Debulgado V CSC - Appointment (GMA of PPA)

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.
MONSERATE)]
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Table of Contents
Debulgado v. CSC...........................................................1
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PEDRO O.
DACOYCOY.....................................................................2
Debulgado v. CSC
26 September 1994
Feliciano, J.
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and

SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J.
GORDON........................................................................5
Facts:
1. Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayo of San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental.
2. He appointed his wife Victoria as General Services Officer
of the City Government.
3. Before her promotion, she had been in the service of the
City Government for 32 years.
4. Congressman Carmona questioned the appointment.
FELIMON LUEGO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and

FELICULA TUOZO........................................................12
Regis vs Osmena..........................................................13
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO vs CATALINO MACARAIG and
RUBEN D. TORRES......................................................15
Province of Camsur vs CA, Tito Dato...........................16
GLORIA v. HON. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, ROSARIO
CERILLO, and 20 other ppl..........................................17
Issue/Held:
1. WON the appointment is valid. NO.
PLM v. IAC....................................................................19
Ratio:
1. The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service
is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). 1
Dr. Emily Marohombsar v. Ahmad Alonto Jr. (President of

Mindanao State Univ.) and Corazon Batara (1991)....21
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO................................................22
Padilla v. CSC...............................................................24
Sec. 59. Nepotism (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governmentsor in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or
of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.
As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred
to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity.
CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ [2004]...................25

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA26
Corpuz v. CA Digest By LA Celebrado..........................27
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)................................................28
General Manager of PPA, and Anino v. Monserate.....30

MONSERATE)]
The prohibition is comprehensive. It refers to
all appointments whether original or promotional.
Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without
seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or
types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
government, as well as any branch or instrumentality
thereof and all government owned or controlled
corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in
Section 59 itself (persons employed in a confidential
capacity, teachers, physicians, and members of the AFP).
The list appears to us to be a closed one, at least closed
until lengthened or shortened by Congress.
To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism
to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into
government service, and to insulate appointments
subsequently issued would be to render the prohibition
meaningless and toothless.
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respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on

two counts as a result of the appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility
worker, respectively, and their assignment under his
immediate supervision and control as the Vocational
School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
[February 25, 1997] respondent Dacoycoy filed a
motion for reconsideration; this was denied.
CA: reversed the decision and set aside the decision of
the CSC
Issue
1. WON Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism? Yes.
The law defines nepotism[9] as follows:
o Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the
national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office,
or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word relative and
members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the
operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential
capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, however, That in each
[G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999]
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, respondent.
Facts
[November 29, 1995] George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime
Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar,
filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a
complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism
Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found
a prima facie case against respondent and issued the
corresponding formal charge against him.
After a formal investigation, the Civil Service

Commission
promulgated
its
resolution
finding

MONSERATE)]
particular instance full report of such

appointment shall be made to the Commission.
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of
nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.
In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial
who the appointing or recommending authority
is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that
an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is
quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a
subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy,
who was the school administrator. He authorized
Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of
first level employees under his immediate
supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondents two sons and placed
them under respondents immediate supervision
serving as driver and utility worker of the
school. Both positions are career positions. The
unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was
behind the appointing or recommending authority in
the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of
nepotism.
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The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil

Service Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced.
Debulgado never even impliedly limited the
coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the
appointing or recommending authority for
appointing a relative. In Debulgado, we stressed
that [T]he basic purpose or objective of the
prohibition against nepotism also strongly
indicates that the prohibition was intended to be
a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to
restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is
textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within
the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that
must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or
wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an
earlier case what we need now is not only to
punish
the
wrongdoers
or
reward
the
outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the
hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well
as to insist on strict compliance with existing
legal procedures in order to abate any occasion
for graft or circumvention of the law.
2. Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals

holding Dacoycoy not guilty of nepotism? It is the CSC
itself, not Dacoycoy or George P. Suan, the witness for
the government.
The Civil Service Commission has become the

party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously
prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling,
we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely

MONSERATE)]
affected
by
the
decision
refers
to
the
government
employee
against
whom
the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action. In other words, we overrule prior
decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers
or employees from administrative charges enunciated
in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil
Service
Commission; Magpale
v.
Civil
Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and
Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
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basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be

convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the
authoritative say on how to interpret laws.
According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase party
adversely affected by the decision refers alone to the respondent
government official or employee against whom the administrative
case is filed. They excluded from its compass the party
complainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence, when the
respondent government official or employee is exonerated, the
decision is deemed final as the party complainant is precluded
from appealing.
I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation
which is not only too narrow but is subversive of the
essence of our civil service lawThe critical question,
therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this
law and protect public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the
standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest
that appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness x x x. A taxpayer has a right to
good government and good government cannot result from
appointments determined by bloodlinesThe general rule is
that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek
review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private
citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint, he must
also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his
complaint, unless the law clearly precludes his right of
appeal for indubitable policy reasons.
Separate Opinions (with respect to who may appeal; not syllabus

issue)
Puno (Concurring)
As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also be
impleaded as party respondent. The Court of Appeals then
reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy from the charge
of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is
precluded from reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on
a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again, I submit that this
Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. Indeed, under the
Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has even been
expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
But even without Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue
in the case at bar and its impact on the effectiveness of
government give the Civil Service Commission the
standing to pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is
There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the

doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating government
officials from charges of nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly
favors officials charged with nepotism, for while we allow further
review of their conviction, we disallow review of their exoneration,

MONSERATE)]
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agencies or regional directors. [7] As further illustrated in Sec. 37 of

P.D. No. 807:
x x x . A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by
a private citizen against a government official or employee x x x.
The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer
or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly,
in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the
parties, either as complainant or respondent in an
administrative
case. Logically
and
by
necessary
implication, it cannot considered either a complainant or a
respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. [8] Based on the foregoing,
there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service Commission
is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought before it
An aggrieved party in an administrative case is the
government employee against whom an administrative
complaint is filed. The Civil Service Commission is
definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an
agency against whom an administrative charge is
filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense, the government is
an aggrieved party in administrative proceedings before the
Commission, it nevertheless is not the aggrieved party
contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Law.
regardless of the errors. This distorted rule contravenes our

distaste against nepotism, a practice whose continuance can
fatally erode faith in government. For another, perpetuating a
nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated wherever found, can
never be the intent of our legislators who crafted our Civil Service
Law. For still another, completely cutting off access to
judicial review goes against the spirit of the 1987
Constitution
expanding
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Court. Putting up borders of non-reviewability weakens
the judiciarys checking power. Indeed, shielding abusive
administrative actions and decisions from judicial
oversight will ultimately erode the rule of law.
Romero (Dissenting)
Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who
may appear before the Commission, thus:
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the following officials and
employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other
Person.[6] (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, the complaint can either be the Secretary of
department, head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local
government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other
person or party. The phrase any other party has been understood
to be a complainant other than the head of department or office
of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs of
G.R. No. 175352
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO,

and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
5

MONSERATE)]
Facts:
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon
(respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M.
Viari are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that:
- by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created
or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he
was elected.
- The Consti prohibition applies based on Camporedondo v.
NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC.
-
Under Flores v. Drilon, incumbent national legislators lose their

elective posts upon their appointment to another government
office.
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Petitioners have no standing in this petition. This appears to

be a quo warranto action, however, the petitioners do not
claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
Assuming it is QW, the petition is barred by prescription.

Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action
should be commenced within one year after the cause of the
public officers forfeiture of office. ICAB, Gordon has been
working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years and
was already Chairman when he was elected Senator in May
2004. He was first elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in
2005.
Assuming this is a taxpayers suit, petitioners failed to show

that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury.
Furthermore, no disbursement of public funds is alleged.
Assuming this is for declaratory relief, original jurisdiction

vests in the RTC.
Lastly, PNRC is not a GOCC, therefore the Consti prohibition

does not apply - volunteer services is neither an office nor
employment.
Issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government- owned or controlled corporation - NO
This is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful disbursement

of funds (salaries/compensation) considering that Gordon is
not entitled to his office.
2. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as

a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution - NO
Gordon asserts that:
Ruling:

MONSERATE)]
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Functions
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government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC

volunteers be identified as government personnel or as
instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the
volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the
displaced civilians in conflict areas.
2. The Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC
does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is
financed primarily by contributions from private individuals
and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns
organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under
Section 11 of the PNRC Charter. 3
On 22 March 1947, President Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,

otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate
humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status,
or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major services: Blood
Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community
Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
1. The Philippines established the PNRC for the purpose
contemplated in the 1929 Geneva Convention 2. In order to be
recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be
autonomous and must operate in conformity with the
Fundamental Principles of the Movement (humanity,
impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service,
unity, and universality).
3. The government does not control the PNRC.

1.1. Under the PNRC Charter4, only six of the thirty members of
the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the

President.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted

by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international
or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be
seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the
Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a
Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as
Of the twenty-four members, eighteen are elected by the

chapter delegates, and six are elected by the twenty-four
3
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National

Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through
solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the
Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective
jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently
of other fund drives by other organizations.
4
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of
Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in
biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. x x x.
Convention of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (referred to in this Charter as the
Geneva Red Cross Convention)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies).

MONSERATE)]
members already chosen a select group where the
private sector members have three-fourths majority.
Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the
PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector
members of the PNRC.
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officers. The first group refers to the heads of the

Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group
refers to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. The third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Furthermore, the PNRC Board of Governors, which

exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the
PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC.
1.2. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or
by any subordinate government official. Thus, the PNRC

Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or
Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Philippine Government. Not being a government official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
government office or employment
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group

of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is
the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to
appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the
head of the agency for it would be preposterous to
vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the
head is the chairperson of the commission. In a
board, the head is also the chairperson of the board.
In the last three situations, the law may not also
authorize officers other than the heads of the
agency, commission, or board to appoint lowerranked officers.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the

President appoints all officials and employees in the
Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution or by law. The President also
appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law. Under Section 16, the law may also
authorize the "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank
than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions
or boards (Rufino v. Endriga):
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution, the President appoints three groups of

MONSERATE)]
the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other
person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons
of the commissions or boards and not to their
members, for several reasons.
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5. The previous ruling in Camporedondo v. NLRC failed to
consider the definition of a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the

Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 5. In
ruling that the PNRC is a GOCC, the simple test used was
whether the corporation was created by its own special
charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation
under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was
created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is
a government corporation.
1.3. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals,
particularly the PNRC Board. Decisions or actions of the

PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The
President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or
actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
However, based on the Administrative Code, a GOCC must be

owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be
owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members
must be government officials holding such membership by
appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not
own or control PNRC.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the

President exercises control over all government offices in
the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the
control of the President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch (Rufino v. Endriga):
The power of control means the power to revise or
reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.
4. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
5
The vast majority of PNRC members are private individuals,

including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are
entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Any one
between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one
year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for
the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be
members of the PNRC.
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for
purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions
and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

MONSERATE)]
On the 2nd issue, considering that PNRC is not a GOCC,
Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution does
not apply.
PUBOFF
The Court in Feliciano v. COA gave the rationale for this

constitution provision - to ban private corporations created by
special charters, which historically gave certain individuals,
families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
Other issues:
The PNRC was created through a special charter. However, the

elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking
in the PNRC. Thus, it cannot be considered a GOCC in the absence
of the essential elements of ownership and control by the
government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress
was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the
constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for
non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter6, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional

Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations
by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC
was created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7,
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned
or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
The other provisions of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can
be considered as a recognition by the State that the
unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the
PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter
implement the Philippine Governments treaty obligations under
Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a
National Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the
legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid
society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian
field."
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar

provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations
except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended, creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic,"
thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of
the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in
the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties
as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The
national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located
in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Only corporations created under a general law
can qualify as private corporations.
Thus, Sections
1,28 2,29 3,304(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of
the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
10

MONSERATE)]
PUBOFF
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a

government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if
it wants to be a private corporation.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition

The petition is an action for quo warranto. Based on the
allegations in the petition, it is action for usurpation of public
office against a public officer who committed an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Sec 1 Rule 66 ROC:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action
for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against:
Nachura Dissent:
PNRC is a GOCC
-
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds

or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or
Gave a different interpretation of Section 16, Article XII of the

Constitution - that since private corporations cannot have
special charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such corporations are
government-owned or controlled.
The PNRC was incorporated under R.A. No 95, a special law.

Following this logic, it cannot be anything but a GOCC.
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the

Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, QW is commenced by the Government. However, under

Sec. 5 Rule 66, an individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by
another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name.
The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf
must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in
dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In
the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the
Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing
to file the present petition.
Upheld the ruling in Camporendondo:
Rather, crucial in the definition of GOCCC is the reference to the

corporation being "vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary." When we relate this to the
PNRC Charter, as amended, we note that Section 1 of the charter
starts with the phrase, "(T)here is hereby created in the Republic
of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the
Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions x x x". It is beyond cavil that the obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines set forth in the Geneva Conventions
Petition likewise fails even if treated as a tax payers suit as PNRC

is a private organization performing public functions.
11

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PUBOFF
are public or governmental in character. If the PNRC is "officially

designated to assist the Republic," then the PNRC is, perforce,
engaged in the performance of the governments public functions.
The respondent holds two

incompatible offices
in violation of the Constitution
PNRC is, at the very least,

a government instrumentality
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly provides that

"no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including [GOCCs]
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat."
Administrative Code of 1987 Section 2(10)

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned or controlled corporations.
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and

the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his holding of more than one office." It is therefore of
no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other
states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member
of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in
whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions
save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted
constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the
purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility
exists in the nature of the two offices under consideration, as
incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility
herein present is one created by no less than the constitution
itself.
The PNRC is vested with the special function of assisting the

Republic of the Philippines in discharging its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions. It is endowed with corporate powers. It
administers special fundsthe contributions of its members, the
aid given by the government, the support extended to it by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) in terms of
allotment of lottery draws. It enjoys operational autonomy, as
emphasized by Justice Carpio himself. And all these attributes
exist by virtue of its charter.
The PNRC Charter does not violate
the constitutional proscription
against the creation of private
corporations by special law
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
Considering that the PNRC is not a private corporation, but a

GOCC or a government instrumentality, then its charter does not
violate the constitutional provision that Congress cannot, except
by a general law, provide for the formation, organization or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government.
12

MONSERATE)]
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. x x x
PUBOFF
character such that the occupant thereof becomes exempt from

the constitutional proscription on the holding of multiple offices.
xxxx
Hence, Senator Gordon, in assuming the chairmanship of the

PNRC Board of Governors while being a member of the Senate, is
clearly violating Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. While
we can only hypothesize on the extent of the incompatibility
between the two officesas stated in petitioners memorandum,
Senator Gordons holding of both offices may result in a divided
focus of his legislative functions, and in a conflict of interest as
when a possible amendment of the PNRC Charter is lobbied in
Congress or when the PNRC and its officials become subjects of
legislative inquiries. Let it be stressed that, as in Adaza, the
incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the
Constitution itself.
x x x x The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of

office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that
conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. x x x
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation

part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned
has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in
the said position. The reason is that these services are already
paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. x x x
FELIMON LUEGO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
The chairmanship of PNRC is not an ex officio capacity.
By Ron San Juan
Nowhere does it say in the law that a member of the Senate can
sit in an ex officio capacity as chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors. Chairmanship of the PNRC Board is neither an
extension of the legislative position nor is it in aid of legislative
duties. Likewise, the position is neither derived from one being a
member of the Senate nor is it annexed to the Senatorial position.
Stated differently, the PNRC chairmanship does not flow from
ones election as Senator of the Republic.
Facts:
The petitioner Luegowas appointed Administrative Officer 11,
Office of the City Mayor, by Cebu City Mayor Solon. The
appointment was described in the space provided for in Civil
Service Form No. 33, as permanent" but the Civil Service
Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the following:
(1) final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent
Tuozo and another employee, and (2) that there was no pending
administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
The fact that the PNRC Chairman of the Board is not appointed by
the President and the fact that the former does not receive any
compensation do not at all give the said position an ex officio
13

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against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority
that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment.
PUBOFF
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service

Laws. Under the Civil Service Law, the Commissioner is not
authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the
nature or kind of the appointment to be extended.
The Civil Service Commission found the Tuozo better qualified

than the Luego for the contested position and, accordingly,
directed that Tuozo be appointed to the position in place of Luego,
revoking the latters appointment in the process. Tuozo was later
on appointed by the new mayor.
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation,

that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position
to which he has been named. Such attestation is required merely
as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.
Issue #1: Was the appointment of the petitioner temporary or

permanent? (Permanent)
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and

must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but

permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority (Mayor Solon) indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. What was
temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary
was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of
the appointee to the position.
It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the

appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like the
Commission on Appointments. In such cases, the confirmation by
that body was then considered part of the appointing process,
which was held complete only after such confirmation. No similar
arrangement is provided for in the Civil Service Decree.
Issue # 2: Whether or not the is CSC authorized to disapprove a

permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter? (NO)
Significantly, the CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner and

the private respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in
the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to
affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it
had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because
it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the

appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
14

MONSERATE)]
that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion

vested solely in the city mayor.
Issue # 3: What is the correct interpretation of the words

approve and disapprove in Section 9(h), Article V of the Civil
Service Decree?7
A full reading of the provision will make it clear that all the
Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if
not, it is disapproved.
Issue #4: Whether or not the next-in-rank rule under the Civil
Service Rules was applicable. (NO)
This rule is inapplicable because neither of the claimants is next
in rank. Moreover, the rule is not absolute as the Civil Service
Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present
employees, reinstatement, re-employment, or appointment of
outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.
Regis vs Osmena
PUBOFF
This is a petition for Mandamus to compel respondents to

reinstate petitioner to his former position as driver.
In 1958, petitioner was appointed as driver in the Motorized
Division of the Cebu Police Department. In the next 5 years,
petitioner was re-appointed as Driver or Driver, Civilian
Employee with increases in salary.
Through a termination letter In 1964, he was removed from
his position without prior investigation or hearing. The
letter stated: There being no more need for your service
as Driver in the Cebu Police Department, your provisional
appointment thereto is hereby terminated
Petitioner is a civil service eligible, having passed the
patrolman and/or detective (qualified) civil service
examination on July 20, 1963 with a rating of 76.85%. The
position of the petitioner, after his removal, was filled up by
the respondent City Mayor with the appointment of
Eduardo Gabiana, a non-civil service eligible.
After his removal, he wrote letters to the Office of the
President and to the CSC protesting his removal and
demanding his reinstatement. He was not reinstated by the
time this action was filed.
CFI of Cebu: Dismissed the petition on the ground that

petitioner's questioned appointment was temporary in nature
and, therefore, terminable at the pleasure of the appointing
power
Issue: W/N petitioners dismissal was valid? NO.
Petitioner: His removal on the ground that there was "no more
need for your service" was not real and true but a mere pretext,
for after his ouster one Eduardo Gabiana, a non-civil service
eligible. In the succeeding budget of the City of Cebu more
positions of driver were created His removal was not for cause,
and it was done without due process.
Davide, Jr. J.
Facts:
7
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in

the civil service, except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications. (emphasis supplied)
8
"whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference
shall be given to the employee who is most competent and qualified and who
has the appropriate civil service eligibility."
15

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Petitioner further argues that his last appointment of 7 November
1963 was approved under Section 24(c) of R.A. No. 2260 (Civil
Service Act of 1959); therefore, it was a provisional and not
a temporary appointment. According to him, his appointment was
provisional because at the time it was extended he was not yet a
civil service eligible. He was still awaiting for the results of the
examination for patrolman-detective. When he became eligible
upon the publication of the results of the exam, the City Mayor
should have extended to him a permanent appointment.
Respondent: Court did not cite any argument of respondent.
Court: We agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in
holding that his appointment is temporary in nature. Obviously,
the trial court failed to appreciate the clear distinction between a
temporary appointment and a provisional appointment. R.A. No.
2260, Sec 24 (c) and (d):
PUBOFF
Whereas a temporary appointment is designed to fill "a position

needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months, a
provisional appointment, on the other hand, is intended for the
contingency that "a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is
necessary in the interest of the service and there is no
appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment."
A provisional appointment may be extended only to "a person
who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who
otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular
position in the competitive service," meaning one who must
anyway be a civil service eligible. On the other hand, again, in the
case of a temporary appointment, all that the law enjoins is that
"preference in filling such position be given to persons on
appropriate eligible lists." And merely giving preference, of
course, presupposes that even a non-eligible may be appointed.
As a matter of fact, under this provision, even if the appointee has
the required civil service eligibility, his appointment is still
temporary, simply because such is the nature of the work to be
done.
Accordingly, since there was no certificate of civil service
eligibility received by respondent City Mayor, the provisional
appointment of petitioner remained valid and subsisting. Prior to
such receipt petitioner may only be removed for cause as
provided by law. That there was "no more need" for his service
was not a valid and lawful cause.
We agree, however, with the court below that the patrolmandetective civil service eligibility of petitioner "is not intended for
or appropriate to the position of driver; hence, it did not convert
his temporary [should be, correctly,provisional] appointment of
driver to a permanent one
(c) Provisional appointments A provisional

appointment may be issued upon prior authorization
of the Commissioner in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who
has not qualified in an appropriate examination but
who otherwise meets the requirements for
appointment to a regular position in the competitive
service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling
thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and
there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the
time of appointment.
(d) Temporary appointment. A person may receive
a temporary appointment to a position needed only
for a limited period not exceeding six months,
provided that a preference in filling such position be
given to persons on appropriate eligible lists.
16

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TOMAS D. ACHACOSO vs CATALINO

MACARAIG and RUBEN D. TORRES
PUBOFF
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,

Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President.
His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by
the above-named officials, it was beyond the prerogatives of the
President to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such
courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for
having been submitted under duress, as otherwise the
President would have the power to remove career officials at
pleasure, even for capricious reasons
The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because
he is not a career official (the petitioner did not possess the
necessary qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of
the POEA in 1987).
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the
Philippines to all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Bureau Heads, and other government officials, he
filed a courtesy resignation.
This was accepted by the President, with deep regrets.
The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not
surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary
but filed only in obedience to the Presidents directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed
Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again
asked to vacate his office.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. He then
came to this Court for relief.
ISSUE: WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure

clause
HELD: NO. The Court finds for the respondent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF TENURE;
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT ISSUED ONLY TO PERSONS QUALIFIED.
A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does
not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if
he does not possess the required qualifications.
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed

removal without legal cause. Achacoso contends that he is a
member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys
security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the
Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. 1
Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes
under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service Decree, which includes in the Career Service:
3.Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATION

DEEMED IN ACTING CAPACITY. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
17

MONSERATE)]
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility
or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first
place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it
merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligibles.
PUBOFF
LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR.

The case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission is not applicable
because the facts of that case are different. The petitioner in
Luego was qualified and was extended a permanent appointment
that could not be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely
temporary. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not eligible and
therefore could be appointed at best only in a temporary capacity.
The other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz,
and Dario v. Mison, are also not pertinent because they also
involved permanent appointees who could not be removed
because of their security of tenure.
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. The purpose of an acting

or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge
of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE. The
person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under
the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called
upon to do so by the appointing authority.
Province of Camsur vs CA, Tito Dato

Facts: Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by governor of
Camsur. He was thereafter promoted to Assistant Provincial
Warden but since he had no civil service eligibility for the position
he was appointed to, he could not be legally extended a
permanent appointment. Hence, what was extended to him was a
temporary appointment which was renewed annually.
In 1974, then Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's
employment status from temporary to permanent upon the
latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of
status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service
Commission. So he remained on temporary appointment.
On March 16, 1976, Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by
Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and
a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to
evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped
from confinement.
EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF TERMINATING TEMPORARY

EMPLOYMENT. In these circumstances, the acting appointee is
separated by a method of terminating official relations known in
the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is
understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. When required to relinquish
his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in
violation of his security of tenure because removal imports the
separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term.
This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as
provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely
because his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not
covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
18

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On March 19, 1976, the CSC communicated to the Governor that
the status of private respondent Tito Dato has been changed from
temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the
examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status
was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release
of said examination.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and
deleted Tito Datos name from the petitioner's plantilla. Tito Dato
was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him.
Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and
backwages. When his request for reinstatement and backwages
was not heeded, he filed an action for mandamus before the
Regional Trial Court.
Issue: Whether or not Tito Dato was a permanent employee of
petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
suspended and therefore entitled to reinstatement and
backwages
Held: No. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the
time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden in 1974, he
had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the
aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility
made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite
term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the
appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil
service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed
the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto
convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In
cases such as the one at bench, what is required is a new
appointment since a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment these are two
distinct acts of the appointing authority.
The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of
approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
PUBOFF
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled

that CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment
set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment
itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into
the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds
the person qualified it must so attest. If not, the appointment
must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest
appointments and after that function is discharged, its
participation in the appointment process ceases. In the case at
bench, CSC should have ended its participation in the
appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the
proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing
communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the
appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion
vested solely upon the latter.
GLORIA v. HON. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN,

ROSARIO CERILLO, and 20 other ppl
J. Hermosisima, Jr.
G.R. No. 116183
October 6, 1995
Digest by Aaron Valdez
FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air
Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA), where the Board of Trustees
is vested with authority to appoint officials and employees of the
college. The Board of Trustees issued a resolution which decreed
that all faculty/administrative employees shall be subject to the
required civil service eligibilities in accordance with the civil
service law. Such resolution caused the Board of Trustees to issue
19

MONSERATE)]
temporary appointments to respondents because they failed to
meet qualification standards for their respective positions.
PUBOFF
mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the

designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for
reinstatement.
One of these appointees was Rosario Cerillo, who was appointed

Board Secretary II, through a letter from the CSC which
emphasized appointments were good and renewable only up to
1992. PAFCA relieved Cerillo because of loss of trust and
confidence but was designated as Coordinator for Extension
Services.
Even granting Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator

for Extension Services", her reinstatement would not be possible
because the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The
PSCA could not have made any valid appointment for an
inexistent position. This could be the reason she was merely
designated as Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could not
have acquired any right to the position even if the position
existed. A mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee
security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an
acting capacity only.
RA 7605 converted PAFCA into a state college known as the

Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA), with the Board of
Trustees as the governing body. On December 7, 1992, Col. Julian
Loleng, the OIC, informed private respondents they shall be
deemed separated upon the expiration of their appointments.
Private respondents filed a case for mandamus and reinstatement
with the Pasay RTC against DECS Secretary Armand Fabella
(replaced by petitioner Ricardo Gloria) to fill up positions in the
Board of Trustees.
Whether or not reinstatement was proper in respect to

Cerillos former position as Board Secretary II NO
Ms. Cerillo had been dismissed from this position for loss of
confidence. She did not contest the dismissal possibly because
the position of Board Secretary II is primarily confidential and the
Board of Trustee found her to be wanting in faithfulness and
integrity dismissed her for that reason alone. She accepted the
dismissal and when designated as Coordinator for Extension
Services, she indicated acceptance by performing acts called for
by the designation.
Petitioners answered that mandamus will not lie to compel

reinstatement because reappointment is discretionary on the
appointing power and that respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Respondent Judge De Guzman ordered
the reinstatement of Rosario Cerillo.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the reinstatement of Cerillo could have
been the subject of mandamus proceedings NO
Cerillo was dismissed because of loss of confidence. The dismissal
was not contested nor appealed from by Cerillo. Her dismissal as
Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition
for mandamus and reinstatement filed before De Guzman.
Cerillo's assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a
The fact that Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service

Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment
is no reason to compel her reappointment. Acquisition of civil
service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment; other
considerations are: performance, degree of education, work
experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, whether or
20

MONSERATE)]
not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the
appointing power. The position of Board Secretary II, by its nature,
is primarily confidential, requiring "not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily
close intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." The
choice of an appointee from among those who possessed the
required qualifications is a political and administrative decision
calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the
interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of
the office concerned.
PUBOFF
respective contracts. Petitioners appointment or employment

simply expired either by its very own terms, or because it may not
exceed one year, and because the PAFCA was dissolved and
replaced by the PSCA. The notice given by Loleng to the
petitioners seems to have been misunderstood by them as an act
of dismissal which belongs to the Board of Trustees alone.
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to
attorneys fees NO
There was merit in the petition, which bars respondents from
claiming AF. Further, this was not discussed nor justified in the
body of the assailed decision.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment

which is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary
power of appointment cannot be controlled even by the Court as
long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority.
PLM v. IAC
GR No. L-65439 / 13 Nov 1985 / J. Gutierrez Jr.
FACTS
Whether or not private respondents were properly

terminated - YES
The termination of the services of private respondents was proper
and legal, it being the consequence of the Board of Trustees'
power to appoint. Either the employees' contracts lapsed or their
temporary appointments were abrogated by circulars from the
Civil Service Commission. This is a necessary consequence of the
transition from the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) to the Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA).
There was no termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an

overt act committed by a superior officer. At most, Col. Julian
(Loleng) gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their
21
Dr. Hernani Esteban was a permanent employee in the

government service for 25 years. He was officially connected
with the Philippine College of Commerce (now PUP) as it's VP
for academic affairs. The BOT abolished the position of VPAA
but he continued teaching at the said college until his
transfer to the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM)
upon invitation of its president, Dr. Consuelo Blanco.
Dr. Esteban was initially extended an ad interim
appointment as the VP for Administration in 1973 by Dr.
Blanco.
The secretary of the Pamantasan handed him a
'Notification of Confirmation of Temporary Appointment'
making his appointment extend until 30 Jun 1974. This was
subsequently renewed by the secretary two more times until
1975.

MONSERATE)]
In June 1975 Dr. Esteban received the same notification of

renewal of his temporary appointment until 1976, but in July
of the year he discovered that he was not included in the list
of employees recommended for permanent appointments.
He wrote to Dr. Blanco requesting the conversion of his
temporary appointment to a permanent one considering his
two and a half years of service.
Dr. Blanco answered unfavorably to his request for reasons
unmentioned in the case.
He received on August a 'Notification of Ad Interim
Appointment' that he was appointed as Professor III, and
further designated him as Director of the Institute of
Continuing Education and Community Service. A few days
later Dr. Blanco issued a memorandum terminating his
appointment as VP for Administration. His appointment
effective until June 1976 has been withdrawn before it could
be confirmed by the Pamantasan Board of Regents.
Dr. Esteban appealed to the CSC for the protection of his
tenure at the Pamantasan.
CSC to the MSB - sadyang magulo dahil walang katapusang

MR
On 9 Oct 1975 the CSC ruled that the appointment was of a
temporary nature and thus may be terminated at any time at
the discretion of the appointing official.
On MR the CSC reversed saying that Dr. Esteban was fully
qualified for the position of VP for Administration and
certified him for appointment under permanent status.
On MR by the Pamantasan, the CSC then said that the
certification should not be interpreted as directing the
reinstatement of Dr. Esteban (confusing said the court)
MR by Dr. Esteban of this order was denied, but he asked
for another review of his termination after the denial, and
also asked for payment of his salaries. The Commission
22
PUBOFF
referred the payment of salaries to the university treasurer

but again modified its resolution and said that the president
did not have any authority to extend an ad interim
appointment as only the Board of Regents was empowered
to do that under the University Charter. Both parties again
filed MRs.
In 1978 PD 1409 created a Merit Systems Board in the CSC
to hear and decide cases on personnel matters. The Board
required the Pamantasan to submit its complete records in
appoitnment and termination of Dr. Esteban as VP for
Administration.
The Pamantasan did not submit a copy of Board Reso 485
passed 20 June 1973 confiring the ad interim appointments
of several academic and non-academic personnel of said
university, including Dr. Esteban effective 21 May 1973. The
Commissioner directed the Pamantasan to submit any
document directly showing that Dr. Esteban was appointed in
a permanent capacity, but despite the existence of this
resolution, the Pamantasan replied that "we cannot find any
document"
Because of this failure the Commission concluded that his
appointment as VP for Administration was approved as
permanent. It cited Governemnt of the Philippine Islands vs
Martinez that when a party has possession or power to
produce the best evidence and withholds it, the presumption
is the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and
production with thwart the evil or fraudulent purpose. The
Commission declared his termination as illegal and directed
the payment of full backwages.
The Pamantasan filed an MR and submitted for the first
time Board Reso 485. The Commission denied the MR and
said that upon confirmation of the Board the ad interim
appointment became permanent.

MONSERATE)]
The Courts, finally

Pamantasan filed a petition for certiorari with the CFI. The
CFI reversed the CSC and adopted the earlier ruling holding
that Dr. Esteban's appointment was invalid (no authority by
the president) though he may be considered a de facto VP up
to the date the commission ruled that his appointment was
temporary.
On appeal, the IAC reversed the trial court, and ordered his
reinstatement with full backwages.
ISSUE
W/N Dr. Esteban's appointment is temporary. NO

o
But IAC decision modified, instead of full backwages,
just 5 years, as is "just and equitable".
RATIO
Dr. Esteban had been extended several ad-interim

appointments. But under Philippine law, the term ad interim
does not mean the usual "for the meantime". But that is not
the meaning under Philippine law. Rather, it is used to
denote the manner in which said appointments were made,
that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the
meantime, while the BOR which is originally vested by the
University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable
to act.
In Summers v. Ozaeta
" an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance
of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the President shall
have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.' lt is an appointment permanent in nature,
23
PUBOFF
and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation

by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character."
Not only is the appointment in question an ad interim
appointment, but the same is also a confirmed ad interim
appointment. In its Board Reso 485 the Pamantasan BOR
verified Dr. Esteban's appointment without condition nor
limitation as to tenure.
The Pamantasan argues that all the notices of
appointments and renewals were temporary with fixed
commencement and termination dates "unless sooner
terminated". However, the IAC correctly held that In case of
conflict between a notification issued by the Secretary of the
University which is supposed to reflect the true content of a
Board Resolution and the Resolution itself of said Board of
Regents of said University, the latter is controlling for
obvious reasons. The Secretary of the University has no
authority to alter or add something which is not provided for
in the Resolution of the Board of Regents
If Dr. Esteban's appointment was intended to be temporary,
it should have been expressly stated. It cannot be made to
rest on inconclusive evidence, specially because a temporary
appointment divests the temporary appointee of the
constitutional security of tenure against removal without
cause even if he is a civil service eligible.
Further supporting Dr. Esteban's stand is the list of
permanent personnel which was submitted to the
Commission by the university president for recognition of
their permanent status by the Commission. The permanent
status of private respondent's appointment as VP for
Administration was recognized by the CSC in its first
Indorsement

MONSERATE)]
Quote:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The
appointing power has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
PUBOFF
b. Substantially all junior officers under the President

were likewise reassigned and designated merely in
acting capacities.
(3) Petitioner refused the offer of a different permanent
position offered by the President and chose to stay with the
Office of the Vice Chancellor. The President replaced her
with respondent Corazon Batara.
(4) Petitioner challenges her removal from the position.
(5) Side issue: there was a motion to cite the President in
contempt (denied by SC).
lt is a prerogative of the appointing power that may be

availed of without liability, provided however, that it is
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws
or under valid agreements, and provided further, that such
prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or
spite.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be removed from her position without

cause (i.e. was her right to security of tenure violated?)
SC: Security of Tenure violated. Petitioner to be reinstated to her
position as Vice Chancellor and made permanent until the end of
her three year term or until her tenure is otherwise validly
terminated.
Dr. Emily Marohombsar v. Ahmad Alonto Jr.

(President of Mindanao State Univ.) and
Corazon Batara (1991)
General Rule: A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is

essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder
of such appointment may be removed without hearing or cause.
Also, a person who accepts such appointment waives the right to
invoke security of tenure as a ground for assailing his removal.
FACTS
(1) Petitioner is a career employee of Mindanao State
University for 27 years. Prior to the controversy, she
served as Vice President of External Affairs.
(2) Jan 1989 Petitioners position was merged with the Office
of the Vice Chancellor and she was appointed as Vice
Chancellor by the President (respondent Alonto) in an
ACTING CAPACITY.
a. The MSU Board of Regents confirmed this
designation in a resolution.
Exception: Where the appointment is not bona fide, i.e. it was

intentionally made to circumvent the petitioners right to security
of tenure. The court draws analogy with the rule that the head of
office cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions into
confidential items so he can freely fire or hire at his discretion.
(Piero v. Hechanova)
The Court may validly inquire into the true nature of an acting
appointment to determine if it is bona fide.
24

MONSERATE)]
PUBOFF
1. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on

Appointments
on
May
22,
2001
the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmation However, the Commission on Appointments
did not act on said appointments.
2. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on
February 2, 2008.They took their oaths of office for a
second time. The Office of the President transmitted on
June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation
3. Congress
adjourned
before
the
Commission
on
Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on
June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
to the same positions. The Office of the President
submitted their appointments for confirmation to the
Commission on Appointments. They took their oaths of
office anew
4. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a
Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner
as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of
the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and
reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC
EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to
petitioners reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14,
2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc.Specifically,
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to
IN THIS CASE: Circumstances surrounding her appointment

point to an attempt to violate right to security of tenure
(1) MSU Code of Governance Sec 40.5 par 22 grants the
President the power to designate officers in an acting
capacity but only for a period of less than one year in
this case, it was indefinite.
(2) BoR had to confirm the appointment this indicates that it
was an ad interim appointment made permanent by the
confirmation, and not merely a designation of OIC which
does not require BoR approval.
(3) Substantially all officers suffered the same fate. to hold
the sword of Damocles over the head of all MSU employees
and officers.
Another Argument from Respondent: Petitioner was already
in the position of PROFESSOR VI.
This precludes her from
becoming permanent at the Vice Chancellor position.
(1) SC response: Comparing to Tapales v. President and BoR
of University of the Philippines The fact that one is a
permanent professor does not detract from the permanent
nature of an ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION.
Especially if
confirmed by the Board of Regents, as was the case here.
Finally: The fact that she turned down an offer for a different
permanent position from the President does not support the
latters case because (a) the position offered was in effect a
demotion even from her prior Vice President position (b) she
cannot be compelled to accept it (c) there is no showing of any
interest of the service that would be served by forcing it upon her.
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO
FACTS
25

MONSERATE)]
consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
reassignment of petitione
5. On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. Petitioner cited Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the
election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April
18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, which states in part:
6. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department,
petitioner
filed
the
instant
petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
7. Petitioner claims
that
the ad
interim appointments
ofBenipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as
on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner
also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department.
PUBOFF
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment

because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as
follows:
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether
voluntary
or
compulsory,
but
such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective
until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying
that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or
revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by
the Constitution which authorizes the President, during
ISSUES
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra
and
Tuason
on
the
basis
of
the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the ConstitutionNO
26

MONSERATE)]
the recess of Congress, to make appointments that
take effect immediately.
PUBOFF
require such concurrence will render the resolution

meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to
approve every personnel transfer or reassignment,
making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No.
3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to
effect transfers and reassignments of personnel,
without need of securing a second approval from the
COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer
or reassignment.
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and

the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad
interim appointments and subsequent assumption of
office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution;--NO
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly

authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC
personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure
capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer
or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning
petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not
violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
For the same reason, Benipayos order designating
Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally
unassailable.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),

Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A
disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived
by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and not because a reappointment is
prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can
be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will
not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed
term of seven years.
Padilla v. CSC
3. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from

her position as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and
without authority, having been done without the
approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body;
FACTS:
Remedios Padilla (Padilla) assumed the permanent position of
Clerk II in the Ministry of Labor and Employment and was
thereafter promoted to the position of Labor Development
Assistant, assuming her new position without waiting for the
approval of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC disapproved Padilla's appointment on the ground that
she failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the position.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that

every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel
should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a
collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to
27

MONSERATE)]
PUBOFF
The Officer-in-Charge of the Institute of Labor and Manpower

Studies, sought reconsideration of CSC's ruling, pointing out
Padilla's satisfactory performance, which was denied.
Padilla resigned from the service for personal reasons and took
the Career Service Examination (Professional Level), after
passing which, she re-applied at the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and was appointed as Casual Research
Assistant.
Following the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 (Salary
Standardization Act of 1989), casual items were abolished and
Padilla was offered the position of Clerk II, which she declined.
Padilla was appointed Casual Clerk III, after the expiration of
which, she was no longer given any position.
Padilla appealed her alleged termination as casual employee to
the CSC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of
time.
Padilla filed a letter-complaint addressed to Department of
Justice, which was forwarded to the CSC, which dismissed the
same.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC had the power to
revoke the appointment of a public officer whose qualification
did not meet the minimum requirements of the law.
Like removal for just cause, voluntary resignation results in the

abdication of all present and future rights accorded to an
employee and in the severance of all work-related ties between
the employer and the employee.
When she returned to work for the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), the same was not a continuation of her
previous service but the start of a new work slate.
Padilla could no longer demand from DOLE her reinstatement to
a permanent position as she was never unjustly removed.
When Padilla re-applied for, and was offered the position of
Casual Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she
readily and unqualifiedly accepted the said offer, and, having
accepted the position of a casual employee, she should have
known that she had no security of tenure and could thus be
separated from the service anytime.
After finishing her contract as a Casual Technical, DOLE offered
to her the permanent position of Clerk II, for which the Selection
Board deemed her qualified, but she declined the offer in favor
of another casual position as Casual Clerk III.
On the ground of estoppel, Padilla is barred from asserting her
right to a permanent position.
ISSUE: Whether or not Padillas termination was legal.
CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ [2004]
HELD: Yes.
facts
RATIO:
Padilla voluntarily resigned after having occupied the permanent
position of Clerk II before the disapproval of her appointment for
Labor Development Assistant, a higher permanent position.
After returning to the service, she occupied casual positions
only, despite passing the eligibility requirement for a permanent
position.
28
Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation

Office as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer.
Prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation
Office (ATO).
Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the
ATO formally filed with the DOTC her protest against the
promotional appointment of respondent claiming that he

MONSERATE)]
did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said

position.
DOTC Sec: protest without merit.
Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Sec to the CSCNCR.
CSC-NCR: recalled the approval of respondents appointment
issue
WON Saturnino met the minimum experience requirements as of
the date of the protestees appointment to the contested position.
YES.
ratio
The contested position requires

o four years of work experience in position/s involving
management
o AND/OR four years of experience in planning,
organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the
enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen
and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying
schools
The use of the term and/or means that the word and and the
word or are to be used interchangeably. The use of the
disjunctive term or in this controversy connotes that either the
standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may
be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant for
the position under question may qualify.
Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work
experience to qualify for the contested position if the
managerial standards in the first clause above were to be
strictly followed. But, the work already rendered by respondent
29
PUBOFF
in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within

the supervisory standard in the second clause.
Rapisora vs. CSC the rule that appointees must possess the
prescribed mandatory requirements cannot be so strictly
interpreted as to curtail an agencys discretionary power to
appoint, as long as the appointee possesses other
qualifications required by law.
The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of
the proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al., in the
appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing
authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but
also their performance, education, work experience, trainings
and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority.
The appointing authority has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his best judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
The final choice of the appointing authority should be
respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute
their judgment for that of the appointing authority.
There is no reason to disapprove the appointment of
respondent as Chief of the Aviation Safety Regulation Office
considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice
of the appointing authority. Between the Commission and the
appointing authority, we sustain the latter.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent
failed to meet the experience requirement to qualify for the
contested position, we are still inclined to uphold the CAs
approval of respondents appointment. Petitioner itself has, on
several occasions, allowed the appointment of personnel who
were initially lacking in experience but subsequently obtained
the same.

MONSERATE)]
PUBOFF
Administrative Code of 1987Book V Title I Subtitle A

Chapter 5Section 27.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR.

DARANGINA - Buenaventura
Employment Status. Appointment in the career service shall be

permanent or temporary. (1)Permanent Status. A permanent
appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
FACTS:
1. Engineer Darangina was a development management
officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA).
2. He was extended a temporary promotional appointment as
Director III, Plans and Policy Services.
(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and

it becomes necessary in
the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temp appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate
civil service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment
shall not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced
sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
3. CSC approved the temporary appointment.

4. New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment,
ground: Not Career Executive Service Eligible.
5. CSC disaprroved the appointment of the replacement who
was also not eligible, and granted that the Darangina
should be paid backwages until the expiration of his 1 yr
temporary appointment.
Corpuz v. CA Digest By LA Celebrado
6. CA reinstated Darangina.
Atty. David B. Corpuz vs.

Court of Appeals, and Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board
ISSUE/S:
Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
G.R. No. 123989 | January 26, 1998 | 1st Div. | Davide, Jr., J.
HELD:
FACTS:
CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED.
CORPUZ was appointed as the MTRCBs Legal Counsel (approved

by CSC and designated as Attorney V under the Salary
Standardization Law).
No reinstatement & back wages, only salary from appointment

until termination. With the expiration of his term upon his
replacement, there is no longer any remaining term to be served.
30

MONSERATE)]
MTRCB passed Resolution No. 8-1-91 entitled An Act to Declare
the Appointments of the Administrative and Subordinate
Employees of this Board as Null and Void. This noted that the
past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for
approval the appointments of administrative and subordinate
employees to the MTRCB9 before forwarding them to the CSC;
thus, considered invalid and MTRCB made the holding of these
positions in a holdover capacity in the meantime.
PUBOFF
appointments which were not submitted to the MTRCB for

approval.
However, in another Resolution, the CSC ruled in favor of
CORPUZ, because his appointment was signed by then Chair.
Morato, as the duly authorized signatory of MTRCB
appointments. All the appointments signed by Mr. Morato in his
capacity as MTRCB Chairman are presumed to have been made
after complying with all the legal requirements including the
Board approval, whether express or implied.
Then, Mendez was appointed MTRCB Chairman. New members of

the Board were likewise appointed. She was informed about
Resolution No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB
members was then constituted to look into the appointments
extended by former Chairman Morato. The Committee resolved to
recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments,
except that of CORPUZ and seven others.
In the meantime, CORPUZ became a permanent employee of the

Ombudsman.
The MTRCB filed petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
declared null and void the said resolution of the CSC, since the
appointment of CORPUZ was not approved by the MTRCB.
CORPUZs motion for reconsideration is also denied by CA.
CORPUZ filed a complaint with the CSC requesting a formal

investigation and hearing.
ISSUE:
Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments

extended by Morato were not submitted to the MTRCB for
approval; hence to cure the defect, she submitted the
appointments to the MTRCB.
WON CORPUZs appointment is valid? (NO)

HELD:
NO. There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB
personnel, other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation
by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing of the
appointment paper10; and (b) approval or disapproval by the
MTRCB of the appointment.
Afterwards, CSC promulgated a resolution granting the MTRCB

authority to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to
9
Section 16. Organization Patterns; Personnel. -- The Board shall determine its
organizational structure and staffing pattern. It shall have the power to
suspend or dismiss for cause any employee and/or approve or disapprove the
appointment, transfer or detail of employees. It shall appoint the Secretary of
the Board who shall be the official custodian of the records of the meetings of
the Board and who shall perform such other duties and functions as directed by
the Board.
10
Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1986, the MTRCB is composed of a

Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and thirty (30) members, all appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Section 5 thereof enumerates the following
functions, powers and duties of the Chairman as the Chief Executive Officer of
the MTRCB, to wit:
31

MONSERATE)]
It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that
where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee
has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the
commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or
confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the
commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only
when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the
appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the
appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed,
the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke
security of tenure.
Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, since the last act required for the
completion of his appointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself,
was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately
disapproved it, his appointment ceased to have effect, if at all,
and his services were properly terminated.
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials
resulting in non-observance of the requirements of law or rules to
complete the appointment does not render the requirements
ineffective and unenforceable.
A public official or employee who assumed office under an
incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void
by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise.
PUBOFF
Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto

officer.
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.
The Facts:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and
regulations issued by the BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the
BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary
administrative and subordinate personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are
not specifically lodged in the BOARD.
32

MONSERATE)]
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the
Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal
Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal
on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on
December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay,
who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals
Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the
decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988.
He contended that he should be designated terminal
supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of
his preferential right thereto.
PUBOFF
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases

of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it
finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but
to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the
recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the
protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders
it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment;
it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it
considers another employee to be better qualified for that would
constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the
appointing authority.
The determination of who among several candidates for a
vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the
sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority
and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job
in an office calls for both formal
and informal qualifications.
Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a
certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but
so are such intangibles as
resourcefulness, team spirit,
courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and
best interests of the service. Given the demands of a certain job,
who can do it best should be
left to the Head of the Office
concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are
satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Head of
Office in this regard
After a careful review of the records of the case,

the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus
obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79)
have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and
Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that

Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be
appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees
Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be
considered for appointment to any position commensurate
and
suitable
to
their
qualifications,
and
that
the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the
implementation hereof.
Decision:
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,[2] this Court
said:
33

MONSERATE)]
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this
Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in
proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection
itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of
his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that
define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing
authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion
of the appointing authority. It is a political question that
the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under
the Constitution and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of

the respondent Civil ServiceCommission dated February
14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19,
1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made
PERMANENT. No costs.
General Manager of PPA, and Anino v.

Monserate
Facts:
-
Julieta Monserate started as Bookkepper II in the Port

Management Office, Iloilo PPA
She was promoted to Cashier II and then to Finance Officer
In 1988, Monserate applied for the permanent position of
Manger II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division
Dumlao, the General Manager of PPA, appointed
Monserate; CSC approved her appointment
Ramon Anino, who ranked 2nd to respondent as per the
Comparative Data Sheet, filed an appeal/petition with the
PPA Appeals Board, protesting Monserates appointment
The said board sustained the protest, and rendered
ineffective Monserates appointment based on (1) CSC MC
34
PUBOFF
No. 5-1988, par 3; (2) CSC MC No. 10-1986, par a, 1.2 and
par b; and (3) Civil Service Eligibility all of which were
without further explanation
She received a PPA Special Order which indicated that
Anino was Manager II and not her
Monserate filed with the PPA Manager an appeal/request for
clarification, questioning her replacement, claiming that
thte proceedings before the Appeals Board were irregular
o There was no notice of hearing
o She was not furnished the Resolution of the Appeals
Board, nor the copy of the protest
o She was not informed of the reasons behind her
replacement
o Their Port Manager in Iloilo, who was then an official
member of the Board, was not included in the
proceedings
Monserate received another PPA Special Order, reassigning
her to Administrative Officer (SG-15), which was Aninos
former position, and was lower than her previous position
as Finance Officer (SG-16), prior to her botched
appointment
Due to the inaction of the General Manager, she filed with
the CSC precautionary appeal, manifesting that she was
yet to receive a copy of the Appeals Board resolution
Thereafter, she received a copy of her appointment as
Admin Officer, which she has since been discharging the
functions thereof; she likewise learned that the General
Manager had just issued Aninos appointment (both in
contrast to the Special Orders)
In 1989, Monserate filed an appeal formally protesting
against Aninos appointment, and the propriety of the
Appeals Board resolution
After 6 years, CSC dismissed her appeal:

MONSERATE)]
"It is well-established rule that an appointment,
although approved by this Commission, does not
become final until the protest filed against it is
decided by the agency or by the Commission.
Although Monserate had already assumed the
position of RMD Manager II, the appointing authority
may still withdraw the same if a protest is
seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule
VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing EO 292 x x x.
o
o
"Monserate's claim that she is more qualified than

Anino is not relevant to the issue before this
Commission. In cases of protest filed or appealed to
the Commission, the main question to be resolved is
whether or not the appointee meets the qualification
standard. x x x. The Commission will not disturb the
choice of the appointing authority as long as the
appointee meets the qualification prescribed for the
position in question."
-
PUBOFF
Displacement was due to the aftermath of PPA

reorganization
Her appointment as Manager II did not become final
until the protest filed against her was favorably
decided in her favor by CSC, citing Admin Code, sec
19
Head of agency, being the appointing authority, is
the one most knowledgeable to decide who can best
perform the functions of the office; he/she has a
wide latitude of choice subject only to the condition
that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law
Issue (1):
w/n Monserates right to due process was violated
Holding and Ratio: Yes.
The PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with her
demotion. It was precisely because of the reorganization that
Monserate applied for Division Manager II. The comparative data
sheet, accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force, shows
that she ranked first from among 6 contenders. It was only after
such reorganization, and in fact nothing else but by virtue of the
Resolution sustaining Aninos protest that she got demoted.
Monserate appealed to the CA which sustained her appeal:

o PPA Appeals Board resolution was not supported by
evidence
o Irregularity in the issuance of the resolution (lack of
proper notice)
o Reassignment from Manager II to Admin Officer was
a demotion violative of her right to security of tenure
and due process
In 1997, Anino retired from the government service
General Manager and Aninos arguments:
o No demotion; demotion is in the nature of an
administrative penalty; since there was no such
charge and conviction, there is no demotion
Moreover, the dispositive portion of the said Resolution appears

irregular. It upholds the appointment of Anino, when in fact,
Anino was yet not appointed as Manager II at that time; it was
Monserate who was appointed. In any case, Aninos official
appointment was not issued until 2 months after the said
resolution. The PPA Appeals Board could not uphold an
appointment which did not yet exist.
35

MONSERATE)]
PUBOFF
Equally questionable are the grounds for sustaining the protest.

The enumeration is incomprehensible for lack of discussion by the
Board to enable Monserate to know the reasons for her demotion.
CA was correct in nullifying the resolution of the Appeals Board for
lack of evidence and proper notice:
instead was a Special Order dated September 29, 1988

already ordering her demotion. She was not at all given the
opportunity of defending herself before the Appeals Board.
Of the CSC MC No. 5, the petitioner had no pending

administrative or criminal case at the time of her
appointment as Manager. x x x.
"In the case now before us, the petitioner did not receive or
was not given a copy of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of
the Appeals Board. She did not even know that she was
demoted until after she received a copy of the the Special
Order No. 479-88."
"x x x.
"With respect to the CSC MC No. 10, Par. A (1.2) and Par. B,
the processing, review, evaluation and recommendation of
her appointment as Manager II, passed several committees
created by the PPA. x x x. Moreover, she had a 1.9 average
performance rating compared to the private respondent
who only got 2.03. x x x.
Substantial and procedural irregularities attended Monserates

demotion. It is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to
security of tenure and due process.
"On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional

eligibility while the private respondent only has a First
Grade Civil Service Eligibility.
In Aquino v. CSC, once an appointment is issued and the moment

the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely
equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by
statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away
from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
"She added that she was not aware of any proceeding on

her demotion as a Division Manager. As a matter of fact, it
was only upon her initiative sometime during the latter part
of November, 1988 that she was able to obtain a copy of
the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the Appeals Board. The
resolution sustained the private respondent's appointment
as Division Manager even if on August 11, 1988, he was not
yet extended any appointment. As a matter of fact, he was
appointed only on October 1, 1988 (should be October 21,
1988).
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of

discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to
vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the
discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the
appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such
appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing
authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause.
Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation.
"Furthermore, she said that the resolution of the PPA

Appeals Board appears irregular, if not null and void. She
was never notified of any proceeding; she was not
furnished either a copy of the resolution. What she received
36

MONSERATE)]
Thus, CA merely restored her appointment to said position;
position never became vacant since her demotion was void.
Consequently, Aninos appointment to a non-vacant position in
the civil service is null and void ab initio.
PUBOFF
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other

compensations attached to the office."
GR: Where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his

wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments attached
to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith.
Re: Aninos incumbency:

Anino is nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the
period of his incumbency. A de facto officer is one who is in
possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions
under color of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular.
HOWEVER, rule cannot be applied squarely on the present case in

view of its peculiar circumstances. Monserate had assumed under
protest the position of Administrative Officer which position she
currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the
emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such
office. While her assumption to said lower position and her
acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot be
considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful office
(Division Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the
period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled
only to backpay differentials (difference between the salary rates
for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer) for the
period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up
to the time of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as
Division Manager. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the
contested position up to the time of his retirement on November
30, 1997.
Re: backwages:
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a rightful incumbent of a public
office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by
the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
(the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under
color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de
jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of
his wrongful tenure.
In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,
SC allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual
services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus:
"x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto
officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office
and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
37

Debulgado V CSC - Appointment (GMA of PPA)

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[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and

FELIMON LUEGO, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and

Dr. Emily Marohombsar v. Ahmad Alonto Jr. (President of

CSC vs. SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ [2004]...................25

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on

[G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999]

After a formal investigation, the Civil Service

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

particular instance full report of such

The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil

2. Who may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals

The Civil Service Commission has become the

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be

Separate Opinions (with respect to who may appeal; not syllabus

There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

agencies or regional directors. [7] As further illustrated in Sec. 37 of

regardless of the errors. This distorted rule contravenes our

G.R. No. 175352

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO,

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

Under Flores v. Drilon, incumbent national legislators lose their

Petitioners have no standing in this petition. This appears to

Assuming it is QW, the petition is barred by prescription.

Assuming this is a taxpayers suit, petitioners failed to show

Assuming this is for declaratory relief, original jurisdiction

Lastly, PNRC is not a GOCC, therefore the Consti prohibition

This is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful disbursement

2. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as

Gordon asserts that:

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC

On 22 March 1947, President Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,

3. The government does not control the PNRC.

the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted

Of the twenty-four members, eighteen are elected by the

SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

officers. The first group refers to the heads of the

Furthermore, the PNRC Board of Governors, which

by any subordinate government official. Thus, the PNRC

Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group

Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

5. The previous ruling in Camporedondo v. NLRC failed to

consider the definition of a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the

1.3. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals,

particularly the PNRC Board. Decisions or actions of the

However, based on the Administrative Code, a GOCC must be

Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the

The vast majority of PNRC members are private individuals,

SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency

[DISQUALIFICATIONS (DEBULGADO V. CSC) APPOINTMENT (GM OF PPA V.

The Court in Feliciano v. COA gave the rationale for this

The PNRC was created through a special charter. However, the

The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional

The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar