DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs SENATE OF PHILIPPINES

GR No. 196271
October 18, 2011
FACTS
(mag-chronology ko of events in case mangayo si Sir ug historical background sa passage sa
Organic Law of ARMM)

A number of laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

were enacted by Congress

RA 6734 established the ARMM; scheduled the 1st regular elections for the regional
officials of ARMM on date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification (November 6, 1990)

RA 9054 - refinement of the basic ARMM structure (Organic Law); reset the
regular elections of ARMM officials to the 2nd Monday of September 2001; ratified in
a plebiscite on Aug. 4, 2001

RA 9140 reset the regular elections of ARMM officials from 2 nd Monday of Sept.
2001 to November 26, 2001

RA 9333 reset the ARMM regional elections to 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter; was not ratified in a plebiscite

Now under RA 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been on Aug. 8,
2011 but on June 30, 2011, Congress passed RA 10153 (mao ni ang gi-assail ani
nga case) resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections
o

Contents of RA 10153:
Reset the ARMM elections from Aug. 8, 2011 to 2 nd Monday of
May 2013 and every 3 years thereafter to coincide with
national and local elections

Granted the President the power to appoint OICs for the ARMM
Regional Officers (Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor,
and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly) who shall
perform functions until the elected officials will assume office
following the May 2013 elections

Petitioners in this case now assail the constitutionality of RA 10153 (House Rep. Edcel
Lagman, Atty. Romulo Macalintal, Louis Biraogo, House Rep. Jacinto Paras, etc.)
Arguments of Petitioners:
1) RA 10153 amends RA 9054 (Organic ARMM Law) therefore it should
comply with the supermajority and plebiscite requirement under RA
9054 (i-explain lang nko unsa ni ang supermajority requirement
later)
2) Unconstitutional for failing to comply with the 3-Readings-on-Separate
Days Rule (hello Consti 1 review)
3) Challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the elected
officials shall assume office (mao jud ni atong topic sa Pub Corp)

RULING:
Main Issue: WON RA 10153 is constitutional? YES, RA 10153 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Since under Holdover Principle man ni nga topic, I will go immediately to the ruling on
holdover capacity and synchronization..

I. SYNCHRONIZATION OF ELECTIONS and HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE

(1) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of the ARMM elections with that of the
national and local elections? YES, the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of the ARMM elections with that of the national and local
elections
While the Constitution does not expressly sate that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Art. XVIII) of the Constitution which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor
and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
Now, to achieve such synchronization of elections, Congress had to reconcile the schedule of
the ARMM elections (Aug. 2011 based on RA 9333) and the national & local elections (May
2013 based on RA 7166). During the oral arguments in this case, the Court identified 3
options in order for Congress to resolve the problem..

(2) What were the 3 options open to Congress to resolve the problem on synchronization of
elections? Which of the following options are constitutional?
A. Allow the incumbent elective ARMM officials remain in office in a holdover
capacity pursuant to Sec. 7(1), Art. VII of RA 9054 until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office (HOLDOVER OPTION) - unconstitutional
B. Hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office
(SPECIAL ELECTION OPTION) unconstitutional
C. Authorize the President to appoint OICs pursuant to RA 10153 until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office (APPOINTMENT OF OIC
option) CONSTITUTIONAL

(2) What were the underlying premises why RA 10153 was passed by Congress?
The decision of Congress to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national
elections and local elections left it with the problem to how to provide the ARMM with
governance in the intervening period (between expiration of the term of the incumbent
officials on Aug. 2008 AND the assumption of office of those who will win the synchronized
elections in May 2013).

The need for INTERIM MEASURES is dictated by NECESSSITY; out-of-the-way

arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal
or objective in sight in a manner that does not violate the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms.

Leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members

of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2
years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic
services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the
regional government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a
reasonable measure to take.

(3) Is the Holdover Option constitutional? If not, why? UNCONSTITUTIONAL since it

VIOLATES Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution providing for the three year-term limit
rule for elective local officials
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms.
Since elective ARMM officials are LOCAL OFFICIALS, they are covered and bound by
the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution hence they CANNOT EXTEND
their term through a holdover.
The primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so
determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. If at all, Congress may
only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to
implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing.
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

(3.1) Can it be argued instead that the Holdover Period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress? NO, it cannot be claimed that the holdover period is
another term mandated by Congress since the RESULT would for Congress
to CREATE A NEW TERM and to APPOINT THE OCCUPANT for the new term
which is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Ang point ni Court is that dili allowed si Congress to create a new term for elective
local officials and appoint an occupant to the said position for the new term;
remember, the term limit sa elective local officials is already set sa Constitution,
walay power si Congress to override (shorten or extend) the term limit provided
under the Consitution
This view is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly (i.e. to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the

incumbents). Congress cannot create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional
appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

(3.2) But there were SC cases before (Sambarani vs COMELEC, Montesclaros vs COMELEC)
which ruled that elective officials could hold on to their positions in a holdover capacity,
how does this reconcile with the case at bar? All those past cases refer to
ELECTIVE BARANGAY or SK officials whose TERMS OF OFFICE are NOT
EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION.
So in effect, it can be said that ang holdover capacity of incumbent elective officials
may be upheld by the Court with respect to Barangay and SK officials, BUT NOT TO
other local elective officials whose terms are limited under the Constitution
The present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot
legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.

(3.1) Assuming that the holdover principle is constitutionally allowed, can the rule on
holdover apply as an available option? NO, the rule on HOLDOVER can ONLY
APPLY as an available option WHERE NO EXPRESS or IMPLIED LEGISLATIVE
INTENT TO THE CONTRARY EXISTS; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident
Ana si Court, even if constitutionally allowed ang holdover principle for local elective
officials, dili japon siya available option because there was a contrary legislative
intent i.e. under RA 10153, Congress opted to authorize the President to power to
appoint OICs during the interim period igka expire sa term sa mga incumbent ARMM
officials
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely
removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this
Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

(4) Is the Special Election option constitutional? If not, why? UNCONSTITUTIONAL since
COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER SPECIAL ELECTIONS
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. No
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either
the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,

Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections. The Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion. But SC power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
The constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress
to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Statutorily, COMELEC has
no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law i.e.,
by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections.

(4.1) Assuming that Court can compel COMELEC to hold special elections, does the
Court have the power to shorten the term of elective officials? NO, Court cannot
shorten the terms of elective local officials.
In the same way that term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, THE TERM CANNOT BE SHORTENED BY PUTTING AN EXPIRATION
DATE EARLIER THAN 3 YEARS that the Constitution provides. This is what will
happen a term of less than 2 years if a call for special elections shall prevail. Not
even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of
elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution.

(5) Is the power of the President to appoint OICs, under RA 10153, for the interim period until
the newly elected ARMM officials assume office constitutional? CONSTITUTIONAL, the
appointment of the President of OICs to govern ARMM during
synchronization period is the only measure that Congress can make.

the pre-

(5.1) What are the 4 groups of officer under the power of appointment of the President
(Consti 1 review)?
A. Heads of executive departments; ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the AFP, from the rank of colonel to
naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution
B. All other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law
C. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
D. Officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the President alone
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

RA 10153 DID NOT AMEND RA 9054. In fact, RA 10153 provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an INTERIM
MEASURE responding to the adjustments that synchronization requires.
=======================================
In case ganahan pa mu-chika si Sir sa uban issues in this case
II. SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENT under RA 9054
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be re-amended
or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when
approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held
not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment
or revision.

(6) Does RA 9333 or RA 10153 amend RA 9054 such that both laws, particularly the latter, has to
comply with the supermajority requirement? NO, RA 9333 and RA 10153 DOES NOT
AMEND RA 9054; RA 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections
and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for Congress to
fix the date of subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA 9333
and later RA 10153.
RA 9333 and RA 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA 9054 as they DID
NOT CHANGE or REVISE ANY PROVISION in RA 9054, they merely filled in the gap
in RA 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections

(6.1) What is this supermajority requirement under RA 9054?

Under RA 9054, the Organic act of ARMM can only be amended by Congress
upon a vote of 2/3 of the members of House of Reps AND members of senate,
VOTING SEPARATELY.
Now, under our Constitution (Sec. 16 (2), Art. VI) a majority of each House
shall constitute quorum meaning as long as majority of members of House
of Reps or Senate are present, quorum is already complied. So by saying nga
need pa ug 2/3 votes to amend the law, in effect gi-enlarge niya ang mere
majority requirement under the Constitution.
(6.2)

Is

the

supermajority

requirement

under

RA

9054

constitutional?

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, since it gives RA 9054 the character of an irrepealable

law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands; significantly

constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less

than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution
requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
(6.3)

Is

the

plebiscite

requirement

under

RA

9054

constitutional?

UNCONSTITUTIONAL since it enlarged the plebiscite requirement under Sec.

18, Art. X of the Constitution

Under Sec. 18, Art. X of the Constitution, the plebiscite requirement for the
creation of an autonomous region means that only amendments or revisions
to the Organic act which are constitutionally-essential to its creation shall be
require ratification through a plebiscite:
These amendments requiring a plebiscite would only include:
o Basic structure of the regional government
o Judicial system (i.e. special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction)
o Grant and extent of legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government
In this case, the date of ARMM elections DOES NOT FALL under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in
the Organic Act. Any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment to the Organic Act that would require plebiscite.
III. THREE-READINGS-ON-SEPARATE DAYS rule
(7) Does the passage of RA 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate days rule under Sec. 26
(2), Art VI of the Constitution? NO, due to the Presidents certification of the urgency
of RA 10153

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative
discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted
RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power
of judicial review.

===============
Warning full text ahead
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

DECISION
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-incharge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional ViceGovernor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied
after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of

this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an

organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted
autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X
of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic
act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22,
2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No.
9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to
not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
(HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition
filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both HB
No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well
for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also
assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member
of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled
for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus [9] against
the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.
and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit
their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention datedJuly 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court
ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB
No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the
parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20)
days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials
of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided
by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert
that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of
the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the
elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments
of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of
the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall
have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues

From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by
the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority
vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections

constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA
No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section
18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the

ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

and

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

thereby UPHOLD the

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city
or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining
the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
[10]
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This

intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional

Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmena v. Commission
on Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the VicePresident have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year
noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every
three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will
have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x
x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be

included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based
on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. [15] As this Court explained in People v.

Derilo,[16] [a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the

Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153 (ThreeReadings-On Separate-Days Rule)
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.
10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.

The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate
enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the
Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the

requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings
in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had
to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of

Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis

supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their

legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification
for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due
our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must
always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending
bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to
Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote
on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities
to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act
may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of

two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the

Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become
effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides
for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the
date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular
elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA
No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change
or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA
No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date
of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs
recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date
of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM
elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No. 8753,
[28]
and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA
No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no
need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31,
2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140[30] to reset the date of
the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the

plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress
to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress
only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153
without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section
1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority
of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these
bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills,
and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City

of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a

legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce
new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34] (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a

limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite
requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in
its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the
settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the

plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, [35] questions on the extent of

the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly
general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these
wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in
the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those

that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters
that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the
plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be
construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166
already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for
local
governments
(with
the
exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the

schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow
the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a
hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054,
until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office;[38]
(2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms
of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or
(3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to
Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V.

The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A.

Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material

premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as
recognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of
civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
[41]
Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative

power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or
implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of
Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found
in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic
law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of
Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power as
they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is
otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must
be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article
X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular,
the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative
matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of

national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in

the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15. [44] In other words, the Constitution
and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium
et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,
the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a
narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of
Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation
that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the
national,
congressional
and
all
other
local
elections
(save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the
expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office
twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections
on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal
landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide
measures for transition from the old constitution to the new [46] and for the
introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired
under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing
regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us
today.
The creation of local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat

Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim

governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to
serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified.
[50]
A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government
from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; outof-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to
adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to
the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization
that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with
it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive
and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that
Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are

covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the

Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover . As this Court

put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by
an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which
is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.
[Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmena ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as

the supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined
or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary

corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the
constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at
all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by
legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may

only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at

three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended

by holdover by Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated
by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the

occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [56] Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of
holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court.
The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly
from Sambarani
v.
COMELEC,[57] Adap
v.
Comelec,
[58]
[59]
and Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective officials
could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective
officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term limit
set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which
they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as

an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to

the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a

policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the

exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass

upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature,
as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on

any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have

delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details
in the execution of that power.[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the

scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.
[64]
But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges,
we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the
COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the
date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily,
COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special
elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True,
Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to
postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only
be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law.
We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested
party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are

afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election

therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address

instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have to
be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled
elections. These analogous causes are further defined by the phrase of such nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the

elections
do
not
occur
or
had
ofunexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

to

be

suspended

because

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections

is by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same
character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881,
which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts,
to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation,
nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly,
neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this
Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special
elections.
D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule

that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the
ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have
assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective
officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court,
has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of
less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum,
while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an
express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be
elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court
has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would
commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA
No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those

whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the

heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public

ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank
of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth,

officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law

vest in the President alone.[74]

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates

from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not

amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for

synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that
must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.

Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and

simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that
the synchronization requires.
[75]

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an

unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment
period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them

may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic

regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative
governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,
with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt
the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
communitys choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures
have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units [76] and
the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces .[77] These

measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the
synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional interests
involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the
exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the
essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the
given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not
necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner
and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments
that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation
of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in
a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten
that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse,
can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they
transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning
Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our
mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an
absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative

Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier

pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem
ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice

Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant
for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions
and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the
proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and
in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in

this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionallyrecognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable
measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates

synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in
constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importance over
the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. [82] We refer to
the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from
the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a
manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional

autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in
the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its
governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence.
The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger
framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the
Constitution for regional autonomous determination . As reflected during the

constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the
central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the
autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as
complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is

Section 17, Article X of the
Section 1 of the same Article
Constitution and the national
Republic of the Philippines.

fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted

Constitution, and by the express reservation under
that autonomy shall be within the framework of this
sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove

Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration
of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision
in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of
the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised
by the national government[.][85] Of note is the Courts pronouncement
in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated
to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country
to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policysetting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to

defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of

elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the

ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the

ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act
in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than
the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused
of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no
reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only

reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid. [91] Congress, thus,
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared inGarcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of

constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.