Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991)

Posted on November 20, 2012

GR 91649
197 SCRA 52, 65
May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward
crony economy, waiving the Manila City governments right to impose
taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local
autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up
for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises,
licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested
exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to
demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR,
being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National
Government is supreme over local governments. As such, mere
creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax
as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat
an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power
to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to
limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within
a state, it simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal
protection clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not
render the applicable laws unconstitutional.

Baes v CA & RP GR 108065 (July 6, 1993)

Posted on August 10, 2013

Spouses
Felix
GR
July 6, 1993

Baes

&

Rafaela

Baes

CA

and

Republic

of

the

Philippines
108065

FACTS
ISSUE
WON Baes owned Lot 1-B.
HELD
Art.
461,
NCC
River beds abandoned through NATURAL CHANGE ipso facto belong to owner whose lands are occupied by the
new course in proportion to the are lost. Owners of the land adjoining the river bed have the right to acquire by
paying its value (must not exceed value of new beds area)
If change is due to concessioners authorized by the Government, the concession may be granted to
concessioners. No grant = land belongs to owners of land covered by the waters. Must not prejudice tge superior
rights of third persons with sufficient title.
If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for damage/loss due to natural reasons, there is no
reson not to compensate when the change was effected through artificial means.
The loss was caused by a deliberate act of Government. The Government is obliged to compensate Baes for the
loss.
However, Baes has already been compensated through the fair exchange of lots between him and the Government.
Posted in Avulsion, Case Digests | Tagged Accession, Avulsion, CA, Felix Baes, July 1993, July 6,ownership, Property, Rafaela Baes
| Leave a reply

Elias Villuga, et al v NLRC and Broad Street Tailoring GR

No. L-70538 August 23, 1993
Posted on August 3, 2013

Elias
Villuga,
et
al
v
NLRC
and
Broad
Street
Tailoring
August
23,
1993
L-70538
HELD:
Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, provides the Elements of
Membership
of
a
Managerial
Staff:
(1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of workdirectly related to management policies;
(2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his
functions;
(3)
that
he
regularly
and
directly
assists
in
the
management
of
theestablishment;
and
(4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above.
Villugas
primary
work
or
duty
is
to
cut
or
prepare
patterns
for
items
to
be
sewn.
The duty to lay down/implement any of the management policies lies in their manager and assistant manager.
While he distributes and assigns work to employees in the absence of the manager & the assistant manager, the
duty is only occasional. Also, Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, his positions functions involve
execution
of
approved
and
established
policies.
In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, employees who do not participate in policy-making but
are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees .

Villuga is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform
supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the
benefits of holiday pay. He should also be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the factthat the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 8 At any rate, dismissal of
an employee due to hisprolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of
a medical certificate is not justified. 9 In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented
himself for four (4) dayswithout leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness,
the imposition of a sanctionis justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioners first
offense. In lieu ofreinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer
be effected inview of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation. 10 But petitioner should
not be grantedbackwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the
circumstances consideringthat he was not entirely free from blame.
As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed because the
circumstancessurrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we disagree with the finding of
respondentCommission
that
the
eleven
petitioners
are
independent
contractors.
For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: (1) the
selectionand
engagement
of
the
employee;
and
engagement
of
the
employee;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employees conduct.
The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argumentthat herein petitioners were not
employees. The term wage has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the LaborCode as remuneration or earnings,
capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on atime, task, piece or commission
basis. . . . The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does
notdefine
the
essence
of
the
relation. 13 The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of
controland supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the
work, not the actual exercise of the right.
In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent
contractor,each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be
considered. 15Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of
privaterespondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or
necessaryfor the business of private respondent, and observing managements approved standards set for their
respectivelines of work as well as the customers specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not
independentcontractors.
Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of
workaccording to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the
result oftheir work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers
specifications mustbe followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected
to control.befollowed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.
In Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 16 this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring
department,although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors.
Accordingly, asregular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium payfor holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be
defined for lack ofevidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however,
their 13th monthpay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.
Posted in Case Digests, Labor Standards | Tagged Elias Villuga, Labor Standards | Leave a reply

Luis Marcos Laurel v Hon. Zeus Abrogar

Posted on June 29, 2013

Luis
Marcos
Laurel
vs
Hon.
Zeus
Abrogar
GR
No.
155076
January 13, 2009
FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's
international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and
completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect
directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that this
service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to
P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are
personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.

ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
1.
There be taking of Personal Property;
2.
Said Personal Property belongs to another;
3.
Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
4.
Taking be done without the owners consent;
5.
No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things
Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real Property
Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's
definition of real and personal property. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so
long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to appropriation.
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are brought under the control of science, as
Personal Property.
The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science can be achieved by tampering with
any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature
from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to
PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using
PLDTs facilities constituteSubtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of appropriation, and not
included in the enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property which can be
the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under
the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as personal
property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such
calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were
taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in
the unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the offended party.
Posted in Case Digests, Criminal Law II, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 2009,Article 308, forces of
nature, GR
155076, Hon.
Zeus
Abrogar, January
13, January
2009, Luis
Marcos
Laurel, personal
property, PLDT, RPC, Subtraction, Theft | Leave a reply

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp., vs Wearever Textile

Mills, Inc.,
Posted on June 29, 2013

Makati
Leasing
122
GR
May 16, 1983

and

Finance

Corp.,
vs
SCRA
No.

Wearever

Textile

Mills,

Inc.,
296
L-58469

FACTS
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation
covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing fi led a petition for judicial foreclosure
of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of
seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order seized the machinery subject matter of the
mortgage. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on
the ground that the same can-not be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article415 of
the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from
Wearever textiles plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete fl oor. When the motion for reconsideration of
Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.
HELD
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the pronouncement
in Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in
the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage
thereon as long as theparties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there
is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomesimmobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is
estopped from the denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the CA lays stress on the fact that the
house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of such house. But the law makes no
distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the house is built and We should not lay
down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization by the private respondent is indicative of the
intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of
New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as
personal property that which by nature would be a real property as long as no interest of third parties would be
prejudiced thereby.
The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property was not raised as an issue before the lower
court and the CA, except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in the appellate court.
There is no record showing that the mortgage has been annulled, or that steps were taken to nullify the same. On
the other hand, respondent has benefited from the said contract.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another.
As such, private respondent could no longer be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has
benefited therefrom.
Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as personal property.
Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 122 SCRA 296, 1983, GR L-58469, Makati Leasing
and Finance Corp, May 16, May 1983, movable property, personal property,Property, Wearever Textile Mills | Leave a reply

Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Posted on June 24, 2013

Caltex
vs
Central
Board
of
Assessment
Appeals
&
City
Assessor
of
Pasay
GR
No.
L-50466
May 31, 1982
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc., in its gas
stations located on leased land.
FACTS
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt.
The lease contract stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment
in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and equipment
installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The City Assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable
realty. However, the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. The Assessor appealed to the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals.

The Board held on June 3, 1977 that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Ses. 3(k) & (m) and
38 of the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of real and personal property in Articles
415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.
ISSUE
WON the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and
pavement should be subject to realty tax.
HELD
Sec.2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due on real property, including land, buildings,
machinery, and other improvements not specifically exempted in Sec.3 thereof.
Sec.3 of the Real Property Tax Code provides the following definitions:

k) Improvements a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its conditionmore than

mere repairs or replacement of wasteintended to enhance its value, beauty, or utility

m) Machinery machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances, and apparatus attached to

the real estateincludes the physical facilities available for productioninstallation and appurtenant service
facilities.
The subject machines and equipment are taxable improvement and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code, because the same are necessary to the operation of the gas
station and have been attached/affixed/embedded permanently to the gas station site.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though they might be considered
personalty. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal property (Standard Oil Co., vs Jaramillo, 44 PHIL 630).
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co., (119 Phil. 328)
where Meralco's steel towers were exempted from taxation. The steel towers were considered personalty because
they were attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when
unscrewed and dismantled.
Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as the tools and equipment in the repair shop of a
bus company which were held to be personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor,
116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the City
Assessor's imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and equipment.
Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 1982, Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, L-50466, May 1982, May 31, movable property, personal property, real property, Real Property Tax, realty tax | Leave a
reply

Mindanao Bus Company vs City Assessor

Posted on June 24, 2013

Mindanao
Bus
Company
vs
City
Assessor
116
PHIL
501
GR
No.
L-17870
September 29, 1962
FACTS
The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed a realty tax on several equipment and machineries of Mindanao
Bus Co. These equipment were placed on wooden or cement platforms and can be moved around in the bus
companys repair shop. The bus company appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that
the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City, however, sustained the city assessor. Thus, the bus
company appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which likewise sustained the city assessor.
HELD
Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or cement platforms. They can
be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop.

Before movables may be deemed immobilized in contemplation of Article 415 (5), it is necessary that they must
first be essential and principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.
In this case, the tools and equipment in question are by their nature, not essential and principal elements of
Mindanao Bus Co.s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals
acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such
tools and equipments, its business may be carried on.
Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less permanently, and
the sawing is conducted in the land/building.
However, in the instant case, the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation
business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law. The
equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's
business is not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land.
As such, the equipments in question are not deemed real property because the transportation business is not
carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law.
The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop, if its rolling equipment is
repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
Therefore, the imposition of realty tax on the maintenance and repair equipment was not proper because the
properties involved were not real property under Article 415 (5).
Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 116 PHIL 501, 1962,Article 415, Cagayan de Oro
City, Case Digest, City Assesor, Civil Code, equipment, immovable property,L-17870, machines. property, Mindanao Bus
Company, movable property, personal property, Property Case Digest, Property cases, real property, realty tax, September
1962, September 29 | Leave a reply

Leung Yee vs Strong Machinery Co

Posted on June 22, 2013

Leung
Yee
vs
Strong
Machinery
Co.
37
PHIL
644
GR
No.
L-11658
February 15, 1918
FACTS
The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased from Strong Machinery Co. ricecleaning machines which CAF
installed
in
one
of
its
buildings.
As security for the purchase price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage on the machines and the building on which
they
had
been
installed.
When CEF failed to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed and Strong Machinery Co. purchased the building.
This
sale
was
annotated
in
the
Chattel
Mortgage
Registry.
Later, Strong Machinery Co. also purchased from Agricola the lot on which the building was constructed. The sale
wasn't registered in the Registry of Property BUT Strong Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.
However, the same building had been previously purchased by Leung Yee, a creditor ofAgricola, at a sheriff's sale
despite his knowledge of the prior sale in favor of Strong Machinery Co.. The sale to Leung Yee was registered in the
Registry of Property.
ISSUES
1. Was the property's nature changed by its registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry?
2. Who has a better right to the property?
HELD
1. Where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the document on record in the
Chattel Mortgage Registry is a futile act.
Chattel Mortgage refers to the mortgage of Personal Property executed in the manner and form
prescribed in the statute.
Since the building is REAL PROPERTY, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be given the
legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property.
The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character
as real property.
Neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the
mortgaged property had any effect on the building.
1.

Art. 1473 of the New Civil Code provides the following rules on determining ownership of property which
has been sold to different vendees:

If Personal Property grant ownership to person who 1st possessed it in good faith

If Real Property grant ownership to person who 1st recorded it in the Registry

If no entry grant to person who 1st possessed in good faith

If no proof of possession grant to person who presents oldest title
Since Leung Yee purchased the property despite knowledge of the previous purchase of the same by Strong
Machinery Co., it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith.
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has
acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein. The same rule
must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation
as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
Good Faith, or the want of it, is a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or
fancied tokens or signs. (Wilder vs. Gilman, 55Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann.,
2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs. Bromley, 119Mich., 8, 10, 17.)
Honesty Of Intention is the honest lawful intent constituting good faith. It implies afreedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.
As such, proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good faith.
Following the rule on possessory rights provided in Art. 1473, Strong Machinery Co. has a better right to the
property since it first purchased the same ahead of Leung Yee, the latter not being a purchaser in good faith.
Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 1918, 37 PHIL 644, Article 1473, building, Case
Digest, chattel mortgage, Chattel Mortgage Registry, Civil Code, February 15, good faith, GR L-11658, honesty of
intention, Leung
Yee, New
Civil
Code, oldest
titles, personal
property,possessor
in
good
faith, possessory
rights, Property, Property Case Digest, Property cases, property right, purchaser in good faith, real property, real property
regostration, registration, Strong Machinery Co | Leave a reply

Board of Assessment Appeals QC v MERALCO

Posted on June 22, 2013

Board
of
Assessment
Appeals,
Q.C.
vs
Meralco
10
SCRA
68
GR
No.
L-15334
January 31, 1964
FACTS
On November 15, 1955, the QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax.
After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board of
Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for
the
years
1952
to
1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which
rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC
City Treasurer of P11,651.86.
ISSUE
Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered real or personal properties?
HELD
Pole long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece of wood, timber, object of metal or the like; an upright
standard to the top of which something is affixed or by which something is supported.
MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4 steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop of
which are cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage transmission wires, and their sole function is to support/carry such
wires. The exemption granted to poles as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of respondent's franchise is determined by the
use to which such poles are dedicated.
It is evident that the word poles, as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not
be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the franchise was granted.
The poles should be taken and understood as part of MERALCO's electric power system for the conveyance of
electric current to its consumers.
Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers should be considered personal property. It should be noted
that the steel towers:
(a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the soil;
(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner they can be separated without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and even if they are, they are not intended for an
industry to be carried on in the premises.
Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 10 SCRA 68, 1964, Act No 484, Art. 415, Article
415, Board of Assessment Appeals QC v MERALCO, buildings, case digests,constructions, immovable property, January
1964, January 31, L-15334, lands, machinery, MERALCO,movable property, New Civil Code, personal property, poles, Proper
cases, Property case digests,Quezon City, real property, real vs personal property, steel poles, steel towers | Leave a reply

Pastor Ago v CA
Posted on June 21, 2013

Pastor D. Ago vs CA, Hon. Montao Ortiz, The Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, and Grace Park
Engineering,
Inc.
GR
No.
L-17898
October 31, 1962
FACTS
Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments from Grace Park Engineer Domineering, Inc. (GPED) A chattel
mortgage was executed over the said properties to secure the unpaid balance of P32,000, which Ago agreed to pay
in
installment
basis.
Because Ago defaulted in his payment, GPED instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. To
enjoin the foreclosure, Ago instituted a special civil case in the CFI of Agusan. The parties then arrived at a
compromise
agreement.
However, a year later, Ago still defaulted in his payment. GPED filed a motion for execution with the lower court,
which
was
executed
on
September
23,
1959.
Acting upon the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Surigao levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill
machineries
and
equipment.
Upon being advised that the public auction sale was set on December 4, 1959, Ago filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on December 1, 1959 with the CA. He alleged that his counsel only received the copy of the judgment
on September 25, 1959 two days after the execution of the writ; that the order of sale of the levied properties was
in grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction; and that the Sheriff acted illegally by levying the
properties and attempting to sell them without prior publication of the notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of
general
circulation
as
required
by
the
Rules
of
Court.
The CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Sheriff, but it turned out that the properties were already
sold on December 4, 1959. The CA ordered the Sheriff to suspend the issuance of the Certificate of Sale until the
decision of the case. The CA then rendered its decision on November 9, 1960.
ISSUES
1. Is the fact that petitioner was present in open court as the judgment was rendered, sufficient notice of the said
judgment?
2. Was the Sheriff's sale of the machineries and equipment at a public auction valid despite lack of publication of
the notice of sale?
HELD
1) No. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open court does not constitute a rendition of judgment.
The filing of the judge's signed decision with the Clerk of Court constitutes the rendition of a valid and binding
judgment.
Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court require that all judgments be rendered in writing, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based, filed with the clerk of the court.
Prior to the filing, the decision could still be subject to amendment and change and may not constitute the real
judgment of the court.
Moreover, the hearing of the judgment in open court does not constitute valid notice thereof. No judgment can be
notified
to
the
parties
unless
it
has
previously
been
rendered.
Sec.7 of Rule 27 expressly requires that final orders or judgments be served either personally or by
registered mail.
The signed judgment not having been served upon the petitioner, said judgment could not be effective upon him
who had not received it. As a consequence, the issuance of the writ of execution is null and void, having been
issued before petitioner was served a copy of the decision, personally or by registered mail.

2) The subject sawmill machineries and equipment became real estate properties in accordance with the provision
of Art. 415 (5) of the NCC:
ART. 415 The following are immovable property:
xxxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
The installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs
carried on in the said building converted them into Real Properties as they became a necessary & permanent part
of the building or real estate on which the same was constructed.
And if they are judicially sold on execution without the necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a
newspaper as required in Sec.16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the sale made by the sheriff would be null and
void.

Posted in Case Digests, Movable Property vs Real Property, Property | Tagged 1962, Article 415, CA,chattel mortgage, Civil
Code, foreclosure, Grace Park Engineer Domineering inc, immovable property, L-17898, machinery, Montao Ortiz, movable
property, notice, notice of judgment, October 1962, October 31, open court, Pastor Ago, Pastor Ago v CA, Pastor D.
Ago, Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, real property,Rules of Court, Sec1 Rule 35, Section 7 Rule 27, Surigao | Leave a reply

Davao Sawmill Co. vs Castillo

Posted on June 21, 2013

Davao
Sawmill
Co.
61
PHIL
GR
No.
August 7, 1935
A tenant placed machines for use in a sawmill on the landlord's land.

vs

Castillo
709
L-40411

FACTS
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. The land upon which the business was conducted was leased from another
person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines
were mounted and placed on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease, Davo Sawmill agreed to turn over free
of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on the premises with the exception of machineries, which
shall remain with the Davao Sawmill. In an action brought by the Davao Light and Power Co., judgment was
rendered against Davao Sawmill. A writ of execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were
levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. Davao Light and Power Co., proceeded to purchase the machinery and
other properties auctioned by the sheriff.
ISSUE
Are the machineries real or personal property?
HELD
Art.415 of the New Civil Code provides that Real Property consists of:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an
industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of the property. While not conclusive,
the appellant's characterization of the property as chattels is indicative of intention and impresses upon the
property the character determined by the parties.
Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery may be immobilized by destination or purpose under the
following conditions:
General Rule: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant.
Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right.

Exception: The tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as agent of the owner of the premises; or he
intended to permanently give away the property in favor of the owner.

As a rule

Gomez v CA GR 77770 (December 15, 1988)

Posted on July 25, 2013

Posted in E - Publication, Opposition, and Default, Land, Titles and Deeds, V - Original Registration |Leave a reply

Republic v Nillas
Posted on July 23, 2013

GR
January 23, 2007
FACTS
ISSUES
HELD

159595

Posted in E - Publication, Opposition, and Default, Land, Titles and Deeds, V - Original Registration |Tagged 159595, GR
159596, January 2007 | Leave a reply

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust
Co. L-24670 (December 14, 1979)
Posted on October 23, 2012

G.R.
No.
L-24670
94
SCRA
533
December 14, 1979
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills
Subdivision
along
EDSA,
Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad
Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the
vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements
and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of
sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later annotated in the
Transfer
Certificates
of
Titles
covering
the
said
lots
issued
in
the
name
of
Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also annotated in their
corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot
No.6
was
acquired
through
a
Deed
of
Exchange
from
Republic
Flour
Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the
beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where
commercial
and
industrial
sites
are
also
designated
or
established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has
been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It
alleges that plaintiff completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and
the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years after the area xxx had
been
declared
a
commercial
and
industrial
zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building devoted to banking purposes but
which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded in
writing that the construction of the commercial building be stopped but the defendant refused to comply
contending that the construction was in accordance with the zoning regulations.
Issues:
1.
Whether
Resolution
No.
27
s-1960
is
a
valid
exercise
of
police
power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the stipulation of
facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution,
plaintiff-appellant
cannot
now
change
its
position
on
appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said resolution, the posture is
unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory
measure
within
the
intendment
of
the
word
regulation
under
the
provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be liberally
construed in its favor and that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be
interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to the general welfare
powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from
contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at bar.

2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers and the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of police power
may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power
to safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to
the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified
under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of
the individual are subordinated.
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Land, Titles and Deeds, Local Police Power, Public Corporation | Tagged 1979, 94
SCRA
533, Augusto
Padilla, Banking, Case
Digest, Certificate
of
Title,Constitutional, construction, contractual
obligations, December 14, Deed of Exchange, deeds of sale,Digest, EDSA, Emma Chavez, G.R. No. L-24670, general
welfare, General Welfare Clause, general welfare powers, Highway Hills Subdivision, LGC, Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank
and Trust Co., Local Autonomy Act, Mandaluyong, No. L-24670, non-impairment of contracts, o, Ortigas, Ortigas & Co.,Ortigas
vs Feati, Ortigas vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., Pasig River, police power, PubCorp, Public Corporation, R.A. No. 2644, RA
2644, regulation, Resolution No. 27, Resolution No.27 s-1960, Rizal, Sed. 16, Shaw Boulevard, TCT, Transfer Certificate of
Title, zoning ordinances, zoning regulations | Leave a reply

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR

127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012

G.R.
292
July 20, 1998

No.
SCRA

127820
676

Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a
Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was
filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of
1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with
the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer
alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not
to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed
the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its lawmaking body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can
exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal
chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a
law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is
obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
, therefore, the machinery should be considered as Personal Property, since it was not placed on the land by the
owner of the said land.

Elias Villuga, et al v NLRC and Broad Street Tailoring GR

No. L-70538 August 23, 1993
Posted on August 3, 2013

Elias

Villuga,

et

al

NLRC

August

and

Broad

Street

Tailoring

23,

1993

L-70538
HELD:
Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, provides the Elements of
Membership

of

Managerial

Staff:

(1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of workdirectly related to management policies;
(2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his
functions;
(3)

that

he

regularly

and

directly

assists

in

the

management

of

theestablishment;

and

(4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above.
Villugas

primary

work

or

duty

is

to

cut

or

prepare

patterns

for

items

to

be

sewn.

The duty to lay down/implement any of the management policies lies in their manager and assistant manager.
While he distributes and assigns work to employees in the absence of the manager & the assistant manager, the
duty is only occasional. Also, Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, his positions functions involve
execution

of

approved

and

established

policies.

In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, employees who do not participate in policy-making but
are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees .
Villuga is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform
supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the
benefits of holiday pay. He should also be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the factthat the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 8 At any rate, dismissal of
an employee due to hisprolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of
a medical certificate is not justified. 9 In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented
himself for four (4) dayswithout leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness,
the imposition of a sanctionis justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioners first
offense. In lieu ofreinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer
be effected inview of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation. 10 But petitioner should
not be grantedbackwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the
circumstances consideringthat he was not entirely free from blame.

As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed because the
circumstancessurrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we disagree with the finding of
respondentCommission

that

the

eleven

petitioners

are

independent

contractors.

For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: (1) the
selectionand

engagement

of

the

employee;

and

engagement

of

the

employee;

(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employees conduct.

The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argumentthat herein petitioners were not
employees. The term wage has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the LaborCode as remuneration or earnings,
capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on atime, task, piece or commission
basis. . . . The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does
notdefine

the

essence

of

the

relation. 13 The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of

controland supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the
work, not the actual exercise of the right.

In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent
contractor,each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be
considered. 15Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of
privaterespondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or
necessaryfor the business of private respondent, and observing managements approved standards set for their
respectivelines of work as well as the customers specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not
independentcontractors.
Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of
workaccording to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the
result oftheir work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers
specifications mustbe followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected
to control.befollowed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.
In Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 16 this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring
department,although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors.
Accordingly, asregular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium payfor holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be
defined for lack ofevidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however,
their 13th monthpay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495 (September 3, 1998)

Posted on October 4, 2012

G.R.

No.

133495;

295

SCRA

157

September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and
was elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected
Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term
after that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government
Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no
reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the official concerned was
elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is
removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which
he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon

demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality
but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the petition
was dismissed.