2. ESTACIO vs.

JARANILLA
417 SCRA 250
FACTS:
This case stemmed from an action for the annulment of deeds of conveyance and certificates of
title over a parcel of land located in Barrio Bulatoc, Pagadian City.
Sometime in 1987, Josefina Jaranilla went to live with her son, Ernesto, a doctor based in the USA.
However, the above-described land was sold in favor of Luis Bersales.
The Deed of Sale was executed in the name of Josefina Jaranilla by one Lolita Estacio who claimed
to have been so authorized by a Special Power of Attorney.
Bersales sold the subject parcel of land in favor of Jorge Almonte. Upon the death of Almontes wife,
he caused the issuance of a new title over the land in his name and those of his children.
Discovering the unauthorized conveyance of her parcel of land, upon her return to the Philippines,
Josefina Jaranilla sent a letter to the Registrar of Deeds.
The trial court, finding the special powers of attorney used by petitioner Lolita as highly
questionable, spurious and self-evidently fabricated, nullified the original sale to Atty. Bersales. It
however found that good faith had intervened in the subsequent transaction; hence, it upheld
Almontes title to the property.
The CA nevertheless found sufficient evidence of forgery. It ruled that the manifest disparity
between the genuine signature of Josefina Jaranilla and those represented to be hers in the
SPA clearly indicates that the latter signatures were, indeed, forged. It modified the trial courts
decision in that it also nullified Atty. Almontes title, finding him to have purchased the property in
bad faith.
ISSUE: W/N the CAs Decision and Resolution is contrary to law on the ground that the respondent failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of forgery.

HELD: The petition is without merit.

In an attempt to cast doubt on the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, petitioners
make much of the fact that respondent did not personally testify nor introduce any witness to prove the
alleged forgery. They aver that as a consequence of such lapse, respondent has failed to discharge the
required burden of proof.

Petitioners argument is not tenable. As shown from the records, the finding of forgery was based on a
comparison of the deceaseds purported signatures on the assailed Special Powers of Attorney and the
latters signature appearing on a private document. Indeed, the factual conclusion of forgery could have
drawn more support from other corroborating evidence such as testimonies of handwriting experts or
witnesses familiar with the deceaseds handwriting. It must be emphasized, however, that the lack of such
evidence is the result of the agreement of petitioners and respondent to submit the case for decision on
the basis of their pleadings and documents. Petitioners would now have this Court tilt the scale in their
favor on the ground that respondent had failed to offer testimonial evidence to prove his case. There is,
therefore, a clear attempt by petitioners to capitalize on what was a mutual agreement to dispense with a
trial on the merits. The same, however, is unavailing, because the lack of testimonial evidence by no
means disturbs the finding of forgery.

It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent
examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily
resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity,

which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of
the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by
itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

This Court notes that the Special Powers of Attorney being questioned constitute public documents,
having been acknowledged before a notary public. As such, their executions are entitled to a presumption
of regularity. But, just like any other presumption, this is not conclusive, but is rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.

After a perusal of the records of the case, this Court finds basis for the finding of manifest discrepancy
between the signatures of the deceased on the questioned Special Powers of Attorney, and the signature
on the submitted specimen. The records support the finding that the signatures on the assailed Special
Powers of Attorney do not appear to have been executed by the late Josefina Jaranilla.

13. PEOPLE vs. CANONIGO

337 SCRA 310

FACTS:

While Carla and her 5 year old sister, Cay Jorelle, were keeping watch over their 5 month old baby
sister, accused-appellant Crispin Canonigo arrived and inquired from Carla if her kuya Bert was
around.

Upon learning that Carlas brother was not around, accused appellant closed the door and
proceeded to kiss Carla on the lips and on her neck.

Remembering news accounts that rapists often kill their victim, Carla kept silent and did not offer
any resistance.

Accused-appellant attempted to insert his organ in Carlas anus, however he did not succeed so he
tightly held the skirt of the girl to keep her from moving and forced his organ into her genitals.

Cay Jorelle was able to witness the entire incident since accused-appellant asked her to hold his
organ while he was licking Carlas private part.

His bestial lust having been satisfied, accused-appellant left.

Carla and her sister reported the incident to their mother.

An information for the crime of rape was filed before the RTC of Pasig against accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and testified that Carla offered no
resistance when he started to kiss her and when he took off his shorts and pulled down his briefs.
He admitted that he intended to have sexual intercourse with Carla but he was troubled by his
conscience so he changed his mind.

Accused-appellant maintains that it was not possible for cay Jorelle to witness the entire incident
because she had her back turned against them at the time.

Accused-appellant also presented as a witness, Macaria Estacio, an employee of the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Taguig who testified that accused-appellants birth was
not registered but she was able to obtain a certificate of baptism, issued by the Archdiocese of
Taguig, Metro Manila, which certificate reflects the true date of birth of the accused-appellant as
January 11, 1978.

The TC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: W/N erred in holding that the accused-appellant may not avail of the mitigating circumstance of
minority.
HELD: The trial court did not err in holding that accused-appellant may not avail of the mitigating
circumstance of minority. Accused-appellant testified during trial that at the time of the commission of the
crime, he was still under eighteen (18) years of age, he having been born on January 7, 1979.
Notwithstanding his allegations, however, and that of his stepmother, accused-appellant presented as a
witness, Macaria Estacio, an employee of the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Taguig
to testify that accused-appellants birth was not registered but she was able to obtain a certificate of
baptism, issued by the Archdiocese of Taguig, Metro Manila, which certificate reflects the true date of birth
of the accused-appellant as January 11, 1978. If accused-appellant was born on January 11, 1978, then he
was already of legal age when he committed the crime on May 9, 1996. Even if we were to compute his
age from the date of his baptism, i.e., February 26, 1978, accused-appellant would still have already
attained the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime.

As earlier discussed, the birth certificate of the accused-appellant, although marked as an exhibit,
was never formally offered in evidence inasmuch as when the defense was about to formally offer its
exhibits, the defense counsel manifested to the trial court that accused-appellants father took hold of the
said certificate and has since refused to return it. Consequently, the said documentary exhibit may not be
taken cognizance of, pursuant to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that, "The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered x x x ."

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the baptismal certificate which reflected accused-appellants
date of birth has not been formally offered in evidence, the court may take note of the said date of birth as
reflected in the baptismal certificate. Not only was it the subject of the testimony of accused-appellants
own witness, Ms. Macaria Estacio, but during the course of the trial, repeated references have been made
by the counsel for accused-appellant to the latters date of birth as appearing in the said baptismal

certificate. In the case of People vs. de Roxas and People vs. Tanjutco, we held that the absence of any
formal presentation of certain exhibits does not render their consideration thereof a reversible error, if
repeated references thereto in the course of trial by counsel for accused and of the court convincingly
show that the documents were part of prosecutions evidence. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is with
more reason that we could take cognizance of the accused-appellants date of birth as appearing in the
baptismal certificate inasmuch as repeated references thereto have been made in the course of trial by the
counsel for the accused-appellant and by the court, which fact convincingly show that the said document
was part of the evidence of the defense. The fact that the defense did not bother to formally offer in
evidence the said document although it was given ample time to do so, only bolsters the presumption that
the presentation of that document was suppressed by the defense because it contained a fact or
declaration that was adverse to the accused-appellant.