G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991CECILIO S.

DE VILLA
vs.
CA
FACTS:On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RTC Branch
145, Makati with violation of BatasPambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner allegedly issued a check
payable to private respondent, Roberto Lorayez, in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00
equivalent to P50,000.00 knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit
with draweebank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment. The check was
dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentmentfor the reason insufficient
funds. Petitioner failed to pay respondent despite receipt of notice of such dishonor.Petitioner
moved to dismiss the information maintaining that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged since thecheck was payable in dollars (foreign currency) and drawn against a foreign
bank.The RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but his motion was subsequentlydenied by the RTC.The petitioner filed a
petition for
certiorari
with the CA seeking to declare the nullity of RTC orders. The Court of Appealsdismissed the
petition. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner
filed petition withSC.ISSUE:1.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.2.
W
hether or not a check drawn against the dollar account with a foreign bank is covered by BP Blg.
22RULING:The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
I. WON RTC has jurisdiction
The RTC has jurisdiction over the case.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of the action.The Rules of Court provide that in
all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of themunicipality or
territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.The court also stated that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the
information.In this particular case, the information filed against petitioner specifically alleged that
the offense was committed in Makati,and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the RTC of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdictionover the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates
acriminal action.Moreover, in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines, the court held that
the determinative factor in determining venue isthe place of the issuance of the check.
Bustamante vs NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 G.R. No.11165
March 15, 1996
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the NLRC Resolution of May 3, 1993setting aside earlier resolution
dated March 8, 1993 and deleting the award of backwages in favor of petitioners.Osmalik Bustamante and three
others were employed as laborers and harvesters while Lamaranwas employed as a laborer and sprayer in
respondent companys plantation. They all signed contracts of employment for a period of six months from January 2,
1960 to July 2, 1990 but started working sometimein September 1989. Before the contracts expire in July 2,1990, their

employments were terminated on June25, 1990 on the ground of poor performance on account of age, not one of
them was allegedly below fortyyears old.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to backwages after a finding by theNLRC that they had
become regular employees .
HELD
Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, All doubts in theimplementation and interpretation
of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall beresolved in favor of the labor. Judgment
rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System topay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00)
Bello v. CA
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa
before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a ladys ring with a
value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on
commission basis. After trial, they were convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of
appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but
the prosecution filed a petition to dismiss appeal on the ground that since the case
was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in
the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to
the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296,
as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should
have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the
appeal and remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment.
Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners motion for having been erroneously
addressed to this court instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners predicament that
the CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal
without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its
judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor
General did not interpose any objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the
Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of
law, i.e.. finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of
Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the
city courts judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI
instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed

appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not
implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities. With their
motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable
and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are
fatal to the appellees cause
Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a
statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial
duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court
is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination
and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are
equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made
but to certify them to the proper appellate court.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was
not indispensable and could be overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The
Court of Appeals act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of
endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the
CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to
subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The
procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to
the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by
asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court,
should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of
appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu
thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City
court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction against petitionersaccused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners appeal from its
judgment to the CA for the latters disposition on the merits; without costs.

Ty v. First National Surety

GR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)
En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring
Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953,
Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton

Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the 8
above-named defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiffs
beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance
premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the
Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on
the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University
hospital, and after receiving first-aid, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for
treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, and fifth fingers of left
hand). From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment
in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total
disability of plaintiffs left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and
notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity.
Defendants rejected plaintiffs claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no
severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not
covered by his policy.
Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed
his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila,
presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the
complaints. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the
disability of his left hand.
Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the
parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only
amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation
that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the
policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of the
stipulation, distinction between temporary disability and total disability need not
be made in relation to ones occupation means that the condition of the insurance is
such that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or
renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or
his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear
and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability
as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no
such amputation in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiffappellant.

De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance

GR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring
Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In
connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer,
participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout with another person,
likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped and
was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to
fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died with the cause of
death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay the
proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest,
was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy, filed a
claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under the insurance
policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No.
U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death
of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and,
therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision
in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff for the
death of the latters son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorneys fees. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.
Held: The terms accident and accidental have not acquired any technical meaning,
and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. The terms
mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and
which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes
place without ones foresight or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is
no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected,
independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the
result of injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable
result of the insureds voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from accident. In
the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is
voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not
have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death or
disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of
the protection of the insurance contract (What was included was death or disablement
consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking,
steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling).

Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing
match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion
that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against appellant.

Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his
allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the
marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and
writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra
Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both
schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has
never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not
believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He
mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated
that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or
civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is
part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of
P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to
civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town
fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines
for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his
tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he
stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth
of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of
P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed
the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been
delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax
return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father
which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court
ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two
years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA
503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did
not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws

of the Philippines he believes in, he answered democracy.; that he stated that his
father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his
income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not
the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in
order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily
include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover
all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an
alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case,
in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in
democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our
constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation
to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien
Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed
salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and
received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of
the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to
file an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in
granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.
Velascovs.Republic
FACTS:
This is a
petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet
the requirements of the law.Petitioner has appealed. Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses
Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiuwho became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that he continuously resided in thePhilippines;
that he has finished his elementary, high school and collegiate studies in thePhilippines; that he is presently employed at the Wilson
Drug Store since February, 1957 with amonthly salary of P150.00; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he
is aCatholic by faith; and has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that hedoes not own any real property
but has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the RepublicSavings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern
University, P2,000.00 sharesof stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he has mingled socially withthe
Filipinos; that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos;and that he desires to become a Filipino
citizen because he considered the Philippines as hiscountry and the Filipinos as his countrymen.
ISSUE
:

Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.

HELD
:
No.
It was found out that his
qualifications as to moral character were attested bySantiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J.
Eugenio, ahousekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner and suchtestimony is biased. The limited
character witnesses indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends. His present income is only P150.00 a month which
is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirements of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must alucrative income or
occupation.Decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic

GR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese
parents. He came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921 and was given the
corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration. He settled in Cebu City
(where he as continuously resided up to the present time). Petitioner studied 1st to
7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private institution recognized by the
government. He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He, having
associated with some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921WWII) and in the lumber business (1946-present). He invested P5,000.00 capital in
the business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00.
Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a profit share worth
P10,000.00 every year. He has no tax liability to the government. He possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he
married one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born
in the Cebu City. All these children had been issued the corresponding alien
certificate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized
Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the exception of William Lee who is not of
school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high
school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and colleges
recognized by the government.
Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of
Cebu. On 30 August 1956, the court rendered decision finding petitioner qualified to
be a Filipino citizen. On 2 October 1957, however, the government filed a motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which if presented may affect the
qualification of petitioner, and finding the same well founded, the court entertained

the motion. After hearing, the court again rendered decision reaffirming its holding
that petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen. The government interposed an
appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.
Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order
that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present case,
the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen
because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of
more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children
in private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached grade
five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her.
Lourdes Lee has studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped
allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that she
continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly Chinese curriculum,
despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the sincerity of petitioner to become a
Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not have tolerated such
deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed
to qualify to become a Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against
petitioner.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil
First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly
described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement,
specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community
opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking, that
it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of
the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of
land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila
appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of
Manila

Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by
its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in
that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not
be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a
law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present
case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If
the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of
them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private.
The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church,
while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the
latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the
ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this
immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good
faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be
used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of
the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for
the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private
property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime
of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of
great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is
fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no
necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded
to ease the traffic situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street
through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have
been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The
Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with costs against the
appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)

GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the
office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later
that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting
withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy for personal reasons. His unsworn
withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection.
Later on 25 January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendozas withdrawal, filed his own sworn Certificate of Candidacy in
substitution of Mendozas for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent
ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a
margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all
votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election
Officers opinion that petitioners name does not appear in the certified list of
candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the
only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that
Mendozas withdrawal was not under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978
Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on the same day.
Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of
Villanueva as vice mayor.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in
case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the
elections. Mendozas withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular
filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and
purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the
provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it
should not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The will
of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election
cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or
candidacy. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be

merely directory and Mendozas failure to observe the requirement should be

considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a
substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his favor must
be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions
of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores,
Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said
municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and
discharge its functions. The resolution is made immediately executory.

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner

GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring
Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children,
requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in
her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19
November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario
K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of
the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the
testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her
thumbmark between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental
witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second
page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However, the
testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the
first page of the testament, composed of two pages. All the three instrumental
witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the
testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the
testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed
freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and
not having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the same in full use
of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22 February 1957, the testator
died in here house in Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman
Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on
the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila
Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of
the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner
appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court because it involves purely a question of law.

Issue: Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to
render the will void
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are
very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the
petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified
and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will
of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the
law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental
witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to
probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.

San Miguel vs Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 G.R. No. L49774, February 24, 1981
FACTS
:
This is
a complaint filed on January 3, 1977 by Cagayan Coca-Cola Free WorkersUnion against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan CocaCola Plant) for the alleged failure or refusalof the latter to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation
or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night
differentials.
ISSUE:Whether or not
in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential Decree851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for
work done on rest days andspecial holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials should be considered.
HELD :
Citing certain provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines specifically
Art. 87 onovertime work performed beyond 8 hours a day is paid as additional compensation equivalent to aregular wage plus 25%
hereof and Art 93 on work performed on any special holiday as anadditional compensation of at least 30% of the regular wage of the
employee, clearly, additionalcompensation is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under theSupplementary Rules
and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851. Therefore, additional compensation shall not be considered in the
computation of the 13th- month pay
: Molina vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 167 G.R. No. L11988,April4,1918
FACTS
:
Plaintiff Molina

contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an"agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used in
paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced
when the disputed taxwas levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by
section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended: (c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of
the land where grown, whether in their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)
ISSUE
:
Whether or not
fish in general constitute an agricultural products, and thereforeexempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by
section 40 of Act No. 2339, asamended.
HELD
:
The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislatureshould be sought in the words employed to express it, and
that when found it should be made togovern, . . . what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what
thecircumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to beredressed; . . . . And where the law has
contemporaneously been put into operation, is entitled togreat respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, and is not lightlyto be overruled, although it is not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.).Therefore, fish
produced in ponds are agricultural products and thus, exempted from taxation whensold by the producer or he owner of the land.
Administrative conclusion of tax law should befollowed unless clearly erroneous. Judgment affirmed
Madrigal vs. Rafferty
FACTS
:
Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno legally contracted marriage prior toJanuary 1, 1914 under the provisions of law concerning
conjugal partnerships (sociedad degananciales). On February 25, 1915, Vicente Madrigal filed sworn declaration on the
prescribedform with the Collector of Internal Revenue, showing, as his total net income for the year 1914, thesum of P296,302.73.
Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the said P296,302.73 did notrepresent his income for the year 1914, but was in fact
the income of the conjugal partnershipexisting between himself and his wife Susana Paterno, and that in computing and assessing
theadditional income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, the income declared byVicente Madrigal should be
divided into two equal parts, one-half to be considered the income of Vicente Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno. The
general question had in the meantime been submitted to the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands who in an
opinion dated March17, 1915, held with the petitioner Madrigal. The revenue officers forwarded the correspondencewith the
opinion of the Attorney-General to Washington for a decision by the United StatesTreasury Department. The United States
Commissioner of Internal Revenue reversed the opinionof the Attorney-General, and thus decided against the claim of Madrigal.
ISSUE
:
Whether or not
the additional income tax should be divided into two equal parts because of the conjugal partnership existing between
Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno.
HELD:

The counter contentions of appellees are that the taxes imposed by the Income TaxLaw are taxes upon income tax and not upon
capital and property; that the fact that Madrigal was amarried man, and his marriage contracted under the provisions governing the
conjugal partnership,has no bearing on income considered as income, and that the distinction must be drawn betweenthe ordinary
form of commercial partnership and the conjugal partnership of spouses resultingfrom the relation of marriage. The income of

husband and wife should be taken as a whole for the purpose of the normal taxregardless as to whether from separate estates or
not. Jjudgment affirmed ,costs against appellants
: PLDT vs Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 G.R. No. L3222, January 21, 1952
FACTS
:
PLDT filed complaint against CIR for collecting P 3, 977.22 representingfranchise tax. The CFI of Manila absolved CIR from said
complaint. The petitioner filed case before the Supreme Court arguing that PLDT should not be obliged to pay
franchise tax onuncollected fees due from regular customers because such earnings were not representative of gross receipts as
what CIR construed it to be. PLDT further contended that CIRs prolonged practice of non-collection of franchise tax on
items of the same nature as those questioned in thecase was an administrative construction of great weight

ISSUE
:
Whether or not
the principle of executive construction is properly applied for in theinstant case.
HELD
:
No. Said principle is not absolute and may be overcome by strong reasons to thecontrary. If through a
misapprehension of law, an officer has erroneously executed it for a long time, theerror may be rectified when the
true construction is ascertained. The CIRs construction is in accordancewith the Constitution because a person
may have earned his salary but may not have collected the same.Thus, the uncollected gross receipts which
should be construed as meaning the same thing as grossearnings should be subject to franchise tax.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Phil Global Communication vs Relova, 145 SCRA 587 GR No. L-60548, November 10, 1986
FACTS
: This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine GlobalCommunications Inc. seeks to set
aside decision dated April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner withoutauthority to establish, maintain and operate,
apart from its single principal station in Makati, anyother branch or station within the Phils.
On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of Communications anapplication for authority to
establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purpose of renderinginternational telecommunication
services from Cebu to any point outside Phils.This was opposedby the private respondents. On March 24,
1977, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-13designating Metropolitan Manila area as the sole
gateway, point of entrance into and exit from) for communications in the Phils. And defining what
constitutes domestic record operations.I was onJan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional
authority to establish a station in Cebu Citysubject to condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have
upgraded their facilities, applicantshall ceases its operation and interface with domestic carriers. On May 24,

1979, BOC grantedpetitioner the final authority to establish a branch/station in Cebu City subject to prior
approval,anywhere in the PHils. Private respondents filed petition for declaratory judgment on the
proper construction of petitioners franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners sought dismissal of petition . Motion
wasdenied. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court held that the suitfor
declaratory relief fell within the competence of the Judiciary and did not require prior action bythe
administrative agency concerned under the concept of primary jurisdiction.
Partiesthen agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their respective pleadings
andmemoranda . Court rendered judgment on April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without authority
toestablish, maintain and operate any other branch or station within the Philippines.
ISSUE
:
(1) Whether or not
petitioner is authorized under its legislative franchise, RA4617,to establish stations or substations in places or points outside
Metropolitan Manila.
HELD
:
It is stressed that the principle of contemporaneous construction of a statute by theexecutive officers of the government,
BOC in his case, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to greatrespect. Therefore, the Bureau of
Communications made final the provisional authority granted to applicantor Phil Global Communications, Inc. to
establish branch stations in ay point within the country for thepurpose of receiving and transmitting messages to
countries outside the Philippines where it is authorizedto render international communications services in accordance
with its legislative franchise, RA 4617 andMemorandum Circular No. 77-13.
The decision appealed from is reversed
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union
obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the
Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid
votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who did not want
any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in
accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon
the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v.
Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the
valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission
that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills
Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie.
The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute
attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the
responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the
present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor
and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known
to the public as far back as 1 May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed
to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for
a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid
any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation
thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen, a 1903 decision, Justice
McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is
to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence
that no authorities need be cited to support it. There was a paraphrase by Justice
Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, a 1918 decision: Courts will
and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby. Since then, such a doctrine
has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by Chief Justice
Castro, the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and
enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.
Iloilo Palay
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and
Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of
595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate,
pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted
said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the
needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn
Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering
that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to
RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no

law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited
by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited
from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or
imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency
and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru
any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national
emergency is repealed by RA 3452
Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This
repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach
are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same
being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes
importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity
as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore
not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.