INTESTATE CASES

1. [G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998]

URIARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate courts
resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. At issue is
the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit,
Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death
on March 31, 1989.
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as
follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica
Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the
death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had
another daughter, the decedent Justa. [2] Private respondent Benedicto
Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio
Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was
one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His
mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and
Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo,
were brothers.[3] Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within
the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva
Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of
her brother Gregorio. [4] The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte,
aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and
Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo,
Primitivas brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas,
Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren
and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her
cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa ArnaldoSering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by
Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.[5] Private
respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the
ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio
Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justas tenant, refused to
give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. [6] He
contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but
could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. [7]
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by his heirs.[8] In their answer, the heirs denied they were
mere tenants of Justa[9] but the latters heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was
originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, [10] their great granduncle. It was
allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocios
nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.
[11]
Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third.
[12]
The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession
and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the
property but only received her share of the harvest from it. [13] They
alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property
because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, [14] the original owner
of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners contention. In its decision
rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two
nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided
as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and onethird or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588
hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two
hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan
Arnaldo, after the latters death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was
covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The
latter however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving
relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her
entire estate passed on after her death by operation of law, to the
exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277,
Civil Code).[15]

Accordingly, the court ordered:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintif
[private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors,
together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled
to the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and
subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo
Sering. No cost.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial
courts finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had
been acquired by Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during
their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica,
private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of
Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court
ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
another is hereby entered Ordering the partition of the property described in the second
amended complaint in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintif.
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the
partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of
Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON
OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO
SERING;
II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED

TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO
ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;

III THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;
IV AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. [18]
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without
merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7
hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals
found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and
Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa
after the death of her parents.Accordingly, the division of Justas
property should be as follows as private respondent contends:
A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of
Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which
pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as
already stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil,
the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo,
whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and
Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. [19]

The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the
private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives
within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and
daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of

Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private
respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of
Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is wellsettled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason,
therefore, should such a question be disallowed when raised for the
first time on appeal to this Court.[20]

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then
plaintif is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a
half-sister of Justa is of no moment.[22]

It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals,

petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justas nephew, his
mother, Agatonica, being Justas half-sister.Apparently they are now
questioning private respondents filiation because, as explained by the
Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa
and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.
[21]

Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was
entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her fathers (Juan
Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled
to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her mothers
(Ursula Tubils) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares
which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or
2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was
inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest
surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the
relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the
right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to
the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and
half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided
by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of
generations. Each generation forms a degree.
ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct
or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from
a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from
him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the
child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the
grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three
from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintif is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He
is thus a third degree relative of Justa.

Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private

respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not
by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the
case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified
to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and
private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of
Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justas nephew. A nephew is
considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant,
ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. [23] That private respondent
is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunts heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half
blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the
survivors.[24]
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and
fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998
VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde
had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita,
is
one
of
the
five
siblings
of
spouses Rafael Nicolas
and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud
are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas
de
Leon,
and RicardoNicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents
and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with
an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter
Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One
Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a
"Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT
No. T-36734". 1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela
property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold
the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar
Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred
Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). 3 In June of the same year, Estrellita
bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements
situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque
property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela
property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a
car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on
June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde
Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI
reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. 4 Accordingly,
Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with
the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as
the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an
"Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita NicolasVizconde With Waiver of Shares", 5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's
parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the
properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and
spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car
and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting
the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita,
Carmela
and
Jennifer,
amounts
to
Three
Million
Pesos
(P3,000,000.00). 6 The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael,
except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer
which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was
allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car and were
also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita

instituted an intestate estate proceeding 8docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and
children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be
appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her
incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an
opposition 9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as
Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed
another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given
the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six
Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon
pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and
validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his
children," 11 Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of
The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's
children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter of Estrellita." 13
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed
Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was
appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's
Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither
was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included
in the estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5,
1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his
ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission. 16
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving
petitioner "ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate
petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is
concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has
been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de
Leon." In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19,
1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate
heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings.
The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2,
1994. 17 Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated
February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car
and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
be collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10,
1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate
proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on
his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order
which Ramon opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an
Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that
spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having
purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the
property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living
with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral
home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses
were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, defacto separation, from the family for sometime and returned
to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths
of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were
financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged
in business venture such as taxi business, canteen
concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no

competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably

support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a
valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in
favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of
the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to
collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision
of
December
14,
1994,
respondent
Court
of
Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the RTC
correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the
Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of
Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the Court on
December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order,
which respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of
the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the
Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs
who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring
into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so
that the division may be made according to law and the will of the
testator. 24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding
with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. 25 The
purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as
possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or
predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a
forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share
in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs
equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. 26 Collation
does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of
collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property
donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was
donated, 27 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in
value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir
or donee. 28
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find
that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals,
committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is
not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is
clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was
not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a
third person or a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner may not be
dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may
he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding, 30 which
petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. 31

transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela

property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become
collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the
Paraaque property has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the probate
court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paraaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the
decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited
and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of
Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with
Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any
interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque
property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his
compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument,
voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir" 38 in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or
not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it
should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the
Valenzuela property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela
property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of
the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter
serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
3.
CORAZON
DEZOLLER
TISON
and
RENE
R.
DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the
title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in
the estate proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in
character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve
title. 33 In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court
went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to
determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property
between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of
the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate
court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate
action. We reiterate:
. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which
takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has
power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded
therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit. 34
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque
property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate
estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein
to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired
to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado,
59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In
accordance with the provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil
Code, it was the duty of the plaintifs to allege and prove
that the donations received by the defendants were
inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence
of evidence to that efect, the collation sought is untenable
for lack of ground or basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this
case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in
ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We note that what was

Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew
of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister
of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on
March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived
only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they
seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute.
Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo
and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action
for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of
the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo
however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as
the lone witness, with documentary evidences ofered to prove
petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter
rested their case and submitted a written ofer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintifs
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father

nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of
the property in question by right of representation.

Ruling:
1.

The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn

the legitimacy of herein petitioners.

There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and

founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an
insult to his memory.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning
the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code
(Article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
2.

The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner
by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case,
to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of

the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But
if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the
entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners
and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered
by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
4. G.R. No. L-2599

October 27, 1905

PAVIA vs. UGARTE

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of
December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be
judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.

There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct

ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented
herself
as
a
collateral
descendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased.
Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased,
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manual Iturralde and
Josefa Gonzalez.
The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to
the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were
instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of
January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the
deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.
In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her
guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the
deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time
that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful
heir of the deceased a fact which this new relative did not
deny be required to render an account of the property of the estate.
The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of
succession as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of
Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y
Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. They, and
Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common trunk from which the
three branches issue.
Carmen Linart does not claim that her father, Pablo, who was of the
same degree as Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, should have succeeded
Ramon, for the reason that the latter died first. This, however, was not
alleged, mush less proved. What she claims is that, although she is one
degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana
Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the
deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation that is
to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same
share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e
Iturralde.lawphil.net
The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment
declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the
inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the
latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same
time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had
been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte excepted to
the judgment and has brought the case to this court.
After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative
nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of
the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil
Code); and (2) that the right of representation in the collateral line
shall take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether
they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).
In the light of the foregoing, the error which the appellant claims was
committed in the court below is very clearly shown. The court below
held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate
that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of
representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintif in this
case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is
the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It
would have been quite diferent had it been shown that her father,
Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have
succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then,
by representation, she, the plaintif, might have inherited the portion of
the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider
that the word "children" in this connection does not include
"grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant
such a conclusion.
The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and
December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those
decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to
intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by
the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code,
where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing,
that the property should pass to their children, it was held that
"Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and
that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit
by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed

the child in the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last
decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision,
"the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer
of the complaint that the action was based upon the right of
representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which
he had under the terms of the will." The diference is this, that in the
case of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration
and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the
children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are
ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are
expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should
only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that
the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond
the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.
We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the
deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because
the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not
obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which
would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintif, had
survived his deceased uncle.
For the reasons above stated, we hereby reverse the judgment of the
court below, and declare that Carmen Linart has no right to succeed
the deceased with said Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once
declared to be the lawful heir, and who is now in possession of the
estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the injunction issued from the
Court of First Instance.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, without special provisions as to the costs of this
instance, and let the record be remanded to the court of First Instance
from whence it came for execution of the said judgment. So ordered.

(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on

January 27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 8,065
(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia Salao, with an area of 11,678
square meters, of which 2,173 square meters were sold to Justa Yongco
. . . . . . . . . .9,505
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 179,022 square
meters
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a
distributive share valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive
share, Valentin Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was
given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a
smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and the riceland
with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an
aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's
distributive share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to
his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was
obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was
beneficial to Valentin.
In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte
de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la
referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion
de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". It was expressly
stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any
accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado
satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella
las contribusiones (pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).
By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueos absolutos de sus
respectivas propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de
sus bienes, en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las
adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).

5. G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

SALAO vs. SALAO,
This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio
Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and
prescription. The facts are as follows:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit,
Malabon, Rizal begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan
(Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son,
Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part
of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After
her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918
but notarized on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her
four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and
Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his
deceased father, Patricio.
The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were
as follows:
Nature of Lands
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her
parents, Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of
which
was
owned
by
her
co-owner,
Josefa
Sta.
Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares
purchased from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on
November 9, 1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square
meters, the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 5,217
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of

Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia
Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at
Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No.
540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became
a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
Plaintifs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had
engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is
not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintifs' version is that
Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture,
that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly
inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the
acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary
evidence to support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran
fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in their
Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintifs.
However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran
fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the
exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.
Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de
retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period
of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia
confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueos
proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the
vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of
lease for an anual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914
Ambrosia and Juan sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the
sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh. 20).
The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the
vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of

Lands reveals that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205
square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia
Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by
Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).
Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911
Ambrosia Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of
Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted to bacawan and nipa
with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio
Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).
The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office
Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that
Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration
of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their
petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes iguales y por la
compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a).
At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir,
Ambrosia testified for the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir
rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio
Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge
Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre
de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa
Diega Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de
edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e).
On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for
the said land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March
12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.
That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No.
544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran
fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years
(Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the
age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However,
if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he
would be sixty-three years old in 1933).
The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on
December 28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo
and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two
fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother,
Valentina Ignacio.
If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and
Lewa fishponds with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911
and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan
Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest
was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.
It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated
to her grandniece, plaintif Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio
Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exit. L). As donee
Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.
On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to
her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond
if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of
Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.
But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia
Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance
of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which
had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a
year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to
senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she
donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question
to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with
Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the
said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
(Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property

owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said
properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page
39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a
letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients
had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took
possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's
children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly
amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically
stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two
fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and
that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint
against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January
28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S.
Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond
as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of
fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia
Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility
of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the
Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked
for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the
premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the
receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one.
He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children
and by the administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two
fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal
shares with the condition that the properties would remain under
administration during the pendency of this case (page 181,
Defendants' Record on Appeal).
After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten
printed pages dismissed the amended complaint and the counterclaim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the
testimonies of plaintifs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo,
Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio
Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio
Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui Damaso de la Pea, Arturo Alcuriza
and Francisco Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six
witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor
Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintifs
presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal
witness).
The trial court found that there was no community of property among
Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the
Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a coownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among
her heirr after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was
administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when
her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson,
Valentin Salao.
The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914
to 1918 misled the plaintifs and their witnesses and caused them to
believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or
thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if valentin had a hand in
the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he
must have done so on a salary or profit- sharing basis. It conjectured
that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia
Salao a portion of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his
services or because of Ambrosia's afection for her grandnieces.
The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime
to assail the Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was
not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the
testimonies of plaintifs' witnesses because their memories could not
be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence supported

the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust

were already dead.
It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it
were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole
legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the
properties donated to him.
Both parties appealed. The plaintifs appealed because their action for
reconveyance was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their
counterclaim for damages was dismissed.
The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to
the Court of Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two
hundred thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to
this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).
Plaintiffs' appeal. An appellant's brief should contain "a subject
index index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument
and page references" to the contents of the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46,
1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of Court).
The plaintifs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not
comply with that requirement. Their statements of the case and the
facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in
section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48 of the
1940 Rules of Court.
Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well
to read and re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with
the formal requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make a
competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten
the burden of the Court.
What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work
upon this Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants,
undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the
testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one witnesses having
testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make such
examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and
brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177,
181). As noted in an old case, this Court decides hundreds of cases
every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally
considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters
(Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re Almacen, L27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).
Plaintifs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In
paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of action they made certain
averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third
interest in the two fishponds which were registrered in the names of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all
the allegations" in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action
with the qualification that Original certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472
were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and
Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s
"positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the in
the amended complaint".
The plaintifs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in efect
tin admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there
was a co-ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all
surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or
1905; that the common funds were invested the acquisition of the two
fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally
adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a
verbal stipulation to to register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y.
Salao".
That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of
Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific dinial a
statement of matters in accordance of the cause or causes of action
asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule requires the
defendant to "deal specificaly with each material allegation of fact the
truth of wihich he does not admit and, whenever practicable shall set
forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support
his denial". "Material averments in the complaint, other than those as
to the amount damage, shall be deemed admitted when specifically

denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth set forth by answer as
many affirmative defenses as he may have. All grounds of defenses as
would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must
be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).
What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in
his "positive defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintifs' first
cause of action which which supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to
10 and 12 of the first cause of action. Obviously, he did so because he
found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own version as to the
acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious
recital of the ultimate facts contradicting allegations of the first cause
of action.
We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the
1940 Rules of Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of
Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of t the material fact or
facts alleged in the complaint essential to plaintif's cause of causes of
action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of
new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by the plaintif." Affirmative defenses include all matters set
up "by of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).
The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and
similar cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In the El
Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the
statement that it denied "generally ans specifically each and every
allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". It
did not set forth in its answer any matters by way of confession and
avoidance. It did not interpose any matters by way of confession and
avoidance. It did not interpose any affirmative defenses.
Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial
was really a general denial which was tantamount to an admission of
the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the
pleadings. That is not the situation in this case.
The other nine assignments of error of the plaintifs may be reduced to
the decisive issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust
for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue
is tied up with the question of whether plaintifs' action for
reconveyance had already prescribed.
The plaintifs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which
defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust
was not definitely alleged in plaintifs' complaint. They mentioned trust
for the first time on page 2 of their appelants' brief.
To determine if the plaintifs have a cause of action for the
enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to maek some exegesis on the
nature of trusts (fideicomosis). Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence
were derived from thefideicommissa of the Roman law (Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable
solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title
to which is vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently
employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are
not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712).
A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom
confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another
person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the
trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440,
Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and
the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money
or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the
intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being
by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by
parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence"
(Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason
de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October
30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are

created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing
or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an
intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 72).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction asmatters of intent, or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matter of
equity,independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89
C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or
created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted
sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed to have
been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be
found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed
or instrument of conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting
trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla
vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179;
Martinez vs. Grao 42 Phil. 35).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by
construction of law, or arising by operation of law". In a more restricted
sense and as contra-distinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive
trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly
evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise "by
agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).
Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes" (Art.
1456, Civil Code).
Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment,
courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive
trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a
trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P. I., 49
Phil. 244).
Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintifs
to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in
favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was ofered by them to
prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of
the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin
Salao is legally untenable.
It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil
Code (already in force when the action herein was instituted) are
peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove
an express trust concerning realty.
Is plaintifs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust,
resulting or constructive, regarding the two fishponds?
Plaintifs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an
implied trust. The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no
community of property during the lifetime of Valentina; Ignacio or
before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence.
The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly
inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintifs'
contention that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin
Salao.

1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight

hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by
the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs'
complaints.
The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered
about seventeen hectares of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the
time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in
Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those
eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case
of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.
It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would
be adjudicated to Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth. Incredible
because for the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by
Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of
twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs. Surely,
for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among
three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have
sufficed.
The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident
when it is borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land
and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and
afects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that any
transaction afecting the registered land should be evidenced by a
registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-ininterest, the plaintifs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years
to procure any documentary evidence to establish his supposed
interest ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the
absence of such interest.
The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the
deed of partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag notarized in 1919
(Exh. 21). The plaintifs assert that the two fishponds were verbally
partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned
to Valentin Salao as his share.
Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was
obligated to pay P3,355.25 to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the
plaintifs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the
custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in
the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due
from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of
the earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a
shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the
two fishponds.
The plaintifs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust
must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It
cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267,
1273).
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence;
certainty of proof. Where a trust is to be established by
oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently
strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as
much certainty as if a document proving the trust were
shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals
of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive
proof. (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol
testimony. In order to establish a trust in real property by
parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if
the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an
authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established
upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises
based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del
Rosario 50 Phil. 110).

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is

quite improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was
likewise not satisfactorily proven. The plaintifs alleged in their original
complaint that there was a co-ownership over two hectares of land left
by Manuel Salao. In their amended complaint, they alleged that the coownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio
Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds,
ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an
area of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares pertained to
Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's
estate.

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code
which, as already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral
evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied
trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the
nucleus, nay the very root, of the property now in litigation (page 6,
plaintifs-appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven by
any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the

ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong
presumption exists. that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that
they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof

as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing

(Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their
claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of

common ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio,
and that plaintifs' action was based on their honest supposition that
the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings
of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao.

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any
intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin
Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the
registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia
was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy
the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran
fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the
heirs of Valentin Salao.

Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude

that plaintifs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended
to harass the defendants. An award for damages to the defendants
does not appear to be just and proper.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintifs' action is
clearly barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872,
December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114
Phil. 377).
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there
were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive
prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado,
103 Phil. 261, 266).
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written
extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintifs in
1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than
forty years from the date of registration. The plaintifs and their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had
any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who
is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21
Phil. 518, 521).
"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a
lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to
assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded".
"Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintif in seeking to
enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may,
according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441).

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not

maliciously instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the
law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14
SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra). The instant case is not among the
cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein
moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as
analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.
The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could
not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right
is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who
may exercise it erroneously. (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779).
The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which
provides that attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintif" (defendant is
a plaintif in his counterclaim) or "in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should he awarded.
But once it is conceded that the plaintifs acted in good faith in filing
their action there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the
defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20
SCRA 61).
It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An
adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's
fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020,
1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959).
6. Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintifs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon
the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao,
Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintifs have no right
and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintifs would not have
any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of
Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the
third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died,
would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan,
Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent
him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral
line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil
Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or greatgandnephews like the plaintifs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintifs' complaint.
Defendants' appeal. The defendants dispute the lower court's
finding that the plaintifs filed their action in good faith. The defendants
contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintifs acted
maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000
attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition, moral
damages.
We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows
that the plaintifs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted
trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought
tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in
prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action turned out to be

GR No. L-66574

(150 SCRA 645)

June 17, 1987

Nature: Petition for Review

Doctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the
legitimate family
Facts:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother

Juliana were the only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and
Petronilla;
Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa
and another child who died during infancy;
Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo;
Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and
Simona;
Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976;
Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona and six minor natural children: four minor children with
Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta.
1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona
Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their
minor children file for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa
from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona
1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from
further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an
heir of Simona

Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her
appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring her as the
sole heir of Simona

Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? Felisa
Ruling: The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil
Code
Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are
illegitimate.
Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other
civilists:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation
was admitted only within the legitimate family.
An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines adhered to this principle
since it reproduced Art 943 in its own Art 992, but with fine
inconsistency in subsequent articles (990, 995, 998) which
allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass
to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

7. G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of
petitioner:

(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim.

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on
July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra
Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter,
Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944,
while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be
the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of
properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate
of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein,
Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes,
described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant
Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived
from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof
until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share
therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted
exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that
petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a
valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently
executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September
1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted,
finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove
ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration
having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was
filed of the following assignment of errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION
ARE
THE
EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES
OF
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.

(a) Declaring plaintif Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and

heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;

III. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE

GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO
INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.

(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the

properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants
Maria Cailles and James Bracewen

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be

the exclusive properties of the private respondents.

(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant
Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are
afected;

There being two properties in this case both will be

discussed separately, as each has its own distinct factual
setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under
a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:

(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this
decision, of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant
Maria Cailles and plaintif Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30
days from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the
fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintif
Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6%
per annum;
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and
severally plaintif Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio

dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a
la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el
solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la
via ferrea delRailroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle
Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty
taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and
her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca
Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the
land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and
declared the same in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously
thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he
had some proprietary right over the same.

The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by

Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which
describes the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal,
que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso
Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo
Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y
por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una
extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax
in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when
she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in
Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in the
first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking
that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintif filed the
instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly
represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the
plaintif principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently
show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are
the same as the properties sought by the plaintif.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge
misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in
question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that
the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal
which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the
time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via
ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the
description fits the land now being sought by the plaintif, as this
property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R.
Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the
property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and
the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several
decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration
and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have
occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in
Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property
from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to
doubt that this property is the same, if not Identical to the property in
Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintif.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from
Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries
to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her
name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24,
1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of
fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on
certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established
rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by
the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this
Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None
of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence,
there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the
following findings:

Going to the issue of filiation, plaintif claims that he is the son of

Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of
Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased
Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in
1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintif can consequently succeed to
the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintif submitted in evidence his alleged birth
certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to
Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation
of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking
for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased
Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way
lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate
is not that of the plaintif but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born
on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other
than his bare allegation, plaintif did not submit any durable evidence
showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is
no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to
go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintif failed to
prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where
he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this
petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is
not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when
he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be
reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner.
8. G.R. No. 5343

September 16, 1910

RODRIGUEZ vs. RAVILAN

On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in
representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan,
the guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and
Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other
things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the
pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion,
Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among
themselves the said property, consisting of lands situated in the said
pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions which pertained to four
of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and
these latter continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to
their shares, and were also associated in business separately from
their other coheirs.
The property of the said four children, which remained undivided,
consists of one parcel of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of
an area such as is usually sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on
the north by property of Damasa Manlili, on the south by that of
Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west
by that of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the
barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area usually covered in
sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on the north by the
street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio
Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio
Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio
and of and an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn,
bounded on the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the south

by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on the west by
the property of Marcelo Oano.
That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained
from these lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of
Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of
seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by property of
Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuez, and Feliciano
Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area
sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the
property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano
Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west by
that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of
sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano
Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of
an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the
north, south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico
Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively;
another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north, south, east,
and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another
parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon,
Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel,
situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area
sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and
west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian,
and Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the
pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by
lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and
Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of
Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on
the north, south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix
Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow
carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle,
acquired by the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against
Laureano Soliano, secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of
Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.
That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common
accord, administered by one of them Espiridion Barte, and, when he
died, the three survivors remained united in their interest and the
undivided property was administered, until December, 1901, by Pedro
Barte, who at his death four heirs, the said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia,
and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa Ravilan, the wife and
widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the said
property, as aforesaid, was administered by Espiridion Barte, in
common accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving
heirs, by force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his
brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of
kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother
and sisters continued their partnership organization and appointed the
brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter's administration,
Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza,
represented by his father Donato, one of the plaintifs; that at the
death of Pedro Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the name of
their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the
guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree
to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix of that
property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and
the debts having been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself,
the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely
refused to do, and that she continued in the possession and to enjoy
the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or intervention of
the plaintifs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea
Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia,
and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the property in question,
which should be divided among them in three equal parts, one to be
allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to
the heirs of Pedro Barte.
The demand further recites that the plaintifs desire that a division be
made and therefore pray that a partition of the property, both real and
personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued
thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct
enjoyed by the defendant, in accordance with the respective rights of
the parties, and that, in case that the distribution can not be made
without detriment to such rights, the property be ordered sold and the
proceeds divided among the parties. The plaintif requested also that
the costs of the suit be assessed against the defendant.

A demurrer to the complaint was interposed, although the record does

not show how it was decided. The defendants in their answer denied all
the allegations of the amended complaint.
The case came to trial and, the testimony having been adduced by
both parties, the exhibits being attached to the record, the judge, in
view of the conclusions reached therefrom and on the date of
November 4, 1907, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintifs, by
ordering the partition of the property mentioned, in the manner and
portions expressed in the judgment, and decreeing that such partition
must be made in accordance with section 185 to 195 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, with respect to the real property, and that the five
carabaos should be distributed in three equal allotments in the manner
determined for the real property. The costs were charged to the
plaintifs and assessed against the divisible property.
Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment and prayed for its
annulment and a new trial. The motions was overruled, to which
exception was taken, and the appellant duly presented his bill of
exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court.
A demand is made in the complaint for the partition of the common
property held undividedly by four brothers and sisters who formed a
partnership for the use and enjoyment of the same.
In relating the origin of a part of the property of the four brothers and
sisters joined in partnership, the plaintifs stated that their deceased
parents, Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno, left at their death nine children,
above mentioned, and property consisting of carabaos, a credit, and
lands situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and that, their property
having been divided among their nine children, that portion thereof
which corresponded to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia,
Matea, and Pedro remained undivided and its owners, associated
together, continued to enjoy it and manage it in common, separately
from their other brothers and sisters.
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said
nine brothers and sisters were unquestionably the children of the
deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it
should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made
among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their
death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of
Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and
sisters associated together, were awarded to the same. Such a
partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document,
which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the
Civil Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to
him."
Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not
exhibited, if it had been shown that the Mandaue lands had been
awarded by partition to the four brothers and sisters aforementioned,
there would have beenprima facie proof that they were and certainly
are the owners thereof.
Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or
holding real estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy
in common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter
prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an
action for partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintif's
title and contain an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded, and name each tenant in common, coparcener,
or other person interested therein, as defendants."
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must
have the status of a coproprietor or coowner of the property the
partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that Jorgia
Barte and the son of Matea Barte, through his representative, aver that
they are the coowners of the said Mandaue lands of others situated in
the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their
averment by titles which establish the common ownership alleged. A
mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant
party, representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte,
absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn
testimony that, as the guardian of her children, she had an interest in
the lands situated in Mandaue and that the parcels of land situated in

Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her deceased husband, Pedro
Barte; but she positively affirmed that the seven parcels of land
situated in Bogo were acquired by her said husband during his lifetime
and during his marriage with her, and she exhibited five documents,
one of them the original of a possessory information, as titles proving
the ownership of her said husband.
Against the averment of the plaintifs appear that of the defendant, in
the name of her four daughters, the heirs of Pedro Barte, and while the
plaintif party exhibited no title of ownership whatever, not even of the
lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo and which the defendant affirmed
were acquired by her deceased husband, Pedro Barte, during his
lifetime, it is an indisputable fact that the latter's widow, who in her
own behalf and in the name of her four daughters claims the exclusive
ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the present time in possession
thereof, and moreover showed documents which prove the acquisition
of some of them. The testimony of the defendant to the efect that she
only had a share in the lands of Mandaue, but not in those situated in
Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she positively
affirmed that those situated in Bogo belonged to her husband and to
herself. As she is in possession of these lands, and as the record of the
trial shows no proof that they belonged to the joint association or
partnership existing between the said four brothers and sisters, there
are no legal provisions that would support the issuance of an order for
the partition of the said lands in Bogo, of which the widow of their
alleged former owner is now in possession.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed
that the parties are all coowners or coproprietors of the undivided
property to be partitioned. The question of common ownership need
not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner,
and in what proportion the said property of common ownership shall be
distributed among the interested parties by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be
remembered that the hereditary succession of the deceased Espiridion
Barte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his death, should
be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who may have
survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his
deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stirpes,
are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the provisions of
articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which
prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers
of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capitaand the latter per
stirpes," representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or
sisters of the deceased.
The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir
at her death, and if she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in
the manner provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four
brothers and sisters can not afect the hereditary rights which belong
to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in interest successions.
(Arts. 744, 763, 806, 808, 913, 946, Civil Code.)

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa
Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his
illegitimate
child,9 and
the de
facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by
one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to
the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of
Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa
Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12with whom Felisa had a
son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine
whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate
half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the
principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado
and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados
intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never
married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever
presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated
that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances
of
his
father. 16 Nevertheless,
oppositors
(now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was
survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining
properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of

the judgment appealed from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that
the partition prayed for be denied, and to absolve, as we do hereby
absolve, the defendant Luisa Ravilan from the complaint, without
special finding as to costs.
9. G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

VDA. DE DE LA ROSA vs. VDA. DE DAMIAN

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the
May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by
the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs
of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues
that complicate its resolution.

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa

Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners
point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as
one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the
absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to
Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,

1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated
that he was married to Josefa Delgado.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to

dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia
was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue
and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for
her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa as administratrix of both estates. 27The dispositive portion of the
decision read:

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no
children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to
father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth
in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenorrespondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the
University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia
has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that
her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement
since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat
he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was overtaken by his
death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman
Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis
Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia"
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; 26 (2) the heirs of
Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on
the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants
were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in
the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was
amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her coclaimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the
Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to
partition the same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the
sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado
executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET
ASIDE and declared of no force and efect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and
their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in
accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the
estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the
intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the
estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue
to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her
filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates,
and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all
her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the
ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and
after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the
interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution
of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file
the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997,
this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion
of our decision 33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed.
However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts

pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the
determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the
appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in
the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an
attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a
fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:

A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the
private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial
courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of
Appeals amended its earlier decision. 36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:
With
the
further
modification,
our
assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the
trial
court
is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
A
new
one
is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal
heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition
his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.)
the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from
the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates
and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of
the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice
of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba
Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
afected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred
to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had
simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested
marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado
as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may
be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of
identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath
of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo
Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony
they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate 45 was conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no
proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the
law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of
the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the
questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado
with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong,
may overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose
merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the
face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2)
Luis
Delgados
and
Caridad
Concepcions Partida
de
Casamiento 49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame
the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her
natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman,
C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children
and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is
unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent diferent from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and
sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition
on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families
does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has
for its basis the diference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such diference when all the children
are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
diferent persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law,
just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore,
that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters
should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally. 53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her
by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since
they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.
Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in
the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised
by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still
alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado
at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001
of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo
could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule
74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of
the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of
the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter
on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code
that was in efect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
ofense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. 65 On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must
likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public

instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did

intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card
of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian
holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published
in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary
was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself
and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia
Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at
all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed,
but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that the administration
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be

represented in the management of the estates, 72a situation which
obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED. 2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall
inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining
half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or halfsiblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of
her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado
who are entitled to share in her estate. 3. Guillermo Rustias estate
(including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be
inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the
late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased,
their respective shares shall pertain to their estates. 4. Letters of
administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as
joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.