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for eighteen (18) years after the execution of the second deed
of sale.
RULING:
Petitioner posits that it was only in 1987 when respondent
intervened in the contempt case alleging to be the owner and
lessor did her cause of action accrue; hence, her complaint
filed on 23 August 1987 has not yet prescribed. Petitioner
asserts that the 10 January 1970 agreement is more credible
and probable than the second deed of sale because such
document contains their real intention.
In Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, we restated the
rule that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based
on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed
or the date of the issuance of the certifi cate of title over the
property. However, we emphasized that this rule applies only
when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property the right
to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. It is not necessary
that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the
property as someone in his name may perform the act. In
other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either
when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or
when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in
such occupancy. This declaration is conformably with Art. 524
of the Civil Code providing that possession may be exercised
in ones own name or in the name of another.
An example of actual possession of real property by an owner
through another is a lease agreement whereby the lessor
transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. The Palacios spouses have been the lessees of
petitioner since 1967 occupying the house erected on the
property subject of the second sale. Petitioner was in actual
possession of the property through the Palacioses and
remained so even after the execution of the second deed of
sale. It was only in 1987 when respondent asserted
ownership over the property and showed a lease contract
between her and the Palacioses dated 17 March 1987 but
effective 1 January 1987 that petitioners possession was
disturbed. Consequently, the action for reconveyance fi led on
23 August 1987 based on circumstances obtaining herein and
contrary to the fi nding of respondent court has not prescribed.
To be accurate, the action does not prescribe. Under Art.
1144, par. (1), of the Civil Code, an action upon a written
contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time
the right of action accrues. And so respondent court also relied
for this rule is that a new relationship between the parties has
been created. What applies is no longer the law on
extrajudicial foreclosure, but the law on lease. And when an
issue arises, as in the case at bar, regarding the right of the
lessee to continue occupying the leased premises, the rights
of the parties must be heard and resolved in a case for
ejectment or unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
xxx
It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws
because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that
he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of
the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does,
that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes
of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by Section 116. These considerations again bring
us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of
the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore,
be the basis of his good faith. The petitioner is deemed a
possessor in good faith.
II. ACQUISITION
After making the said ruling, the Court did not, however,
consider the petitioners as the preferred possessors.
Neither did the Court consider the petitioners as the
present possessors. This is due to the fact that the
possession by the petitioners and/or their predecessorsin-interest was not exclusive. The Court explained
xxx
Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful
improvements? The answer is clearly in the negative.
Recognized authorities on the subject are agreed on this
point. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever
useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity
(Santos v. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 703).
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in
good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right
of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof,
only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the
principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession
does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful
expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to
remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain
them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into
possession (Article 549, Id.).
He who has a right may renounce it. This act by which thing is
voluntary renounced constitutes an abandonment. There is no
real intention to abandon a property when, as in the case of a
shipwreck or a fi re, things are thrown into the sea upon the
highway.
Certainly the owner of the property cannot be held to have
abandoned the same until at least he has some knowledge of
the loss of its possession or of the loss of the thing.
Property cannot be considered abandoned under the law and
the possession left vacant for the finder until the spes
recuperandi is gone and the animus revertendi is finally given
up. (The Ann L. Lockwood, 37 Fed. Rep., 233.)
The theory of abandonment on the part of the owners of the
money stolen is fully refuted by the fact that some weeks after
the wreck of the said ship they sent men to the place of the
wreck for the purpose of recovering the property which
belonged to them, which was on board the ship at the time of
her sinking. The mere fact that cargo is sunk with a ship
wrecked at sea by no means deprives the owner of said cargo
of his property therein. The owner certainly still had the right to
reclaim such property and to recover the same if possible. If it
should be recovered by others, the real owner would be
entitled to recover its value less the necessary expense of
recovering the same and carrying it shore by the most
approved appliances for that purpose by others. (Murphy v.
Dunham, 38 Fed. Rep., 503.)