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Facts:
In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order
certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed
a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the
motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
proposals to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal
before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the
notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE
Secretary was yet to decide on Toyotas appeal.
In relation to Toyotas appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union
members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly
represented by the Union. But despite this, many Union members and
officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which
caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the
hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees
allegedly abandoned their work.
This resulted to another rally within Toyotas premises as the strikers
barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to
work.
In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same
month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still conducted
rallies and pickets.
Issue:
Facts:
Amalia P. Kawada is an employee of Uniwide. Sometime in 1998,
Uniwide received reports from the other employees regarding some
problems in the departments managed by the private respondent. Thus, on
March 15, 1998, Uniwide, through Store Manager Apduhan, issued a
Memorandum addressed to the private respondent summarizing the various
reported incidents signifying unsatisfactory performance on the latters part
which include the commingling of good and damaged items, sale of a
voluminous quantity of damaged toys and ready-to-wear items at
unreasonable prices, and failure to submit inventory reports. Uniwide asked
private respondent for concrete plans on how she can effectively perform her
job.
Issue:
Was there constructive dismissal? Respondent argues that since the
investigation was conducted after she was constructively dismissed.
Therefore, according to her, there was no point to still attend the
investigation set on August 12, 1998. Hence there was denial of due process.
Held:
Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.
- The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employees position would have felt compelled to give up his position
under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but made to
appear as if it were not. In fact, the employee who is constructively
dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming to work. Constructive
dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and
resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights
and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
- In the present case, private respondent claims that from the months of
February to June 1998, she had been subjected to constant harassment,
ridicule and inhumane treatment by Apduhan, with the hope that the latter
can get the private respondent to resign] The harassment allegedly came
ISSUES
While the employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension, it can do so only if the latters continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the
employer or of his co-workers. The grounds relied upon by Woodridge
do not show that their employment poses a threat to the employer or
other co-workers.
As probationary employees, respondents security of tenure is limited
to the period of their probation for Pe Benito, until June 2001 and for
Balaguer, June 2002. As they were no longer extended new
appointments, they are not entitled to reinstatement and full
backwages. Rather, Pe Benito is only entitled to her salary for her 30day preventive suspension. As to Balaguer, in addition to his 30-day
salary during his illegal preventive suspension, he is entitled to his
backwages for the unexpired term of his contract of probationary
employment.
employment. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was dismissed illegally since
respondent failed to prove by substantial evidence the alleged fraud
committed by the petitioner which would not suffice to lay the basis for
respondents loss of trust and confidence in petitioner. On respondents
appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioner
guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty as the continually reported
ANSECAs backfilling operations as okay per his inspection and did not act
on Lupegas report concerning irregularities. Petitioners failure to perform
his duty of inspecting ANSECAs operations constituted sufficient basis for
respondents loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which was dismissed by the latter. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed on the following
grounds: (1.) fraud resulting in lost of trust and confidence and (2.) gross
neglect of duty.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code allows the employer to terminate the
services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a wilful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Respondents
evidence against petitioner fails to meet this standard. With regard to the
second ground, Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code provides that an employer
may terminate an employment due to the gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties to warrant removal from service, the negligence
should not merely be gross but also habitual. The single or isolated act of
negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the
employee. The petitioner did not repeatedly fail to perform his duties for a
period of time and the events do not constitute gross and habitual
negligence. The petitioner, although not entirely faultless, was dismissed
without just cause and procedural due process and consequently, entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages without loss of seniority rights and
privileges. If reinstatement is no longer feasible, to give him separation pay
equivalent to at least one month salary for every year of service.
Records shows that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied
for optional retirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility
age. Thus, he cannot claim optional retirement benefits as a matter of right.
Facts:
Isuue:
WON private respondent was validly dismissed. No.
Held:
An employer may dismiss or lay off an employee only for just and
authorized causes enumerated in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor
Code. However, this basic and normal prerogative of an employer is subject
to regulation by the State in the exercise of its paramount police power
inasmuch as the preservation of lives of citizens, as well as their means of
livelihood, is a basic duty of the State more vital them the preservation of
corporate profits. Ones employment, profession, trade or calling is a
property right within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law.
The ship captains logbook is vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of
Commerce requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as
the vessels head.
Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties
appended to the contract of employment entered into by petitioners and
private respondent, the offense described by the logbook entry may well fall
under insubordination and may constitute assaulting a superior officer with
the use of deadly weapon punishable with dismissal if the victim is indeed a
superior officer. However, an apprentice officer cannot be considered a
superior officer. An apprentice is a person bound in the form of law to a
master, to learn from him his art, trade, or business, and to serve him during
the time of his apprenticeship.
Physical violence against anyone at any time and any place is
reprehensible. However, in cases such as this, where a persons livelihood is
at stake, strict interpretation of the contract of employment in favor of the
worker must be observed to affirm the constitutional provision on protection
to labor. Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy that,
unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many questions
unanswered. Although private respondent candidly admitted in his affidavit
having hit Sason on the chest twice, he did not admit using a spanner.
Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the logbook were the only pieces
of evidence presented by petitioners to support the dismissal of private
respondent, have no probative value at all, petitioners cause must fail.
Petitioners failure to substantiate the grounds for a valid dismissal was
aggravated by the manner by which the employment of private respondent
was terminated. It must be borne in mind that the right of an employer to
dismiss an employee is to be distinguished from and should not be confused
with the manner in which such right is exercised. Dismissal from
employment must not be effected abusively and oppressively as it affects
ones person and property.
Neither is the ship captains having witnessed the altercation an excuse for
dispensing with the notice and hearing requirements. Serving notice to
private respondent under the circumstances cannot be regarded as an
absurdity and superfluity. The petition at bar is DISMISSED.
FACTS:
Petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr., an employee of respondent The
Peninsula Manila, Inc., seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals upholding his dismissal for willful disobedience. At the
time of his dismissal, petitioner worked as Commis II of the Food and
Beverage Department of the Peninsula Manila Hotel, Inc. He was also a
Director of the National Union of Workers in Hotels Restaurants and Allied
Industries (NUWHRAIN)-Manila Peninsula Chapter.
The controversy stems from a Memorandum dated August 7, 1998
issued by respondent Hotel prohibiting the union from using the union office
from midnight until 6:00 in the morning.
On August 18, 1998, at about 1:30 in the morning, petitioner was seen
inside the union office with Conrad Salanguit and a certain Ma. Theresa Cruz.
They left the office at about 2:20 in the morning of the same day.
On August 20, 1998, petitioner and a male companion were seen
entering the union office. Later that evening, petitioner was again seen in
the office, seated with both legs resting on a table. His male companion,
who turned out to be Mr. Salanguit, was lying on the bench. The office lights
were off. DPO Lt. Caronan approached petitioner and reminded him of the
Memorandum dated August 7, 1998. Petitioner and Mr. Salanguit refused to
leave, however, and replied, Consult that to our President because we gave
a reply to that memorandum. Both petitioner and Mr. Salanguit stayed in
the office until 3:30 in the morning of August 21, 1998.
ISSUE:
WON dismissal is valid
RULING:
Willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for
the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two
requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.[9]
Petitioner avers that his dismissal for willful disobedience is
unwarranted because: (1) the Memorandum dated August 7, 1998 is not in
connection with the duties which the employee had been engaged to
discharge; (2) the same Memorandum is not reasonable and lawful; and (3)
petitioner did not exhibit a wrongful and perverse attitude in disobeying
said Memorandum.
Petitioner further posits that the use of the union office has no
connection whatsoever with petitioners duties as Commis II, one of the
kitchen personnel. However, as respondent points out, every employee is
charged with the implicit duty of caring for the employers property;
consequently, he is bound to obey the reasonable and lawful orders of the
employer regulating the use and preservation thereof. Thus, this Court has
upheld the dismissal of an employee for violation of a rule prohibiting
employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without
authority from management.[10] This is not only to prevent loss on the part
of the employer but also to prevent injury to the employees as well as the
customers of the employer.
The PRRM management sent Pulgar a copy of the report, together with
a memorandum, asking him to explain these findings.5
In a letter dated February 24, 1997, Pulgar admitted that TBFOs
reported expenses did not reflect its actual expenses. He explained that as
field manager, he presumed he had the discretion to determine when and
how the funds would be used, as long as the use was devoted to the
implementation of TBFO projects. Thus, there were instances when he used
the funds intended for one project to sustain the activities of other projects.
On March 4, 1997, Pulgar met with PRRM representatives to discuss
the findings of the investigation report. During the meeting, Pulgar furnished
these representatives with a photocopy of a savings account passbook
with Account Number 1103508 under Pulgars name at the
Cooperative Bank of Quezon. The passbook showed that the account had
a balance of P207,693.10. According to Pulgar, this balance represented the
TBFO savings he mentioned in his response. At this point, two versions of the
story develop.
PRRM maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went
on leave on March 3-10, March 20-25, and April 1-15, 1997. After the lapse of
his last leave on April 15, 1997, Pulgar no longer reported to work, leading
PRRM to believe that Pulgar had abandoned his work to evade any liability
arising from the investigation. PRRM was therefore surprised to learn that
Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case on April 3, 1997.
Pulgar tells another tale. According to him, on March 17, 1997, he
submitted a letter to PRRM to complain that he was not given the right to
confront and question Solis,8 but his letter went unanswered. Thereafter, on
March 31, 1997, he was not allowed to enter the premises of the
organization. Pulgar also alleges that PRRMs representatives removed his
personal properties and records from his office, placed them in boxes and
kept them in storage.
Believing he was constructively dismissed by PRRMs actions, Pulgar
filed a complaint against PRRM on April 3, 1997 for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month
pay. On March 31, 1999, the Labor Arbiter found in his decision 10 that Pulgar
had been illegally dismissed and ordered PRRM to pay full backwages.
However, the Labor Arbiter chose not to award Pulgar moral or exemplary
damages after finding that PRRM had legitimate grounds to investigate
Pulgar. Due to the strained relations between PRRM and Pulgar, the Labor
Arbiter opted to award Pulgar separation pay instead of ordering his
reinstatement.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in its January 28, 2000
decision and dismissed Pulgars complaint.
On May 25, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision, 13 granting
Pulgars petition and reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision.
In the present petition, filed after the appellate court denied PRRMs Motion
for Reconsideration.
Issues:
Whether or not Pulgar was illegally dismissed.
Held:
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and
the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every
labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management
also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in
life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker
and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded the Court to the rule thatjustice is in every case for
the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the
applicable law and doctrine. The substantial evidence proffered by the
employer that it had not, in the first place, terminated the employee, should
not simply be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed
the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed.
Although under normal circumstances, an employees act of filing an illegal
dismissal complaint against his employer is inconsistent with abandonment;
in the present case, we simply cannot use that one act to conclude that
Pulgar did not terminate his employment with PRRM, and in the process
ignore the clear, substantial evidence presented by PRRM that proves
otherwise. While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the evidence
do not establish a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from
employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial
evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no
dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality. Bare
allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence
on record, cannot be given credence.
JOSE P. ARTIFICIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 172988
July 26, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Jose P. Artificio was employed as security guard by
respondent RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under Philippine Laws and likewise duly licensed to engage in
the security agency business.
Sometime in June 2002, Artificio had a heated argument with a fellow
security guard, Merlino B. Edu (Edu). On 25 July 2002, Edu submitted a
confidential report5 to Antonio A. Andres (Andres), Administration &
Operations Manager, requesting that Artificio be investigated for maliciously
machinating Edus hasty relief from his post and for leaving his post during
night shift duty to see his girlfriend at a nearby beerhouse.
On 29 July 2002, another security guard, Gutierrez Err (Err), sent a
report 6 to Andres stating that Artificio arrived at the office of RP Guardians
Security Agency, Inc. on 25 June 2002, under the influence of liquor. When
Artificio learned that no salaries would be given that day, he bad-mouthed
the employees of RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc. and threatened to
"arson" their office.
Andres issued a Memorandum8 temporarily relieving Artificio from his post
and placing him under preventive suspension pending investigation for
conduct unbecoming a security guard. He also directed Artificio to report to
the office of RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc. and submit his written
answer immediately upon receipt of the memorandum.
In another memorandum, Andres informed Artificio that a hearing will be
held on 12 August 2002.9
Without waiting for the hearing to be held, Artificio filed on 5 August 2002, a
complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, non-payment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest days, 13th month pay,
and damages. He also prayed for payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.10
After hearing, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dated 6 October 2003,
finding respondents guilty of illegal suspension and
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
motion for reconsideration filed by Artificio was denied for lack of merit by
the NLRC.
On 31 March 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which
affirmed the NLRC decision.17 Artificio filed a motion for reconsideration
which the Court of Appeals again denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of petitioner Artificio is valid.
Held:
Preventive suspension is justified where the employees continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of
the employer or of the employees co-workers. Without this kind of threat,
preventive suspension is not proper. In this case, Artificios preventive
suspension was justified since he was employed as a security guard tasked
precisely to safeguard respondents client. His continued presence in
respondents or its clients premises poses a serious threat to respondents,
its employees and client in light of the serious allegation of conduct
unbecoming a security guard such as abandonment of post during night shift
duty, light threats and irregularities in the observance of proper relieving
time. As the employer, respondent has the right to regulate, according to its
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work
assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. Management has the prerogative to
discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring
workers pursuant to company rules and regulations. This Court has upheld a
companys management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose