BA Finance Corp vs.

CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988

FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of
P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his
own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his
wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name
the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and
their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When
the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay
the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment
alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the
execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the
spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for
was issued by the trial court and not contented with the order,
petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor
alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was
likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE:WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is
Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the
marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence,
it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable,
the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was
contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and
left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was
duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure
such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite
showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the
spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily.
Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the
said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual
damages amouting to P660,000.00.
SPS LITA DE LEON and FELIX TARROS v. ANITA, DANILO and
VILMA DE LEON
July 23, 2009
What constitutes CPG if property bought by installments
*A property bought in installment, if not proven to be bought solely by
exclusive funds, is not exclusive property if ownership was vested during
marriage. The sale of one half of the conjugal property without liquidation
of partnership is void as the interest during marriage is merely inchoate
and will only be realized upon liquidation.
FACTS

July 20, 1965 - Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and Peoples

Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a
Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot
in QC

April 24, 1968 - Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in civil rites ; they
had two children Danilo and Vilma
June 22, 1970 - At the full payment of the cost price, PHHC
executed a final deed of sale in favor of Bonifacio; a transfer
certificate of title was issued in Bonifacios name, where it was
stated therein that he was "single"
January 12, 1974 - He sold the lot to petitioners - her sister Lita and
her husband Rio Tarrosa; however, Anita De Leon was not a
signatory to the Deed of Sal eexecuted
May 23, 1977 - Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church
wedding
Feb. 29, 1996 - Bonifacio died
May 8, 1996 - Sps. Tarrosa registered their Deed of Sale and had the
first TCT canceled. Another TCT was issued in their names
May 19, 2003 - Daniel and Vilma De Leon then filed a Notice of
Adverse Claim to protect their rights over the property
Subsequently, Anita, Danilo and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
before the RTC and alleged that fraud attended the execution of
Deed of Sale to the Tarrosas and that Bonifacio was still the owner
of the property by his subsequent acts, i.e. Bonifacio also executed a
real estate mortgage over the same property in favor of another
spouse, which had already been nullified by the CFI
The Tarrosas answered that the property was Bonifacio's exclusive
property as he was single when he acquired it from the PHHC and
that they were not aware of the supposed marriage at the time of the
execution of Deed of Sale
RTC ruled that lot was conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita
and declared the subsequent deed of sale and TCT void ab initio and
awarded damages to Anita and her children
CA affirmed RTC; held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow legal
presumption that the parcel of land was conjugal; that of the
conjugal assets does not vest to Bonifacio because of the absence of
liquidation. It deleted the grant of damages.

ISSUES
1. Whether the property purchased on installment by Boni before marriage
although some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and
not his exclusive property (YES)
2. Whether 1/2 of the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio because of
the absence of liquidation (YES)
HELD
1. The full payment of the conditional contract was during marriage, thus
ownership was transferred only during the marriage.

NCC 160, the governing provision at the time of Boni and

Anitas marriage, provides that properties acquired during
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
the wife. It is not even necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with the funds of the partnership, for only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. Even when the
manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear,
the presumption will apply.

Here, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and

covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to
Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio
and Anita. Conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent to a
contract to sell - ownership is retained by the seller and is
not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price,
unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon
delivery of the thing sold. The efficacy or obligatory force
of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is conditioned
upon full payment; if the condition has not been fulfilled,
the conditional obligation would stand as it had never
existed.

Evidently, title to the property in question only passed

to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price
on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more
than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April
24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such,
ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.

It is not exclusive just because it was registered solely in his

name. The mere registration of a property in the name of one

spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is

the time when the property was acquired. Thus, they were not
able to overthrow the presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property as no evidence was brought forth to prove that the
source of funding solely came from Bonifacio.
The deed of sale is also void ab initio for not having marital
consent from Anita as provided by NCC 166. Since Art. 166 of
the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband
may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed
against this mandatory provision are void except when the law
itself authorized their validity.

2. Sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the

partnership is void.

Prior to liquidation, right of the husband or wife in the

conjugal assets is inchoate (mere expectancy) and does
not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets
in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. Their interest is limited to the net remainder
(remanente liquido) resulting from the liquidation after
dissolution. Thus, their right will only be determined by
the net assets left after settlement of obligations which
can be divided by the spouses or their heirs.

Nevertheless, because the Tarrosas paid a valuable

consideration for the property in question. As a matter of
fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the
liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the
amount paid by the Tarrosas (ground: unjust enrichment).
PETITION IS DENIED
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO
DOCTRINE: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal
property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation
mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void
if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
FACTS:

On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of

land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath
that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he,
who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio,
Sr. and mother of the petitioners.
On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go
(joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).
On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand.
They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of
the property.
PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had
exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it
with his own money.
RTCs RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale.
However, declared the property was the conjugal
o
property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.,
because there were three vendors in the sale to
Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina).
The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been
o
by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect
o
when the property was acquired, all property acquired by

either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless

there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was
void for being made without prior liquidation? NO
RULING:
Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of
the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of
the Family Code:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
The CPG established before and after the effectivity of the Family
Code are governed by the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil
Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her
share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence,
Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio,
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling coowners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Beumer vs Beumer
SUMMARY
Dutch national seeks to reimburse funds he invested in allowing his
Filipina spouse to buy parcels of Filipino land after their marriage
was declared null.
FACTS
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in
March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of
their marriage. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for the
distribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage. During trial, petitioner testified that

while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of land, were registered in the

name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted was contrary to Article
89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. The RTC ruled that,
regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots W, X, Y
and Z, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over
these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of private lands. This was made evident
by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show
that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive
funds of his wife, the herein respondent. Petitioners plea for
reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the
foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for
not having come to court with clean hands. CA affirmed. Petitioner
appealed.
ISSUE
W/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the purchase of
Filipino land
DECISION
The Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA. In In Re:
Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land
instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It held
that the foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that
he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and
even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and
respondent registered the subject properties in the latters name.
Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt
the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the
Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling. The
time-honored principle is that he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no
rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on
the basis of unjust enrichment. It does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an
alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to
apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family
dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio
because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both
parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in
dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January
1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition,
dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil
Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues,
the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition,
viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual

psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital

obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay
with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of
their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the
decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property
in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire
to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by
the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in
the Civil Code shall apply.
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the
family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was
denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling: he argues
that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the
parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases
where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the
children wish to stay. 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of

Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated"
in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the coownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above
extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the
law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or
her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other,
during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit
his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9
or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the

settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed
in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did
it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in
the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed
that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations,
on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages
(before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the
latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Metrobank v. Pascual
FACTS:
Florencia Nevalga and Nicholson Pascual were married in 1985.
During the union, they acquired a lot with a three door apartment
standing thereon. Their marriage were annulled in 1994 and they
went on their separate ways without liquidating their properties.
In 1997, Florencia mortgaged the aforesaid property as a security
for the loan she obtained with spouses Oliveros. Petitioner
foreclosed the mortgage, had the property auctioned and acquired
it as the successful bidder. Nicholson filed an action to annul the
mortgage alleging that the subject property is still a conjugal
property and it was executed without his consent
RTC ruled that mortgage is invalid. The said lot is a conjugal
property, the same having been acquired during the existence of
the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. (Art 116 NCC) Metrobank
had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And
being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the disputed property may
not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholsons
consent.CA affirmed the decision

ISSUES:
A. WON the subject property is a conjugal by applying Article 116 of
the Family Code.
B. WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the
respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto
dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.
RULING:
A.) The property relations of the former spouses are governed by
the Civil Code Art 106 (Being contrated prior to effectivity of the
Family Code) which provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does
not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. (Note: The
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption in this case)
B.) While the declared nullity of marriage severe marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties
acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses. Thus, applying the provision to the present case, the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the coownership.Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered
the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided
half.
(In the trial, it was found that the alleged waiver presented by
Florencia bore Nicholson's forged signature.)
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner, v. EDEN VILLENA
AGUILA,Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1985, Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and respondent Eden
Villena Aguila were married. In 1986, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or
their daughter.
In 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties
whatsoever.".
In May 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of
the marriage of Salas and Aguila. The RTC Decision further
provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if
any."
In September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion
stating that she discovered properties covering TCTs under the
name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas, found to be
the common-law wife of Salas. Thereafter, Salas filed a
Manifestation with Entry of Appearance requesting for an Entry of
Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration
orappeal was filed and no conjugal property was involved.
Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation alleging that there is
no conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition.
According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a judicial admission and
was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila
waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise
enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila,
namely, parcels of land in Batangas, cash amounting
toP200,000.00 and motor vehicles. Thus, Salas contended that the
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila confirming the partition of the
properties.

The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,even upon entry of

judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated
upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered
Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that
Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that : (1) she is
Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not
contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had
no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized
her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he
was not well-versed with legal documentation, he registered the
properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C.
Salas."
The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing
to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA denied
the Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by Salas. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this
case.
HELD:The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.
CIVIL LAW property regime
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this
Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.Lacbayan v.
Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21 March 2011
Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had
no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties
during their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA
affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of
the Waived Properties during their marriage.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the
presumption of regularity.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties
were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and
the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas
name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of
the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29
September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas
marriage.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest
in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this
case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action." Rules of Court, Rule
19, Sec. 1.
In Di v. Di, G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011we held that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples
joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.Valdes v.
RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996)
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a
similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired
during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the

CA, would be governed by co-ownership.Buenaventura v. Court of

Appeals, 494 Phil. 264 (2005).
The Petition is denied.
Ventura vs Abuda

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas

property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and
Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on
11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were
married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of
legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

FACTS:
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son
Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and
Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a
subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was
also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the
death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named
Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo,
Manila, while the remaining portion was purchased by Evangeline
on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and
Evangeline also had small business establishments located in
Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed
with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July
1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother discovered the sale
sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale,
claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin,
her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus,
neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over
the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan
properties were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban.
CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest
over the subject properties
HELD: No. CA decision sustained
Civil Law -in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the
properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall
be based on the actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA
applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties
can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired
during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive
of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro,
even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely
confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase
of the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline
shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the
Delpan property.
Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does
not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a
donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is
in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and
the parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by
and registered under the name of Esteban.