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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF

THE FIRM NAME OZAETA, ROMULO, etc. (Malicay)


FACTS:
The surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta pray that they be allowed to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the names of partners who passed away.
ISSUE:W/N a law partnership may continue using the names of their deceased
partners in the firm name
RULING: NO. It will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code. In fact, Article 1825
of Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name
under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. Moreover, a partnership for the
practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or
for business. The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is
a profession.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop
the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names
may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in
their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SYJUCO v. CASTRO (Malicay)
FACTS:
Eugenio Lim, along with his brothers, all hereinafter collectively called
the Lims, borrowed from petitioner Syjuco. The loan was given on the security of a
first mortgage on property registered in the names of said borrowers as owners in
common. Thereafter, additional loans on the same security were obtained by the
Lims. When the obligation matured, the Lims failed to pay despite demands so
Syjuco moved for the foreclosure of the mortgage. The Lims contend that the
mortgage was void because the mortgaged property had been contributed to the
partnership "Heirs of Hugo Lim," to which all of them were partners, and was
already property of said partnership when the individual Lims unauthorizedly
mortgaged it to Syjuco.
ISSUE:Can a mortgage of a property in the names of all partners be attributed to the
partnership?
RULING: YES. Article 1819 states: Where the title to real property is in the names of
all the partners a conveyance executed by all the partners passes all their rights in
such property. The term conveyance used in said provision, which is taken from
Section 10 of the American Uniform Partnership Act, includes a mortgage. The legal
fiction of a separate juridical personality and existence will not shield it from the

conclusion of having such knowledge which naturally and irresistibly flows from the
facts. It would violate all precepts of reason, ordinary experience and common
sense to propose that a partnership, as such, cannot be held accountable with
knowledge of matters commonly known to all the partners or of acts in which all of
the latter, without exception, have taken part, where such matters or acts affect
property claimed as its own by said partnership.
If, therefore, the respondent partnership was inescapably chargeable with
knowledge of the mortgage executed by all the partners thereof, its silence and
failure to impugn said mortgage within a reasonable time, let alone a space of more
than seventeen years, brought into play the doctrine of estoppel to preclude any
attempt to avoid the mortgage as allegedly unauthorized.
CHIAO LIONG TAN v. CA (Malicay)
FACTS:
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle.
As owner thereof, petitioner says he has been in possession, enjoyment and
utilization of the said motor vehicle until it was taken from him by his older brother,
Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent herein. Petitioner relies principally on the fact
that the motor vehicle is registered in his name under a Certificate of Registration.
However, the brother is now claiming ownership on the motor vehicle. The money
used to purchase the motor vehicle was from a loan acquired by the brother through
a friend and asked petitioner to purchase the motor vehicle and gave petitioner
money for down payment hence, the registration in petitioners name.
ISSUE:W/N an implied trust is created when the motor vehicle was registered under
another name but was paid for and owned by another
RULING: The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust other than those
enumerated therein.
Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it
is undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration
of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner although the price
thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent. The principle that a trustee
who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust,
which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially
between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a
legal document.

CHAPTER 2
EXPRESS TRUSTS (Malicay)
Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may
be proved by parol evidence.
By virtue of Article 1443, writing is necessary to prove an express trust
concerning an immovable or any interest therein. The writing is required by
said article not for validity but for purposes of proof.
To affect third persons, a trust concerning an immovable or any interest
therein must be embodied in a public instrument and registered in the
Registry of Property.
Art. 1444. No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.
What is important is whether the trustor or the party manifested an intention
to create the kind of relationship which in law is known as a trust. It is
immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to
create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristic of the relationship which is called a trust, it being sufficient that
a trust is clearly intended.
Art. 1445. No trust shall fail because the trustee appointed declines the designation,
unless the contrary should appear in the instrument constituting the trust.
Art. 1446. Acceptance by the beneficiary is necessary. Nevertheless, if the trust
imposes no onerous condition upon the beneficiary, his acceptance shall be
presumed, if there is no proof to the contrary.
The trust being beneficial to the beneficiary, his acceptance is presumed if
there is no proof to the contrary. However, if the trust imposes some onerous
condition, acceptance must be shown. Such acceptance may be express or
implied.
CHAPTER 3
IMPLIED TRUSTS
Art. 1447. The enumeration of the following cases of implied trust does not exclude
others established by the general law of trust, but the limitation laid down in Article
1442 shall be applicable.

Implied trusts are not created voluntarily, but imposed by law or inferred from
the conduct or dealings of the parties. The concept of implied trusts is that
from the facts and circumstances
of a given case, the existence of a trust relationship is inferred in order to
effect the presumed intention of the parties. Thus, there is no implied trust
where a contrary intention is proved.
The enumeration of cases of implied trust in Chapter 3 is not exclusive. (Art.
1447.) It is intended to be illustrative of situations in which implied trust is
needed in order to correct a wrong or
prevent an unjust enrichment.