A Response to Rorty

Author(s): Daryl Koehn

Source: Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 391-399
Published by: Philosophy Documentation Center
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A RESPONSETORORTY

Daryl Koehn

In his SBE address,RichardRortyarguesagainstany attemptto validateobjective truthsor norms.He makesno claimthathis accountof the natureandscope
of the disciplineof philosophicalbusinessethicsis true.Fromhis perspective,no
accountis objectivelytruebecausethe worldwe experienceis alwaysmediatedby
narrativescontingentlyshapedby cultureandhistory.The standardfor assessing
an accountshouldnot be whetherit is truebutwhetherit efficaciouslyenablesus
to achievesocialjustice andto amelioratesuffering.Like MichelFoucault,Rorty
sees himselfas undermininginstitutionsandcontrollingnarrativesin orderto free
us to imaginenew ways to reducethe injusticeandhumanpainresultingfromthe
spreadof globalcapitalism.
Rortymakesthreemajorclaims:
1. Philosophyhas played an importanthistoricalrole in curtailingthe power
of religionandallowingscienceto advance.Now thatsciencehas triumphedover
religion,thatrole(alongwithits attendant
truthclaims)oughtto be abandoned.
Language be it ordinary,literary,poetic,historical,or philosophicalnly provides
us with a descriptionof an ever-changingworld.Everydescriptionis irreducibly
historicalandcontingentin nature.Therefore,we shouldgive up the illusionthat
thereis someArchimedeanpointwe can use to groundourtheories.
2. Since philosophyhas no special or uniqueaccess to the truth,we should
not thinkof it as the universalarbiterof values or normsand shouldnot look to
philosophersto discoveror to build a foundationfor ethics. But if ethicaltheory
cannotprovideus withan objective,solid foundationfor norms,whatshouldbusiness ethicistsbe doing?Musttheysettleforcritiquingtheworkof foundationalists?
Rortydeniesus even this optionbecausehe insiststhereis no non-historical,noncontingentlanguageforadjudicating
amongcompetingclaimsortheories.Wehave
no objectiveplaceon whichto standwhenmakingthecase thatourcritiqueis more
groundedor correctthansomeoneelse's.
To understandwhatRortyis arguing,it is helpfulto situatethese claimsin the
contextof his largerbody of work.ElsewhereRortyarguesthatphilosophy,like
poetry,is a languagegame,andthe properfunctionof humanlinguisticactivityis
to articulateimaginedworlds,not to reflectan unmediatedreality,whichdoes not
exist in anycase.Theloverof wisdommustsettleforre-describinghumanactivity
andthe world.The appealof anysuchre-description
is, ultimately,notrational,for
Rortydeniesreasonan adjudicatingrole. Instead,we embracevaluesbecausethey
appealto us. If we philosopherssucceedin re-describing
a hostof things,events,and
C)2006. Business Ethics Quarterly,Volume 16, Issue 3. ISSN 1052-1SOX.

pp. 391-399

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BUSINESSETHICSQUARTERLY

issues, thenperhapsotherswill beginto see the worldas we do andwill embrace

it. If a paradigmshift does occur,it will not be becausewe have reasonedthings
throughbutbecausewe have startedseeing themafresh:
Themethodis to re-describelotsandlots of thingsin newways,untilyouhave
createda patternof linguisticbehaviorwhichwill tempttherisinggeneration
to adoptit.... Thissortof philosophydoesnotworkpieceby piece,analyzing
conceptafterconcept,or testingthesis afterthesis. Ratherit worksholistically andpragmatically.
It says thingslike "trythinkingof it this way" or
morespecifically,"tryto ignorethe apparentlyfutiletraditionalquestionsby
substitutingthe following new and possibly interestingquestions."It does
not pretendto have a bettercandidatefor doing the same old thingswhich
we did whenwe spokein the old way.... Conformingto my own precepts,
I am not going to offer argumentsagainstthe vocabularyI wantto replace.
Instead,I amgoingto tryto makethe vocabularyI favorlook moreattractive
by showinghow it may be used to describea varietyof topics.'

3. Whatkindof worlddoes Rortythinkis especially"attractive"?

In otherwritings, he has devotedhis considerablelinguisticskills to portrayingan ideal world,
a tolerantplace wherewe all, as the Britishsay, "rubalongandmuddlethrough":
Whatis neededis a sortof intellectualanalogueof civic virtue-tolerance,
irony,anda willingnessto let spheresof cultureflourishwithoutworryingtoo
muchabouttheir"commonground,"theirunification,the "intrinsicideals"
they suggest,or whatpictureof manthey "presuppose."2

Webusinessethicistsshouldbe tellingstoriesof exemplaryfigureswith a view

to inspiringour studentsto act. FromRorty'spragmaticpointof view, thereis no
pointin tryingto articulateandjustifymoralprinciplessincetherecanbe no objective foundationfor anymorality.As he confidedin an interview:
It's hardto keep moralphilosophyas an academicsub-disciplinegoing if
you'rea pragmatist.The name of the game in moralphilosophyis finding
principlesand then findingcounter-examples
to the otherguy's principles.
Pragmatistsaren'tvery big on principles.Thereisn't muchto do in moral
philosophyif you'rea pragmatist.3

As othercommentators
havenoted,Rortyis nota relativistif one takesa relativist to be someonewho believes all values are equallygood. Rortyunequivocally
commitshimselfto liberalvaluesof solidarityandautonomy.Moreover,he favors
descriptionsemphasizing(or even celebrating)ironyandthe contingencyof every
narrative,all the while concedingthathis own ironicportrayalsof the worldlack
objectivityandcannotbe proven.The most we can hope for is thatourfellow humanbeings try on Rorty'sway of viewingthe worldandfind thatdoing so opens
up new vistas.Havingonce imagineda betterworld,we will be in a positionto set
aboutrealizingthatworld.
Muchof Rorty'sanalysistakesthe negativeformof arguingagainstotherpeoples' foundationalmoralitiesorinterpretations.
Suchnegativityhaspromptedcritics
to chargethat"Rortyis only one step awayfromBaudrillard,the self-proclaimed

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393

'intellectualterrorist'who preferssimply to blow up ideas with unsubstantiated

claimsandoutrageousexaggerationsratherthanattendingto mattersof evaluating
truthor falsehood,or patientempiricaldemonstration
of his claims."4This charge
mayhavesomemerit,butforpurposesof thisdiscussion,I will assumethatRorty's
agendais a positiveone:by focusingon theimportanceof creatingourselvesanew
throughtheimagination,he seeksto liberateus fromanunnecessaryobsessionwith
foundationsandevermoreconvolutedrefinementsof moralprinciplesandmaxims.
Oncefreed,we will perhapsbe ableto thinkmoreimaginativelyandto leavebehind
stultifyinginheritedworldviews.Toparaphrase
Shakespeare:
therearemorethings
in heavenandearththataredreamtof in ethicists philosophy.
Rorty'sthree claims are interdependentand, by his own admission,standor
fall as a whole pictureor description.Eitherwe see the world as mediatedvia
contingent,historicalnarratives,or we don't.If we don'tfind this portrayalto be
emotionallycompelling,we won'tbe persuadedto showsolidaritywithRortyand
to join forces with him in reformingthe world.SeparatingRorty'sportrayalinto
threestrands(;'claims"may be too strong,given thatwe are supposedlydealing
only with"re-descriptions")
maysomewhatmisrepresent
his project,butonehasto
beginsomewhere.Furthermore,
for all of his talkaboutliteratureandfiction,Rorty
is not writingnovels or lyric poetry.He is advancingreasonedconsiderationsfor
his positionand,to thatextent,his positioncan be rationallydissected.
This last observationleadsme to my firstconcern.Rortyis notmerelycommittedto certainvalues:he is equallydevotedto presentinghis porbayalin a coherent
way.He takespainsto ensurethatwhathe says at the openingof his addressis not
contradictedby whathe says in middleor at the end.Why,though,does he bother
withcoherence?Whynot, say,alongwiththepoetWaltWhitman,"DoI contradict
myself?Verywell, then,I contradictmyself"?Whybehavein a way thatrevealshe
is committedto thelawof non-contradiction?
KantandPlatohaveananswer:we are
essentiallythe sortof beingswho do notwish to assertbothA andnot-A.ForKant,
we arerationalbeingswho (if ourconsciencesarenotutterlycorrupted)experience
self-respectrootedin regardfor the morallaw.Toputthe pointslightlydifferently:
reasonhasits owninterestsand,consequently,hasmotivatingforcein ourlives.For
Plato,oursoulsareconstitutedin sucha wayas to be moresatisfyinglyorderedwhen
reasongives ordersto desireratherthanthe reverse.It seemsto me thatRortyalso
showshimselfto be thekindof beingfor whomreasonhasmotivatinginterests if
his self-respectdidnotdemandcoherence,he wouldnotbe so concernedto maintain
it in his writings.So, althoughRortyexplicitlyrejectsessences,he certainlyacts
andspeaksas if he believeswe areessentiallyrationalbeings.5
Inhis SBE address,Rortyspeaksaboutcoherencein general.In otherworks7he
has arguedthatwe must settle for "local"coherence:whatwe say anddo should
accordwith a limitedsubsetof beliefs becausewe cannothope to bringall of our
beliefs into harmonywitheach other.Thus,Rortywouldlikely arguethatthe SullivanPrinciplesplayeda usefulrolein weakeningapartheid,eventhoughwe might
notbe ableto showthattheseprincipleswerepartof somegloballycoherentsystem
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BUSINESS

Twopointsneedto be madeaboutthisideaof localcoherence:

ofmoralprinciples.6
its normativeforce?Thatis, why should
first,whatgives Rorty'srecommendation
we settle for local coherence?Since settlingfor local coherenceis equivalentto
sayingthatwe are perfectlycontentto live in contradictionwith ourselves;and
sincethe lattercourse is exactly what rationalbeings reject,it could be argued
does not haveanynormativeforce.Thrasymachus's
thatRorty'srecommendation
positionhas a kindof local coherence.Yet,when Socratesshowsthatthe position
is not coherentwith a host of otherbeliefs, Thrasymachushas the good graceto
blushes-he feels shame
blush.PlatoandKantcanaccountforwhyThrasymachus
atbeing caughtin contradiction.As far as I can see, Rortyhas no way to explain
blush.
Thrasymachus's
exampleof the SullivanPrinciplessupportRorty'snotion of a
the
Nor does
merelylocal coherence.Leon Sullivanwas a Christianministerwho understood
these principlesto be groundedin the objective natureof God's creation.He
maintained,"Thereis no greatermoralissue in the worldtoday than apartheid.
The SullivanPrinciples
. . . Apartheidis againstthe will of God and humanity."7
garneredwidespreadsupportamongotherclergywho also believedin a complex,
elaboratedmoralsystemof objectiverights,duties,andprinciplesthatgenerationsof
theologianshavetakencareto makeas consistentandpersuasiveas
Judeo-Christian
possible.Withoutsustainedpressurefromchurchleaderswhobelievedin theglobal
coherenceof the underlyingmoralsystem,the SullivanPrinciples,I wouldargue,
wouldneverhave gainedwidespreadacceptanceamongWesternexecutives.
Second,to aim at even a local coherencemeansgrantingreason'srule in this
narrowerdomain.Consequently,this refinementdoes not deny the force of the
aboveobjection.In fact, talk of local coherenceraises anotherset of issues:just
how smallcouldthis set of local beliefs be? One or two beliefs?If a speakerwere
to presenta positionwith minisculelocal coherence,we wouldaccusehim or her
of sloppythinkingandsuspectthe speakerof tryingto pull the wool overoureyes.
Why is the speakerfocusingon only thesebeliefs andnot otheraspectsandfacts?
we wouldbe on ourguardagainstsophistry.ElseCatchinga whiffof the arbitrary,
will have to be able to encompassmany
account
any
that
concedes
wherellorty
a paradigmshift.Thinkerslike Kant
producing
of
hope
any
thingsif it is to have
Since we
comprehensiveness.
toward
drive
this
andPlatohave an explanationof
ourselves,
with
contradiction
in
live
are constitutedsuch that we do not want to
everybelief in whichwe areinvestedneeds,in principle,to be reconciledwiththe
otherclaimsin whichwe haveputourtrust.Ouressenceor psychologicalmakeup
preventsus frombeingpersuadedby half-bakedtheoriesthatfail to harmonizewith
the wholeof ourexperience.Andit is, as Platowouldsay,thereasoningpartof our
psyche,notemotionsorfeelings,thatimposesthisharmonizingdemandandpoints
the way to orderingourbeliefs accordingly.(NeitherPlatonorI woulddenythata
felt uneaseand/orinspirationalso play a partin drivingthisprocessof integration
forward.So this processdoes have a subjectivecomponent.But it is reasonthat

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sortsthroughthe contradictionsandcomesup withbetterformulationsintendedto

overcomeidentifiedinconsistencies).
I come now to my second objectionto Rorty'sposition.Partof what reason
considerswhen decidingwhetherto alterpreviouslyheld positionsis "thefact of
the matter."Accordingto Rorty,though,thereareno facts thatdo not dependon
contingenthistoricalnarratives.
Everythingwe see anddo is mediatedby ourbeliefs
or worldview,which may be moreor less rational.As Anais Nin writes,;'Wesee
the worldnot as it is, but as we are."I readilyconcedethatmanyof our beliefss
andeven ourperceptions,are,to some extent,a functionof otherthingswe've encounteredorbeentaught.Severalyearsago I heardaninterviewon NationalPublic
Radiowith childrenfroma "primitive"
partof the worldwho, uponarrivingin a
moderncity, saw theirfirstbus.Theythoughtit mustbe largeanimalof some sort
withlargewhiteeyes. Familiarwith animals,theyassimilatedthis machineto that
which they alreadyknew with what fit into theirframingnarrative,a narrative
contingentupontheirpreviousexperiencesin thejungle.
At firstglance,this examplewouldseemto supportRorty'sposition.However,
I thinkwe must be exceedinglycareful.This exampleequally suggeststhat the
processof assimilationis not arbitrary.
Thesechildrenthoughtof animalsin a matter akinto thatof Aristotle.In De Anima,Aristotledefinesanimalsas organisms
ableto initiateself-motion.The childrendid not thinkthe bus was a huge coconut
treeor a staror the numberthree.They saw thatit movedandso they reasonably
theonzedthatthe bus was a huge, lumberinganimal.The divisionbetweenplants
andanimalsitself seems to be a non-arbitrary
division,given thatpeoplesall over
the worlddistinguishbetweenself-movingandstationaryorganisms.In his fascinatingessay "AQuahogIs a Quahog,"the biologistStephenJayGouldarguesthat
peoplesfromaroundthe worldcharactenzebirdsinto roughlythe same species.8
Groupingbirdsusingcharacteristics
we employ(color,form,beaktype),theyamve
at divisionsalmostidenticalto those we make:
The literatureon non-Westerntaxonomiesis not extensive,but it is persuasive.Weusuallyfinda remarkable
correspondence
betweenLinnaeanspecies
and non-Westernplantand animalnames.In short,the same packagesare
recognizedby independentcultures.... Severalbiologistshavenotedthese
remarkable
correspondences....ErnstMayrhimselfdescribeshis experience
in New Guinea:';Fortyyearsago, I lived all alonewith a tribeof Papuansin
the mountainsof new Guinea.These superbwoodsmenhad 136 namesfor
the 137 species of birdsI distinguished.... ThatStoneAge man recognizes
the same entitiesof natureas Westernuniversity-trained
scientists refutes
ratherdecisivelythe claim thatspecies are nothingbuta productof the humanimagination."
(italicsmine)9

Workingwithotherpopulations,
JaredDiamond,RalphBulmer,BrentBerlin,Dennis
Breedlove,PeterRaven,andotherbiologistshaveconfirmedMayrs finding.l
Here,then,is some evidencethatRortyis wrong.Humanbeingsdo not imaginativelygeneratedistinctionswilly-nilly.Ourdivisionsarenon-arbitrary:
"Welive
in a worldof structureand legitimate
distinctions"(italics mine).l' Gouldargues
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thatthisstrikingempiricalsimilarityof divisionimplieseither1) thathumanbeings

possesssimilarhardwiredspecies-distinguishing
frameworks
and,consequently,
our
divisionsreflectthis naturalhumanessence;2) thatthereare naturalkindsin the
worldandwe are,in Socraticlanguage,all cuttingat the samenaturaljoints;or 3)
thatbothpossibilitiesholdtrue.I takeno positionhereon whichof thesepossibilities is the correctone. I simplynote thateach optionrepresentsa kindof fact an
objectivefeatureof the naturalself and/orthe naturalworldthatcontrolshow we
organizeour experience.Underall threescenariossketchedby Gould,objective
natureproducesthe distinctions;distinctionsdo not contingentlyproducenature.
Indeed,Gouldrelateshowthreebiologicalanthropologists
who initiallycontended
thathow variouspeoplesorganizethe worlddependscontingentlyupontheirlocal
socialnarrativessubsequentlyrepudiatedtheirfindings.Whenthe anthropologists
returnedandinterviewedthe tribesmorecarefullywith a morecompetenttranslator,they discoveredsignificantconvergenceor overlapbetweenhow Westerners
andnon-Westerners
divvy up birdandplantspecies.
To summarize:Althoughwe assimilatenew thingswe encounterto those that
we alreadyknow;and althoughour experiences(or, at least, some of them)have
a contingentdimension,it does not follow that our narratives,distinctions,and
theoriesmerelyreflecta particularhistoricaloutlook.If, as Gould,Aristotle,Plato
and othersargue,our past experienceshave been organizedobjectively(or, at a
minimum,admitof beingso organized),thenthe assimilatedpresentwill alsohave
an objectivefoundation.
A relatedpoint:yes, reasoninterpretswhatwe experience it gives meaning
to that which we experience.However,reasonis alwaysinterpretingsomething.
This somethingis the experiencedfacts, whichpossess an integrityall theirown.
HurricaneKatrinahitNew Orleansandfloodedmuchof thecity.The spaceshuttles
ChallengerandColumbiablew up.Whattheseeventsmeanis opento debate;that
they occurredis not. As HannahArendthas argued,it will alwaysbe true that
GermanyinvadedBelgium,not the reverse.Holocaustdeniersmay tryto re-write
history,butthatdoes notalterthefactthattheyaredeniers.Thosewho experienced
HurricaneKatrinaor who witnessedmassmurderknowa truththatcannotbe gainsaid,even thoughthis experientialtruthcannotbe provenby reason.
In my view, Rortymakestwo inter-relatedmistakes.First,he treatsexistence
as a predicativequality.Yet,as RichardMcKeonhas argued,therearefoursenses
of the verb"tobe":thereis 1) thatwhichis or the "is"of entities;2) whatis or the
"is"of being/nature/essence;
3) the set of conditionsunderwhichan entityis what
it is or the "is"of existence;and4) the questionof whethertheseconditionsobtain
for us personallyor the "is"of
Existenceis not a predicate.It is a
determination
of the conditionsunderwhichanentityis whatit is. Do unicornsexist?Theunicornexists as an animalto be encounteredin certaintypesof narratives
knownas mythsor fairytales.This sameunicorndoes not exist as an animalin the
wild or in zoos. To say thatsomething"exists"meansto makea determination
of
the conditionsunderwhichthatwhichis is whatit is. It is not to perceivea quality
experience.l2

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TORORTY
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of a thing.Existenceproperlyunderstoodis necessarilymediatedby reasonspecifying conditions.If so, thenRorty'sclaimthatwhatexists is relativeto a situated

languageuseris truebutalmosttriviallyso.
His secondmistakeconsistsin conflatingtheexistential"is"withtheexperiential
"is."Determiningthe existentialconditionsunderwhich a substanceis whatit is
says nothingaboutwhetherthose conditionshave actuallyobtainedin the pastor
are applyingin the present.Justas essence does not determineexistence,so existencedoes not determineexperience.Concreteorparticularfactsaregivento us by
personalexperience not by reasonor theories.The victims of HurricaneKatrina
felt the lashof the windandknewthe terrorof risingwaters.The stormcameupon
them with a characterthat CharlesSandersPeirceterms'4secondness" a brute
Whena passingworkqualityof one subjector substanceactingupon another.l3
manhits us in the backof the headwith a ladder,we staggerandwonderwhathas
or narrativesdo not give us thatstartlingexperience.On
happened.Interpretation
the contrary,it is ourexperiencethatsets the interpretivemachinerygoing: what
struckus? Somethingorganicor inorganic?Wasa humanbeingresponsible?If so,
was the blow intentional,accidental,or the resultof negligence?
Havingtreatedexistenceas a predicateand then mistakenthe existential"is"
for the expenential"is,"Rortytendsto overlookfacts givenby experience.l4This
neglectof experiencemeans,in turn,thatRortycannotgroundethics.Foundational
ethicistsgroundethics in some objectivefact(s) of immediateexperience-e.g.,
ourawarenessthatwe arefree (Kant;Hegel);thatwe can anddo originateactions
(Aristotle);that we are frequentlyconflictedand so the soul (understoodas the
organizingandorganizedenergyof a purposefullife) musthavetwo or moreparts
(Plato).We do not choose to be free or conflicted.On the contrary,humanchoice
presupposesthese experiences.These expenencesfunctionas objectivebases for
ethics enablingphilosophersto argueforthe superiontyof a particularway of life.
Plato,Aristotle,and Kantare not just paintingprettypicturesof the world.As I
arguedabove,whetherwe findtheiranalysesto be persuasivedepends,in part,on
thegeneralcoherenceof theirreasoning.Butit alsodependsultimatelyandcrucially
uponwhetherwe havehad the experiencespresupposedby theiraccounts.Those
whohaveneverfelt pulledin one directionby reasonandin anotherby desirecannot
knowthepeace satisfactionandjoy thatarisewhenthe soulhasharmonizeditself.
will never
Thosewhohaveneverexpenencedthepainof livingin self-contradiction
know whattrueself-respectis. If these humanexperiencesare,indeed,universal,
thenthefoundationalprojectsof thesephilosophersbecomemorepromising,while
stancebecomesless plausible.
Rorty'santi-foundational
I wantto end by returningto Rorty'spositiveagendaandexplonng a bit how
his approachwill translateinto teaching.If he is right,then most of our students
are condemnedto live in the cave.All they can andwill ever see and "know"are
to themby theirfamiliesandthe
shadowscastby aninheritedworldviewtransmitted
largerculture.Theteachermerelyfunctionsas yet anotherfigureholdingupvanous
thatcastmovingshadowsthrownupon
images(in thiscase, constructednarratives)
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the wall of the cave.A few brightstudentsmightsucceedin becomingpoliticians,

artists,or membersof the chatteringclass. Still, this successdoes not meanmuch.
The only differencebetweenthose chainedto the wall gazingat imagesandthose
producingthe images (e.g., philosopherslike Rorty)is thatthe latterunderstand
thatopinion-makers
areresponsiblefor fosteringandsustainingthebeliefsheldby
those chainedin the cave.Educationreducesto indoctrination.
Even if we inspire/indoctrinate
our studentsto seek solidarity,in whatsense is
theirnew, committedlife "better"thanbefore?Unless thereis some objectively
good life, they can hardlybe said to have progressed.Even if they feel they are
betteroff, perhapsthis feeling is an illusion engenderedby some spin doctor's
image. The liberalartshave traditionallybeen thoughtof as an initiationinto a
freerlife; the trulyeducatedareliberatednot only fromillusionandbutalso from
instrumentalactivities:
Now the original conception of the Liberal Arts was a way one way of
establishing a space apartfrom immediately pragmaticand political concerns,
insofar as the Liberal Arts initiated studies that were pure ends in themselves,
not means to anything else. These arts were activities of reason in its various
guises (arithmetic, geometry, music, logic, grammar,etc.).'5

If I understandRortycorrectly,thenthispromiseof liberationis false.Teaching

the liberalartsloses its nobilityandbecomesjust anotherpoliticallyinstrumental
game.If thatis all thatteachingis, I findit hardto conceivewhy one wouldbother
to get up in the morningandpreparefor class.

Notes
1.
RichardRorty,quotedin StephenBest andDouglasKellner,"RichardRortyandPostmodernTheory,"at www.gSeis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/richardrortypostmoderntheory.pdf.
2.
Ibid.
3.
JoshuaKnobe,"ATalentfor Bricolage:An Interviewwith RichardRorty,"TheDualist
2 (1995): 56-71.
4.
Best and Kellner,"Rortyand PostmodernTheory."
5.
It might be objectedthat,while reasonis essentialto us in some sense, reasonplays no
role in effecting the paradigmshift. However,Rortyhimself insists thatthe shift occurs because
a new way of looking at things makes global or holistic sense. It would seem to be reason, not
the emotions or feelings, that requiresus to come up with a new picture "hangstogether"as a
whole.
6.
I am indebtedto an anonymousreviewerfor the example of the Sullivanprinciples.
7.
Leon Sullivan, quoted in Chris Herlinger,"Leon Sullivan Dies," Christianity
Today
(April 30, 2001).
8.
StephenJay Gould, "A Quahog Is a Quahog,"in ThePanda'sThumb(New York:W.
W. Norton & Company,1980), 20>13.
9.
Ibid., 207-08.
10. Ibid.,208-13.

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11. Ibid., 213.

13
12. RichardMcKeon, "Being, Existence, and That Which Is,"Reviewof Metaphysics
(June 1960): 537-54.
13. Charles Sanders Peirce, CollectedPapersof CharlesSandersPeirce,vols. 1 and 2
(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1960), passim.
14. Rortydoes recognize one fact, "thefact thatour sense of possibilities open for human
beings has changed as history has rolled along, and will go right on changing in unpredictable
ways."But this "fact"is simply anotherway of statinghis theoryof subjectivepragmatism,and
it is this theory that,I contend,leads him to neglect the reality of facts given in and by personal
experiences.
15. JohnCornell,CommencementAddressfor St. John'sGraduateInstitute,SantaFe,New
Mexico, August 2005.

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