltreatedCarmeneveninfrontoftheirchildren.30

CarmenalsopresentedaswitnessDr.PurezaTrinidadOate,apsychiatrist. 31Insteadof
theusualpersonalinterview,however,Dr.OatesevaluationofBenjaminwaslimited
tothetranscriptofstenographicnotestakenduringBenjaminsdepositionbecausethe
latterhadalreadygonetoworkasananesthesiologistinahospitalinSouthAfrica.
Afterreadingthetranscriptofstenographicnotes,Dr.OateconcludedthatBenjamins
compulsivedrinking,compulsivegamblingandphysicalabuseofrespondentareclear
indicationsthatpetitionersuffersfromapersonalitydisorder.32
TorefuteDr.Oatesopinion,petitionerpresentedDr.RenatoD.Obra,apsychiatrist
and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial
MedicalCenter,ashisexpertwitness. 33 Dr.ObraevaluatedBenjaminspsychological
behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric
evaluationreportpreparedbyDr.A.J.L.Pentz,apsychiatristfromtheUniversityof
PretoriainSouthAfrica,andhis(Dr.Obras)interviewwithBenjaminsbrothers. 34
ContrarytoDr.Oatesfindings,Dr.Obraobservedthatthereisnothingwrongwith
petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow
doctorsandhisgoodtrackrecordasanesthesiologist.35
OnJanuary 9, 1998,the lower court rendered its Decision 36 declaring the marriage
betweenpetitionerandrespondentnullandvoid.TheRTCgavecredencetoDr.Oates
findingsandtheadmissionsmadebyBenjamininthecourseofhisdeposition,and
foundhimtobepsychologicallyincapacitatedtocomplywiththeessentialobligations
of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a
compulsivegambler,someonewhoprefershisextracurricularactivitiestohisfamily,
andapersonwithviolenttendencies,whichcharactertraitsfindrootinapersonality
defectexistingevenbeforehismarriagetoCarmen.Thedecretalportionofthedecision
reads:
WHEREFORE,alltheforegoingconsidered,judgmentisherebyrendereddeclaring
themarriagebetweenplaintiffanddefendantnullandvoidabinitiopursuanttoArt.36
oftheFamilyCode.
SOORDERED.37
Aggrieved,petitionerappealedtotheCA.OnOctober19,2000,theCArendereda
Decision38 reversingthetrialcourtsruling.Itfaultedthetrialcourtsfinding,stating
thatnoproofwasadducedtosupporttheconclusionthatBenjaminwaspsychologically
incapacitatedatthetimehemarriedCarmensinceDr.Oatesconclusionwasbased
onlyontheoriesandnotonestablishedfact, 39 contrarytotheguidelinessetforthin
Santosv.CourtofAppeals40andinRep.ofthePhils.v.CourtofAppealsandMolina.41
Becauseofthis,Carmenfiledamotionforreconsideration,arguingthatthe Molina
guidelinesshouldnotbeappliedtothiscasesincetheMolinadecisionwaspromulgated
onlyonFebruary13,1997,ormorethanfiveyearsaftershehadfiledherpetitionwith
theRTC.42SheclaimedthattheMolinarulingcouldnotbemadetoapplyretroactively,
asitwouldruncountertotheprincipleof staredecisis. Initially,theCAdeniedthe

motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
Respondentthereafterfiledamanifestationexplainingcompliancewiththeprescriptive
periodbutthesamewaslikewisedeniedforlackofmerit.Undaunted,respondentfiled
apetitionforcertiorari43withthisCourt.InaResolution44datedMarch5,2003,this
Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for
reconsideration.45Onreview,theCAdecidedtoreconsideritspreviousruling.Thus,on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and
sustainingthetrialcourtsdecision.47
Amotionforreconsiderationwasfiled,thistimebyBenjamin,butthesamewasdenied
bytheCAinitsDecember13,2004Resolution.48
Hence,thispetition.
Forourresolutionarethefollowingissues:
I.WhethertheCAviolatedtheruleon staredecisis whenitrefusedtofollowthe
guidelinessetforthundertheSantosandMolinacases;
II.WhethertheCAcorrectlyruledthat therequirement ofproofofpsychological
incapacityforthedeclarationofabsolutenullityofmarriagebasedonArticle36ofthe
FamilyCodehasbeenliberalized;and
III.Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondentnullandvoid[is]inaccordancewithlawandjurisprudence.
Wefindmeritinthepetition.
I.Ontheissueofstaredecisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
establishedbythisCourtinitsfinaldecisions.Itisbasedontheprinciplethatoncea
questionoflawhasbeenexaminedanddecided,itshouldbedeemedsettledandclosed
tofurtherargument.49Basically,itisabartoanyattempttorelitigatethesameissues, 50
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principleisentrenchedinArticle8oftheCivilCode.51
Thisdoctrineofadherencetoprecedentsor staredecisis wasappliedbytheEnglish
courtsandwaslateradoptedbytheUnitedStates.AssociateJustice(nowChiefJustice)
ReynatoS.Punosdiscussiononthehistoricaldevelopmentofthislegalprincipleinhis
dissentingopinioninLambinov.CommissiononElections52isenlightening:
Thelatinphrasestaredecisisetnonquietamoveremeansstandbythethinganddo
not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone
observedthatatthebeginningofthe18thcentury,itisanestablishedruletoabideby
formerprecedentswherethesamepointscomeagaininlitigation.Astheruleevolved,
earlylimitstoitsapplicationwererecognized:(1)itwouldnotbefollowedifitwere
plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used toreach the
decision.

ThedoctrinemigratedtotheUnitedStates.ItwasrecognizedbytheframersoftheU.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to
preventarbitrarydiscretioninthecourts.Madisonagreedbutstressedthatxxxonce
theprecedent ventures intothe realm ofaltering orrepealingthelaw, it shouldbe
rejected.Prof.ConsovoywellnotedthatHamiltonandMadisondisagreeaboutthe
countervailingpolicyconsiderationsthatwouldallowajudgetoabandonaprecedent.
He added that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness
requiredbytheruleoflawandtheflexibilitydemandedinerrorcorrection.Itisthis
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries.
Indeed,twocenturiesofAmericancaselawwillconfirmProf.Consovoysobservation
althoughstaredecisisdevelopeditsownlifeintheUnitedStates.Twostrainsofstare
decisis havebeenisolatedbylegalscholars.Thefirst,knownasvertical staredecisis
dealswiththedutyoflowercourtstoapplythedecisionsofthehighercourtstocases
involvingthesamefacts.Thesecond,knownashorizontal staredecisis requiresthat
highcourtsmustfollowitsownprecedents.Prof.Consovoycorrectlyobservesthat
vertical staredecisis hasbeenviewedasanobligation,whilehorizontal staredecisis,
hasbeenviewedasapolicy,imposingchoicebutnotacommand.Indeed,staredecisis
isnotoneofthepreceptssetinstoneinourConstitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involvesinterpretationsofstatutes.Thedistinctionisimportantforcourtsenjoymore
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeisviewonthebindingeffectofthedoctrineinconstitutionallitigationsstill
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a
universalandinexorablecommand.Theruleofstaredecisisisnotinflexible.Whether
itshallbefollowedordepartedfrom,isaquestionentirelywithinthediscretionofthe
court,whichisagaincalledupontoconsideraquestiononcedecided.Inthesame
vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. In
contrast,theapplicationof staredecisis onjudicialinterpretationofstatutesismore
inflexible.AsJusticeStevensexplains:afterastatutehasbeenconstrued,eitherbythis
Courtorbyaconsistentcourseofdecisionbyotherfederaljudgesandagencies,it
acquiresameaningthatshouldbeasclearasifthejudicialglosshadbeendraftedby
theCongressitself.ThisstancereflectsbothrespectforCongressroleandtheneedto
preservethecourtslimitedresources.
Ingeneral,courtsfollowthe staredecisis ruleforanensembleofreasons, viz.:(1)it
legitimizesjudicialinstitutions;(2)itpromotesjudicialeconomy;and,(3)itallowsfor
predictability.Contrariwise,courtsrefusetobeboundbythe staredecisis rulewhere
(1)itsapplicationperpetuatesillegitimateandunconstitutionalholdings;(2)itcannot
accommodatechangingsocialandpoliticalunderstandings;(3)itleavesthepowerto
overturnbadconstitutionallawsolelyinthehandsofCongress;and,(4)activistjudges

candictatethepolicyforfuturecourtswhilejudgesthatrespectstaredecisisarestuck
agreeingwiththem.
Inits200yearhistory,theU.S.SupremeCourthasrefusedtofollowthestaredecisis
ruleandreverseditsdecisionsin192cases.Themostfamousofthesereversalsis
Brownv.BoardofEducation whichjunked Plessyv.Fergusons separatebutequal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be
segregatedonpublictransportation.In Brown,theU.S.SupremeCourt,unanimously
heldthatseparate...isinherentlyunequal.Thus,byfreeingitselffromtheshackles
ofstaredecisis,theU.S.SupremeCourtfreedthecoloredAmericansfromthechainsof
inequality.InthePhilippinesetting,thisCourthaslikewiserefusedtobestraitjacketed
bythestaredecisisruleinordertopromotepublicwelfare.InLaBugalBlaanTribal
Association,Inc.v.Ramos,wereversedouroriginalrulingthatcertainprovisionsofthe
Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondentisbereftoftherighttonoticeandhearingduringtheevaluationstageofthe
extraditionprocess.
Anexaminationofdecisionsonstaredecisisinmajorcountrieswillshowthatcourts
areagreedonthefactorsthatshouldbeconsideredbeforeoverturningpriorrulings.
Theseareworkability,reliance,interveningdevelopmentsinthelawandchangesin
fact.Inaddition,courtsputinthebalancethefollowingdeterminants:closenessofthe
voting,ageofthepriordecisionanditsmerits.
Theleadingcaseindecidingwhetheracourtshouldfollowthe staredecisis rulein
constitutionallitigationsis PlannedParenthoodv.Casey.Itestablisheda4pronged
test.Thecourtshould(1)determinewhethertherulehasprovedtobeintolerablesimply
indefyingpracticalworkability;(2)considerwhethertheruleissubjecttoakindof
reliancethatwouldlendaspecialhardshiptotheconsequencesofoverrulingandadd
inequitytothecostofrepudiation;(3)determinewhetherrelatedprinciplesoflawhave
sofardevelopedastohavetheoldrulenomorethanaremnant ofanabandoned
doctrine;and,(4)findoutwhetherfactshavesochangedorcometobeseendifferently,
astohaverobbedtheoldruleofsignificantapplicationorjustification.53
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in
SantosandMolinashouldnotbeappliedretroactivelyforbeingcontrarytotheprinciple
of staredecisis isnolongernew.Thesameargumentwasalsoraisedbutwasstruck
downinPescav.Pesca,54andagaininAntoniov.Reyes.55Inthesecases,weexplained
thattheinterpretationorconstructionofalawbycourtsconstitutesapartofthelawas
ofthedatethestatuteisenacted.ItisonlywhenapriorrulingofthisCourtisoverruled,
and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectivelyinfavorofpartieswhohavereliedontheolddoctrineandhaveactedin
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.
II.Onliberalizingtherequiredproofforthedeclarationofnullityofmarriageunder

Article36.
Now,petitionerwantstoknowifwehaveabandonedtheMolinadoctrine.
Wehavenot.
In EdwardKennethNgoTev.RowenaOngGutierrezYuTe,56 wedeclaredthat,in
hindsight,itmayhavebeeninappropriatefortheCourttoimposearigidsetofrules,as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket,
forcingallcasesinvolvingpsychologicalincapacitytofitintoandbeboundbyit,which
isnotonlycontrarytotheintentionofthelawbutunrealisticaswellbecause,with
respecttopsychologicalincapacity,nocasecanbeconsideredasonallfourswith
another.57
BytheverynatureofcasesinvolvingtheapplicationofArticle36,itislogicaland
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regardingthepsychologicaltemperamentofpartiesinordertodeterminetherootcause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However,suchopinions,whilehighlyadvisable,arenotconditions sinequanon in
grantingpetitionsfordeclarationofnullityofmarriage. 58Atbest,courtsmusttreatsuch
opinionsasdecisivebutnotindispensableevidenceindeterminingthemeritsofagiven
case.Infact,ifthetotalityofevidencepresentedisenoughtosustainafindingof
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the
personconcernedneednotberesortedto.59Thetrialcourt,asinanyothergivencase
presentedbeforeit,mustalwaysbaseitsdecisionnotsolelyontheexpertopinions
furnishedbythepartiesbutalsoonthetotalityofevidenceadducedinthecourseofthe
proceedings.
ItwasforthisreasonthatwefounditnecessarytoemphasizeinNgoTethateachcase
involvingtheapplicationofArticle36mustbetreateddistinctlyandjudgednotonthe
basisofaprioriassumptions,predilectionsorgeneralizationsbutaccordingtoitsown
attendantfacts.Courtsshouldinterprettheprovisiononacasetocasebasis,guidedby
experience,thefindingsofexpertsandresearchersinpsychologicaldisciplines,andby
decisionsofchurchtribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirementssetforththerein,cognizantoftheexplanationgivenbytheCommitteeon
the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
NullityofVoidMarriagesandAnnulmentofVoidableMarriages(A.M.No.021110
SC),viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accreditedpsychologistorpsychiatristhaveprovedtobetooexpensivefortheparties.
Theyadverselyaffectaccesstojusticeofpoorlitigants.Itisalsoafactthatthereare
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it
necessarytorelaxthisstringentrequirementenunciatedintheMolinaCase.Theneed

fortheexaminationofapartyorpartiesbyapsychiatristorclinicalpsychologistand
thepresentationofpsychiatricexpertsshallnowbedeterminedbythecourtduringthe
pretrialconference.60
Butwhere,asinthiscase,thepartieshadthefullopportunitytopresentprofessional
andexpertopinionsofpsychiatriststracingtherootcause,gravityandincurabilityofa
partysallegedpsychologicalincapacity,thensuchexpertopinionshouldbepresented
and,accordingly,beweighedbythecourtindecidingwhethertograntapetitionfor
nullityofmarriage.
III.Onpetitionerspsychologicalincapacity.
Comingnowtothemainissue,wefindthetotalityofevidenceadducedbyrespondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly,wereversethetrialcourtsandtheappellatecourtsrulingsdeclaringthe
marriagebetweenpetitionerandrespondentnullandvoidabinitio.
TheintendmentofthelawhasbeentoconfinetheapplicationofArticle36tothemost
seriouscasesofpersonalitydisordersclearlydemonstrativeofanutterinsensitivityor
inabilitytogivemeaningandsignificancetothemarriage. 61Thepsychologicalillness
thatmusthaveafflictedapartyattheinceptionofthemarriageshouldbeamaladyso
graveandpermanentastodepriveoneofawarenessofthedutiesandresponsibilitiesof
thematrimonialbondheorsheisabouttoassume.62
Inthiscase,respondentfailedtoprovethatpetitionersdefectswerepresentatthe
timeofthecelebrationoftheirmarriage.Shemerelycitedthatpriortotheirmarriage,
shealreadyknewthatpetitionerwouldoccasionallydrinkandgamblewithhisfriends;
butsuchstatement,byitself,isinsufficient toproveanypreexistingpsychological
defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such
defectstobeincurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determiningwhethertodeclarethemarriagebetweenthepartiesnullandvoid.Sadly,
however,wearenotconvincedthattheopinionsprovidedbytheseexpertsstrengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that
petitionersbehaviorisapositiveindicationofapersonalitydisorder, 63whileDr.Obra
maintainedthatthereisnothingwrongwithpetitionerspersonality.Moreover,there
appearstobegreaterweightinDr.Obrasopinionbecause,asidefromanalyzingthe
transcriptofBenjaminsdepositionsimilartowhatDr.Oatedid,Dr.Obraalsotook
intoconsiderationthepsychologicalevaluationreportfurnishedbyanotherpsychiatrist
in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras)
personalinterviewwithBenjaminsbrothers.64Logically,therefore,thebalancetiltsin
favorofDr.Obrasfindings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling
problems,orhisviolentoutburstsagainsthiswife.Thereisnovalidexcusetojustify

suchabehavior.Petitionermustrememberthatheoweslove,respect,andfidelitytohis
spouseasmuchasthelatterowesthesametohim.Unfortunately,thiscourt finds
respondentstestimony,aswellasthetotalityofevidencepresentedbytherespondent,
tobetooinadequatetodeclarehimpsychologicallyunfitpursuanttoArticle36.
Itshouldberememberedthat thepresumptionisalwaysinfavorofthevalidityof
marriage.Semperpraesumiturpromatrimonio.65Inthiscase,thepresumptionhasnot
beenamplyrebuttedandmust,perforce,prevail.

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly

REVERSEDandSETASIDE.
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago(Chairperson),CarpioMorales,**ChicoNazarioandPeralta,
JJ.,concur.
Petitiongranted,amendedjudgmentandresolutionreversedandsetaside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

GRANTED.TheNovember17,2003AmendedDecisionandtheDecember13,2004