RULE 66 Quo Warranto

(Kenneth David)

What is Quo Warranto?

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the
right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. Sec. Defensor Santiago V. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302
(1998)
It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded
into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office Pilar V. Sec. of the
DPWTC, etl., 125 Phil. 766 (1967)
When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the
action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other
credit proceeding.

Who may commence the action of QW:

It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and
commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President
of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring
such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the
permission of the court.
The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action
for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims
to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another."

GR: Government as party Plaintiff ; Exemption to GR

General Rule: A Quo Warranto proceeding shall be commenced by the
Government as a party plaintiff
Ex: An individual may commence a proceeding if he/she claims to be
entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another in which case he can
bring the action in his or her own name. (Sec 5)

By analogy, a Public Utility may bring a QW action against another public utility
which has usurped the rights of the former granted under a franchise. Cui Vs.
Cui, 60 Phil. 57

A public utility may bring a quo warranto action against another public utility
which has usurped the rights of the former granted under a franchise.

Role of Solicitor General and Public Prosecutor:

As the law office of the Government, the SolGen when directed by the President
of the RP must commence an action as directed or;
That the Public Prosecutor when a complaint has been filed or he has good
reason to believe in a case mentioned in Sec 1 and 2 can be established by
proof.
With leave of court and a bond a relator may request to be represented by the
SolGen or Public Prosecutor.
EX: When an individual institutes a QW proceeding in his own behalf, under Sec
5, he does not have to secure the intervention of the SolGen or the Fiscal, nor
does he have to obtain prior leave of court. However, such petitioner in the QW
proceeding must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in
disputed. Without such averment and evidence, it may be dismissed.

Relator:
The individual in whose name a legal action is brought by a state; the individual
who relates the facts on which an action is based.
The relator is the individual upon whose complaint certain writs are issued.
The relator is the party of interest in a proceeding, who is allowed
to institute such proceeding in the name of the people, or in the name of the
Solicitor general when such official has the sole right to sue.
Under Sec. 5 an individual who can prove that he is entitled to the position
averred may commence a proceeding on his own behalf without leave of court
and the intervention of the SolGen and Public Prosecutor.

Corporations now under the Corporation Code

Quo Warranto V. Election Contest / Appointive Officials

Quo Warranto
The occupant is disqualified from holding
the office by reason of ineligibility or
disloyalty
If the Quo Warranto proceedings
succeeds, the respondent will be ousted
but the petitioner will not assume the office

Election Contest
It challenges the right of a person to hold
office on the ground of irregularities in the
conduct of the elections for said office
The successful protestant will assume the
office if he had obtained a plurality of the
valid votes

Quo Warranto for:

Elective Office
Appointive Office
The issue is the eligibility of the
The issue is the validity of the appointment
respondent
The occupant who was declared ineligible
The court will oust the person illegally
or disloyal will be unseated but the
appointed and will order the seating of the
petitioner will not be declared the rightful
person who was legally appointed and
occupant of the rightful office
entitled to the office

SEC 2. The SolGen or a Public Prosecutor, when directed by the President, or when
upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in
the proceeding secion can be established by proof, must commence such action.
SEC 3. The SolGen or Public Proscutor may, with the permission of the court in which
the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation
of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity
for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited
in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is
brought.
SEC. 4. When hearing had on application for permission to commence action.-Upon
application for permission to commence such action in accordance with the next
preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be given to the respondent so that he
may be heard in opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court shall issue an
order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all interested parties, and the
petition shall then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)

SEC. 5. When an individual may commence such an action.-A person claiming to be

entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
may bring an action therefor in his own name. (6)

SEC. 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation.-When the action is against a
person for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition shall set forth the
name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right
to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who
claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may be made parties, and
their respective rights to such public office, position or franchise determined, in the same
action. (7a)
SEC. 7. Venue.-An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents
resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme
Court. (8a)

Venue: SC, CA, and RTC.

o For SOLGEN: RTC Manila, CA, SC

SEC. 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be reduced; action given precedence
.-The court may reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing pleadings and for all
other proceedings in the action in order to secure the most expeditious determination of
the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of the parties. Such action may be
given precedence over any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a)
SEC. 9. Judgment where usurpation found.-When the respondent is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or
franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether

excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his
costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and
to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
(10a)
SEC. 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public office; delivery of books and
papers; damages.-If judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in the
complaint to be entitled to the public office he may, after taking the oath of office and
executing any official bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of the office,
and may immediately thereafter demand of the respondent all the books and papers in
the respondents custody or control appertaining to the office to which the judgment
relates. If the respondent refuses or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to
such demand, he may be punished for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of
the court. The person adjudged entitled to the office may also bring action against the
respondent to recover the damages sustained by such person by reason of the
usurpation. (15a)
SEC. 11. Limitations.-Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in
accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
petitioners right to the office in question. (16a)
SEC. 12. Judgment for costs.-In an action brought in accordance with the provisions of
this Rule, the court may render judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the
relator, or the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a corporation, or may
apportion the costs, as justice requires. (17a)

Prescriptive Periods:

Abeto V. Rodas, 82 Phil. 59: Rule of Court 68, section 16, which provides
that "Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed to authorize an action .
. . against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
plaintiff to hold office arose; . . .."

Mendiola V. Tancino, et. Al., 109 Phil. 317: the action for quo warranto must
be commenced within one year from the time the cause of such ouster, or the
right of the plaintiff to hold office arose. On the other hand, Article 1155 of the
New Civil Code provides that "the prescription of actions is interrupted when
they are filed before the court."

Galano, et al. V Roxas, GR: L-31241 Sept. 12, 1975: this one year period is
not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Accordingly,
after said period has lapsed, the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any, lies
exclusively with administrative authorities. While it may be desirable that
administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to
do so; and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution
of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a
public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in
the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary
period. The public interest requires that the right of public office should be
determined as speedily as practicable.

Quo Warranto in Omnibus Election Code V. ROC

Q.W. Omnibus Election CodeWhich deals with specific elective officials
This is an electoral proceeding for the
exclusive purpose of impugning the
election of a public officer on the ground of
ineligibility for or disqualification to hold the
office
The petition must be filed within 10 days
from proclamation of the candidate
The petition may be filed by any registered
candidate, even if petition prospers he
would not be entitled to that office

JURISPRUDENCE
Campos Vs. Degamo, 6 SCRA 235 (1962)
- Section 7, Rule 68, provides (Now Sec 9, Rule 66):

Q.W. Rules of CourtRefers to QW in general

This is a prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to
show by what title he holds a public office
or exercises a public franchise
The ROC presupposes that the
respondent is already actually holding the
office
The petitioner under the ROC must be the
person entitled to the office and who would
assume the same if his action succeeds

What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be made parties.
When the action is against a person for usurping an office or franchise, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto,
if any, with an averment of his right to the same and that the defendant is
unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled to the office
or franchise may be made parties, and their respective rights to such office or
franchise determined, in the same action.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively, are not parties herein. The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs
were duly elected to such positions. Where the office in question is an elective one, the
complaint must show that the plaintiff was duly elected thereto. Petitioners-appellants
Campos and Oroc, having been candidates and elected for the office of councilors and
not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not the proper parties to institute the
present action.
Sison Vs. Pangramuyen, 84 SCRA 364 (1978)
- After all as We see it, petitioner rests his case mostly on the Organization Chart and
the position description or CSC Form No. 122-D of respondent Maliwanag, prepared by
petitioner himself, which do not carry the approval of the Mayor, as Department Head,
contrary to requirement of Memorandum Circular No. 5, S. 1963 of the Commission of
Civil Service touching on the basis for determining the hierarchical relationships of
positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily controlling.
On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more
than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose.
This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.
Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private
respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also
for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct. As
earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of
action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position
to which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment
in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a
nullification o her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari.
His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed
as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year.
And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year,
he was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to
such administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action.
Municipality of San Narcisco Vs. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11 (1994)
While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so
named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually,

however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San

Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
-

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of
San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal
District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to
exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the
same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right
of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action
belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be
timely raised. Public interest
demands it.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December
1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain
governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a
municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San
Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income
requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this
Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order,
the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the
seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally
significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a
pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions
is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated
Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights.22