Envireg Digests 1 31

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIGESTS
MERIDA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008 Ponente:
Carpio
FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for
"cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which
private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting
about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted
the narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating
his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as
provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized
lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that
petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property
without any DENR permit.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. YES.
2) W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. YES.

RATIO:
1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint
filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying
such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and
not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a
private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted
for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705
or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's
alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
3) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or processed log is
covered by the forest products term in PD 705, as the law does not
between a raw and processed timber.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
distinguish

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS V. BATARIO

G.R. No. 92285 March 28,
1994 Ponente: Bellosillo
FACTS: Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
gubas trees in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production
of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in
industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like
PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "woodderivated" products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported 4
containers of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers of matches from Singapore. On 25
April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the DENR issued a certification that "there
are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price."
In light of this, PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
for a TRO against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from
importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and
releasing the importations. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario. Lower
court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or
illegal importations."
ISSUE: W/N The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation, and
other incidental matters relating to such. YES.
RATIO: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry
Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to
the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of
any legal basis. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on his
determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the
prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which
would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

PEOPLE V. CFI
G.R. No. L-46772 February
13, 1992 Ponente:
Medialdea
FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores,
together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being
the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned
land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and
proceeded to illegally cut, gather, and take, therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and
without any authority under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on 2
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus dismissed the information
based on the respondents grounds.
ISSUE: W/N the information correctly and properly charged an offense and WON the trial court had
jurisdiction over the case. YES.
RATIO: The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered,
collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut,
gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that
the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement,
lease, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure of the information to allege that the logs
taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint
were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of
complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license
agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products
produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not
an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705
covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the
Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in
his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an
offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee
and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however,
the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate
official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations
in court. Unfortunately, the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section
80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and
neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a
private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the
OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code
giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor
and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with
the commission of the crime. In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest
officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom it is vested
by general law.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

LAGUA V. CUSI
G.R. No. L-44649 April 15,
1988
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr.
FACTS: This is a mandamus case filed against respondents for closing a logging road without
authority. The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose
out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question
is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The lower court affirmed the respondents defense, stating that the
petitioners must first seek recourse with the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the
legality of the closure of the logging roads, before seeking redress with the regular courts for
damages.
ISSUE: W/N the regular courts can take cognizance of the damages case without first seeking the
determination of the Bureau regarding the legality of the closure. YES.
RATIO: P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in
the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is
legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may
be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a
matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private
respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the
power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every
activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

MUSTANG LUMBER V. CA
G.R. No. 104988
June 18, 1996
Ponente: Davide, Jr.
FACTS: A consolidation of three cases. Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in a lumber
dealer registered with the Bureau of Forest Development. Respondents are DENR Sec. Factoran
and Atty. Robles of the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the DENR.
Acting based on an information, the SAID team went to the lumberyard of petitioner and
based on a search warrant, were able to execute an administrative seizure of different kinds of
lumber, to which the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the documents such as
corresponding certificate of lumber origin and auxiliary invoices which shall prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin. Robles then submitted a memorandum report to Factoran, ordering the
cancellation of petitioners Dealers Permit, filing of criminal charges, and confiscation of the trucks
and lumbers. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, stating that possession of lumber without
permit or authority is not a crime.
ISSUE: W/N a lumber cannot be considered timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal
logging under Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. NO.
RATIO:While PD 705 explicitly provides that timber is included in the term forest products, the
term lumber is found in paragraph (aa) of Section 3 which states that the latter is a processed log
or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the law uses the word lumber in its plain and common
usage, and in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, it shall be interpreted as such.
Hence, it is safe to conclude that the law makes no distinction whether the forest product is
processed or not. Therefore, Judge Teresita Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

TIGOY V. CA
G.R. No. 144640
June 26, 2006 Ponente:
Azcuna
FACTS: On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan
City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who
signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Lanao del Norte
to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo.
Petitioner Tigoy and a certain Sumagang were then employed as truck drivers of Ong.
Due to a dispatch, policemen apprehended the trucks driven by Tigoy, based on a
suspicion that hot items were loaded therein. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles
of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks, and upon inquiry, the drivers could not
produce any permit for the lumber. Thereafter the Forester of the DENR named Dingal investigated
and then charged petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for illegal possession of lumber
without permit.
ISSUE: W/N Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without permit.
YES.
RATIO: There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering
and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.Petitioner was charged with and
convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the
Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in
flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not
know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were
bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when
Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement, however, the court
is unconvinced because Tigoy refused to stop at a checkpoint and when accosted, even offered
grease money to the policemen. In offenses considered as mala prohibita, the commission of the
prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.
PEOPLE V. QUE
G.R. No. 120365 December
17, 1996 Ponente: Puno
FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of PD
705.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial Task
Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task
Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and
eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que,
who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and
found that it contained coconut slabs, but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que
himself. When required to show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of
Sec. 68 of PD 705.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

ISSUE: W/N petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that amended Section 68,
which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal, and
considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at the time of the enactment of said E.O.
YES.
Held: Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws
and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The
suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should
not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations
existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order
No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest
products. Thus Ques possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly
constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Also, the court rejected Ques argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal
forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the
DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting
and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source
is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
CALUB V. CA
G.R. No. 115634 April 27,
2000 Ponente: Quisumbing
FACTS: the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles wherein
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and
its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer,
then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended
by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code). Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even
granted recovery of possession to them via replevin.
Upon petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the mere
seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis.
According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly
authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest
products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to
pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the
appellate court said. Additionally, respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the
ATTY. VILLEGAS

procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to
submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover,
petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order
has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in
failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be
considered in custodia legis
ISSUE: W/N said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to Section 68 of PD 705. YES.
RATIO: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent
documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of
the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code. Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a
report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor
vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able
to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The
seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing
before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could
not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise
FACTORAN V. CA
G.R. No. 93540
December 13, 1999
Ponente: De Leon, Jr.
FACTS: On August 9, 1988, 2 police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck,
carrying narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck
driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel
Investigation
Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon
City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber. Due to the failure of respondents to show
the required documents, petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck. Private
respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed, the said order to the Office of the
President. Consequently, these items were then forfeited in favor of the government. They were
subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction on March 20, 1989.
Respondents then filed for preliminary injunction and replevin, to which the trial court acceded.
Petitioner then refused to obey the writ of seizure and filed a counterbond, to which the court
denied because of lack of service to the respondents. Court of appeals affirmed the lower courts
decision.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

ISSUE: WON respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber based on
the writ of replevin. NO.
RATIO: Firstly, herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of petitioner Secretary to
the Office of the President as provided for in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies
have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to
act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. However,
petitioners waived this ground for failure to raise such in their motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, in
order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an
action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler
truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a
thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal
writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession
before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property was
taken. Lastly, Sec. 80 of P. D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6
hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
PAAT V. CA
G.R. No. 111107 January
10, 1997 Ponente:
Torres, Jr.
FACTS: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from Cagayan, was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could
not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed
to submit the required explanation. Later, the Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained
petitioner Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section
68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Respondents then
appealed.
Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director, which thereafter issued a writ
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed upon petitioners appeal.
ISSUES:
1. W/N an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of
P. D. 705. NO.
2. W/N the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government. YES.
ATTY. VILLEGAS

RATIO: Firstly, the Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it
was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of
private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which
they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
Secondly, as to the power of the DENR to confiscate, SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of
the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter.
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
Lastly, as to the contention that since they are not liable for qualified theft, then they should
not have necessarily have committed a crime under Sec. 68. This is unmeritorious. With the
introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the
phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code .
ATTY. VILLEGAS
10

ALVAREZ V. PICOP
G.R. No. 162243
December 3, 2009 Ponente:
Chico-Nazario
FACTS: PICOP (Paper Industries Corp of the Phil) filed with the DENR an application to have its
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA (Integrated forest management
agreement). In the middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the RTC
of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus 1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez.
PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to
sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. Lower court ruled in favor of respondents, CA
affirmed, but upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed the judgment of the CA. Now PICOP
files a Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled to the IFMA by way of mandamus and due to the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution in relation to Document 1969. NO, Document 1969 is not a contact, but
a mere collateral undertaking pursuant to the TLA.
RATIO: An examination of the Presidential Warranty (Doc. 1969) at once reveals that it simply
reassures PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber
license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas
which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers
only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the
utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession. The
Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and FMA No. 35.
It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license.
The ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
nonimpairment clause is edifying.
Also, PICOP failed to secure NCIP Cerification based on R.A. 8371 and Sanggunian
consultation and approval for environmentally critical projects based on the Local Government
Code.
ALVAREZ V. PICOP
G.R. No. 162243 November
29, 2006 Ponente: ChicoNazario
FACTS: This is a consolidation of three cases. On 23 December 1999, then DENR Secretary
Cerilles promulgated DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53 which had for its subject, the
"Regulations Governing the Integrated Forest Management Program (IFMP)."In a 28 August 2000
letter to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), PICOP signified its
intention to convert its TLA No. 43 into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA)
invoking the provisions of Section 9, Chapter III of DAO No. 99-53. Pursuant to the application for
conversion, the Performance Evaluation Team of DENR conducted a report indicating violations by
PICOP of existing DENR Rules and Regulations governing TLA No. 43, such as the nonsubmission of its five-year forest protection plan and seven-year reforestation plan as required by
ATTY. VILLEGAS
11

the DENR rules and regulations, as well as overdue and unpaid forest charges. Upon submission
of the memorandum to the DENR Secretary, negotiations were held to assure PICOPs compliance
with DAO 99-53, however PICOP later claimed that the conversion had already been completed
pursuant to Sec. Alvarez letter of clearance.
PICOP then filed for a petition for mandamus against petitioner which was granted by the
trial court. Later on, Gozun was substituted in the case as the new DENR Secretary. Court of
Appeals eventually affirmed the lower courts ruling, to which herein petitioners now appeal.
ISSUE: W/N PICOP is entitled by way of mandamus to the conversion of its TLA to IFMA, and
WON there was compliance with DAO No. 99-53 and thus conversion had already been effected.
NO.
RATIO: A timber license agreement is not a contract, neither is the presidential warranty of
President Marcos a contract. The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the
ground that there were mutual considerations taken into account consisting in investments on
PICOPs part is preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. To
construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective
the settled jurisprudence that "a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and
the licensee or permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend."
As to the compliance with the DAO, the following are the requisites for the automatic
conversion of the TLA into an IFMA, to wit:
1. The TLA holder had signified its intent to convert its TLA into an IFMA prior to the
expiration of its TLA;
2. Proper evaluation was conducted on the application; and
3. The TLA holder has satisfactorily performed and complied with the terms and conditions of
the TLA and the pertinent rules and regulations.
In the case at bar, PICOP failed to comply with DAO, as evidenced by the memorandum
submitted to the DENR Secretary by the Performance Evaluation Team. Finally, the DENR, by
withholding the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA, has made a factual finding that
PICOP has not yet complied with the requirements for such a conversion. Findings of facts of
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts because
of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Lastly, as to whether or not conversion already took place, the court ruled in the negative.
By giving this clearance for the conversion of PICOPs TLA into an IFMA, the DENR Secretary
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be claimed to have granted the conversion itself. The letter is
clear that the "conversion" could not be final since its conditions and details still have to be
discussed as stated in the second paragraph of said letter; hence, the same letter could not have
reduced to a mere formality the approval of the conversion of PICOPs TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
Even assuming, however, that the IFMA has already been converted, this is all purely academic
because of the above-discussed settled jurisprudence that logging permits are not contracts within
the NonImpairment Clause and thus, can be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded when the
national interest so requires. If the DENR Secretary, therefore, finds that the IFMA would be in
violation of statutes, rules and regulations, particularly those protecting the rights of the local
governments and the indigenous peoples within the IFMA area, then it behooves the DENR
Secretary to revoke such IFMA. These same statutes, rules and regulations are the very same
requirements mentioned above for the conversion of the TLA No. 43 into an IFMA.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
12

DY V. CA
G.R. No. 121587 March 9,
1999 Ponente: Mendoza
FACTS: On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating
Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of
illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products in that city. The team was
composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, PNP, DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of
Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of civilian security in the
mayors office, was a member of the team. On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received
confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City
from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a checkpoint along
kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City. Therafter upon catching up with the two cars in the latters
compound, the caretaker of the compound was not able to produce any documents proving the
legality of possession of the forest products. DENR officers then seized the truck and lumber, and
since there were no claimants after posting the notice of confiscation, it was deemed forfeited in
favor of the government.
2 months after the said forfeiture, petitioner herein filed a suit for replevin to recover the
trucks and lumber, to which respondent Lausa filed a motion for approval of counterbond and
dismissal of the replevin since the seizure was pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code. Trial court
for petitioner, but was reversed in the CA in favor of Lausa. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering
that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the
DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No.
277. NO.
RATIO: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the
courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the
means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before a courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a courts intervention is
fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is
susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of
Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioners application for
a replevin writ and denying private respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant
to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all
actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the
DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as
being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have
done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the DENR .
ATTY. VILLEGAS
13

PICOP V. BASE METALS

G.R. No. 163509
Tinga
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity)
entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual
commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the
terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the
mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines
Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining
claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's
logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA
whereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims. In 1991,
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to
sell/assign its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals
Mineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its mining operating
agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner,
immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent
Base
Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On
March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA
applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional
documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application because it violate the nonimpairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for
petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was in favor of respondent,
CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the
latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given
upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license
agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract
because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the
non-impairment clause finds no application.
Issue: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and that the conversion of
the agreement into MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. NO, a
Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere privilege.
RATIO: We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws
towards the end that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized
and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and
timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein
provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage
done to the property as a consequence of mining operations.
Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation,
defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such
does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that
government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written clearance by the
ATTY. VILLEGAS
14

government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that
mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the
DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all
forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in
this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of
area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that
timber or forest lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest
reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within
timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining applications
subject to area status and clearance.
Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a
protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law,
presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as required by RA 7586.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
15

ASAPHIL V. TUASON
G.R. NO. 134030
April 25, 2006 Ponente:
Austria-Martinez
FACTS: On March 24, 1975, respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. entered into a Contract for Sale and
Purchase of Perlite Ore with Induplex wherein Induplex agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be
found and mined in Tuasons mining claim located in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange, Induplex
will assist Tuason in securing and perfecting his right over the mining claim . Thereafter, Tuason
executed an Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of petitioner Asaphil Construction and
Development Corporation. Later, Tuason filed with the Bureau of Mines, DENR a complaint against
Asaphil and Induplex for declaration of nullity of the said Contracts. Tuason alleged in his complaint
that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon Mineral Resources, an entity whose
purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals, that this is in violation of the condition imposed by
the Board of on Induplex in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc, prohibiting Induplex from
mining perlite ore, through an operating agreement or any other method; that Induplex acquired the
majority stocks of Asaphil and that 95% of Ibalons shares were also transferred to Virgilio R.
Romero, who is a stockholder of Induplex, Asaphil and Ibalon. Tuason claimed that said acts
adversely affected, not only his interest as claimowner, but the governments interest as well.
Asaphil filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
DENR has no jurisdiction over the case. Induplex filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, also on
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Induplex contended that to fall within the jurisdiction of the DENR, the
controversy should involve a mining property and the contending parties must be claimholders
and/or mining operators; and that the dispute in this case involves mineral product and not a
mining property, and the protagonists are claimholders (Tuason) and a buyer (Induplex). DENR
affirmed, but the Mines Adjucation Board reversed, stating that the complaint is for the cancellation
and revocation of the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims, which is within the jurisdiction of the
DENR under Section 7 of PD 1281. The MAB also found that the acquisition by Induplex of the
majority stocks of Asaphil, and Induplexs assumption of the mining operation violated the BOI
prohibition.
Issue: W/N the DENR has jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint for the annulment of the Contract for
Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore between Tuason and Induplex, and the Agreement to Operate
Mining Claims between Tuason and Asaphil; and second, WON the MAB erred in invalidating the
Agreement to Operate Mining Claims. YES.
RATIO: In several cases on mining disputes, the Court recognized a distinction between (1) the
primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as
granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling
applications, or deciding conflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be
adjudicated only by the courts of justice.The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a
case for a mining dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement
to Operate Mining Claims is a mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be
annulled is not due to Asaphils refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but
due to Induplexs alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture
Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase
of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which
is proper for determination by the regular courts.
The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any
mining operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements
based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts. Thus,
the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of
ATTY. VILLEGAS
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jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking
cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts.
DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS V. GOZUN
G.R. No. 157882
March 30, 2006
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
FACTS: In 1987, Cory promulgated EO 279 which empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies regarding technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos
signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with
Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore
37,000 hectares of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy .Didipio. After the passage of
the law, DENR then issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners
reasoned that these in effect allow the unlawful and unjust taking of property for private purpose in
contravention with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, mandating that private property
shall not be taken except for public use and with the corresponding payment of just compensation.
They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Public respondents on the other hand avers that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a
valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and it endeavors
potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded
that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate
by purchase.
Issue: W/N RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. YES.
RATIO: The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are following:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is with just compensation. Sec. 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well
as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit:
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to
the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence
of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure
mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
17

PEOPLE VS ROSEMOOR
G.R. No. 149927
March 30, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban
FACTS: Rosemoor Mining And Development Corporation Corporation (Rosemoor), after having
been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato,
Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities.
They applied with the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau), for the issuance of
the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits, which was issued to them, giving them
the right to quarry 330 hectares of land. After Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of DENR, he
cancelled Rosemoors license. Rosemoor filed for injunctive relief from the RTC, which ruled in
their favor.
The RTC said that Rosewoods respondents license had already ripened into a property
right, which was protected under the due process clause, and such right was supposedly violated
when the license was unjustifiably cancelled without notice and hearing. Petitioners aver that the
license contravenes PD 463 because it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted to a
Licensee for quarrying (100 hectares), which renders the license void. The CA sustained the RTC
decision because the license was embraced by four (4) separate applications, and that the 100
hectare limitation was superseded by RA 7942. The CA also said that Proclamation 84, which
confirmed the cancellation of the license, impaired the non-impairment clause of contracts, a bill of
attainder and an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: W/N Rosemoors license was validly cancelled. YES.
RATIO:
Validity of License
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases, but was omitted in the 1987
Constitution as it was deemed violative of its provisions. This was replaced by RA 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees,
rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with it.
While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with
its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. In this case, the terms
of Rosemoors license was subject to PD 463, the existing law when it was granted. And under
such law, it is clear that a license should only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or
consideration to the number of applications. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented
by ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing
several applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.
Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Rosemoors license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national
interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. This condition to the license was acknowledged by Rosemoor in
its permit. Moreover, granting that Rosemoor license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is
clearly in accord with the regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all natural
resources.
Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the license is not a
contract. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of
police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare.
PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the declaration that the license was void is not a
punishment. It is also not an ex post facto law because the proclamation does not fall under any of
ATTY. VILLEGAS
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the enumerated categories of an ex post facto law. And an ex post facto law is limited in its scope
only to matters criminal in nature.
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882 27 January
2004 Ponente: CarpioMorales
FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreignowned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942
defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their
filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions
govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila
Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA
with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur
and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on
December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving
the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act
on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance
Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and
null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as
unconstitutional
and
null
and
void;
and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining
Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
In January 2001, MMC a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company sold
its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of
which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and
registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. WMCP
ATTY. VILLEGAS
19

contends that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources. YES.
RATIO: RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands
of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the
purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to
complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive
and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of
assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial
assistance. The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to
the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute
employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution,
its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing
foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has in
effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors,
leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations
engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are
thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only
to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Pgilippines is a service contract. YES.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
20

The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a device contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced
from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide all
financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are
intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution.
They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882.
Panganiban
FACTS: In the January Decision, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition
and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), DENR
AO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and Western Mining
Corp. Philippines, an Australian corporation. (WMCP). The Court said RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional for allowing service contracts
now prohibited by the 1987 Charter. The Court said FTAA is a service contract that grants control or
beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to foreign contractors, leaving the State
with nothing but bare title thereto. It was also on this ground that the Court struck down as
constitutionally infirm the FTAA between the government and WMCP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance
contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution was properly interpreted in
the previous decision to warrant the unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and the FTAA of WMCP. YES.
RATIO:
The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase Agreements Involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance
Section 2 Article XII does not reveal any intention to proscribe foreign involvement in the
management or operation of mining activities or to eliminate service contracts, nor does it have
express prohibition to this effect. Had the framers intended to prohibit direct participation of an alien
corporation in the exploration of the countrys natural resources, they would employed clearly
restrictive language barring foreign corporation from directly engaging in the exploration of the
countrys natural resources.
Foreign corporations may indeed participate in the exploitation, development and use of
Philippine natural resources but subject to the full control and supervision of the State. RA 7942, its
implementing rules (DAO 96-40) and the FTAA entered into by then Government and WMCP grant
the Government full control and supervision over all aspects of planned exploration, development
and utilization activities.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
21

Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the FTAA however are objectionable and void for being contrary to
public policy. Section 7.8 permits the sum spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to
be deductible from the States share in the net mining revenues since it constitutes unjust
enrichment on the part of the contractor at the governments expense. Section 7.9, meanwhile,
deprives the Government of its share in the net mining revenues in the event the foreign
stockholders of a foreign mining company sell 60% or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or
corporation.
Thus, with the exception of Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, the FTAA, RA 7942
and DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional.
The Meaning of Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance
A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporation to render financial
or technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly
unnecessary; the provision meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance.
The framers of the Constitution, during its deliberation regarding foreign investment in and
management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals
spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious
from their discussions that they did not intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they
were intent on crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors but with safety measures to prevent abuses as an exception to the
general norm established in the first paragraph of Section2 of Article XII, which reserves or limits to
Filipino citizens and corporations that are at least 60 percent owned by such citizens the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. This was prompted by
the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of
mineral resources.
The drafters, by specifying such agreements involving assistance, necessarily gave implied
assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary
to make them tenable and effective including management authority with respect to the day-today operations of the enterprise, and measures for the protection of the interests of the foreign
corporation, at least to the extent that they are consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural
resources, the constitutional requirement of State control, and beneficial ownership of natural
resources remains vested in the State.
It is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance referred to in
paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one hand, and on the other hand government as principal
or owner )of the works), whereby the foreign contractor provides the capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale
mining/extractive enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises
full control and supervision over the entire enterprise.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to mineral oils. The grant of
such service is subject to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted
in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements;
(2) the President be the signatory for the government; and (3) the President report the executed
agreement to Congress within thirty days.
Ultimate Test: Full State Control
The primacy of the principle of the States sovereign ownership of all mineral resources,
and its full control and supervision over all aspects of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources must be upheld. But full control and supervision cannot be taken literally to
mean that the State controls and supervises everything down to the minutest details, and makes all
required actions, as this would render impossible the legitimate exercise by the contractor of a
reasonable degree of management prerogative and authority, indispensable to the proper
functioning of the mining enterprise. Also, the government need not micro-manage the mining
ATTY. VILLEGAS
22

operations and day-today affairs of the enterprise in order to be considered as exercising full
control and supervision.
The States full control and supervision over mining operations are ensured through the
different provisions in RA 7942. The government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove the various work programs and corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for
each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the enterprise. Once they have been
approved, the contractors compliance with its commitments therein will be monitored. The
contractor is also mandated to open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny, to enable the
State to determine if the government share has been fully paid. The State may likewise compel
compliance by the contractor with mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and
environmental protection, and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. The contractor is
also obligated to assist the development of the mining community, and pay royalties to the
indigenous peoples concerned. And violation of any of FTAAs terms and conditions, and/or
noncompliance with statutes or regulations, may be penalized by cancellation of the FTAA. Such
sanction is significant to a contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars sunk into a mining project.
Overall, the State definitely has a pivotal say in the operation of the individual enterprises,
and can set directions and objectives, detect deviations and non-compliance by the contractor; and
enforce compliance and impose sanctions should the occasion arise. Hence, RA 7942 and DAO
9640 vest in government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct
of mining operations.
Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 was objected to as being unconstitutional for allowing a foreign
contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit. During the exploration phase, the permit
grantee (and prospective contractor) is spending and investing heavily in exploration activities
without yet being able to extract minerals and generate revenues. The exploration permit issued
under Section 3 (aq), 20 and 23 of RA7942, which allows exploration but not extraction, serves to
protect the interests and rights of the exploration permit grantee (and would-be contractor), foreign
or local. Otherwise, the exploration works already conducted, and expenditures already made, may
end up only benefiting claim-jumpers. Thus, Section 3 (aq) of RA 7942 is not unconstitutional.
The provisions of the WMCP FTAA, far from constituting a surrender of control and a grant
of beneficial ownership of mineral resources to the contractor in question, vest the State with
control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor,
including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral
products.
There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions of the
WMCP FTAA.
The FTAA provisions do not reduce or abdicate State control: No Surrender of Financial
Benefits
The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 has been denounced for allegedly limiting
the States share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just taxes, fees, and duties, and depriving the
State of a share in the after-tax income of the enterprise. However, the inclusion of the phrase
among other things in the second paragraph of Section81 clearly and unmistakably reveals the
legislative intent to have the State collect more than just usual taxes, duties and fees.
Thus, DAO 99-56, the Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements spells out the financial benefits government will receive from an FTAA, as
consisting of not only a basic government share, comprised of all direct taxes, fees and royalties,
as well as other payments made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA, but also an
additional government share, being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining enterprise,
so as to achieve a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from mining between the government and the
contractor.
The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet take into
account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining projects, which are real and
actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people; if these are taken into account, total government
ATTY. VILLEGAS
23

share increases to 60 percent or higher (as much as 77 percent, and 89 percent in one instance) of
the net present value of total benefits from the project.
The third or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA7942 is slammed for deferring the payment
of the government share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall have recovered its pre-operating
expenses, exploration and development expenditures. Allegedly, the collection of the States share
is rendered uncertain, as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period or recovery period.
But although RA7942 did not limit the grace period, the concerned agencies (DENR and MGB) in
formulating the 1995 and 1996 Implementing Rules and Regulation provided that the period of
recovery, reckoned from the date of commercial operation, shall be for a period not exceeding five
years, or until the date of actual recovery, whichever comes earlier.
Since RA 7942 allegedly does not require government approval for the pre-operating,
exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractors, it is feared that such expenses
could be bloated to wipe out mining revenues anticipated for 10 years, with the result that the
States share is zero for the first 10 years. The argument is based on incorrect information. Under
Section 23 of RA 7942, the applicant for exploration permit is required to submit a proposed work
program for exploration, containing a yearly budget of proposed expenditures, which the State
passes upon and either approves or rejects; if approved, the same will subsequently be recorded
as pre-operating expenses that the contractor will have to recoup over the grace period.
The Government is able to know ahead of time the amounts of pre-operating and other
expenses to be recovered, and the approximate period of time needed therefore because under
Section 24, when an exploration permittee files with the MGB a declaration of mining project
feasibility, it must submit a work program for development, with corresponding budget, for approval
by the Bureau, before government may grant an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements. The
government has the opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted
expenditures for development works, which will become the pre-operating and development costs
that will have to be recovered.
Moreover, there is no concrete basis for the view that, in FTAAs with a foreign contractor,
the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from the exploitation of its mineral
resources, and that such share is the equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60
percent of the capital, and hence 60 percent of the income, of mining companies should remain in
Filipino hands. Even if the State is entitled to a 60 percent share from other mineral agreements
(CPA, JVA and MPSA), that would not create a parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. .
The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share, applicable to all
situations, regardless of circumstances. The terms and conditions of petroleum FTAAs cannot
serve as standards for mineral mining FTAAs, because the technical and operational requirements,
cost structures and investment needs of off-shore petroleum exploration and drilling companies do
not have the remotest resemblance to those of on-shore mining companies. To avoid compromising
the States full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no
attempt to impose a minimum 60 percent rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and
means, should it so decide, to get a 60 percent share (or greater); and it is not necessary that the
State does so in every case.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
24

METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT VS CA

G.R. No. 122855
March 31, 2005 Ponente:
Tinga
FACTS: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD), which was granted water rights to extract and withdraw
ground water within its jurisdiction. MIWD filed an injunction case against private respondents
(Nava et al.) for withdrawing ground water within the formers jurisdiction without securing a water
permit from NWRC, which was still being done upon filing the petition. Private respondents averred
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the matter, as the cases were within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council). The RTC dismissed the
petitions saying it had no jurisdiction and that MWID failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
CA affirmed the RTC Decision, saying that the NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes
relating to appropriation, utilization and control of water which was the subject matter of the case.
ISSUE: W/N NWRC had jurisdiction over the case. NO.
RATIO: The petitions filed before the RTC were for the issuance of an injunction order for private
respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWDs well and from
selling the same within its service areas. The petitions focus on the violations incurred by private
respondents by virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water
within petitioners service area, visa-a-vis MIWDs vested rights as a water district. At issue is
whether or not private respondents extraction and sale of ground water within petitioners service
area violated petitioners rights as a water district.
The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and
jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents actions violate MIWDs rights as a
water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the
special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While
initially it may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the
Water Council, in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.
MIWD had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant MIWD the right to use but to compel
private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, the trial courts jurisdiction must be upheld where
the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to
water use for which a permit was already granted.
BF NORTHWEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS IAC AND BF HOMES, INC.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
25

G.R. No. 72370 May 29,

1987 Ponente: MelencioHerrera
FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. (HOMES), which was granted a certificate of public convenience by
National Water Resources Council (NWRC) [formerly the Board of Power and Waterworks],
increased water rates by authority of the latter. BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc
(ASSOCIATION) filed a petition enjoin BF Homes, Inc. from collecting from ASSOCIATION
members the adjusted water rates for being arbitrary and unreasonable and to annul NWRCs
Order granting HOMES authority to charge the increased water rates on the ground that it was
rendered without procedural due process and without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion. HOMES filed a motion to dismiss but was denied.
However, upon petition by HOMES, the CA reversed and held that the RTC was without
jurisdiction to entertain the case since NWRC, which took over the functions of the Public Service
Commission, has the rank of a Regional Trial Court and its decision on water rates may only be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over actions to annul Orders, Resolutions and/or Decisions of
the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) relative to water rates. YES.
RATIO: Under PD 1067, it explicitly states that decisions of the NWRC on water rights
controversies may be appealed to the Court of First Instance. The NWRC is thus ranked with
"inferior courts," which, under the SC Interim Rules and Guidelines are listed as the Metropolitan
Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we take note of the fact that
the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and
all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions of fact and
law.
The distinction made by the CA between "water rights controversies" which it maintains are
appealable to the Regional Trial Courts, and "water rates disputes" which it says are appealable to
the Court of Appeals, is not well taken. Considering that rate- fixing is merely an incident to the
grant of a certificate of public convenience, it would be irregular if disputes over water rates, should
be held appealable to the Court of Appeals while controversies over water rights, the latter being
the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water and, therefore, a primary
right, would be appealable only to the Regional Trial Court.
However, it is to be noted that since Decision Orders of the NWRC are assailed, the latter
agency should be impleaded as an indispensable party defendant in order that any judgment could
be effective and binding on it, and so that complete relief may be accorded to the parties.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
26

AMISTOSO VS ONG AND NERI

G.R. No. L-60219 June 29,
1984 Ponente: Cuevas
FACTS: Amistoso and Neri are owners of adjoining parcels of agricultural land. An irrigation canal
traverses the land of Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and and
flows to the land of the Amistoso for the latter's beneficial use. Amistoso filed a complaint for
Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Neri and Ong(cultivator
of Neris land) for refusal, despite repeated demands, to recognize the rights and title of the former
to the beneficial use of the water passing through the irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights
and/or claims annotated on the Certificate of Title of Neri. Neri denied any right of Amistoso over
the use of the canal, nor was there any contract, deed or encumbrance on their property and assert
that they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the filing of the
complaint against them.
Neri asserts that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistosos claim is based on
his right to use water coming from the Silmod River and prays that Amistosos right to the utilization
thereof be respected and not be disturbed and/or obstructed by Neri. The dispute is thus on the
use, conservation and protection of the right to water and the annotation is merely the relief prayed
for on the basis of the claim to the use and protection of water passing through the land of Neri.
And since the controversy hinges on the right to use and protect the water from the Silmod River
that passes on the land of Neri to Amistoso's property, the proper authority to determine such a
controversy is the National Water Resources Council, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
over such question.
The trial court dismissed Amistosos complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal. YES.
2. W/N National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. NO.
RATIO: Based from the stipulation of facts between the parties, Neri admits that Amistoso , has an
approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. Neri contends that the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of
irrigation water from Silmod River. The records, however, do not show any other irrigation water
going to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from the Silmod
River, making Neris allegations invalid.
The record clearly discloses an approved Water Rights Grant in favor of Amistoso. The
grant was made three (3) years before the promulgation of P.D. 1067 (Water Code of the
Philippines). The water rights grant partakes the nature of a document known as a water permit
recognized under Article 13 of P.D. 1067. the WATER RIGHTS GRANT of Amistoso does not fall
under "claims for a right to use water existing on or before December 31, 1974" which under P.D.
1067 are required to be registered with the National Water Resources Council within two (2) years
from promulgation of P.D. 1067, otherwise it is deemed waived and the use thereof deemed
abandoned.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and incontrovertibly
entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River. That right is now a. vested one
and may no longer be litigated as to bring petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National
Water Resources Council. To resurrect that issue will be violative of the rule on res judicata.
Amistoso is not asking the court to grant him the right to use but to compel Neri to recognize that
right and have the same annotated on the latters TCT. The interruption of the free flow of water
caused by the refusal to re-open the closed irrigation canal constituted petitioner's cause of action
in the court below, which decidedly do not fall within the domain of the authority of the National
Water Resources Council.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
27

LONEY et al. VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 152644
February 10, 2006 Ponente:
Carpio
FACTS: Loney et al., are officers of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. In one of Marcoppers operations, the
corporation discharged millions of tons of tailings (mine waste) into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged Loney et al. for violating various laws (The Water Code, The Mining
act, RPC, and the National Pollution Control Decree). Loney et al. moved to quash the informations
claiming that the informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a
single act.
The MTC held that Loney et al. is liable under the Philippine Mining Act but dismissed the
violation of other laws. On petition to the RTC, it affirmed the decision and ordered the other
charges reinstated. The RTC said that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other
offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The
different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from
one another. On petition to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. W/N all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand. NO.
2. W/N Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
RATIO:
No Duplicity of Charges
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than
one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of
such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. In this case, however,
the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one
offense. Thus, Loney et al. erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
The filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident,
is consistent with settled doctrine that where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. A comparative analysis between the laws shows that each of these
laws on which Loney et al. were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others.
Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mala prohibita in contrast with those punished
by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.The charge for violation of RPC does not absorb
the charges for the other laws because mala in se felonies cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes.
People v. Relova not in Point
In the case of People v. Relova, the court held that a person charged with theft of electric
power under the RPC after being acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring violates the right against double jeopardy because the
act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling
within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act. However, such is not the
case here because Loney et al.are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. Although Loney et al. cannot be
ATTY. VILLEGAS
28

for multiple prosecuted for the same offense, they can be charged for offenses arising from the
same incident.
THE ALEXANDRIA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION (TACC) VS. LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA)
G.R. No. 169228 September
11, 2009 Ponente: Carpio
FACTS: Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty), which constructed and developed The
Alexandra Condominium Complex, transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC)
such condominium complex by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance. Subsequently (after 5 years),
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet
government effluent standards, and informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment
Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. Since constructing an STP
would be expensive (P15M), TACC tried to experiment with other methods of cleaning its
wastewater. However, the wastewater still failed to meet government standards. For this violation,
LLDA imposed a P1000 daily fine on TACC until the wastewater discharge complies with the
government standard.
TACC then entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of
the STP for P7.5M. LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay the fine (~P1M) representing the
penalty from until the STP was constructed. TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of
the penalty of P1,000 per day in recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to
comply with government standards. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government
standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty. This was denied by LLDA.
TACC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The CA denied TACCs petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N TACC complied with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. NO.
2. W/N TACC is the one liable to pay the fine. YES.
RATIO:
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first
made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. 11 A premature
invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. 12
In this case, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have
first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. This is because under
Executive order No. 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR "for policy
and program coordination and/or administrative supervision. And although under the same order,
DENR only has administrative power over LLDA, a subsequent EO 192 mandates the DENR to
"promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution" and to "promulgate
ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other
pollutants and radiations."
1 Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and
its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and
from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise,
punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality
control and management.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
29

Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty

LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. Under Section 4-A of RA 4850 1, as amended, LLDA is entitled
to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality
standards.
It is clear that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC,
because PhilRealty turned over the project to TACC five years before LLDA advised TACC that its
wastewater did not meet government effluent standards.
If, as claimed by TACC, the
noncompliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty, TACCs recourse is to file an action,
if warranted, against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to LLDA by
shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing its 4
September 2003 Order.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) VS COURT OF APPEALS (CA)

G.R. Nos. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr.
FACTS: RA 4850, which created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), was partially
amended by Marcos due to the rapid expansion of Metro Manila and its impact on the environment.
This further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of LLDA. Subsequently, the LGC took
effect, where the municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the
authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion which gave rise to sharp increase in unregulated fishpen and fish cages.
Because of this, the LLDA notified the public that all unregistered fishpen or fishcages are
declared illegal and dismantled otherwise demolition will be effected. The affected fishpen owners
filed injunction cases against the LLDA. LLDAs motions to dismiss were denied by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. The CA held that the power to grant fishing permits is now vested with the
LGUs and the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are
concerned had been repealed by the LGC.
ISSUE/S: Which agency of the Government (the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region) should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned. LLDA has jurisdiction.
RATIO: The LGC do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the
lake region. The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal
the charter of the LLDA.
LLDAs charter constitutes a special law while the LGC is a general law. . It is basic in
statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Thus, LLDAs
charter should prevail over the LGC.
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for
revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens,
ATTY. VILLEGAS
30

fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management.
Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over the LGC on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
TANO v. SOCRATES
G.R. No. 110249 August
21, 1997 Ponente:
Davide, Jr.
FACTS: TANO et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
Ordinances2 issued by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa and its Governor
(Socrates). Tano et al contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the
absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away
their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering
2 (1) Ordinance No. 15-92 "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF" (2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any
person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his
possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and
directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from Puerto Princesa and, (3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THECATCHING, GATHERING , POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE
MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS
"into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to
a successful conclusion. Socrates et al. defended the validity of the Ordinances as a valid exercise
of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained
that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Socrates et al. reasoned that public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to
the latter, a substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish with the
intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it
live," i.e., "the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not." Further, the Ordinance
applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
ISSUE: W/N the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional. NO.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
31

RATIO: There is absolutely no showing that any of the Tano et al. qualifies as a subsistence or
marginal fisherman to invoke as defense of violation of Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII. Section 7,
particularly, speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their
protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may
be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. IN
addition, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but
to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision
merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted therein to LGU under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and other
provisions, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. It is clear that both
Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the
species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the
coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities. Furthermore, Ordinances banning the catching of certain
species of fishes and corals need not be approved by the DENR before they can be effective
because in the exercise of devolved power, such approval is not necessary.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters
and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods
of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed
to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall
include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive
fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the
LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters.
HIZON et al. VS CA
G.R. No. 119619 December
13, 1996 Ponente: Puno
FACTS: HIZON et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing without the use of
a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing by "muro
ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The
police (PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed the boat captain to get
random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive
for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against Hizon et al. However, a
second set of fish samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them to
imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together with
the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the
warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson without a search warrant are
admissible in evidence. YES.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
32

2. W/N Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. NO.
RATIO: As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Search and seizure
without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception
ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D.
704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or poisonous
substances. However, this presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to
present evidence to rebut this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result
of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded
and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance.
Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage
itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible
conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with
the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, it was the police who were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition.
"Muro ami", as what was reported the fishermen were doing, is made with "the use of a big net with
sinkers to make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." This
method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing
by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the
fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged
with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.

GR 129546, 13 December
2005 Ponente: ChicoNazario
FACTS: A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by DPWH, DENR and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (MMC) Governor, allowing DENR to utilize Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by
MMC.
However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of San Mateo wrote to MMC, DPWH, the Executive
Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for
Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. SB also asked to suspend all operations with respect to the San
Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters. It was also found out that the land
subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, the report
submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community
Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, revealed that there
was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes. It further
states that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and
environmental factors in that community.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
33

DENR subsequently granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an

Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite. Less than
six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the
DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the site. DENR then sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all
facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Bocaue be dismantled. Despite the various
objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the President,
through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635, Excluding
from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as
Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan
Manila Development
Authority.
Province of Rizal (PROVINCE) filed before the CA a civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA
denied the petition for lack of cause of action. While the appeal was pending, Province filed a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon
would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. As a
result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months
President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite
and directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo
dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a
critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. Claiming the above events constituted a
clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas, the Province filed an Urgent
Petition for Restraining Order. The SC issued the TRO. Meanwhile, RA. 9003, otherwise known as
The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of
December 2000; and
2. W/N the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003.
RATIO: San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Proclamation No. 635 is illegal. The
Court held that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. The San Mateo
site has adversely affected its environs, and sources of water should always be protected. Adverse
effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. MMA was also informed that the heavy
pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the
Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with Laguna Lake Development Authoritys (LLDA)
program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. Investigation Reports regarding the
respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the
site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools
playground were also submitted. Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already, contaminating the
nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. The contaminated water was
also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de
Bay.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered
now. Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the garbage crisis,
Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to adopt urgent and effective measures to
address the nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the health and well-being of the
population, food production, and industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to
address was the protection and conservation of watersheds. Respondents actions in the face of
such grave environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of
providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
34

The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the countrys
natural resources. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the
DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other
natural treasures. Although the DENR owns the Marikina Reserve, it is but is defined by the
declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the
DENR, makes particular reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. With
great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have
vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored
their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
The Local Government Code gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the
general welfare of their inhabitants. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was
passed also violates R.A. No 7160, or the Local Government Code. Proclamation No. 635, which
was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which
was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is
the policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.
Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was
enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and
ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and
environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable
resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence to a
Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer,
processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling
and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid waste
management projects.
The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework,
which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phase out and the
eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps
and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any
landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section
40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local
government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not
detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or
watershed areas.
CITY OF BAGUIO VS MASWENG
G.R. No. 180206
February 4, 2009 Ponente:
Tinga
FACTS: The Baguio City Mayor ordered demolition of illegal structures located in Busol Watershed
Reservation. Gumangan et al., opposed the demolition, claiming that the lands where their
residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing
openly and continuously since time immemorial. They further claim that their ownership over the
lands has been expressly recognized Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended
ATTY. VILLEGAS
35

by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage
of the Busol Forest Reserve. Masweng, Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP issued TROs to
refrain from enforcing the Demolition, and subsequently the NCIP granted a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The Mayor contends that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for
injunction as it was not a case pending before such Commission. Another contention is that the
IPRA that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim
their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA. Lastly, the Mayor claims that the
Busol Forest Reservation had already been declared by jurisprudence as inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property.
The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP and affirmed the TROs.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the NCIP has the jurisdiction over the matter. YES.
2. W/N Baguio City is exempt from IPRA. NO.
3. W/N Gumangan et al.s ancestral land claim is recognized by by Proclamation No. 15, in
which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. NO.
RATIO:
The NCIP has jurisdiction
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to
resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members
of ICCs/IPs. Private respondents, as members of the Ibaloi tribe, were asserting ownership over
portions of Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. The petition for
injunction sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor.
These thus qualifies the action as as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains
of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction.
Baguio City is not exempt from IPRA.
Although IPRA states that is governed by its own charter, its exemption from the IPRA,
however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights
recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the citys
charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.
Proclamation 15 does not recognize the ancestral land claim
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of
said right. Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol
Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation
No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. The fact remains,
too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable by jurisprudence.
The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into
private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate
forest lands. Although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
36

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL

G.R. No. 183591
October 14, 2008 Ponente:
Carpio Morales
FACTS: The Philippines and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not push through because
upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of
the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several
prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the
same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations,
protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of
the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel filed a
petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation
thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional insofar as by
creating and recognizing the Bangsamoro Juridicial Entity as a separate state or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision, it would conflict with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution,
among others.
ISSUE: W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional? NO, IT IS NOT BECAUSE ITS ADOPTION WOULD
ENTAIL THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 10, SECTION 20 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AMONG
OTHERS. THE BJE IS NOT JUST AN AUTONOMOUS REGION, IT IS ALMOST LIKE A STATE.
RATIO: The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would
be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the
MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Firstly, what is an association? [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a
state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association , specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the
BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. BJE was also granted
the right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
ATTY. VILLEGAS
37

environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. These provisions of the MOA indicate,
among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state . The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already
requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following
provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines .
These amendments would be necessary because the BJE is a far more powerful entity
than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over: x x x
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOAAD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere
passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would
not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must,
itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass
ATTY. VILLEGAS
38

legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the
strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and
trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and
understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power.
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK ET AL., VS. JUDGE LANZANAS ET AL.

G.R. No. 131442
July
10, 2003 Ponente: Carpio
FACTS: DENR Regional Executive Director Principe issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC) in favor of Napocor, authorizing the corporation to construct a temporary mooring facility in
the
Minolo Cave in Puerto Galera. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared the Minolo
Cave which was a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry a eco-tourist zone. The
mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of Napocor's power barge. The Bangus
Fry Fisherfolk, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, Puerto Galera, sought reconsideration of the
ECC issuance, which was denied by the DENR. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk then filed a complaint
with the RTC of Manila for the cancellation of the ECC, for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
stop the construction of the mooring facility, and further prayed for the demolition of mooring
structures that has already been built. By this time, the provincial government of Mindoro
manifested that it was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.
The Provincial Government of Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint for the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action, and that Manila
RTC had no jurisdiction as the mooring facility is outside its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies since there was no appeal
before the DENR Secretary prior to filing the case with the trial court. The Bangus Fry Fisherfolk
contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance
of the ECC was a patent violation of existing laws and regulations, one of which was Sections 26
and 27 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N RTC erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
NO.
2. Whether the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera was required to approve the
construction of a mooring facility NO, Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects
which are not environmentally critical
RATIO:
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
The Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC because the
office of the Regional Director Principe is in Manila, within its territorial jurisdiction. However, the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to
be committed within their judicial region. Therefore, it could not issue an injunctive writ against the
DENR or NAPOCOR.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
39

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the DENR Procedural Manual, a final decision of a regional Director may be appealed to the
Office of the Secretary of DENR. The failure of this method of appeal deprived the DENR Secretary
to review the decision of his subordinate. This omission renders the complaint dismissible for lack
of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, this does not apply in the present case. Congress introduced Sections 26
and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of
a sound ecology and clean environment. These provisions require every national government
agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local
government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, the mooring
facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of
projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to
approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power
barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation of the
power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this
Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus,
the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
ATTY. VILLEGAS
40

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