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Transportation Law | Atty.

Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

NEGROS NAVIGATION v. CA
G.R. No. 110398, November 7, 1997
Related doctrines from the full text:
Civil Law Negligence Court finds that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to
take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning
of the ship.In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of
this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for the death of other
passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the
crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latters
master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch,
Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent
danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take
steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Same Same Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by the Courts policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere. Adherence to
the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with
the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
Same Same A shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively
real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. The next issue
is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of
first impression. The rule is wellentrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for
injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can
be attributed to the shipowner.

CRESCENT PETROLEUM v. M/V LOK MAHESHWARI


G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by
respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India
and principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant
Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time
charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited
(Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling
petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker
fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile
dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner
Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner
Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian
corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544
inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada.
The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine
Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to
"Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok
Maheshwari" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1,
1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks
issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest,
tracking fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before
the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00.
Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar
through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of undertaking, to
consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the
motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws on
foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether
such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where
the supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the law
of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors were
considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of
the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters
arising under maritime law in general.
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case
of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign
Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract;
India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime
lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic
shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws
even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in
this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the
supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of
contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

PNB v. CA
337 SCRA 381 (Aug. 8, 2000)
FACTS:
To finance the acquisition of 7 shipping vessels, the Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC)
applied for and was granted by National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) guaranty
accomodations. As security for these guaranty accomodations, PISC executed chattel mortgages on the vessels
to be acquired by it. Meanwhile, PISC entered into a contract with Hong Kong United Dockyards, Ltd. for the
repair and conversion of one of the vessels, M/V Asean Liberty. The Central Bank of the Phils. authorized
PISC to open with China Banking Corporation (CBC) a standby letter of credit for US$545,000 in favor of
Citibank, N.A. to cover the repair and partial conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. PISC executed an
Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit for US$545,000 with CBC in favor of Citibank.
CBC then issued its Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank for the account
of PISC. PISC executed a promissory note for US$545,000 in favor of Citibank pursuant to the Loan
Agreement between PISC and Citibank. Upon failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations, Citibank sent CBC a
letter drawing on the Letter of Credit. CBC then instructed its correspondent Irving Trust Co. to pay to
Citibank the amount of US$242,225. Subsequently, for failure of PISC to settle its obligations under the
guaranty accommodations, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) conducted an auction sale of the mortgaged
vessels. NIDC emerged as the highest bidder in these auctions. PISC, claiming that the foreclosure sale of its
mortgaged vessels was illegal and irregular, instituted a civil case for the annulment of the foreclosure and
auction sale. CBC filed a complaint in intervention for recovery upon a maritime lien against the proceeds of
the sale of the foreclosed vessels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CBCs claim as evidenced by its Irrevocable Letter of Credit is in the nature of a maritime lien
under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521; and if so, whether or not said maritime lien is preferred over the
mortgage lien of PNB/NIDC on the foreclosed vessel M/V Asean Liberty
HELD:
Under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521, any person furnishing repairs, supplies, or other necessities to a vessel
on credit will have a maritime lien. Such maritime lien, if it arose prior to the recording of a preferred
mortgage lien, shall have priority over the said mortgage lien. In this case, it was Hongkong United
Dockyards, Ltd. which originally possessed a maritime lien over the vessel M/V Asean Liberty by virtue of its
repair of the said vessel on credit. CBC, however, stands as guarantor of the loan extended by Citibank to
PISC. It was Citibank which advanced the money to PISC. It was only upon the failure of PISC to fulfill its
obligations under its promissory note to Citibank that CBC was called upon by Citibank to exercise its duties
under the Standby Letter of Credit. The applicable law, which is the Shipping Mortgage Decree of 1978, was
patterned closely after the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. Being of foreign origin, the provisions of the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 may thus be construed with the aid of foreign jurisprudence. Under American
jurisprudence, furnishing money to a master in good faith to obtain repairs or supplies or to remove liens, in
order to forward the voyage of the vessel, raises a lien just as though the things for which money was obtained
to pay for had been furnished by the lender. This is in accord with Art5. 1302 of the Civil Code which
provides that there is legal subrogation when a third person, not interested in the fulfillment of the obligation,
pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor. In this case, the amount for the repair of vessel M/V
Asean Liberty was advanced by Citibank and was used for the purpose of paying off the original maritime
lienor, Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd. As a person not interested in the fulfillment of the obligation

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

between PISC and Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd., Citibank was subrogated to the rights of Hongkong
United Dockyards, Ltd. as maritime lienor over the vessel. CBC, as guarantor, was itself subrogated to all the
rights of Citibank as against PISC, the latters debtor. Art. 2067 of the civil Code provides that the guarantor
who pays is subrogated by virtue thereof to all the rights which the creditor had against the debtor.
When CBC honored its contract of guaranty with Citibank on March 30, 1983, it also acquired by subrogation
the maritime lien over the vessel which attached to it on March 12, 1979 in favor of Hongkong United
Drydocks, Ltd. The maritime lien of CBC thus arose prior to the recording of PNB/NIDCs mortgage on
September 25, 1979. As such, the said maritime lien has priority over the said mortgage lien.

YU CON v. IPIL
Araullo (1916)
FACTS
Respondent, Yu Con, chartered the banca Maria owned by petitioner Narciso Lauron with
Gilcerio Ipil as its master and Juto Solamo as it supercargo to transport certain merchandise and money
from the port of Cebu to Catmon.
Yu Con loaded the merchandise and delivered the money, placed in a trunk, to Ipil and Solamo.
Allegedly because there was no more room for Yu Cons trunk, Ipil and Solamo transferred the money to
their own trunk in the stateroom.
Before the ship could sail, the trunk and the money placed therein disappeared.
ISSUES/HELD
Are the petitioners liable for the loss? YES.
RATIONALE
It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred through the manifest fault and
negligence of Ipil and Solamo.
o They failed to take the necessary precautions in order that the stateroom containing the trunk in which
they kept the money should be properly guarded by members of the crew and they also did not
expressly station some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk.
o

All of these circumstances, together with that of its having been impossible to know who took the trunk and
the money, make the conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and the other crew members eminently supicious and prevent
our holding that the disappearance or loss of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure.

Ipil and Solamo were depositaries of the sum in question and, having failed to exercise the diligence
required by the nature of the obligation of safe-keeping assumed by them and by the circumstances of the
time and the place, it is evident that they are liable for its loss or misplacement and must restore it.

With respect to Lauron, he is also liable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force
because, as the proprietor and owner of the vessel who executed a contract of carriage with Yu Con, there
occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to Yu Con through the negligence of Ipil and
Solamo and which theft does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft.

The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from liability for the negligence of the captain
and its crew but, in the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-liability of the
shipowner for the unlawful acts, crimes or quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew can
no longer be maintained in its absolute and categorical terms.
o

In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through the
confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him; they presume that the owner made a most
careful investigation before appointing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make such an
investigation, and even though they should do so, they could not obtain complete security, inasmuch as the
shipowner can, whenever he sees fit, appoint another captain instead.
Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner should be made liable.

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

WING KEE COMPRADORING v. BARK MONONGAHELA


G.R. No. L-19540, January 29, 1923
FACTS
Wing Kee Compradoring Company furnished various supplies to Bark Monongahela. Most of the bills for
these goods are made out against the Admiral Line, S.S. Monongahela. All are countersigned by the
master and the first steward
Wing Kee Compradoring Company was looking to the Admiral Line for payment
from the documents where the requisitions are made out, it can be deduced that the Admiral Line was the
operating agent for the Monongahela and was responsible as such until the agency was terminated
o Ex. The forms have the heading The Admiral Line. Then follows Manila, the date, and the name,
Wing Kee Compradoring Co. Next is the order Please deliver to S.S. Monongahela now lying at
Bay, the following goods and send bills to Admiral Line.
Later, the following appeared in Manila Bulletin: Notice- Bark Monongahela- The undersigned hereby
give notice that they are not responsible in any manner for any indebtedness incurred by Bark
Monongahela, its Master and/or Crew- The Admiral Line.
ISSUE: WoN The Admiral Line is liable to Wing Kee Compradoring as the agent of by Bark Monongahela? YES

RATIO:
Under Art. 586 of the Code of Commerce, The owner of a vessel and the agent shall be civilly liable
for the acts of the captain and for the obligations contracted by the latter to repair, equip, and
provision the vessel By agent is understood the person intrusted with the provisioning of a vessel or
who represents her in the port in which she happens to be.
It has also been held in common law that when the agents buy in their own names, but really for the
account of their principal, the seller has an option to look to either for payment, unless (1) he trusted the
agent exclusively; or (2) by the usage and understanding of the business, the agent is only held; or (3) the
special circumstances show that only the agent was intended to be bound and the seller knew it or was
chargeable with knowledge of it.
In this case, it must be noted that Wing Kee Compradoring has not followed out its allegation that it has a
claim against the Bark Monongahela. It has also not exerted effort to bring the owner of the bark into the
case and hasnt pushed the case against the captain. What Wing Kee Compradoring wants is for the
Admiral Line, as Bark Monongahelas agent, to pay the claim.
The argument that the agency has ceased and so action cant be brought against the Admiral Line is farfetched. Its as if saying that every agent for a vessel could avoid responsibility pursuant to Art. 586 by
giving up its agency when threatened with suit to enforce the obligations of third parties. Moreover, the
bills were presented when Admiral Line was still agent.
Thus, Admiral Line, as agent of Bark Monongahela is liable to Wing Kee Compradoring, during the period
when it was still its agent.

YU BIAO SONTUA v. OSSORIO


Romualdez (1922)
FACTS

On March 12, 1920, 2K cases of petroleum and 8,473 cases of gasoline were loaded in the motor boat Alfonso

o
o
o

The loading was done without the permission from the customs authorities
The cases were loaded by means of straps supporting 10-12 cases at a time
The cases were placed in the hold of the ship, which is 14ft from the boiler of the main engine and
4ft from the boiler of the smaller engine

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On March 13, the smaller engine was in operation preparatory to the departure
Subsequently, a fire broke out with an explosion on board Alfonso followed by a violent expulsion of
gasoline and petroleum
Due to the magnitude of the fire and the inflammability of the materials and the proximity of the steamer
Y. Sontua, the fire spread to the said steamer
Sontua brought this action to recover from Ossorio, the owner of Alfonso, alleging that the damages were
due to the negligence of the agents and employees of Ossorio
Ossorio contended that the damages were caused by a fortuitous event and are not imputable to his or any
of his agents/employees/mandataries negligence
CFI ruled in favor of Sontua and held that:
o The explosion was due to the negligence of the persons in charge of Alfonso
o Ossorio is liable for the negligence of his agents and employees
ISSUES/HELD
WoN the explosion was due to the negligence of the persons in charge of Alfonso? YES.

WoN Ossorio, the owner of the motorboat, was liable for the negligence of his agents and employees? YES.

RATIONALE
Issue #1
Expert testimony introduced by Sontua shows the explosion and fire, which caused the damages, are
imputable to the negligence of the persons having charge of Alfonso at that time. It was shown that:
o Due to the manner by which the cases were loaded, the cases would receive bumps resulting in
damage to the cans and consequent leakage (use of straps)
o The gases formed by the volatilization are apt to accumulate in a compartment without sufficient
ventilation (hold of a ship)
o This accumulation will cause the gases to ignite upon comin gin contact with a spark or upon
temperature being sufficiently raised (smaller engine was in operation)
Issue #2
The rule is that where the vessel is one of freight, a public concern or public utility, it owner or agent
is liable for the tortuous acts of his agents
The Code of Commerce further provides that the general liability of a vessel owner extends to losses by
fire arising from other than a natural or other excepted cause, whether occurring on the ship, or
communicated from other vessel, or from the shore. This means that losses by fire are not within the
exceptions (act of God or peril of the sea except by local custom) UNLESS proximately caused by
one of the exceptions
Re: allegation that obligations under Art. 612 of the Code of Commerce are inherent in the master, the SC
said that although such duties are inherent to the master, it does not

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY v. CA


G.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998 // G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998
Related doctrines from the full text:
Admiralty Maritime Law Ships and Shipping Torts In American jurisprudence, there is a
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such as a dock or
navigational aid.We start our discussion of the successive issues bearing in mind the evidentiary rule in
American jurisprudence that there is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary
object such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, this presumption does more than merely require the
ship to go forward and produce some evidence on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must show that
it was without fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was the result of

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel must exhaust every reasonable possibility which the
circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that reasonable care required. In the absence of
sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed
object and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel. Logic and experience support this presumption.
Same Same Same Same Pilots Words and Phrases Pilot, Defined.A pilot, in maritime law, is a
person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. In a broad
sense, the term pilot includes both (1) those whose duty it is to guide vessels into or out of ports, or in
particular waters and (2) those entrusted with the navigation of vessels on the high seas. However, the term
pilot is more generally understood as a person taken on board at a particular place for the purpose of
conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a port.
Same Same Same Same Same Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the pilot
supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders
must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation.Under English and American authorities,
generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of the
ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro
hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing, anchoring, towing and the
like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on
having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the
pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains
command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory.
Same Same Same Same It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law.It is quite common for states and
localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching
their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation.
Same Same Same Same A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations
and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such as
a particular harbor or river. Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth
4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the
universally accepted high stan dards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill
and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and
more to be trusted than that of the master. A pilot should have a thorough knowledge of general and local
regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed,
such as a particular harbor or river. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must
have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert
in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
Same Same Same Same Negligence Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are
required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minimum of
special knowledge and abilityevery man who offers his services to another, and is employed, assumes
to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence.An act
may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable person in the position of the actor
would recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those who
undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do
but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. Every man who offers his services to
another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable
degree of diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed by
others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded he commits a species of fraud on every
man who employs him in reliance on his public profession.
Same Same Same Same Same The degree of care required is graduated according to the danger a
person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality which he
usesthe greater the danger the greater the degree of care required.There is an obligation on all
persons to take the care which, under ordinary circumstances of the case, a reasonable and prudent man would
take, and the omission of that care constitutes negligence. Generally, the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or the
instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of care required. What is ordinary
under extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions extraordinary risk demands extraordinary
care. Similarly, the more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care.
Same Same Same Same Same Ship Masters While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a
pilot is in sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the
pilot is not the masterthe master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his
vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him. While it is indubitable that in exercising his
functions a pilot is in sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the time being in the command
and navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted by him, there is
overwhelming authority to the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is
not the master. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. There are
occasions when the master may and should interfere and even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is obviously
incompetent or intoxicated and the circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory pilot
because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however, the master does not observe that a compulsory
pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot, but not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on board his vessel, and may advise with or
offer suggestions to him. He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, and
must cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution taken. Thus, in
particular, he is bound to see that there is sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their
duties, also that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready to go at the pilots
order.
Same Same Same Same Same Same Where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master
being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or
physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act, but if no such
reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly.In sum, where
a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master
observes that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to
permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot,
but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the master, exercising that
reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the
pilot was so navigating the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the
exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship from
danger, the master should have acted accordingly. The master of a vessel must exercise a degree of vigilance
commensurate with the circumstances.
Same Same Same Same Same Same Damages A pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his
own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in a
collision, such negligence in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort.In general, a pilot is
personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third

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parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty constitutes
a maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the negligence
of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply if
the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is responsible only for his own personal
negligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there
be anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners
are liable.
Same Same Same Same Same Same Same The fact that the law compels the master to take the
pilot does not exonerate the vessel from liabilityit cannot be maintained that the circumstance of
having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is
upon the party claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot
was at fault, and that there was no fault on the part of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive to
the damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel from
liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that occasioned the
damage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not always had for
compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts of the pilot, and they
must be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be maintained that the
circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of
responsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her
owner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of
the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the
vessel are bound to accept him, but is employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable
for his negligent act.
Same Same Same Damages Obligations Joint and Solidary Liability Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
sameeach wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine
to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it
being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or
all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actors negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
Same Same Same Same Same Same There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.There is no contribution between
joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole

Transportation Law | Atty. Golangco | 2015-2016 | 2J

injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Same Same Same Same Same Same As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control
of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of
her negligent management or navigation.Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute,
the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or
those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and
the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation.
Same Same Same Same Same Same Same Customs Administrative Order No. 1565, which as an
implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.Article 1207
of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 1565,
which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability. We
note the Solicitor Generals comment hereon, to wit: x x x Customs Administrative Order No. 1565 may be a
mere rule and regulation issued by an administrative agency pursuant to a delegated authority to fix the
details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Nonetheless, said administrative
order, which adds to the procedural or enforcing provisions of substantive law, is legally binding and receives
the same statutory force upon going into effect. In that sense, it has equal, not lower, statutory force and effect
as a regular statute passed by the legislature.