a.

Rawls
Rawls burst into prominence in 1958 with the publication of his game-changing paper,
Justice as Fairness. Though it was not his first important publication, it revived the
social contract theory that had been languishing in the wake of Humes critique and its
denigration by utilitarians and pragmatists, though it was a Kantian version of it that
Rawls advocated. This led to a greatly developed book version, A Theory of Justice,
published in 1971, arguably the most important book of American philosophy published
in the second half of the last century. Rawls makes it clear that his theory, which he
calls justice as fairness, assumes a Kantian view of persons as free and equal,
morally autonomous, rational agents, who are not necessarily egoists. He also makes it
clear early on that he means to present his theory as a preferable alternative to that of
utilitarians. He asks us to imagine persons in a hypothetical initial situation which he
calls the original position (corresponding to the state of nature or natural
condition of Hobbes, but clearly not presented as any sort of historical or pre-historical
fact). This is strikingly characterized by what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance, a
device designed to minimize the influence of selfish bias in attempting to determine
what would be just. If you must decide on what sort of society you could commit
yourself to accepting as a permanent member and were not allowed to factor in specific
knowledge about yourselfsuch as your gender, race, ethnic identity, level of
intelligence, physical strength, quickness and stamina, and so forththen you would
presumably exercise the rational choice to make the society as fair for everyone as
possible, lest you find yourself at the bottom of that society for the rest of your life. In
such a purely hypothetical situation, Rawls believes that we would rationally adopt
two basic principles of justice for our society: the first requires equality in the
assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic
inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result
in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society. Here we see Rawls conceiving of justice, the primary social virtue,
as requiring equal basic liberties for all citizens and a presumption of equality even
regarding socio-economic goods. He emphasizes the point that these principles rule out
as unjust the utilitarian justification of disadvantages for some on account of greater
advantages for others, since that would be rationally unacceptable to one operating
under the veil of ignorance. Like Kant, Rawls is opposed to the teleological or

consequentialist gambit of defining the right (including the just) in terms of

maximizing the good; he rather, like Kant, the deontologist, is committed to a priority
of the right over the good. Justice is not reducible to utility or pragmatic desirability.
We should notice that the first principle of justice, which requires maximum equality of
rights and duties for all members of society, is prior in serial or lexical order to the
second, which specifies how socio-economic inequalities can be justified (Theory, pp.
12-26, 31, 42-43). Again, this is anti-utilitarian, in that no increase in socio-economic
benefits for anyone can ever justify anything less than maximum equality of rights and
duties for all. Thus, for example, if enslaving a few members of society generated vastly
more benefits for the majority than liabilities for them, such a bargain would be
categorically ruled out as unjust.
Rawls proceeds to develop his articulation of these two principles of justice more
carefully. He reformulates the first one in terms of maximum equal liberty, writing that
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with
a similar liberty for others. The basic liberties intended concern such civil rights as are
protected in our Constitutionfree speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience,
the right to private property, the rights to vote and hold public office, freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure, etc. The lexical priority of this first principle requires that it
be categorical in that the only justification for limiting any basic liberties would be to
enhance other basic liberties; for example, it might be just to limit free access of the
press to a sensational legal proceeding in order to protect the right of the accused to a
fair trial. Rawls restates his second principle to maintain that social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to
everyones advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. Thus socioeconomic inequalities can be justified, but only if both conditions are met. The first
condition (a) is the difference principle and takes seriously the idea that every socioeconomic difference separating one member of society from others must be beneficial to
all, including the person ranked lowest. The second condition is one of fair equality of
opportunity, in that socio-economic advantages must be connected to positions to
which all members of society could have access. For example, the office of the
presidency has attached to it greater social prestige and income than is available to most
of us. Is that just? It can be, assuming that all of us, as citizens, could achieve that office
with its compensations and that even those of us at or near the bottom of the socioeconomic scale benefit from intelligent, talented people accepting the awesome
responsibilities of that office. Just as the first principle must be lexically prior to the

second, Rawls also maintains that fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.
Thus, if we have to choose between equal opportunity for all and socio-economically
benefiting the least advantaged members of society, the former has priority over the
latter. Most of us today might be readily sympathetic to the first principle and the equal
opportunity condition, while finding the difference principle to be objectionably
egalitarian, to the point of threatening incentives to contribute more than is required.
Rawls does consider a mixed conception of justice that most of us would regard as
more attractive arising when the principle of average utility constrained by a certain
social minimum is substituted for the difference principle, everything else remaining
unchanged. But there would be a problem of fairly agreeing on that acceptable social
minimum, and it would change with shifting contingent circumstances. It is curious
that his own theory of justice as fairness gets attacked by socialists such as Nielsen
(whom we shall consider) for sacrificing equality for the sake of liberty and by
libertarians such as Nozick (whom we shall also consider) for giving up too much liberty
for the sake of equality. Rawls briefly suggests that his theory of justice as fairness
might be applied to international relations, in general, and to just war theory, in
particular (ibid., pp. 60-65, 75, 83, 302-303, 316, 378).
Rawls applies his theory of justice to the domestic issue of civil disobedience. No society
is perfectly just. A generally or nearly just society can have unjust laws, in which case
its citizens may or may not have a duty to comply with them, depending on how severely
unjust they are. If the severity of the injustice is not great, then respect for democratic
majority rule might morally dictate compliance. Otherwise, citizens can feel a moral
obligation to engage in civil disobedience, which Rawls defines as a public, nonviolent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing
about a change in the law or policies of the government. Certain conditions must be
met in order that an act of civil disobedience be justified: (1) it should normally address
violations of equal civil liberties (the first principle of justice) and/or of fair equality of
opportunity (the second part of the second principle), with violations of the difference
principle (the first part of the second principle) being murkier and, thus, harder to
justify; (2) the act of civil disobedience should come only after appeals to the political
majority have been reasonably tried and failed; (3) it must seem likely to accomplish
more good than harm for the social order. Yet, even if all three of these conditions seem
to be met and the disobedient action seems right, there remains the practical question of
whether it would be wise or prudent, under the circumstances, to engage in the act of
civil disobedience. Ultimately, every individual must decide for himself or herself

whether such action is morally and prudentially justifiable or not as reasonably and
responsibly as possible. The acts of civil disobedience of Martin Luther King (to whom
Rawls refers in a footnote) seem to have met all the conditions, to have been done in the
name of justice, and to have been morally justified (ibid., pp. 350-357, 363-367, 372376, 389-390, 364n).
Rawlss second book was Political Liberalism. Here he works out how a just political
conception might develop a workable overlapping consensus despite the challenges to
social union posed by a pluralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This, of
course, calls for some explanation. A just society must protect basic liberties equally for
all of its members, including freedom of thought and its necessary condition, freedom of
expression. But, in a free society that protects these basic liberties, a pluralism of views
and values is likely to develop, such that people can seriously disagree about matters
they hold dear. They will develop their own comprehensive doctrines, or systems of
beliefs that may govern all significant aspects of their lives. These may be religious (like
Christianity) or philosophical (like Kantianism) or moral (like utilitarian). Yet a variety
of potentially conflicting comprehensive doctrines may be such that all are reasonable.
In such a case, social unity requires respect for and tolerance of other sets of beliefs. It
would be unjust deliberately to suppress reasonable comprehensive doctrines merely
because they are different from our own. The problem of political liberalism nowadays
is how we can establish a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are
deeply divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines. What is needed is a shared political conception of justice that is
neutral regarding competing comprehensive doctrines. This could allow for an
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, such that tolerance and
mutual respect are operative even among those committed to incompatible views and
values, so long as they are reasonable (Liberalism, pp. 291-292, 340-342, 145, xviii, 13,
152n., 59-60, 133, 154-155, 144, 134). Thus, for example, a Christian Kantian and an
atheistic utilitarian, while sincerely disagreeing on many ethical principles,
philosophical ideas, and religious beliefs, can unite in mutually accepting, for instance,
the American Constitution as properly binding on all of us equally. This agreement will
enable them mutually to participate in social cooperation, the terms of which are fair
and reciprocal and which can contribute to the reasonable good of the entire society.
Near the end of his life, Rawls published The Law of Peoples, in which he tried to apply
his theory of justice to international relations. Given that not all societies act justly and

that societies have a right to defend themselves against aggressive violent force, there
can be a right to go to war (jus ad bellum). Yet even then, not all is fair in war, and rules
of just warfare (jus in bello) should be observed: (1) the goal must be a just and lasting
peace; (2) it must be waged in defense of freedom and security from aggression; (3)
reasonable attempts must be made not to attack innocent non-combatants; (4) the
human rights of enemies (for example, against being tortured) must be respected; (5)
attempts should be made to establish peaceful relations; and (6) practical tactics must
always remain within the parameters of moral principles. After hostilities have ceased,
just conquerors must treat their conquered former enemies with respectnot, for
example, enslaving them or denying them civil liberties. Rawls adds a very controversial
supreme emergency exemption in relation to the third rulewhen a relatively just
societys very survival is in desperate peril, its attacking enemy civilian populations, as
by bombing cities, can be justifiable. More generally, Rawls applies his theory of justice
to international relations, generating eight rules regarding how the people of other
societies must be treated. While we do not have time to explore them all here, the last
one is sufficiently provocative to be worth our considering: Peoples have a duty to
assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just
or decent political and social regime. This, of course, goes beyond not exploiting,
cheating, manipulating, deceiving, and interfering with others to a positive duty of
trying to help them, at the cost of time, money, and other resources. Justice demands
that we try to assist what Rawls calls burdened societies, so that doing so is not
morally supererogatory. What is most interesting here is what Rawls refuses to say.
While different peoples, internationally speaking, might be imagined in an original
position under the veil of ignorance, and Rawls would favor encouraging equal liberties
and opportunities for all, he refuses to apply the difference principle globally in such a
way as to indicate that justice requires a massive redistribution of wealth from richer to
poorer societies (Peoples, pp. 94-96, 98-99, 37, 106, 114-117).
From a critical perspective, Rawlss theory of civil disobedience is excellent, as are his
theory of political liberalism and his version of the just war theory, except for that
supreme emergency exemption, which uncharacteristically tries to make right a
function of teleological good. His views on international aid seem so well worked out
that, ironically, they call into question part of his general theory of justice itself. It does
not seem plausible that the difference principle should apply intrasocietally but not
internationally. The problem may be with the difference principle itself. It is not at all
clear that rational agents in a hypothetical original position would adopt such an

egalitarian principle. The veil of ignorance leading to this controversial principle can
itself be questioned as artificial and unrealistic; one might object that, far from being
methodologically neutral, it sets up a bias (towards, for example, being risk-aversive)
that renders Rawlss own favored principles of justice almost a foregone conclusion.
Indeed, the mixed conception that Rawls himself considers and rejects seems more
plausible and more universally applicablekeeping the first principle and the second
part of the second but replacing the difference principle with one of average utility,
constrained by some social minimum, adjustable with changing circumstances. Thus we
could satisfactorily specify the requirements of an essentially Kantian conception of
justice, as requiring respect for the dignity of all persons as free and equal, rational
moral agents. While less egalitarian than what Rawls offers, it might prove an attractive
alternative. To what extent should liberty be constrained by equality in a just society?
This is a central issue that divides him from many post-Rawlsians, to a few of whom we
now briefly turn.

b. Post-Rawls
Rawlss monumental work on justice theory revitalized political philosophy in the
United States and other English-speaking countries. In this final subsection, we shall
briefly survey some of the most important recent attempts to provide preferable
alternatives to Rawlss conception of justice. They will represent six different
approaches. We shall consider, in succession, (1) the libertarian approach of Robert
Nozick, (2) the socialistic one of Kai Nielsen, (3) the communitarian one of Michael
Sandel, (4) the globalist one of Thomas Pogge, (5) the feminist one of Martha
Nussbaum, and (6) the rights-based one of Michael Boylan. As this is merely a quick
survey, we shall not delve much into the details of their theories (limiting ourselves to a
single work by each) or explore their applications or do much in the way of a critique of
them. But the point will be to get a sense of several recent approaches to developing
views of justice in the wake of Rawls.
(1)

Nozick

Nozick (a departmental colleague of Rawls at Harvard) was one of the first and remains
one of the most famous critics of Rawlss liberal theory of justice. Both are
fundamentally committed to individual liberty. But as a libertarian, Nozick is opposed
to compromising individual liberty in order to promote socio-economic equality and

advocates a minimal state as the only sort that can be socially just. In Anarchy, State,
and Utopia (1974), especially in its famous chapter on Distributive Justice, while
praising Rawlss first book as the most important work in political and moral
philosophy since that of Mill, Nozick argues for what he calls an entitlement
conception of justice in terms of three principles of just holdings. First, anyone who
justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to keep and use it. Second, anyone who
acquires any holding by means of a just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep
and use it. It is only through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is
rightly entitled to any holding. But some people acquire holdings unjustlye.g., by theft
or fraud or forceso that there are illegitimate holdings. So, third, justice can require
the rectification of unjust past acquisitions. These three principles of just holdings
the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the
principle of rectification of the violations of the first two principlesconstitute the core
of Nozicks libertarian entitlement theory of justice. People should be entitled to use
their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it. On this view, any
pattern of distribution, such as Rawlss difference principle, that would force people to
give up any holdings to which they are entitled in order to give it to someone else (i.e., a
redistribution of wealth) is unjust. Thus, for Nozick, any state, such as ours or one
Rawls would favor, that is more extensive than a minimal state and redistributes
wealth by taxing those who are relatively well off to benefit the disadvantaged
necessarily violates peoples rights (State, pp. 149, 183, 230, 150-153, 230-231, 149).
(2)

Nielsen

Nielsen, as a socialist (against both Rawls and Nozick) considers equality to be a more
fundamental ideal than individual liberty; this is more in keeping with Marxism than
with the liberal/libertarian tradition that has largely stemmed from Locke. (Whereas
capitalism supports the ownership and control of the means of producing and
distribution material goods by private capital or wealth, socialism holds that they should
be owned and controlled by society as a whole.) If Nozick accuses Rawls of going too far
in requiring a redistribution of wealth, Nielsen criticizes him for favoring individual
liberty at the expense of social equality. In direct contrast to Rawlss two liberal
principles of justice, in Radical Egalitarian Justice: Justice as Equality, Nielsen
proposes his own two socialistic principles constituting the core of his egalitarian
conception of justice. In his first principle, he calls for equal basic liberties and
opportunities (rather than for merely equal basic liberties), including the

opportunities for meaningful work, for self-determination, and political participation,

which he considers important to promote equal moral autonomy and equal selfrespect. Also (unlike Rawls) he does not claim any lexical priority for either principle
over the other. His sharper departure from Rawls can be found in his second principle,
which is to replace the difference principle that allegedly justified socioeconomic inequality. After specifying a few qualifications, it calls for the income and
wealth of society to be so divided that each person will have a right to an equal share
and for the burdens of society also to be equally shared, subject, of course, to
limitations by differing abilities and differing situations. He argues that his own
second principle would better promote equal self-respect and equal moral autonomy
among the members of society. Thus we might eliminate social stratification and class
exploitation, in accordance with the ideals of Marxist humanism (Equality, pp. 209,
211-213, 222-225).
(3)

Sandel

Sandel, as a communitarian, argues (against Rawls and Nozick) that the well-being of a
community takes precedence over individual liberty and (against Nielsen) over the
socio-economic welfare of its members. While acknowledging that Rawls is not so
narrowly individualistic as to rule out the value of building social community,
in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, he maintains that the individualism of persons
in the original position is such that a sense of community is not a basic constituent of
their identify as such, so that community is bound to remain secondary and derivative
in the Rawlsian theory. To deny that community values help constitute ones personal
identity is to render impossible any preexisting interpersonal good from which a sense
of right can be derived. Thus, for Sandel, Rawlss myopic theory of human nature gives
him no basis for any pre-political natural rights. So his conception of justice based on
this impoverished view must fail to reflect the shared self-understandings of who they
are as members of community that must undergird the basic structure of political
society. Through the interpersonal relationships of community, we establish more or
less enduring attachments and commitments that help define who we are, as well as the
values that will help characterize our sense of justice as a common good that cannot be
properly understood by individuals detached from community. Thus justice must
determine what is right as serving the goods we embrace in a social contextas
members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as

sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic rather than as abstract
individuals (Limits, pp. 66, 60-65, 87, 150, 172-174, 179, 183, 179).
(4)

Pogge

Pogge develops a globalist interpretation of justice as fairness that, in a sense, is more

consistent than Rawlss own. More specifically, it not only accepts the difference
principle but wants to apply it on an international level as well as nationally. In An
Egalitarian Law of Peoples, Pogge observes that Rawls means his theory of justice to be
relatively egalitarian. And, as applied intranationally, so it is. But, as applied
internationally, it is not. As he says, there is a disconnect between Rawlss conception
of domestic and of global justice. (We should note that, like Sandels critique, which we
just considered, Pogges is not a complete theory of justice, but more a modification of
Rawlss own.) While Rawls does believe that well-off societies have a duty to assist
burdened societies, he rejects the idea of a global application of his difference principle.
What Pogge is proposing is a global egalitarian principle of distributive justice. He
thinks that this will address socio-economic equalities that are to the detriment of the
worlds worst-off persons. What he proposes is a global resources tax, or GRT. This
means that, although each of the peoples of our planet owns and fully controls all
resources within its national territory, it will be taxed on all of the resources it extracts.
If it uses those extracted resources itself, it must pay the tax itself. If it sells some to
other societies, presumably at least part of the tax burden will be borne by buyers in the
form of higher sales prices. The GRT is then a tax on consumption of our planets
resources. Corporations extracting resources (such as oil companies and coal mining
companies) would pay their taxes to their governments which, in turn, would be
responsible for transferring funds to disadvantaged societies to help the global poor.
Such payments should be regarded as a matter of entitlement rather than charity, an
obligation of international justice. If the governments of the poorer states were honest,
they could disburse the funds; if they were corrupt, then transfers could go through
United Nations agencies and/or nongovernmental organizations. At any rate, they
should be channeled toward societies in which they could improve the lot of the poor
and disadvantaged. (Of course, less well-off societies would be free to refuse such funds,
if they so chose.) But, one might wonder, would well-off societies only be motivated to
pay their fair share by benevolence, a sense of justice, and possible shame at being
exposed for not doing so? No, there could be international sanctions: Once the agency
facilitating the flow of GRT payments reports that a country has not met its obligations

under the scheme, all other countries are required to impose duties on imports from,
and perhaps also similar levies on exports to, this country to raise funds equivalent to its
GRT obligations plus the cost of these enforcement measures. Pogge believes that welloff societies should recognize that his more egalitarian model of international relations
is also more just than Rawlss law of peoples (Egalitarian, pp. 195-196, 210, 199-202,
205, 219, 224).
(5)

Nussbaum

Nussbaum, like Pogge (and unlike Nozick and Nielsen), does not so much reject Rawlss
liberal conception of justice as extend its explicit application. In Sex and Social Justice,
she argues for a feminist interpretation of justice, using what she calls a capabilities
approach that connects with the tradition of Kantian liberalism, nowadays
represented by Rawls, tapping into their notions of dignity and liberty, as a foundation
for discussing the demands of justice regarding womens equality and womens human
rights. The feminism she embraces has five key dimensions: (1) an internationalism,
such that it is not limited to any one particular culture; (2) a humanism, such as affirms
a basic equal worth in all human beings and promotes justice for all; (3) a commitment
to liberalism as the perspective that best protects and promotes the basic human
capacities for choice and reasoning that render all humans as having an equal worth;
(4) a sensitivity to the cultural shaping of our preferences and desires; and (5) a concern
for sympathetic understanding between the sexes. She expresses an appreciation for the
primary goods at the core of Rawlss theory, while asserting that his analysis does not go
far enough. She offers her own list of ten central human functional capabilities that
must be respected by a just society: (1) life of a normal, natural duration; (2) bodily
health and integrity, including adequate nourishment and shelter; (3) bodily integrity
regarding, for example, freedom of movement and security against assault; (4) freedom
to exercise ones senses, imagination, and thought as one pleases, which includes
freedom of expression; (5) freedom to form emotional attachments to persons and
things, which includes freedom of association; (6) the development and exercise of
practical reason, the capacity to form ones own conception of the good and to try to
plan ones own life, which includes the protection of freedom of conscience; (7) freedom
of affiliation on equal terms with others, which involves provisions of
nondiscrimination; (8) concern for and possible relationships with animals, plants, and
the world of nature; (9) the freedom to play, to seek amusement, and to enjoy
recreational activities; and (10) some control over ones own political environment,

including the right to vote, and ones material environment, including the rights to seek
meaningful work and to hold property. All of these capabilities are essential to our
functioning as flourishing human beings and should be assured for all citizens of a just
society. But, historically, women have been and still are short-changed with respect to
them and should be guaranteed their protection in the name of justice (Sex, pp. 24, 6-14,
34, 40-42).
(6)

Boylan

Boylan has recently presented a rights-based deontological approach based upon the
necessary conditions for human action. In A Just Society, he observes that human
goods are more or less deeply embedded as conditions of human action, leading to a
hierarchy that can be set forth. There are two levels of basic goods. The most deeply
embedded of these, such as food, clothing, shelter, protection from physical harm, are
absolutely necessary for any meaningful human action. The second level of basic goods
comprises (less) deeply embedded ones, such as basic knowledge and skills such as are
imparted by education, social structures that allow us to trust one another, basic
assurance that we will not be exploited, and the protection of basic human rights. Next,
there are three levels of secondary goods. The most embedded of these are life
enhancing, if not necessary for any meaningful action, such as respect, equal
opportunity, and the capacity to form and follow ones own plan of life and to participate
actively and equally in community, characterized by shared values. A second level of
secondary goods comprises those that are useful for human action, such as having and
being able to use property, being able to benefit from ones own labor, and being able to
pursue goods typically owned by most of ones fellow citizens. The third level of
secondary goods comprises those that are least embedded as conditions of meaningful
action but still desirable as luxuries, such as being able to seek pleasant objectives that
most of ones fellow citizens cannot expect to achieve and being able to compete for
somewhat more than others in ones society. The more deeply embedded goods are as
conditions of meaningful human action, the more right to them people have. Boylan
follows Kant and Rawls in holding an ultimate moral imperative is that individual
human agents and their rights must be respected. This is a matter of justice, distributive
justice involving a fair distribution of social goods and services and retributive justice
involving proper ways for society to treat those who violate the rules. A just society has
a duty to provide basic goods equally to all of its members, if it can do so. But things get
more complicated with regards to secondary goods. A just society will try to provide the

first level of secondary goods, those that are life enhancing, equally to all its members.
Yet this becomes more problematic with the second and third levels of secondary goods
those that are useful and luxuriousas the conditions for meaningful human action
have already been satisfied by more deeply embedded ones. The need that people have
to derive rewards for their work commensurate with their achievement would seem to
militate against any guarantee of equal shares in these, even if society could provide
them, although comparable achievement should be comparably rewarded. Finally, in
the area of retributive justice, we may briefly consider three scenarios. First, when one
person takes a tangible good from another person, justice requires that the perpetrator
return to the victim some tangible good(s) of comparable worth, plus compensation
proportionate to the harm done the victim by the loss. Second, when one person takes
an intangible good from another person, justice requires that the perpetrator give the
victim some tangible good as adequate compensation for the pain and suffering caused
by the loss. And, third, when one person injures another person through the
deprivation of a valued good that negatively affects society, society can justly incarcerate
the perpetrator for a period of time proportionate to the loss (Society, pp. x, 53-54, 5658, 131, 138, 143-144, 164-167, 174-175, 181, 183).
In conclusion, we might observe that, in this rights-based alternative, as in the previous
five (the libertarian, the socialistic, the communitarian, the globalist, and the feminist)
we have considered, there is an attempt to interpret justice as requiring respect for the
dignity of all persons as free and equal, rational moral agents. This historical survey has
tracked the progressive development of this Kantian idea as becoming increasingly
prominent in Western theories of justice.