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G.R. No.

112872

Alexander Ty in order to generate funds for the payment of deficiency estate

April 19, 2001

THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALEXANDER T. TY, represented by the


Administratrix,

SYLVIA

S.

TY,

petitioner,

taxes in the sum of P4,714,560.00.


Private respondent Alejandro Ty then filed two complaints for the recovery of

vs.

the properties mentioned. Private respondent claims that the subject

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ILDEFONSO E.GASCON, and ALEJANDRO

properties are bought through his money even if said properties are placed

B. TY, respondents.

in the name of Alexander Ty.


Motions to dismiss were filed by petitioner. Claiming that An express trust

G.R. No. 114672

between private respondent Alejandro and his deceased son Alexander.

April 19, 2001

SYLVIA S. TY, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate


of

Alexander

T.

Ty,

petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondents.

The motions to dismiss were denied. Petitioner then filed petitions for
certiorari in the , which were also dismissed for lack of merit. Thus, the
present petitions now before the Court.
Petitioner contends that private respondent is attempting to enforce an
unenforceable express trust over the disputed real property. Petitioner is in
error when she contends that an express trust was created by private

Doctrine: A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase
money of an estate and places the title in the name of another, because of
the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest
therein for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the
parties.

respondent when he transferred the property to his son.


Issue/s: Was an express trust created?
Held: No.
Express trusts are those that are created by the direct and positive acts of

Facts: Petitioner Sylvia S. Ty was married to Alexander T. Ty, son of private

the parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an

respondent Alejandro B. Ty, on January 11, 1981. Alexander died of

intention to create a trust. On the other hand, implied trusts are those which,

leukemia on May 19, 1988 and was survived by his wife, petitioner Sylvia,

without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by

and only child, Krizia Katrina. In the settlement of his estate, petitioner was

operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention

appointed administratrix of her late husbands intestate estate.

of the parties.

On November 4, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for leave to sell or mortgage

In the cases at hand, private respondent contends that the pieces of property

properties(a parcel of land and shares of stock in different companies) of

were transferred in the name of the deceased Alexander for the purpose of

taking care of the property for him and his siblings. Such transfer having
been effected without cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.
A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of an

of twenty years in accordance with Article 870 of the Civil


Code. The petitioners came to court to move for the
dissolution of the trust having already existed for more than
twenty years.

estate and places the title in the name of another, because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein
for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties. Such

Issues:

a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4, p.


678).
If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may

a
a

be proven by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil Code), and it matters not

w/n the trust should be dissolved


w/n petitioners are entitled to inherit the
remaining properties

whether property is real or personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,


Annotated, Vol. 4, p. 814).
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 112872 is
DISMISSED, having failed to show that grave abuse of discretion was
committed in declaring that the regional trial court had jurisdiction over the
case. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. 114672 is DENIED, having
found no reversible error was committed.

G.R. No. 168660


June 30, 2009
Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Rodriquez

Held:
The trust should be dissolved having lapsed for more than
twenty years.

The petitioners are not necessarily entitled to


inherit. The lower court must determine who are
the heirs entitled.
G.R. No. L-38972 September 28, 1987

GARCIA vda. de MAPA et. al., vs. CA et. al.

Facts:
Facts:
MR died with a will. She left no compulsory or forced heirs. In
her will, she created a trust over her estate which expressly
prohibits alienating or mortgaging some specified pieces of
property. The Supreme Court cited its previous ruling that
such provision on perpetual trust shall only last for a maximum

C died leaving a will and designating her spouse L as the


universal heir of her estate having died without any
descendant or ascendant. L was designated as universal heir

but with the obligation to hold the residue of her estate in trust
for their nephews and nieces.
Issue:
a
b

w/n a trust is created


w/n a trust can be created without
consideration of the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs

Held:
Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the
testatrix's intent to create one is nonetheless clearly
demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. In designating her
husband L as universal and sole heir with the obligation to
deliver the properties to petitioners and private respondents,
she intended that the legal title should vest in him, and in
significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as
"beneficiarios," she intended that the beneficial or equitable
interest to these properties should repose in them. To our
mind, these designations, coupled with the other provisions for
co-ownership and joint administration of the properties, as well
as the other conditions imposed by the testatrix effectively
created a trust in favor of the parties over the properties
adverted to in the Will. "No particular words are required for
the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is
clearly intended. " (Art. 1443, Civil Code of the Philippines).

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the


surviving spouse of the testatrix, L was entitled to a legitime of
one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. As that portion is
reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever

may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator. (Art. 904,


second paragraph, Ibid) The trust created by C should
therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be effective only on
the free portion of her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by
L's legitime.

SPS. FELIPE and JOSEFA PARINGIT v. MARCIANA


PARINGIT BAJIT, et al.G.R. No. 181844, 29 September
2010, SECOND DIVISION (J. Abad)
The nature of a transaction results to an implied trust
by operation of law notwithstanding the lack of
agreement between the parties.

FACTS:
During their lifetime, spouses Julian and Aurelia Paringit
leased a lot in Sampaloc, Manila (the lot) from Terocel
Realty, Inc. (Terocel Realty). They built their home there and
raised five children. Aurelia died on November 6, 1972.
For having occupied the lot for years, Terocel Realty offered
to sell it to Julian. Julian sought the help of his children so
he can buy the property but only his son Felipe and wife
Josefa had the financial resources he needed at that time.
To bring about the purchase, on January 16, 1984 Julian
executed a deed of assignment of leasehold right in favor of
Felipe and his wife that would enable them to acquire the
lot. On April 12, 1984 Felipe and his wife paid the last
installment and the realty company executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale in their favor and turned over the title to


them.
In 1985, due to issues among Julians children regarding
the ownership of the lot, Julian executed an affidavit
clarifying the nature of Felipe and his wifes purchase of the
lot. He claimed that it was bought for the benefit of all his
children.
Expressing their concurrence with what their father said in
his affidavit, Felipes siblings (Marciana, et. al.), except
Florencio,
signed
the
same.
Marciana, et al continued to occupy the lot with their
families without paying rent. This was the situation when
their father Julian died on December 21, 1994.
In 1995. Felipe and his wife sent a demand letter to
Marciana, et al asking them to pay rental arrearages for
occupying the property from March 1990 to December 1995
at the rate of P2,400.00 a month, totaling P168,000.00.
Marciana, et al refused to pay believing that they had the
right to occupy the house and lot, it being their inheritance
from their parents. On March 11, 1996 Felipe and his wife
filed an ejectment suit against them. The suit prospered,
resulting in the ejectment of Marciana, et al and their
families from the property. Shortly after, Felipe and his wife
moved
into
the
same.
Marciana, et al filed the present action against Felipe and
his wife for annulment of title and reconveyance of property.

In his answer, Felipe denied knowledge of the agreement


among the siblings that the property would devolve to them
all. Josefa, his wife, claimed that she signed the affidavit
only because Marciana, et al were going to get mad at her
had she refused. She also claimed that she signed the
document
only
to
prove
having
received
it.
RTC rendered a decision, finding the evidence of Marciana,
et al insufficient to prove by preponderance of evidence that
Felipe and his wife bought the subject lot for all of the
siblings.
CA rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC
and ordering Felipe and his wife to reconvey to Marciana, et
al their proportionate share in the lot upon reimbursement of
what the spouses paid to acquire it plus legal interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in finding that Felipe
and his wife purchased the subject lot under an implied
trust for the benefit of all the children of Julian
CIVIL

LAW:

Implied

Trust

on

sale

of

land

HELD:
The CA found that Felipe and his wifes purchase of the lot
falls under the rubric of the implied trust provided in Article
1450
of
the
Civil
Code.
Implied trust under Article 1450 presupposes a situation

where a person, using his own funds, buys property on


behalf of another, who in the meantime may not have the
funds to purchase it. Title to the property is for the time
being placed in the name of the trustee, the person who
pays for it, until he is reimbursed by the beneficiary, the
person for whom the trustee bought the land. It is only after
the beneficiary reimburses the trustee of the purchase price
that the former can compel conveyance of the property from
the
latter.
CIVIL

LAW:

Prescription

on

implied

trust

In an implied trust, the beneficiarys cause of action arises


when the trustee repudiates the trust, not when the trust
was created as Felipe and his wife would have it. The
spouses of course registered the lot in their names in
January 1987 but they could not be said to have repudiated
the implied trust by that registration. Their purchase of the
land and registration of its title in their names are not
incompatible with implied trust. It was understood that they
did this for the benefit of Julian and all the children.
At any rate, even assuming that Felipe and his wifes
registration of the lot in their names in January 1987
constituted a hostile act or a violation of the implied trust,
Marciana, et al had 10 years or until January of 1997 within
which to bring their action. Here, they filed such action in
July 1996 well within the period allowed them.
Finally, the CA ordered Marciana, et al to reimburse
Felipe and his wife the individual siblings

proportionate share in theP55,500.00 that the spouses


paid the realty company.

Soledad Caezo substituted by William Caezo and


Victoriano Caezo,-vs.
Concepcion Rojas, G.R. No.
148788, Nov. 3, 2007 - constructive trust ; laches and
estoppel en pais
FACTS:The subject property is an unregistered land
with an area of 4,169 square meters situatedat Naval,
Biliran. In a complaint on 1997, petitioner Soledad
Caezo alleged that she boughtsuch parcel of land in
1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was
not reduced intowriting. Thereafter, she immediately
took possession of the property. In 1948, she and her
husband left for Mindanao and entrusted the said land
to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of,
and cultivated the property. In 1980, she found out
that
the
respondent,Concepcion
Rojas,
her
stepmother, was in possession of the property and was
cultivating thesame. She also discovered that the tax
declaration over the property was already in the name
of his father.Respondent asserted that it was her
husband
who
bought
the
property
from
Limpiado,which accounts for the tax declaration being
in Crispulos name.After the hearing, MTC rendered a

decision in favor of the petitioner, making her the


realand lawful owner of the land. Respondent appealed
to the RTC of Naval, Biliran, which reversedthe MTC
decision on the ground that the action had already
prescribed and acquisitive prescription had set in.
However,
acting
on
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration, the RTCamended its original decision
and held that the action had not yet prescribed
considering that the petitioner merely entrusted the
property to her father. The ten-year prescriptive period
for therecovery of a property held in trust would
commence to run only from the time the
trusteerepudiates the trust. The RTC found no
evidence on record showing that Crispulo Rojas ever
ousted the petitioner from the property.Petitioner filed
a petition for review with the CA, which reversed the
amended decisionof the RTC. The CA held that,
assuming that there was a trust between the petitioner
and her father over the property, her right of action to
recover the same would still be barred by prescription
since 49 years had already lapsed since Crispulo
adversely possessed the contested property in
1948.Hence, this petition for review.ISSUE:Whether or
not there is an existence of trust over the property
express or implied between the petitioner and her
father HELD: NONE. A trust is the legal relationship
between one person having an equitableownership of
property and another person owning the legal title to
such property, the equitableownership of the former
entitling him to the performance of certain duties and
the exercise of certain powers by the latter. Trusts are

either express or implied. Express trusts are those


whichare created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or bywords
evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts
are those which, without beingexpressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent or, independently,of the particular
intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
equity.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a


trust is on the party asserting itsexistence, and such
proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the
existence of the trust and itselements. The presence of
the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or
settlor whoexecutes the instrument creating the trust;
(2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated
tocarry out the trust; (3) the
trust res
, consisting of duly
properties; and (4) the

identified

and

definite

real

cestui que trust,or beneficiaries whose identity must


be clear. Accordingly, it was
incumbent upon
petitioner to prove the existence of the trust
relationship. And petitioner sadly failed to discharge
that burden. The existence of express trusts
concerning real property may not be established by

parol evidence. It must be proven by some writing or


deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the
claim that an express trust existed between the
petitioner and her father was the self-serving
testimony of the petitioner. Although no particular
words are required for the creation of an express trust,
a clear intention to create a trust must be shown; and
the proof of fiduciary relationship must be clear and
convincing. The creation of an express trust must be
manifested with reasonable certainty and cannot be
inferred from loose and vague declarations or from
ambiguous circumstances susceptible of other
interpretations. In the case at bench, an intention to
create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioners
testimony and the attendant facts and circumstances.
The petitioner testified only to the effect that her

agreement with her father was that she will be given a


share in the produce of the property. This allegation,
standing alone as it does, is inadequate to establish
the existence of a trust because profit-sharing
per se
, does not necessarily translate to a trust relation. In
light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no
express trust or resulting trust established between
the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a
trust relation, we can only conclude that Crispulos
uninterrupted possession of the subject property for 49
years, coupled with the performance of acts of
ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes,
ripened into ownership. Petition denied. Decision of the
CA affirmed.