ALVAREZ VS PICOP

G.R. No. 162243

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

November 29, 2006

FACTS: PICOP was granted Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 covering an area of 75,545 hectares in Surigao
del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, and Davao Oriental, to "terminate on April 25, 2002." On 23 December
1999, DENR promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 mandating the conversion of the TLA into
IFMA that is primarily aimed at sustaining the raw materials for the continuous operation of the integrated wood
processing plant of the company. Pursuant to this, PICOP signified its intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA).
A Performance Evaluation Team was created to conduct performance evaluation indicating violations by
PICOP of such as the non-submission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as
required by the DENR rules and regulations. Also there are alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges of PICOP. It
was the position of the DENR members that PICOPs application for the IFMA conversion should undergo the
process as provided in DAO No. 99-53. PICOP representative Atty. Caingat, however, claimed that "the conversion of
TLA No. 43 into IFMA has already been completed" and indicated that they had "no choice except to decline
participation in the ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the proper public and legal forum."
Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims that further processing of PICOPs application for the conversion
of TLA No. 43 cannot proceed until PICOP complies with the requirements. Insisting that the conversion of its TLA
No. 43 had been completed, PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez before the
RTC of Quezon City. The RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOPs Petition for Mandamus. On appeal, CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition by the DENR assailing that the mandamus filed by PICOP
should be out rightly dismissed on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since
the acts questioned herein are related to the licensing regulation and management of forest resources. Furthermore,
RTC is prohibited to issue TRO, writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction as provided by
PD605 and RA8975.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE BECAUSE THE
SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF PERTAINS TO THE EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN OF THE DENR
SECRETARY
HELD: YES. The Petition filed before the trial court was one for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with damages. Specifically, it sought to compel the DENR Secretary
to: (1) sign, execute and deliver the IFMA documents to PICOP; (2) issue the corresponding IFMA number
assignment; and (3) approve the harvesting of timber by PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43. In its petition for
mandamus, [PICOP] asserted that "DENR Secretary Alvarez acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction in refusing to perform his ministerial duty to sign, execute and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue the
corresponding IFMA number to it." What is at stake is not the scope of the DENR jurisdiction but the manner by which
it exercises or refuses to exercise that jurisdiction.
The courts have the duty and power to strike down any official act or omission tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in providing that judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Since PICOP alleges grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DENR Secretary, it behooves the court to determine the same. An outright dismissal of the case would
have prevented such determination.
it is argued that PICOPs immediate resort to the trial court was precipitate based on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This holds no water. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
disregarded when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, which are averred to be
extant in this case, citing PICOPs employment of a sizable number of workers and its payment of millions in taxes to

the government. Moreover, contrary to [the DENR Secretarys] claim, the approval of an application for IFMA
conversion is not purely discretionary on the part of the DENR Secretary since the approval of an IFMA conversion
depends upon compliance with the requirements provided under DAO No. 99-53. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
approval of an IFMA conversion involves the exercise of discretion by the DENR Secretary, the writ of mandamus
may be issued to compel the proper exercise of that discretion where it is shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
DENR Sec is wrong in invoking the provisions of PD605 and RA8975. These statutes merely proscribe the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues
raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.
Hence, the outright dismissal of the mandamus prayed for by DENR herein is hereby denied.