Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Officer
to
conduct
preliminary
verification
of
the
returns.6[6]
The Facts
On 21 May 1997, George P. Mercado filed an Affidavit with
2[2]Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Arturo G. Tayag, and
Edgardo A. Camello, concurring.
3[3]Penned by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta with Associate Justices Amancio Q. Saga and
5[5]Id. at 12.
6[6]Id.
7[7]Id. at 12-13.
assessed with deficiency income taxes for the years 1993 to 1996.
assessment notices.
P 6,462.188[8]
the
deficiency
assessments.
Petitioner
filed
motion
for
1994
47,187.39 [9]
1995
24,729.6410[10]
1996
113,083.8311[11]
P
191,463.04
3 May 2002.
Petitioner appealed the CTAs decision to the CA. In a
decision dated 14 June 2004, the CA affirmed the CTAs decision.
Aggrieved
by
the
CAs
decision
affirming
the
8[8]Id. at 56.
9[9]Id. at 57.
10[10]Id. at 58.
11[11]Id. at 59.
person may be excluded from the coverage of the VAP. The CTA
cancelled.16[16]
The CA explained that the persons who may avail of the VAP
The CTA also stated that the rationale behind the VAP is to
are those who are liable to pay any of the above-cited internal
before they will be dealt with strictly for not paying their correct
taxes. The CTA noted that under the RMOs, among the benefits that
tax liabilities or has not filed the required tax returns. The CA
1)
2)
12[12]Id. at 93.
13[13] Id.
14[14] Id. at 93-94.
17[17]
RMO No. 59-97, as well as those added in RMO No. 63-97, should
3.1. Dealers of petroleum products and purchasers of goods and services from
petroleum companies who have availed of the VAP under RMO No. 39-96, as
amended by RMO No. 10-97;
3.3. Persons to whom a validly issued Letter of Authority has been served;
Issue
18[18]
under
Section
28119[19]
of
the
Tax
Code
is
mandatory
Verba Legis
It is well-settled that where the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, it must be given its literal application and applied
without
interpretation.21[21]
The
general
rule
of
requiring
Registry
Book
of
the
BIR
does
not
affect
respondents
of the VAP.
are not covered by the program and are not entitiled to its benefits.
to come up with a clean slate. Any person liable to pay income tax
Code for the taxable years 1993 to 1996, who due to inadvertence
or otherwise, has not filed the required tax return may avail of the
benefits under the VAP.23[23] RMO No. 59-97 also enumerates the
persons or cases that are excluded from the coverage of the VAP.
21[21]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159610, 12
June 2008, 554 SCRA 398, 409.
20[20]Id. at 156-163.
xxx
3.4 Persons under investigation by the
Tax Fraud Division and/or the Regional
Special Investigation Divisions as a result of
verified information filed by an informer
under Section 281 of the NIRC, as amended,
and duly recorded in the Official
Registry Book of the Bureau before the
date of availment under the VAP;
(Underscoring in the original, boldfacing
supplied)
xxx
3.4.
Persons
under
investigation as a result of verified
information filed by an informer under
Section 281 of the NIRC, as amended, and
duly recorded in the Official Registry
Book of the Bureau before the date of
availment under the VAP; x x x (Boldfacing
supplied)
24[24] LAUREL, JOSE JESUS, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES & MATERIALS, 1999
Revised Edition, p. 139.
25[25]LICOMCEN, Incorporated v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., G.R. No. 167022, 31 August 2007, 531
SCRA 705, 722.
recorded in the Official Registry Book of the BIR before the date of
Nos. 59-97, 60-97, and 63-97 is further bolstered by the fact that
Findings of Fact
2005 reads:
SECTION 1. COVERAGE. x x x
Any person, natural or juridical, including
estates and trusts, liable to pay any of the abovecited internal revenue taxes for the above specified
period/s who, due to inadvertence or otherwise,
erroneously paid his/its internal revenue tax liabilities
or failed to file tax returns/pay taxes, may avail of
the EVAP, except those falling under any of the
following instances:
xxx
b. Persons under investigation as a
result of verified information filed by a
Tax Informer under Section 282 of the
NIRC, duly processed and recorded in
the BIR Official Registry Book on or
before
the
effectivity
of
these
regulations. (Boldfacing supplied)
27[27]Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, Inc., G.R. Nos. 31776-78, 21 October 1993, 227
SCRA 317, 322.
xxx
- versus -
Respondent.
non-filing
of
return.
SO ORDERED.
31[1]
Rollo, pp. 32-75. Penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova, with Associate Justices
Erlinda P. Uy, Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring and Associate Justices Ernesto D. Acosta and Lovell
R. Bautista, dissenting.
SECOND DIVISION
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,Petitioner,
30[30]Rollo, p. 38.
Gross Sales
On January 26, 2001, the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 10, Legazpi City, issued Letter of
Authority No. 00006561 for Revenue Officer Daisy G.
Justiniana to examine petitioners books of accounts
and other accounting records for income tax and
other internal revenue taxes for the taxable year
1999. Said Letter of Authority was revalidated on
August 10, 2001 by Regional Director Leonardo
Sacamos.
P1,697,718.90
Output Tax
P 154,338.08
P 154,338.08
P 38,584.54
20% Interest
79,746.49
TOTAL
Expanded
110,103.92
P 112,876.83
Compromise Penalty
Late Payment
P16,000.00
WITHHOLDING TAX
Compensation
2,772.91
111,848.27
P 1,028.56
Compromise Penalty
TOTAL
576.51
200.00
P 1,805.07
412.73
10,000.25
x 10% 1,000.00
193,261.20
x 5% 9,663.00
Rental Expense
Security Service
1,561.42
Service Contractor
41,272.73
x 1%
156,142.01
x 1%
TOTAL
x x x.
SUMMARIES OF DEFICIENCIES
WITHHOLDING TAX
On
February
8,
2005,
respondent
Commissioner, through its authorized representative,
Revenue Regional Director of Revenue Region 10,
Legaspi City, issued a Decision denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner, through
counsel received said Decision on February 18, 2005.
P 110,103.92
Total
P 291,069.09
1,805.07
P 292,874.16
16, 2002. It, accordingly, ruled that the Formal Letter of Demand
2.2 Whether petitioner was informed of
the law and facts on which the
assessment is made in compliance
with Section 228 of the National
Internal Revenue Code;
3. Whether or not petitioner, as owner/operator of a
movie/cinema house, is subject to VAT on sales of
services under Section 108(A) of the National
Internal Revenue Code;
4. Whether or not the assessment is based on the
best evidence obtainable pursuant to Section 6(b)
of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The CIR sought reconsideration37[7] of the decision of the CTASecond Division, but the motion was denied in the latters July 24,
2007 Resolution.38[8]
Aggrieved, the CIR filed a petition for review 39[9] with the CTA-En
SO ORDERED.
35[5] Id. at 85, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 233 Phil. 359, 364 (1987).
The CIR, insisting that Metro Star received the PAN, dated
January 16, 2002, and that due process was served nonetheless
because the latter received the Final Assessment Notice (FAN),
comes now before this Court with the sole issue of whether or not
Metro Star was denied due process.
The general rule is that the Court will not lightly set aside
the conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its
functions, has accordingly developed an exclusive expertise on the
resolution unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise
of authority.42[12] In Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. (now known as
UBP Securities, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,43[13] the
Court wrote:
Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this
Court accords the findings of fact by the CTA with the
highest respect. In Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Court of
42[12]
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils), Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
157594March 9, 2010.
43[13] G.R. No. 150764, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 126, 135-136.
The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to
discharge its duty and present any evidence to show that Metro
Star indeed received the PAN dated January 16, 2002. It could have
simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the
postmaster that it mailed the PAN, but failed. Neither did it offer
any explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of
service of the PAN. It merely accepted the letter of Metro Stars
chairman dated April 29, 2002, that stated that he had received the
FAN dated April 3, 2002, but not the PAN; that he was willing to pay
the tax as computed by the CIR; and that he just wanted to clarify
some matters with the hope of lessening its tax liability.
This now leads to the question: Is the failure to strictly
comply with notice requirements prescribed under Section 228 of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 and Revenue
Regulations (R.R.) No. 12-99 tantamount to a denial of due process?
Specifically, are the requirements of due process satisfied if only
the FAN stating the computation of tax liabilities and a demand to
pay within the prescribed period was sent to the taxpayer?
The answer to these questions require an examination of
Section 228 of the Tax Code which reads:
SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment. - When the
Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds
Such
assessment
may
be
protested
administratively
by
filing
a
request
for
reconsideration or reinvestigation within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the assessment in such form
and manner as may be prescribed by implementing
rules and regulations. Within sixty (60) days from
filing of the protest, all relevant supporting
documents shall have been submitted; otherwise,
the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or
is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180)
days from submission of documents, the taxpayer
adversely affected by the decision or inaction may
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the said decision, or from the
lapse of one hundred eighty (180)-day period;
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory
and demandable. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the
the law upon which the assessment is made. The law imposes a
not
merely
formal,
requirement.
To
proceed
by law and its own rules is a denial of Metro Stars right to due
process.45[15] Thus, for its failure to send the PAN stating the facts
and the law on which the assessment was made as required by
Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, the assessment made by the CIR is
void.
The case of CIR v. Menguito46[16] cited by the CIR in support
of its argument that only the non-service of the FAN is fatal to the
validity of an assessment, cannot apply to this case because the
issue therein was the non-compliance with the provisions of R. R.
No. 12-85 which sought to interpret Section 229 of the old tax law.
RA No. 8424 has already amended the provision of Section 229 on
protesting an assessment. The old requirement of merely notifying
x x x.
From the provision quoted above, it is clear that the
sending of a PAN to taxpayer to inform him of the assessment
the taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on which an
would be invalid.47[17] The regulation then, on the other hand,
simply provided that a notice be sent to the respondent in the form
prescribed, and that no consequence would ensue for failure to
comply with that form.
The Court need not belabor to discuss the matter of Metro
Stars failure to file its protest, for it is well-settled that a void
assessment bears no fruit.48[18]
45[15] Tupas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89571, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 597, 600.
46[16] G.R. No. 167560, September 17, 2008, 461 SCRA 565.
47[17] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Azucena T. Reyes, G.R. No. 159694 & G.R. No. 163581
January 27, 2006, 382 SCRA 480.
48[18] Id.
49[19] Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
50[20] 241 Phil. 829 (1988).
March 7, 2008
that the CIR was not precluded from collecting the deficiency within
three (3) years from the time the notice of assessment was issued
on 7 April 1989, or even until the expiration on 31 December 1994
of the last waiver of the statute of limitations signed by BPI.
Moreover, BPI avers that the cabled instructions to its
correspondent bank are not subject to DST because the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (Tax Code of 1977) does not contain
a specific provision that cabled instructions on SWAP transactions
are subject to DST.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment 6 dated 1
June 2007, on behalf of the CIR, asserting that the prescriptive
period was tolled by the protest letters filed by BPI which were
granted and acted upon by the CIR. Such action was allegedly
communicated to BPI as, in fact, the latter submitted additional
documents pertaining to its SWAP transactions in support of its
request for reinvestigation. Thus, it was only upon BPIs receipt on
13 January 2003 of the 9 August 2002 Decision that the period to
collect commenced to run again.
The OSG cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v. Suyoc
Consolidated Mining Company, et al.7(Suyoc case) in support of its
argument that BPI is already estopped from raising the defense of
prescription in view of its repeated requests for reinvestigation
which allegedly induced the CIR to delay the collection of the
assessed tax.
In its Reply8dated 30 August 2007, BPI argues against the
application of the Suyoc case on two points: first, it never induced
the CIR to postpone tax collection; second, its request for
reinvestigation was not categorically acted upon by the CIR within
the three-year collection period after assessment. BPI maintains
that it did not receive any communication from the CIR in reply to
its protest letters.
We grant the petition.
Section 3189 of the Tax Code of 1977 provides:
Sec. 318. Period of limitation upon assessment and
collection.Except as provided in the succeeding section,
internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years
after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court
Footnotes
10
13
Id. at 232.
15
17
18
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 37-39.
THIRD DIVISION
Id. at 106-121.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision1 dated June 16, 2006 affirming the Decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc dated June 7, 2005 in C.T.A. EB No. 50, which
affirmed the Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals Second
Division dated May 3, 2004 and November 5, 2004 in C.T.A. Case
No. 6475, denying petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment and
Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner reiterates its claim that its former counsels failure to file
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals within the period
set by Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
(NIRC) was excusable and raised the following issues for resolution:
A.
THE DENIAL OF PETITIONERS PETITION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT WILL RESULT IN THE DENIAL OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE TO PETITIONER, CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT BECAUSE THE ASSESSMENT SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED A FACT NOT
DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT IN ITS ANSWER.
B.
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION,
AND FOLLOWING THE LASCONA DECISION, AS WELL
AS THE 2005 REVISED RULES OF THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, PETITIONER TIMELY FILED ITS PETITION FOR
REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS; THUS,
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.
C.
CONSIDERING THAT THE SUBJECT ASSESSMENT
INVOLVES AN INDUSTRY ISSUE, THAT IS, A
DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FOR DOCUMENTARY STAMP
xxxx
Also, Section 3, Rule 4 and Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules
of the Court of Tax Appeals6 state:
RULE 4
Jurisdiction of the Court
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 30, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
COMMISSIONER
REVENUE,
OF
INTERNAL
Petitioner,
For review on certiorari is the Decision52[1] and Resolution53[2]
Present:
dated January 31, 2005 and April 14, 2005, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 79675, which affirmed the
Decision54[3] dated March 20, 2003 of the Court of Tax Appeals
52
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA,
53
54
On
October
18,
1999,
FMF
received
amended
pre-
56
assessment notices [5] dated October 6, 1999 from the BIR. FMF
Revenue (BIR) for the deficiency income and withholding taxes for
day, it received BIRs Demand Letter and Assessment Notice No. 33-
Philippine laws.
on Management Fees
16,000.00
TOTAL
P2,053,698.2557[6]
55
56
57
58
reason of the invalidity of the waiver. In its reply, the BIR insisted
Appeals held that the waiver did not strictly comply with RMO No.
that the waiver is valid because it was signed by the RDO, a duly
be taken. Treating this as BIRs final decision, FMF filed a petition for
review with the CTA challenging the validity of the assessment.
SO ORDERED.61[10]
On March 20, 2003, the CTA granted the petition and cancelled
Assessment Notice No. 33-1-00487-95 because it was already timeThe
barred. The CTA ruled that the waiver did not extend the three-year
prescriptive period within which the BIR can make a valid
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue
sought
I.
and accepted within the prescribed period. Second, the CTA also
found that FMF was not furnished a copy of the waiver signed by
II.
RDO Zambarrano. Third, the CTA pointed out that since the case
III.
OF APPEALS
PETITIONERS
59
61
60
62
(1) Is the waiver valid? and (2) Did the three-year period to assess
[14]
63
period. Petitioner also argues that the requirements in RMO No. 2090 are merely directory; thus, the indication of the dates of
must be assessed within three years counted from the period fixed
BIR, respectively, are not required by law. Petitioner adds that there
by law for the filing of the tax return or the actual date of filing,
whichever
is
later.
This
mandate
governs
the
question
of
63
time.67[16]
64
65
66
67
An
exception
to
the
three-year
prescriptive
period
on
the
officials
are
tax
cases
between the BIR and respondent, within which the former may
more than P1 million, and the period to assess is not yet about to
prescribe. Lastly, it did not contain the date of acceptance by the
taxpayer
within
the
contemplation
of
the
Commission
which
70
68
71
69
72
73
COMMISSIONER
INTERNAL
OF
REVENUE,
Petitioner,
Present:
BRION,
- versus -
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
Republic of the Philippines
PEREZ, JJ.
Supreme Court
Manila
KUDOS
CORPORATION,
METAL
Promulgated:
SECOND DIVISION
Respondent.
May 5, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
Factual Antecedents
President, Mr. Chan Ching Bio, in a letter dated October 20, 2000.
76
issued beyond the prescriptive period and the Resolution [3] dated May
Service on January 31, 2002 and by the BIR Tax Fraud Division on
February 4, 2002, and accepted by the Assistant Commissioner of the
74
75
76
77
VAT
13,962,460.90
EWT
1,712,336.76
Withholding Tax-Compensation
247,353.24
Penalties
8,000.00
Total
P25,624,048.76
78
February 2, 2004.
prescribed, respondent filed on August 27, 2004 a Petition for Review 80[7]
with the CTA. Petitioner in turn filed his Answer.81[8]
On April 11, 2005, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
On June 22, 2004, the BIR rendered a final Decision 79[6] on the
matter, requesting the immediate payment of the following tax liabilities:
Kind of Tax
Income Tax
9,693,897.85
Amount
P
80
78
81
79
82
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CTA Second Division denied
the motion in a Resolution85[12] dated April 18, 2006.
A.
83
84
85
For tax
For
cases
other
than
those
cases
falling
under
Subsecti
on
B
hereof
3. ACIR, Legal Service
pending
For
cases
For
pending in
or subject to
revi
ew
or
ap
pro
val
by
the
ACI
R,
AS
Based on the foregoing, the Assistant
Commissioner, Enforcement Service is authorized to sign
waivers in tax fraud cases. A perusal of the records
reveals that the investigation of the subject deficiency
taxes in this case was conducted by the National
Investigation Division of the BIR, which was formerly
named the Tax Fraud Division. Thus, the subject
assessment is a tax fraud case.
Nevertheless, the first waiver is still invalid based
on the second and third grounds stated by the Court in
Division. Hence, it did not extend the prescriptive period
to assess.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the first
waiver is valid, the second waiver is invalid for violating
Section 222(b) of the 1997 Tax Code which mandates
that the period agreed upon in a waiver of the statute can
still be extended by subsequent written agreement,
provided that it is executed prior to the expiration of the
first period agreed upon. As previously discussed, the
exceptions to the law on prescription must be strictly
construed.
In the case at bar, the period agreed upon in the
subject first waiver expired on December 31, 2002. The
second waiver in the instant case which was supposed to
extend the period to assess to December 31, 2003 was
executed on February 18, 2003 and was notarized on
February 19, 2003. Clearly, the second waiver was
executed after the expiration of the first period agreed
Issue
may no longer repudiate the validity of the waivers and raise the issue of
prescription.
Petitioners Arguments
when the law is doubtful, which is not present in the instant case.
Our Ruling
86
87
Section 222 (b) of the NIRC provides that the period to assess and
three years from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the tax
the CIR and the taxpayer executed before the expiration of the three-
return or the actual date of filing of such return, whichever comes later.
year period. RMO 20-9090[17] issued on April 4, 1990 and RDAO 05-
0191[18] issued on August 2, 2001 lay down the procedure for the proper
89
Petitioner does not deny that the assessment notices were issued
beyond the three-year prescriptive period, but claims that the period was
extended by the two waivers executed by respondents accountant.
We do not agree.
88
90
89
91
1.
in behalf of respondent.
3.
waivers.
the second copy for the taxpayer and the third copy
for the Office accepting the waiver. The fact of receipt
by the taxpayer of his/her file copy must be indicated
Estoppel
does
not
was the one which asked for additional time to submit the required
documents.
In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Suyoc Consolidated Mining
Company,93[20] the doctrine of estoppel prevented the taxpayer from
92
93
the respondent of the waivers. Having caused the defects in the waivers,
assessments.
the BIR must bear the consequence. It cannot shift the blame to the
taxpayer. To stress, a waiver of the statute of limitations, being a
derogation of the taxpayers right to security against prolonged and
unscrupulous investigations, must be carefully and strictly construed.98
[25]
can the BIR use this as an excuse for issuing the assessments beyond the
94
95
97
96
98
CIR has the power to make assessments based on the best evidence
99
obtainable. [26]
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184823
October 6, 2010
99
sales;10 and that in its application for refund/credit filed with the
DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center, it only claimed the amount of P3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer 12 raising the following
special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative
investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period
in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales
contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the
Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2)
year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is
fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for
the same partake of the nature of exemption from taxation. 13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of
the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondents claim
for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly
claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has
not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the
following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales which are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VATregistered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the
close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made; and (4)
the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such
sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such
input tax has not been applied against the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been
complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by
petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to
"JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in
sales which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The
Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C")
with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its
administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit "N")
and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both
within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, which is from
September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are
some documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless and
have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
P 3,891,123.82
Less:
41,020.37
Exceptions as found by the ICPA
Net Creditable Input VAT
P 3,850,103.45
Less:
Output VAT Due
610,984.20
P 3,239,119.25
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions
Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in favor of
respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the
two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were
filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the honorable
Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner
further contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and
judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the authority of the
honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount
of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following
the close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer:
Provided, however, That VAT-registered persons shall pay the valueadded tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five
(25) days from the close of each taxable quarter within which to file
a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In
the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the
1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to
file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it
complied when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20,
2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided
under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from the payment
of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its
VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20,
2002. Thus, respondent's administrative and judicial claims for
refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed on time because
AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for
refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that
the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an administrative
claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the
case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and judicial claims for refund. What is controlling is
that both claims for refund must be filed within the two-year
prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb
the findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed January 4,
2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second
Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to
view and appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of
things, which unfortunately had already been considered and
passed upon.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of the CTA
applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may,
within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has
not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the
case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B)
and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency
exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is
engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in
taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the
amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and
entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration
Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax.
(A) In General. Every person liable to pay the value-added tax
imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the amount
of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following
the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive
period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty, for
the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or
illegal collection of internal revenue taxes.
MPCs creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is
an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the buyer,
transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the
taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves
a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the
taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input
VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does
not enter the equation.
xxxx
xxxx
We do not agree.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a
leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
filed
in
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax
credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the
application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted
claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120
days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents
in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to
grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR,
the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the
120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction
of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent
did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day
period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with
the CTA premature.
Respondents assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day
period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both the
administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondents
view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that "any VATregistered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zerorated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable
to such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to applications
for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the
CTA. This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the
same provision, which states that the CIR has "120 days from the
submission of complete documents in support of the application
filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to
decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render
nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already provides for a
specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision
or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of
the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by
the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no
decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the
taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA.
As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal
with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias
Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we find the same
inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section
306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed,
Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT, such as
the instant case.