Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
683
"Thus, in Jover vs. Borra, supra, the same rule was reiterated:
'The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure
for the Mayor of the City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at
the pleasure of the appointing authority may be inferred from the
fact that whereas the appointment of the Vice-Mayor of the same
city, as provided for in an amendatory act (Republic Act No. 365),
and those of the Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities (section
2545, Revised Administrative Code; Commonwealth Acts Nos. 39,
51 338, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162; 170, as
amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305; 306; 327;
328; 521; 523; 525, as amended; 537; and 603) are at pleasure,
that of the Mayor of the City of Iloilo is for a fixed period of time, as
provided for in the original charter (Commonwealth Act No. 57),
and this continued unchanged despite subsequent amendatory acts
(Commonwealth Act No. 153; Republic Acts Nos. 276 and 365).'
"It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior
officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the
exercise of the power of removal is absolute. As long as the
removal is effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law, it may not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how
reprehensible and unjust the motives of the removal might be
(State vs. Kennelly, 55 Atl. 555).
"For respondent judge to ignore these judicial doctrines brought to
his attention by petitioner Alba even during the quo warranto
proceedings and in the face of their impressive clarity to rashly
resolve his doubt against the constitutionality of section 8 of
Republic Act No. 603 is to exert his discretion with the greatest
measure of abuse as to amount to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos,
vs. Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 830).
'After all the foregoing circumstances are found to be present, it
must be shown that the statute violates the constitution dearly,
palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the court (Sharpless vs. Mayer, 21 Pa.
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower
court declaring " Constitutional, null and void ` Section 7, Republic
Act No. 3019, in so far as it required periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official
or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement upon assuming office; * * *."[12]
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice
J. B. L. Reyes: "We are thus compelled to conclude that the
positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential
in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the
confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that
respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., were not subject to
dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and with
due process * * *."[49] In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido,[50] this
Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the
constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken
by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his
dismissal from service - without hearing - upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against
Civil Service rules" Equally emphatic is this observation from the
same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is
condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such
unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make
citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process
may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in that limited sense in analogous to property, could
he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to
strike down what he considers to be an infringement of his
liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must
be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to
freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that
there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the
due process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and
restraint the exception, the question raised cannot just be brushed
aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board,
[51]
liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., concurs, added a few observations in a separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., see separate opinion.
75 Phil. 113
were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces; (2) Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944,
by General Douglas McArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, in which he declared that all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings
have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the
present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same courts
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied
and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is,
whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts
and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of Philippine
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.
If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme
Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government,
the same general laws for the administration of justice and the
neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States
and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established
by the free will of the Filipino people who, taking advantage of the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the
occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had
organized an independent government under that name with the
support and backing of Japan, such government would have been
considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or
rebellion against the parent state or the United States. And, as
such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession
and recognized as such by the Supreme Court of the United States
in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith,
Williamsvs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar
to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents
in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized
as ade facto government by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416).
According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces
evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first
appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the
Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of
the Island and established a republic, governing the Island until
possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on
February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case
that "such government was of the class of de facto governments
described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, * * * 'called
also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps,
be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force * *
*." That is to say, that the government of a country in possession
of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent
state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied
by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate
power.
of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were
continued with no substantial change in the organization and
jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which have
become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in
cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a
law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principle "a
state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign
military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired * * *. Such political resurrection is the
result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon the removal of the external force,
and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of
the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.
615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution
in support of his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of
Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance
of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment
until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines * * * shall have provided for the transfer of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the
Philippines, and the cases commenced and left pending therein," is
"that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the
that the exercise of their powers in the name of the French people
and government was at least an implied recognition of the
Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting.
Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow
the use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton,
International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political
nature, "Law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of
sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III,
Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met.,
68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
(Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence
with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last
until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it
persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues
in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever.
Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite
of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends
upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue
in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative
acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly
continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force.
Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of
respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming
that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands,
which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands
had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts and the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in
force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government,
unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government.
As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings
pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another
court, are not required by the mere change of government or
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are
abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer
continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings
commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts
having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.
When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and
the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to
exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending
therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu
thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the
Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending
therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the
same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the
present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former.
Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese
occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the
Islands were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of
Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the
provost courts created by the military government of occupation in
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993 ]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, on extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
are required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred
pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city.
Respondent court, through Justice Filemon Mendoza with whom
Justices Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred, construed the
publication of the notices on March 28, April 11 and 12, 1969 as a
fatal announcement and reversed the judgment appealed from by
declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces
of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership
(p. 27, Rollo).
Hence, the petition at bar, premised on the following backdrop
lifted from the text of the challenged decision:
The facts of the case as related by the trial court are, as follows:
II
VII
III
VIII
IV
IX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "SUFFICE IT TO STATE
THAT ACTUALLY THE POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO THE PNB WAS
EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE (EXB. 10) WHICH WAS
REGISTERED IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND
WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TWO TORRENS CERTIFICATES INVOLVED"
(page 118, Amended Record on Appeal).
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE NOTICES
REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT NO. 3135 WERE ALL COMPLIED
WITH" AND "THAT THE DAILY RECORD x x x IS A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION (pages 117-118, Amended Record on
Appeal).
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE, FINAL DEED OF SALE AND AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION,
NULL AND VOID.
that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil.
1058, G.R. No. 42589, August 31, 1937 and October 29, 1937).
Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in
Sec. 18(c) of Rule 39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135)
in Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co. (38 Phil. 808,
G.R. No. 1309, October 18, 1918), this Court held that if a sheriff
sells without the notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
induced thereto by the judgment creditor, and the purchaser at the
sale is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title
passes. This is regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
whatever the rule may be elsewhere (Borja vs. Addison, 14 Phil.
895, G.R. No. 18010, June 21, 1922).
x x x. It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements
constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a
substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the
notice insufficient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314)."
(Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November 8, 1988; 167
SCRA 16, 23-24).
In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading
showing that there was no compliance of the notice prescribed in
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with respect to
the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this case, we
have no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in
view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said
auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the
Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of
Consolidation are likewise of no legal efffect. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Before we focus our attention on the subject of whether or not
there was valid compliance in regard to the required publication,
we shall briefly discuss the other observations of respondent
court vis-a-vis herein private respondent's ascriptions raised with
the appellate court when his suit for reconveyance was dismissed
by the court of origin even as private respondent does not impugn
the remarks of respondent court along this line.
Although respondent court acknowledged that there was an
ambiguity on the date of execution of the third promissory note
(June 30, 1961) and the date of maturity thereof (October 28,
1958), it was nonetheless established that the bank introduced
sufficient proof to show that the discrepancy was a mere clerical
error pursuant to Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Anent
the second disputation aired by private respondent, the appellate
court observed that inasmuch as the original as well as the
subsequent mortgage were foreclosed only after private
respondent's default, the procedure pursued by herein petitioner in
foreclosing the collaterals was thus appropriate albeit the petition
therefor contained only a copy of the original mortgage.
It was only on the aspect of publication of the notices of sale under
Act No. 3135, as amended, and attorney's fees where herein
private respondent scored points which culminated in the reversal
of the trial court's decision. Respondent court was of the impression
that herein petitioner failed to comply with the legal requirement
and the sale effected thereafter must be adjudged invalid following
the ruling of this Court in Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals (167
SCRA 16 [1988]); p. 8, Decision, p. 24, Rollo). In view of
petitioner's so-called indifference to the rules set forth under Act
No. 3135, as amended, respondent court expressly authorized
private respondent to recover attorney's fees because he was
compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Immediately upon the submission of a supplemental petition, the
spouses Conrado and Marina De Vera filed a petition in
intervention, claiming that the two parcels of land involved herein
were sold to them on June 4, 1970 by petitioner for which transfer
certificates of title were issued in their favor (p. 40, Rollo). On the
other hand, private respondent pressed the idea that the alleged
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari seeking the annulment or setting aside, on the
grounds of excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, of
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in
consolidated NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79 thereof, 1 the
dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby modified in this wise:
Respondent Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc., is hereby ordered to pay the following to the
complainant Seamen who have not withdrawn from
the case, namely: Capt. Rogelio H. Bisula, Ruben
Arroza, Juan Gacutno, Leonilo Atok, Nilo Cruz, Alvaro
Andrada, Nemesio Adug, Simplicio Bautista, Romeo
Acosta and Jose Encabo:
1. their earned wages corresponding to
the period from 16 to 19 April 1979;
9, 1980 and they filed their memorandum of appeal only on July 23,
1980 or fourteen (14) days later, whereas under article 223 of the
Labor Code which governs appeals from the National Seamen's
Board to the National Labor Relations Commission per Article 20(b)
of the Code provides that such appeals must be made within ten
(10) days.
In this connection, it is contended in the comment of private
respondents that petitioner has overlooked that under Section 7,
Rule XIII,, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the
ten-day period specified in Article 223 refers to working days and
that this Court has already upheld such construction and manner of
computation in Fabula vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 54247, December 19,
1980. Now, computing the number of working days from July 9 to
July 23, 1980 We find that there were exactly ten (10) days, hence,
if We adhere to Fabula, the appeal in question must be held to have
been made on time.
But petitioner herein maintains that the Minister of Labor may not,
under the guise of issuing implementing rules of a law as
authorized by the law itself, go beyond the clear and unmistakable
language of the law and expand it at his discretion. In other words,
since Article 223 of the Labor Code literally provides thus:
Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any
or both of the parties within ten (10) days from
receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the labor Arbiter or
compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
the implementing rules may not provide that the said period should
be computed on the basis of working days. This, indeed, is a legal
issue not brought up nor passed upon squarely in Fabula, and
petitioner prays that this Court rule on the point once and for all.
After mature and careful deliberation, We have arrived at the
conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by
Article 223 contemplates calendar days and not working days. We
are persuaded to this conclusion, if only because We believe that it
is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded
that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long
periods for any acts to be done by the contending parties can be
taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor
claims are decided in their favor and management is generally the
appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with
well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not
infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than
what is due them.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar
circumstances of this case, particularly, the fact that private
respondents must have been misled by the implementing rules
aforementioned. We have opted to just the same pass on the
merits of the substantial issues herein, even as We admonish all
concerned to henceforth act in accordance with our foregoing view.
Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power to amend or alter in
any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocally specifies
or fixes.
We need not ponder long on the contention of petitioner regarding
the alleged forgery of the signature of respondent Rogelio Bisula
and the alleged lack of authority of the new counsel of
respondents, Atty. B. C. Gonzales, to appear for them. Resolution of
these minor points, considering their highly controversial nature, so
Disagreeing with the foregoing findings of the NSB, the NLRC held:
The more important issue to be resolved in this case,
however, is the question of whether the Seamen
violated their employment contracts when they
demanded or proposed and in fact accepted wages
over and above their contracted rates. Stated
otherwise, could the Seamen rightfully demand or
propose the revision of their employment contracts?
While they concede that they are bound by their
contracts, the Seamen claim that their cable asking
for the revision of their contract rates was a valid
exercise of their right to grievance.
The right to grievance is recognized in this
jurisdiction even if there is a valid and subsisting
contract, especially where there are supervening
facts or events of which a party to the contract was
not apprised at the time of its conclusion. As pointed
out by the Supreme Court in the Wallem case, supra,
it "is a basic right of all working men to seek greater
benefits not only for themselves but for their families
as well ..." and the "Constitution itself guarantees the
promotion of social welfare and protection to labor."
In this care, records show that it was impressed on
the Seamen that their vessel would be trading only in
Caribbean ports. This was admitted by the Company
in its cable to the Seamen on 10 January 1979. After
the conclusion of their contracts, however, and after
they had boarded the vessel, the principals of the
Company directed the vessel to can at different ports
or to engage in "worldwide trade" which is
admittedly more difficult and hazardous than trading
in only one maritime area. This is a substantial
change in the original understanding of the parties.
Thus, in their cable asking for a wage increase, the
Seamen expressed their dissatisfaction by informing
the Company that they were "not contented with
(their) present salary based on volume of work, type
of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in world
wide trade."(emphasis supplied.) With such change
in the original agreement of the parties, we find that
the Seamen were well within their rights in
demanding for the revision of their contract rates.
errors in the findings of fact are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant." (par. d)
The NLRC has noted in its decision that respondents were originally
made to believe that their ship would go only to the Caribbean
ports and yet after completing trips to Inchon, Korea and Kuwait
and Keelung, Taiwan, it was suddenly directed to call at Kwinana,
Australia, an ITF controlled port. The record shows that this
imputation is more apparent than real, for respondents knew from
the very moment they were hired that world-wide voyages or
destinations were contemplated in their agreement. So much so
that corresponding steps had to be taken to avoid interference of or
trouble about the ITF upon the ship's arrival at ITF controlled ports.
As already stated earlier, the ITF requires the seamen working on
any vessel calling at ports controlled by them to be paid the rates
fixed by the ITF which are much higher than those provided in the
contract's signed here, to the extent of causing tremendous loss if
not bankruptcy of the employer.
And so, as revealed to the NLRC later, in anticipation precisely of
such peril to the employer and ultimate unemployment of the
seamen, in the instant case, the usual procedure undeniably known
to respondents of having two payroll's, one containing the actually
agreed rates and the other ITF rates, the latter to be shown to the
ITF in order that the ship may not be detained or interdicted in
Kwinana, was followed. But according to the NLRC, this practice
constitutes deception and bad faith, and worse, it is an effect within
the prohibition against alteration of contracts approved by the NSB,
considering there is nothing to show that NSB was made aware of
the so-called addendum or side agreement to the effect that should
the ship manned by respondents be made to call an any ITF
controlled port, the contract with ITF rates would be shown and, if
for any reason, the respondents are required to be actually paid
higher rates and they are so paid, the excess over the rates agreed
in the NSB contract shall be returned to petitioner later.
and
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19.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992 ]
ANTONIO A. MECANO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify
the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity)
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying
his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of
P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to
April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S.
Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699[1] of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
"Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred
in performance of duty. -- When a person in the service of the
national government or in the service of the government of a
province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not founded the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations,
claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the
two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict
because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the
fact that Section699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of
1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further
maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in
the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself.
The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the
1987 Code, which states:
"WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be
enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporates in
a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
x x x x x x"
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code -the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute maymerely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.[12] What is necessary
is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. [13]
We come now to the second category of repeal -- the enactment of
a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was
JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.